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Avoid multiple lookups of the bpffs creator SID using the token's file
descriptor when the same information can be found via the resolved
path/dentry (in selinux_bpf_token_create()) or the token itself (in
selinux_bpf_map_create() and selinux_bpf_prog_load()). Not only does
this simplify the code, it avoids potential TOCTOU issues if the user
changes the token file descriptor passed into the kernel.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5473a722f782 ("selinux: add support for BPF token access control")
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Convert a __get_free_page() call into a kmalloc() call
We had some very old code that called out to __get_free_page() for
allocating a pathname. There is no reason this couldn't be done with
a call to kmalloc() so we've done the conversion and now there is one
less __get_free_page() caller in the kernel.
- Limit the number of retired/unknown DCCP netlink messages
While DCCP is gone from the kernel, there are still userspace tools
which try to talk to the kernel about DCCP sockets which were
generating SELinux related log noise (unrecognized netlink message).
This pull request both limits the log messages to just the first
instance and also explains to the user that DCCP support has been
removed.
- Convert the SELinux strlcat() calls to seq_buf_XXX() calls
As part of the effort to drop the strlcat() API from the kernel, the
SELinux/IMA code was converted over to using seq_buf_XXX() calls.
- Only calculate the SELinux IMA configuration string length once
Previously each call to generate a SELinux configuration string for
IMA would have to calculate the length of the string. While the
contents of the string will likely change over the lifetime of the
system, the length of the string will not. Calculate the string
length once at boot and reuse the length value throughout the
lifetime of the system.
- Further validation of the SELinux policy at policy load time
Perform additional sanity checks on the policy constraints and types.
- Proper cleanup and error handling for selinuxfs init failures
We were not properly cleaning up some state in the case where
selinuxfs fails to initialize properly. It's somewhat of an academic
exercise as a failure to initialize selinuxfs will cause the system
to fail on boot, but it's arguably better to make sure we do things
the proper way.
- Various code cleanups
Convert integer flags to boolean types and drop an uncessary goto
from the SELinux code.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: validate constraint expression attr and op at load time
selinux: compute the IMA configuration settings string length once at boot
selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state()
selinux: suppress warning flood for retired DCCP netlink messages
selinux: tighten type validation during policy load
selinux: drop unnecessary goto and label from avc_alloc_node()
selinux: convert int flags to bool flags in ss/services.c
selinux: clean up selinuxfs resources on init failure
selinux: hooks: use kmalloc() to allocate path buffer
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As reported by Jiri Vozar, commit 7edea6e8c8e8 ("selinux: beef up
isvalid checks") introduces a new loop in mls_level_isvalid() that
causes ~89-94% throughput regression in System V IPC message queue
operations (msgsnd/msgrcv).
Move the expensive part of the ebitmap checking to policy load time
instead as the reporter suggested.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAMgFczCi2Z011dNf84Amc0Q-qnTt0+VUjWY+Y7zPyXdaH35Jvw@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 7edea6e8c8e8 ("selinux: beef up isvalid checks")
Reported-by: Jiri Vozar <jvozar@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Jiri Vozar <jvozar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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p_bools.nprim comes from the policy image independently of how many
booleans follow it, and cond_index_bool() fills bool_val_to_struct[] at
value - 1, so a count larger than the values present leaves NULL entries.
Every user of that array then walks it by index and dereferences each
entry: cond_evaluate_expr() on the access-vector path,
security_get_bools() and security_get_bool_value() behind selinuxfs, and
security_set_bools(). A sparse class value is absorbed by
policydb_class_isvalid() and its siblings; booleans have no such
predicate, and no consumer that could use one.
Reject a boolean value that no boolean defines, once, where the array is
built. Conforming policies define every boolean they declare and are
unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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security_get_classes() sizes an array by p_classes.nprim and fills it at
value - 1, so a class value the policy never defines leaves a NULL.
sel_make_classes() passes every entry to sel_make_dir(), reaching the same
d_alloc_name() dereference as the permission array. The class symbol table
is allowed to be sparse (policydb_class_isvalid() exists to absorb that),
but this getter builds its own array straight from the hash table and has
no such predicate.
Fail the lookup when a value went unclaimed instead of handing out the
NULL. Conforming policies define every class they declare and are
unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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security_get_permissions() sizes an array by the class's permissions.nprim
and fills it at value - 1, from the inherited common's permission table and
then the class's own. A value no permission defines leaves a NULL that
sel_make_perm_files() passes to d_alloc_name(), an oops inside
sel_write_load() that strands selinux_state.policy_mutex and leaves every
later load in uninterruptible sleep; two permissions sharing a value
overwrite the first kstrdup(). Bounding each value by nprim catches
neither, and neither would a count: the symbol table is keyed on the
permission name, so duplicates pass.
Track the values each permission table claims and require them to cover
exactly what its count declares, rejecting a count no value can reach.
Conforming policies are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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sel_write_load() calls selinux_policy_cancel() when sel_make_policy_nodes()
fails, and that helper dereferences the outgoing policy to cancel its
sidtab conversion. On the first policy load there is no outgoing policy:
security_load_policy() returns early for that case, before it converts
anything, and state->policy is still NULL. A first load that fails while
building the selinuxfs tree therefore takes a NULL dereference in
selinux_policy_cancel(), reached from a write(2) to /sys/fs/selinux/load.
Skip the cancel when there is no old policy, mirroring the check
security_load_policy() already makes before it converts.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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selinux_inode_init_security() marks the isec as initialized before
checking if mount labeling is supported (SBLABEL_MNT). This was fine
until commit 9722955b5430 ("bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs"),
where genfscon bpffs mounts fail the SBLABEL_MNT check as expected (no
xattrs) and yet leave the isec->initialized. This breaks subsequent
calls to inode_doinit_with_dentry().
Do the SBLABEL_MNT check before the inode security is initialized.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/akWdcp6P0FkNDzBk@google.com/
Fixes: 9722955b5430 ("bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs")
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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security_get_permissions() maps an inherited common's permissions into
an array sized by the class's own permissions.nprim, but class_read()
takes that nprim verbatim from the policy image and never checks that it
covers the common. A class that inherits a common of N permissions while
declaring a smaller nprim is accepted, and on load the common's
permissions are written past the class-sized array -- an out-of-bounds
heap write.
Reject a class whose permission count is below its inherited common's.
Well-formed policies, where the class count already includes the
inherited permissions, are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: tweak comment for line length]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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read_cons_helper() validates the expression type and stack depth
of each constraint node but leaves e->attr and e->op unchecked,
so a policy with an invalid operator or attribute value is
accepted at load and only detected when the constraint is evaluated.
constraint_expr_eval() handles such unrecognized cases with BUG()
so the first permission check that reaches such a node oopses in
the context of the checking process or panics with panic_on_oops.
Reject these expresssions when the policy is loaded, matching what
the libsepol validator already does.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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selinux_ima_collect_state() builds a string of the current SELinux
configuration settings. The string lists each setting as a name and
one digit. The length of the string therefore never changes, but is
still recomputed on every call.
Add selinux_ima_config_len_init() to compute the length once during
selinux_init(). Update selinux_ima_collect_state() to use the stored
length.
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df755e0282dab3b932d19aceab71b7d7@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The commit fixing the overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
failed to skip the execmem check in __file_map_prot_check() for the case
where the "mounter check" is being performed. This check should be
performed only against the credentials of the task that is calling
mmap()/mprotect(), since it doesn't pertain to the file itself, but
rather just gates the ability of the calling task to get an executable
memory mapping in general.
The purpose of the "mounter check" is to guard against using an
overlayfs mount to gain file access that would otherwise be denied to
the mounter. For execmem this is not relevant, as there is no further
file access granted based on it (notice that the file's context is not
used as the target in the check), so checking it also against the
mounter credentials would be incorrect.
Fix this by passing a boolean to [__]file_map_prot_check() and
selinux_mmap_file_common() that indicates if we are doing the "mounter
check" and skiping the execmem check in that case. Since this boolean
also indicates if we use current_cred() or the mounter cred as the
subject, also remove the "cred" argument from these functions and
determine it based on the boolean and the file struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the
strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct
seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally.
Each field is written with seq_buf_printf() using a "=%d;" format, which
removes the open-coded "=1;"/"=0;" constants. The seven per-append
WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks are replaced by a single
seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/370 [1]
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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When deploying linux-6.18.y stable kernel to production servers, we
observed kernel dmesg being flooded with SELinux warnings when running
`ss -l`:
SELinux: unrecognized netlink message: protocol=4 nlmsg_type=19 \
sclass=netlink_tcpdiag_socket pid=188945 comm=ss
The root cause is that DCCP support was retired in
commit 2a63dd0edf38 ("net: Retire DCCP socket."). Consequently,
DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK was removed from nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms. This causes
nlmsg_perm() to return -EINVAL, triggering the SELinux warning for every
`ss -l` invocation [0].
Use pr_warn_once() for the retired DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK to prevent message
flooding.
Link: https://github.com/iproute2/iproute2/blob/main/misc/ss.c#L3901 [0]
Fixes: 2a63dd0edf38 ("net: Retire DCCP socket.")
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Tighten type validation during policy load to improve robustness in
the face of ill-formed policies.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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selinux_sctp_bind_connect() dereferences sk->sk_socket to pass a
struct socket * to selinux_socket_bind() and
selinux_socket_connect_helper(). However, when the hook is invoked
from the ASCONF softirq path (sctp_process_asconf), there is no file
reference guaranteeing that sk->sk_socket is non-NULL. The setsockopt
callers (bindx, connectx, set_primary, sendmsg connect) hold a file
reference and are not affected.
Both selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper()
immediately resolve sock->sk, never using the struct socket * for
anything else. Refactor the inner logic into helpers that take a
struct sock * directly so that selinux_sctp_bind_connect() never needs
to touch sk->sk_socket at all.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Since avc_alloc_node() doesn't need to perform any cleanup on
its exit paths, there is no benefit to keeping the out
label and goto statement. Drop it.
Signed-off-by: Kalevi Kolttonen <kalevi@kolttonen.fi>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Update security_sid_to_context_core(), security_context_to_sid_core(),
and their callers to pass boolean flags via bool rather than int.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Kalevi Kolttonen <kalevi@kolttonen.fi>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: minor subject and description tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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init_sel_fs() creates the selinuxfs mount point and registers the
filesystem before mounting selinuxfs internally. If kern_mount()
or the subsequent lookup of the null file fails, the function
returns without undoing the resources that were already registered.
Add the missing error unwinding so the internal mount, filesystem
registration, and sysfs mount point are released as appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024@163.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Similar to Landlock, SELinux was not updated when TCP Fast Open
support was introduced to ensure connect-related permissions are
checked when using TCP Fast Open. Update its socket_sendmsg() hook to
call selinux_socket_connect() when MSG_FASTOPEN is passed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260616201615.275032-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260617180526.15627-2-matthieu@buffet.re/
Reported-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Reported-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>
Reported-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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selinux_genfs_get_sid() allocates memory for a path with __get_free_page().
Such usage does not require a "page" and the size of the buffer should
actually be PATH_MAX which may be less than PAGE_SIZE on some
architectures.
Replace __get_free_page() for allocation of a path buffer with kmalloc()
and make it explicit that the buffer size is PATH_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A number of SELinux patches, almost all of which are either minor
fixes or hardening patches:
- Additional verifications when loading new SELinux policy
Multiple patches by Christian Göttsche to add additional
validations to the code responsible for loading and parsing SELinux
policy as it is loaded into the kernel.
- Avoid nontransitive comparisons comparisons in our sorting code
Done to prevent unexpected sorting results due to overflow. Qualys
documented a similar issue with glibc
https://www.qualys.com/2024/01/30/qsort.txt
- Consistently use u16 for SELinux security classes
- Move from page allocations to kmalloc() based allocations
Unfortunately one of these patches had to be reverted, but you
should see a fixed version during the next merge window.
- Move from kmalloc_objs() to kzalloc_objs() in the policy load code
- Reorder sel_kill_sb() slightly to match other pseudo filesystems
- Simplify things with QSTR() instead of QSTR_INIT()
- Minor comment typo fixes"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260615' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: revert use of __getname() in selinux_genfs_get_sid()
selinux: comment spelling fix in ibpkey.c
selinux: comment typo fix in selinuxfs.c
selinux: hooks: use __getname() to allocate path buffer
selinux: use k[mz]alloc() to allocate temporary buffers
selinux: check for simple types
selinux: more strict bounds check
selinux: beef up isvalid checks
selinux: reorder policydb_index()
selinux: check type attr map overflows
selinux: check length fields in policies
selinux: more strict policy parsing
selinux: use u16 for security classes
selinux: avoid nontransitive comparison
selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()
selinux: fix sel_kill_sb()
selinux: use QSTR() instead of QSTR_INIT() in init_sel_fs
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm update from Paul Moore:
"A single LSM update the security_inode_listsecurity() hook to be able
to leverage the xattr_list_one() helper function.
We wanted to do this for a while, but we needed to fixup the callers
in the NFS code first. With the NFS code changes shipping in Linux
v7.0 and no one complaining, it seemed a good time to complete the
shift"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20260615' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
security,fs,nfs,net: update security_inode_listsecurity() interface
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2026-06-12
1) Replace the open-coded manual cleanup in xfrm_add_policy() error
path with xfrm_policy_destroy() for consistency with
xfrm_policy_construct().
From Deepanshu Kartikey.
2) Limit XFRMA_TFCPAD to a sensible maximum (max IP length, 64k) since
u32 is excessive for traffic flow confidentiality padding.
From David Ahern.
3) Add a new netlink message XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE that
allows migrating individual IPsec SAs independently of
their policies. The existing XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE is tightly coupled
to policy+SA migration, lacks SPI for unique SA identification,
and cannot express reqid changes or migrate Transport mode
selectors. The new interface identifies the SA via SPI and mark,
supports reqid changes, address family changes, encap removal,
and uses an atomic create+install flow under x->lock to prevent
SN/IV reuse during AEAD SA migration.
From Antony Antony.
* tag 'ipsec-next-2026-06-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next:
xfrm: add documentation for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE
xfrm: restrict netlink attributes for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE
xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration
xfrm: make xfrm_dev_state_add xuo parameter const
xfrm: extract address family and selector validation helpers
xfrm: refactor XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH validation into a helper
xfrm: move encap and xuo into struct xfrm_migrate
xfrm: add error messages to state migration
xfrm: add state synchronization after migration
xfrm: check family before comparing addresses in migrate
xfrm: split xfrm_state_migrate into create and install functions
xfrm: rename reqid in xfrm_migrate
xfrm: fix NAT-related field inheritance in SA migration
xfrm: allow migration from UDP encapsulated to non-encapsulated ESP
xfrm: add extack to xfrm_init_state
xfrm: remove redundant assignments
xfrm: Reject excessive values for XFRMA_TFCPAD
xfrm: cleanup error path in xfrm_add_policy()
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612074725.1760473-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Add a new netlink method to migrate a single xfrm_state.
Unlike the existing migration mechanism (SA + policy), this
supports migrating only the SA and allows changing the reqid.
The SA is looked up via xfrm_usersa_id, which uniquely
identifies it, so old_saddr is not needed. old_daddr is carried in
xfrm_usersa_id.daddr.
The reqid is invariant in the old migration.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Revert commit 54067bacb49c ("selinux: hooks: use __getname() to allocate
path buffer") as it improperly assumed that PATH_MAX == PAGE_SIZE
everywhere. Moving away from __get_free_page() is still a good thing and
will be revisited in the future.
Cc: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Signed-off-by: Kalevi Kolttonen <kalevi@kolttonen.fi>
[PM: updated subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Signed-off-by: Kalevi Kolttonen <kalevi@kolttonen.fi>
[PM: updated subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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selinux_genfs_get_sid() allocates memory for a path with __get_free_page()
although there is a dedicated helper for allocation of file paths:
__getname().
Replace __get_free_page() for allocation of a path buffer with __getname().
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Several functions in selinuxfs.c allocate temporary buffers using
__get_free_page() or get_zeroed_page().
These buffers are used either to store a string generated by snprintf() (in
sel_make_bools()) or to copy data from user (sel_read_avc_hash_stats() and
sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats()).
Such usage does not require struct page access and it is better to allocate
these buffers with kzalloc()/kmalloc() that provide better scalability and
more debugging possibilities.
Replace use of get_zeroed_page() with kzalloc() and usage of
__get_free_page() with kmalloc().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/635405e4-9423-4a25-a6e7-e03c8ea0bcbe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Validate that the target of AVTAB_TYPE rules and file transitions are
simple types and not attributes.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, dropped parts due to dependencies]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Validate the types used in bounds checks.
Replace the usage of BUG(), to avoid halting the system on malformed
polices.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, fixed typo identified by Smalley]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Check that an ID does not refer to a gap in the global array of
definitions.
Constify parameters of isvalid() function and change return type to
bool.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fixes, dropped boolean checks due to missing dependency]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Index as soon as possible to enable isvalid() checks to fail on gaps.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Validate that no types with an invalid too high ID are present in the
attribute map. Gaps are still not checked.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: changed name to ebitmap_get_highest_set_bit()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In multiple places the binary policy announces how many items of some
kind are to be expected next. Before reading them the kernel already
allocates enough memory for that announced size. Validate that the
remaining input size can actually fit the announced items, to avoid OOM
issues on malformed binary policies.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: manual merge fuzz fixups, style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.
Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Security class identifiers are limited to 2^16, thus use the appropriate
type u16 consistently.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Avoid using nontransitive comparison to prevent unexpected sorting
results due to (well-defined) overflows.
See https://www.qualys.com/2024/01/30/qsort.txt for a related issue in
glibc's qsort(3).
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: use the cmp_int() macro from sort.h]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently sel_write_load() takes the policy mutex earlier than
necessary. Move the taking of the mutex later. This avoids
holding it unnecessarily across the vmalloc() and copy_from_user()
of the policy data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently there can only be a single open of /sys/fs/selinux/policy at
any time. This allows any process to block any other process from
reading the kernel policy. The original motivation seems to have been
a mix of preventing an inconsistent view of the policy size and
preventing userspace from allocating kernel memory without bound, but
this is arguably equally bad. Eliminate the policy_opened flag and
shrink the critical section that the policy mutex is held. While we
are making changes here, drop a couple of extraneous BUG_ONs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20100726193414.19538.64028.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Remove the previously deprecated /sys/fs/selinux/user interface aside
from a residual stub for userspace compatibility.
Commit d7b6918e22c7 ("selinux: Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/user") started
the deprecation process for /sys/fs/selinux/user:
The selinuxfs "user" node allows userspace to request a list
of security contexts that can be reached for a given SELinux
user from a given starting context. This was used by libselinux
when various login-style programs requested contexts for
users, but libselinux stopped using it in 2020.
Kernel support will be removed no sooner than Dec 2025.
A pr_warn() message has been in place since Linux v6.13, and a 5
second sleep was introduced since Linux v6.17 to help make it more
noticeable.
We are now past the stated deadline of Dec 2025, so remove the
underlying functionality and replace it with a stub that returns a
'0\0' buffer to avoid breaking userspace. This also avoids a local DoS
from logspam and an uninterruptible sleep delay.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Commit f22f9aaf6c3d ("selinux: remove the runtime disable
functionality") removed the underlying SELinux runtime disable
functionality but left everything else intact and started logging an
error message to warn any residual users.
Prune it to just log an error message once and to return count
(i.e. all bytes written successfully) to avoid breaking
userspace. This also fixes a local DoS from logspam.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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commit a7e4676e8e2cb ("selinux: remove the 'checkreqprot'
functionality") removed the ability to modify the checkreqprot setting
but left everything except the updating of the checkreqprot value
intact. Aside from unnecessary processing, this could produce a local
DoS from log spam and incorrectly calls selinux_ima_measure_state() on
each write even though no state has changed. Prune it to just log an
error message once and return count (i.e. all bytes written
successfully) so that userspace never breaks.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Update the security_inode_listsecurity() interface to allow
use of the xattr_list_one() helper and update the hook
implementations.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20250424152822.2719-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: forward porting to bring this patch up to v7.1-rc1+]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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These were the only two allocations in the policy loading logic
that were not already using kzalloc_objs() for the policy
data structures. Fix these to be consistent with the rest and
to protect against ill-formed policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Fix the order in sel_kill_sb() to match other pseudo filesystems.
This does not currently matter for selinuxfs per se but could
in the future, e.g. with SELinux namespaces and multiple selinuxfs
instances.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The per-task avdcache was incorrectly saving and reusing the
audited vector computed by avc_audit_required() rather than
recomputing based on the currently requested permissions and
distinguishing the denied versus allowed cases. As a result,
some permission checks were not being audited, e.g.
directory write checks after a previously cached directory
search check.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dde3a5d0f4dce ("selinux: move avdcache to per-task security struct")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: line wrap tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently
dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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