diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 68 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 6 |
5 files changed, 49 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c index 9519fec09ee6..c5c2f778c669 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/irq.c @@ -488,8 +488,10 @@ int kvm_arch_irq_bypass_add_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons, if (irqfd->irq_entry.type == KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI) { ret = kvm_pi_update_irte(irqfd, &irqfd->irq_entry); - if (ret) + if (ret) { kvm->arch.nr_possible_bypass_irqs--; + irqfd->producer = NULL; + } } spin_unlock_irq(&kvm->irqfds.lock); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index 92a1e69c5962..d806abaeda3d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -3371,6 +3371,12 @@ static void apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_lapic *apic) { int vector; + + if (unlikely(!pv_eoi_enabled(vcpu))) { + __clear_bit(KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention); + return; + } + /* * PV EOI state is derived from KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING in host * and KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED in guest memory as follows: @@ -3382,8 +3388,6 @@ static void apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, * KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING is set, KVM_PV_EOI_ENABLED is unset: * -> host enabled PV EOI, guest executed EOI. */ - BUG_ON(!pv_eoi_enabled(vcpu)); - if (pv_eoi_test_and_clr_pending(vcpu)) return; vector = apic_set_eoi(apic); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index d90f5a41e340..996f398a577f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -2142,8 +2142,9 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) if (ret) return ret; + /* Do not allow SNP VM migration until additional state transfer is implemented */ if (kvm->arch.vm_type != source_kvm->arch.vm_type || - sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm)) { + sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm) || sev_snp_guest(source_kvm)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } @@ -2865,8 +2866,9 @@ int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd) * disallow out-of-band SEV/SEV-ES init if the target is already an * SEV guest, or if vCPUs have been created. KVM relies on vCPUs being * created after SEV/SEV-ES initialization, e.g. to init intercepts. + * Also do not allow SNP VM mirroring until additional state transfer is implemented. */ - if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm) || + if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm) || sev_snp_guest(source_kvm) || is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || kvm->created_vcpus) { ret = -EINVAL; goto e_unlock; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 3fe88f29be7a..52ab52b0e1cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -553,6 +553,9 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_msr_bitmap_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int nested_vmx_check_tpr_shadow_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) { + gpa_t vtpr_gpa = vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr + APIC_TASKPRI; + u32 vtpr; + if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) return 0; @@ -562,6 +565,32 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_tpr_shadow_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (CC(!nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) && vmcs12->tpr_threshold >> 4)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Do the illegal vTPR vs. TPR Threshold consistency check if and only + * if KVM is configured to WARN on missed consistency checks, otherwise + * it's a waste of time. KVM needs to rely on hardware to fully detect + * an illegal combination due to the vTPR being writable by L1 at all + * times (it's an in-memory value, not a VMCS field). I.e. even if the + * check passes now, it might fail at the actual VM-Enter. + * + * If reading guest memory fails, skip the check as KVM's de facto ABI + * for VMX instruction accesses to non-existent memory is to provide + * PCI Bus Error semantics (reads return 0xFFs), in which case the vTPR + * is guaranteed to greater than or equal to the threshold. + * + * Note! Deliberately use the VM-scoped API when reading guest memory, + * to ensure the read doesn't hit SMRAM when restoring L2 state on RSM, + * and only perform the check when in KVM_RUN, to avoid a false failure + * if userspace hasn't yet configured memslots during state restore. + */ + if (warn_on_missed_cc && vcpu->wants_to_run && + nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) && + !nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) && + !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) && + !kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, vtpr_gpa, &vtpr, sizeof(vtpr)) && + CC((vmcs12->tpr_threshold & GENMASK(3, 0)) > ((vtpr >> 4) & GENMASK(3, 0)))) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } @@ -3085,38 +3114,6 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return 0; } -static int nested_vmx_check_controls_late(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, - struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) -{ - void *vapic = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva; - u32 vtpr = vapic ? (*(u32 *)(vapic + APIC_TASKPRI)) >> 4 : 0; - - /* - * Don't bother with the consistency checks if KVM isn't configured to - * WARN on missed consistency checks, as KVM needs to rely on hardware - * to fully detect an illegal vTPR vs. TRP Threshold combination due to - * the vTPR being writable by L1 at all times (it's an in-memory value, - * not a VMCS field). I.e. even if the check passes now, it might fail - * at the actual VM-Enter. - * - * Keying off the module param also allows treating an invalid vAPIC - * mapping as a consistency check failure without increasing the risk - * of breaking a "real" VM. - */ - if (!warn_on_missed_cc) - return 0; - - if ((exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) && - nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) && - !nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) && - !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) && - (CC(!vapic) || - CC((vmcs12->tpr_threshold & GENMASK(3, 0)) > (vtpr & GENMASK(3, 0))))) - return -EINVAL; - - return 0; -} - static int nested_vmx_check_address_space_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) { @@ -3666,11 +3663,6 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if (nested_vmx_check_controls_late(vcpu, vmcs12)) { - vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01); - return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMFAIL; - } - if (nested_vmx_check_guest_state(vcpu, vmcs12, &entry_failure_code)) { exit_reason.basic = EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE; @@ -3755,6 +3747,8 @@ vmentry_fail_vmexit: if (!from_vmentry) return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMEXIT; + nested_put_vmcs12_pages(vcpu); + load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12); vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason.full; if (enable_shadow_vmcs || nested_vmx_is_evmptr12_valid(vmx)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c index ec29a2db1adc..556bf9fe1f5d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c @@ -2725,7 +2725,11 @@ static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd) goto out; } - if (init_vm->cpuid.padding) { + /* + * Reject the request if userspace changes cpuid.nent between the + * initial read and the subsequent copy. + */ + if (init_vm->cpuid.padding || init_vm->cpuid.nent != nr_user_entries) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } |