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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- "ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm" (Bryam
Vargas)
Validate and bound all input lengths and count fields in the o2dlm
migration and recovery receive handlers to prevent memory corruption
and kernel panics from malformed cluster messages
- "ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds" (Cen Zhang)
Validate OCFS2 extended attribute entry name and value bounds during
metadata reads to prevent out-of-range memory accesses during
retrieval or listing operations.
- "taskstats: fix cgroupstats invalid fd handling and add selftests"
(Yiyang Chen)
Return -EBADF when cgroupstats receives an invalid file descriptor to
prevent caller hangs and misleading success ACKs. Add a kselftest to
validate valid cgroup v1 queries and verify proper error handling
across different Netlink flag combinations.
- "misc lib/raid/ improvements v2" (Christoph Hellwig)
Improve benchmark-based algorithm selection for the XOR and RAID6
libraries, add KUnit benchmark tests, and cleanup minor
implementation details.
- "ocfs2: cluster: o2hb_region_pin() fixes" (Joseph Qi)
Fix sleeping-in-atomic, lock order inversion and error-path cleanup
bugs in o2hb_region_pin() by releasing o2hb_live_lock across sleeping
configfs_depend_item() calls and using unlocked variants from
callback context. Ensure failed pin attempts properly decrement user
counts and unpin partially initialized heartbeat regions to prevent
memory leaks and unprotected states.
- "lib/ucs2_string.c: fix out-of-bounds read in ucs2_strnlen()"
(Vincent Mailhol)
Fix an off-by-one which could cause an out-of-bounds read.
- "ocfs2: harden heartbeat teardown races" (Cen Zhang)
Fix two OCFS2 heartbeat/o2net teardown races found by KASAN.
- "taskstats: tidy up the cpumask command path" *Bradley Morgan)
make two small cleanups in kernel/taskstats.c.
- "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read" (ZhengYuan
Huang)
Validate active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from OCFS2
dinodes at the metadata boundary to prevent corrupted slot indices
from causing out-of-bounds array accesses.
- "ocfs2: bound-check both readdir re-validation scans" (Zhan Xusheng)
Enforce strict boundary checks on directory entry record lengths and
offset calculations during OCFS2 directory re-scans to prevent
out-of-bounds memory reads and directory position corruption.
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-08-22-16-57' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (95 commits)
mailmap: fix bouncing address for Taniya Das
ocfs2: bound-check dir entries in the inline-data re-validation scan
ocfs2: bound-check dir entries in the readdir re-validation scan
squashfs: avoid thundering-herd cache wakeups
prctl: fix PR_SET_MM_AUXV losing the forced AT_NULL terminator
mailmap: update email address for Linfeng Sun
lib/interval_tree: fix allocation warning messages
checkpatch: add NOKPROBE_SYMBOL to the whitelist of lines that can occur immediately after functions
Squashfs: check block offset is not negative
signal: factor out the kernel reserved si_code check
ocfs2: fix readdir position truncation on 32-bit kernels
ocfs2: fix cached cluster count after suballocator reclaim
ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_init_acl()
ocfs2: validate DIO orphan slot during inode read
ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read
selftests/prctl: fix non-anonymous VMA mapping in set-anon-vma-name test
MAINTAINERS: add IRC and patchwork for LTP
include/linux/list.h: mark list_add and __list_add as __always_inline
tools/mm: prevent page_owner_sort from truncating input
hung_task: update DETECT_HUNG_TASK_BLOCKER Kconfig help
...
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ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() re-scans the inline data area the same way
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() re-scans a directory block, and is missing the
same two bounds:
for (i = 0; i < i_size_read(inode) && i < offset; ) {
de = (struct ocfs2_dir_entry *)(data->id_data + i);
if (le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len) < OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1))
break;
i += le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len);
}
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() keeps i_size inside the inline area:
if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di))
if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count))
and that area runs to the end of the inode block, so for a full inline
directory data->id_data + i_size is the end of di_bh->b_data. A bogus
rec_len leaves i in the last OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1) - 1 bytes of it, and
de->rec_len, at byte offset 8 within the entry, is then read past the
block.
The emit loop below hands i_size_read(inode) to ocfs2_check_dir_entry(),
which refuses both an entry that close to the end and one whose rec_len
runs past it. Apply the same two bounds to the re-validation scan,
reading i_size once into a local as ocfs2_check_dir_entry() takes it as
@size.
Unlike the extent case there is no mask to corrupt here: an unbounded i
only sets ctx->pos past i_size, which ends the readdir early rather than
moving it to the wrong place.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260811024337.3972976-3-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com
Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "ocfs2: bound-check both readdir re-validation scans", v2.
This patch (of 2):
When the inode version changed since the last readdir(),
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() re-scans the directory block from its start to
relocate the current position:
for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) {
de = (struct ocfs2_dir_entry *)(bh->b_data + i);
if (le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len) < OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1))
break;
i += le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len);
}
i walks the block on rec_len values taken from the block itself and the
only thing tested is that rec_len is not too small, so a single bogus
rec_len leaves i anywhere in the block, including its last
OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1) - 1 bytes. @offset comes from ctx->pos, which
userspace moves with lseek() on the directory fd, and decides how far the
walk gets.
Two bounds are missing, both of which ocfs2_check_dir_entry() applies for
the emit loop below.
de->rec_len sits at byte offset 8 within the entry, so dereferencing de in
that tail reads past the s_blocksize buffer. ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
declines to look at an entry that close to the end:
size - buf_offset < OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1)
Nothing bounds i += rec_len either, so i can end up past the block. The
emit loop that follows is guarded by offset < sb->s_blocksize and does not
run, but
offset = i;
ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;
runs first and ORs a value with bits above the block mask into ctx->pos,
corrupting the block number readdir() resumes from.
ocfs2_check_dir_entry() rejects that as "directory entry overrun":
next_offset = buf_offset + rlen;
... next_offset > size
Apply both bounds. For a consistent directory this changes nothing:
entries are at least OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1) bytes and do not cross the end
of the block, so no valid entry is skipped.
Found by the sashiko review tool; fix approach suggested by Joseph Qi.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260811024337.3972976-1-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260806022044.167962-1-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260811024337.3972976-2-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com
Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
Suggested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs superblock updates from Christian Brauner:
- Make it possible to share a block device between multiple
filesystems.
erofs can mount read-only blob devices shared between many
superblocks, but because we only tracked a single superblock a
freeze, thaw, removal or sync on such a device was never propagated
to all the superblocks using it, and there was no way to find them.
Add an efficient table to lookup all superblocks using a given block
device.
- A bunch of pre-existing fixes fell out of this work:
A block-device freeze racing a btrfs device change could leave the
whole filesystem stuck frozen. A bdev_freeze() issued by "dmsetup
suspend" or an LVM snapshot resolves that holder to freeze the
filesystem. and bdev_thaw() resolves it again to thaw. A freeze
landing while btrfs is adding, removing or replacing a device freezes
the filesystem. The membership change then drops that link. So the
matching thaw could no longer find the superblock.
Forbid freezing a device for the duration of a membership change,
modelled on deny_write_access()/allow_write_access().
* tag 'vfs-7.3-rc1.super' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (24 commits)
super: fix dying superblock warning messages
block: reject block device inodes with i_rdev == 0 in lookup_bdev()
selftests/filesystems: add ustat() coverage
fs: look up the superblock via the device table in user_get_super()
super: make fs_holder_ops private
f2fs: open via dedicated fs bdev helpers
erofs: open via dedicated fs bdev helpers
fs: tolerate per-superblock freeze errors on shared devices
fs: look up superblocks via the device table in fs_holder_ops
ext4: open via dedicated fs bdev helpers
btrfs: open via dedicated fs bdev helpers
xfs: port to fs_bdev_file_open_by_path()
fs: add dedicated block device open helpers for filesystems
fs: maintain a global device-to-superblock table
ocfs2: don't reset s_dev on dismount
ext4: use anonymous devices for KUnit test superblocks
fs, block: move blk_mode_t and fop_flags_t into <linux/types.h>
super: take lock after last reference count
super: convert s_count to refcount_t s_passive
btrfs: deny freezing devices undergoing a replace
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
"Bigger cleanups:
- The lockref dead-count handling is tidied up.
The open-coded check for a count below zero as the dead marker
relies on information the caller should not have.
- make put_mnt_ns() leave mounts connected. Destroying a mount
namespace disconnected its mounts from their mount points. So a
file descriptor still open on the parent of a mount point could be
used to peek under it.
Locked mounts were already kept connected to prevent exactly that.
But a mount is only locked when its tree is copied across a user
namespace boundary. So a mount namespace set up by a privileged
component had no locked mounts and its mounts were disconnected.
Passing UMOUNT_CONNECTED keeps every mount connected and prevents
that bug.
- vfs_prepare_mode() passes S_IFDIR for directories. I meant to fix
that ago but didn't get to it. So now someone finally did it.
This kills the exception where the mode could be 0 when a directory
was created whereas every other creation operation passed it
explicitly already.
- move long delayed work for ufs, jffs2, hfsplus, hfs and affs from
the per-cpu system_long_wq to the new unbound system_dfl_long_wq.
None of that work relies on per-cpu state and the work item is
enqueued with queue_delayed_work() whose timer is global anyway. So
it may as well benefit from scheduler task placement.
Smaller fixes and cleanups:
- unlock_buffer() and journal_end_buffer_io_sync() use
clear_and_wake_up_bit()
- the pipe page pools are unified into a single per-pipe pool and the
extra wake_up(rd_wait) is limited to EPOLLET consumers
- eventpoll now computes its timer slack lazily in ep_poll()
- shrink_dcache_for_umount() keeps making progress on busy roots
- excess xarray nodes are freed in clear_inode()
- romfs detects hard link cycles
- the user path of nested backing files is fixed
- pidfd holds exec_update_lock around the namespace ioctl
- non-memcg-aware nr_cached_objects is skipped during memcg slab
shrink
- iomap_write_iter() always returns status
- mangle_path() is renamed to seq_mangle_path()
- inode timestamp accessors are annotated
- new regression test for pipe->poll_usage.
- a few documentation, kernel-doc and selftest fixes"
* tag 'vfs-7.3-rc1.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (67 commits)
selftests/namespaces: Fix racy pipe handshake in timens and pidns_separate
selftests/epoll: add a regression test for pipe->poll_usage
pipe: only enable the extra wake_up(rd_wait) for EPOLLET consumers
pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl
fs: fix user path of nested backing files
fs: remove stale inode_insert5() kernel-doc parameter
fs: fix switch/case indentation in sysfs() syscall
fs: document semantics of kstat::{uid,gid} fields
dcache: keep shrink_dcache_for_umount() making progress on busy roots
seq_file: rename mangle_path to seq_mangle_path
nstree: add/fix struct ns_id_req kernel-doc member fields
dcache: use lockref routines for dead count checks
lockref: tidy up dead count handling
initramfs: fix typo in reserve_initrd_mem comment
fs/pipe: unify the page pools into a single per-pipe pool
fs: annotate inode timestamp accessors
eventpoll: compute timer slack lazily in ep_poll()
selftests/filesystems: add mntns cleanup test
put_mnt_ns(): leave mounts connected
affs: Move long delayed work on system_dfl_long_wq
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs lookup updates from Christian Brauner:
"This refactors lookup_open() and adds vfs_lookup_open() for nfsd.
mnt_want_write() and parent locking are moved into lookup_open()
itself.
audit_inode_child() is also now called in lookup_open() on failure.
That is the calling convention in vfs_create() and vfs_mkdir(), but
lookup_open() made no such call when atomic_open() should have created
a file and did not. And neither did the regular ->create() path fwiw.
This also contains work to remove the unneeded excl argument from the
->create() inode op"
* tag 'vfs-7.3-rc1.lookup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
fs/namei.c: fix coding style in atomic_open() and lookup_open()
fs/namei.c: fix kerneldoc of atomic_open() and vfs_lookup_open()
fs/namei.c: update stale comments in lookup_open()
Remove excl arg to ->create inode_operation
fs/namei.c: update kerneldoc of atomic_open()
vfs: call audit_inode_child() in lookup_open() on failure
vfs: move create error && negative dentry case in lookup_open() up
VFS: add vfs_lookup_open() for nfsd
VFS: move delegated_inode retry loop into lookup_open()
VFS: move mnt_want_write() and locking into lookup_open()
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In ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the directory cookie position is
rebuilt with
ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;
`ctx->pos` is loff_t (signed 64-bit), while `sb->s_blocksize` is
unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32-bit, so the mask
~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)
is computed as a 32-bit unsigned value (e.g. 0xfffff000 for a 4 KiB
block size). In the AND expression with the 64-bit `ctx->pos`, that
unsigned operand is zero-extended to 64 bits per the usual arithmetic
conversions, yielding 0x00000000fffff000. The high 32 bits of
`ctx->pos` are silently cleared, even though directory size is
allowed to exceed 4 GiB.
When readdir() crosses the 4 GiB boundary on a 32-bit kernel the
position is reset back into the first 4 GiB block, making the
re-validation path re-enumerate already-returned dirents indefinitely.
This is ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the extent-list readdir path taken
for all non-inline directories, so a directory large enough to cross
4 GiB reaches it.
This is the same class of bug that commit 3dce5bb82c97 ("exfat: Fix
bitwise operation having different size") fixed in exfat, and the
fix mirrors the equivalent ext4 fix in this series. Cast the operand
to loff_t so the mask is 64-bit before the AND:
ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;
64-bit kernels are unaffected.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260806022044.167962-3-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: "zhangyi (F)" <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When reclaiming a suballocator block group, first reduce the on-disk
cluster count by cl_cpg. The current code then subtracts that new count
(fe->i_clusters) from the old cached count
(OCFS2_I(alloc_inode)->ip_clusters).
For an allocator with N block groups, that leaves the cache at
N * cl_cpg - (N * cl_cpg - cl_cpg) = cl_cpg
i.e. ip_clusters -= (fe->i_clusters - cl_cpg) leaves ip_clusters equal to
cl_cpg regardless of N. This happens to be correct when reclaiming from
two block groups, but undercounts the clusters from three block groups
onwards. The incorrect cache value is also used immediately to update
i_blocks.
Assign the updated on-disk count to the cache, matching the allocation and
inode refresh paths.
In a QEMU test using a clean 256 MiB OCFS2 image and a 10,000-file
create/delete workload, the first buggy reclaim left the on-disk
(fe->i_clusters) and cached (ip_clusters) counts at 2048 and 512 clusters
respectively; later reclaims underflowed the cache. With this change, the
cache matched the on-disk count across all four reclaims: 2048, 1536,
1024, and 512 clusters.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260805113920.385959-1-matthias.goergens@gmail.com
Fixes: 4a54331616b3 ("ocfs2: give ocfs2 the ability to reclaim suballocator free bg")
Signed-off-by: Matthias Goergens <matthias.goergens@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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A lockdep warning indicates a circular locking dependency between
`&oi->ip_xattr_sem` and `&journal->j_trans_barrier`:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
is trying to acquire lock:
(&oi->ip_xattr_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_init_acl+0x2fd/0x7e0
fs/ocfs2/acl.c:367
but task is already holding lock:
(&journal->j_trans_barrier){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_start_trans+0x3ab/0x700
fs/ocfs2/journal.c:369
The deadlock involves two code paths: Path 1 (setxattr) where
`ocfs2_xattr_set()` acquires `ip_xattr_sem` (write) and then starts a
transaction, which acquires `j_trans_barrier` (read); and Path 2
(mkdir/mknod) where `ocfs2_mknod()` starts a transaction (`j_trans_barrier`
read) and then calls `ocfs2_init_acl()`, which attempts to acquire
`ip_xattr_sem` (read) on the parent directory to retrieve the default ACL.
Because rw_semaphores are subject to writer priority, a pending writer on
`j_trans_barrier` (e.g., the journal commit thread) can cause Path 1 to
block, while Path 2 is blocked waiting for Path 1 to release
`ip_xattr_sem`.
The patch fixes the lock ordering by precomputing the ACL state before
starting the OCFS2 transaction, while preserving POSIX ACL storage
semantics and the existing inode/security initialization order. By reading
the parent directory's default ACL and preparing the new inode's ACLs
outside the transaction, `ip_xattr_sem` is always acquired before
`j_trans_barrier`.
`struct ocfs2_acl_state` encapsulates the prepared ACL state, while
`ocfs2_acl_init_prepare()` and `ocfs2_acl_init_release()` avoid code
duplication between `ocfs2_mknod()` and `ocfs2_init_security_and_acl()`.
`ocfs2_calc_xattr_init()` and `ocfs2_init_acl()` use this precomputed
state, removing internal `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition and redundant disk
reads.
Additionally, remove the `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition from
`ocfs2_xattr_set_handle()`. This function is only used while initializing a
new inode that has not yet been inserted into the inode hash or attached to
a dentry, meaning there is no risk of concurrent access and the lock is
unnecessary.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/4094de06-9b69-4174-b2ee-08126dffc693@mail.kernel.org
Fixes: 16c8d569f570 ("ocfs2/acl: use 'ip_xattr_sem' to protect getting extended attribute")
Signed-off-by: Krystian Kaniewski <krystianmkaniewski@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.5-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot
Reported-by: syzbot+4007ab5229e732466d9f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4007ab5229e732466d9f
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=cc75363d-c672-499e-8fc5-44bcdc1cee39
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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[BUG]
A corrupted append-DIO dinode (high byte at offset 0xa1
corrupted from 0 to 1) can carry an i_dio_orphaned_slot
outside the mounted filesystem slot range and trigger a
use-after-free error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() uses i_dio_orphaned_slot to index the
slot-local system inode cache. The dinode validator does not check
this active slot, so an out-of-range value produces an invalid cache
entry pointer that is dereferenced as an inode pointer.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_dio_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before DIO orphan recovery can consume it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-3-gality369@gmail.com
Fixes: 06ee5c75b575 ("ocfs2: add functions to add and remove inode in orphan dir")
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read".
OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes.
A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local
system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is
reported.
Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing.
Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and
orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode
validation boundary.
This patch (of 2):
[BUG]
A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an
i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range.
ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking
up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves
the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers
assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-1-gality369@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-2-gality369@gmail.com
Fixes: b4df6ed8db0c ("[PATCH] ocfs2: fix orphan recovery deadlock")
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Heartbeat regions publish struct o2hb_region as the private data for the
NEGO_TIMEOUT and NEGO_APPROVE o2net handlers as soon as make_item()
creates the configfs region. The approve handler can call
o2hb_arm_timeout(), so a peer can touch the region timeout work before
dev_store() has finished building the heartbeat runtime, or after teardown
has started to shut that runtime back down.
The final configfs put also has to keep reg alive until the last in-flight
o2net callback drops its handler reference.
o2net_unregister_handler_list() blocks future handler lookups, but it does
not wait for sc_rx_work that already passed o2net_handler_get(). That
drain needs to cover local listener teardown as well, where the o2net
ordered workqueue may already be inside destroy_workqueue().
Fix the lifetime rule in both directions. Initialize the region delayed
works before publishing reg through the o2net handler table, keep new or
stopping regions non-armable with hr_stopping, and quiesce both delayed
works on failed-start and teardown paths even when no heartbeat thread is
left to call o2hb_disarm_timeout(). Then unregister handlers before
tearing down handler-visible region state and make the drain wait for the
active or destroying o2net ordered workqueue before release frees reg.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
region lifecycle: late negotiate callback:
1. make_item() registers the 1. o2net_process_message() gets a
region handlers before heartbeat handler for reg.
dev_store() has built a 2. The callback runs after the lookup
runnable heartbeat context. lock is dropped and dereferences reg.
2. A failed start or rmdir 3. An approve or timeout path tries to
stops the heartbeat thread, queue reg's delayed work, or release
quiesces existing work, and races the callback body after handler
drops the final configfs ref. unregister.
3. region_release() must drain 4. The callback or delayed work can
handler-visible o2net rx work outlive reg unless lifecycle code
before freeing reg. keeps the region non-armable and
drains the active-or-destroying
o2net workqueue.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0
Write of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
__run_timers+0x22c/0x5b0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27/0x60
try_to_wake_up+0x191/0xf70
timer_expire_remote+0xae/0xf0
run_timer_softirq+0x19b/0x1a0
handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660
__irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0x160
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
Allocated by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
o2hb_heartbeat_group_make_item+0x3c/0x600
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260624095310.763763-3-zzzccc427@gmail.com
Fixes: 34069b886f95 ("ocfs2: o2hb: add NEGO_TIMEOUT message")
Fixes: e76f8237a2f7 ("ocfs2: o2hb: add NEGOTIATE_APPROVE message")
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "ocfs2: harden heartbeat teardown races".
This series fixes two OCFS2 heartbeat/o2net teardown races found by
KASAN.
This patch (of 2):
Heartbeat callbacks stay registered while configfs local-node teardown
enters o2net_stop_listening(). A node-down event can still run through
o2net_disconnect_node() and o2net_set_nn_state() while teardown is
destroying o2net_wq, so the later queue/flush operations can hit a dead
workqueue. KASAN has caught this as a slab-use-after-free in
__queue_work() with the call chain:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in __queue_work+0x56/0xa90
Read of size 4
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
__queue_work+0x56/0xa90
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
__queue_delayed_work+0x58/0x1e0
queue_delayed_work_on+0xb4/0xc0
o2net_set_nn_state+0x467/0x840
o2net_disconnect_node+0x7b/0xe0
o2net_hb_node_down_cb+0x54/0x60
o2hb_run_event_list+0x236/0x2d0
o2hb_check_slot+0xad4/0xbc0
lock_release+0xc8/0x290
o2hb_check_slot+0x9ea/0xbc0
trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x646/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079)
__lock_acquire+0x466/0x2260
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0
ktime_get_with_offset+0xe9/0x230
o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770
kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540
__switch_to+0x2e9/0x730
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Allocated by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_noprof+0x292/0x760
__alloc_workqueue+0x736/0xc60
alloc_workqueue_noprof+0xb1/0x110
o2net_start_listening+0xe5/0x430
o2nm_node_local_store+0x184/0x310
configfs_write_iter+0x18a/0x210
vfs_write+0x469/0x810
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x313/0x590
rcu_core+0x4f4/0x1320
handle_softirqs+0x156/0x660
queue_delayed_work_on
o2net_set_nn_state
o2net_disconnect_node
o2net_hb_node_down_cb
o2hb_run_event_list
Keep heartbeat callbacks registered so quorum state still tracks node
state, but stop them from driving o2net reconnect/disconnect work once
local teardown starts. Mark the transport offline before destroying
o2net_wq, wait for any in-flight heartbeat callback to finish, and delay
bring-up replay until the new local node is published through
o2nm_this_node().
The replay also has to stay serialized with heartbeat callback delivery.
Otherwise a live-node snapshot can be copied, a real hb_down callback
can install -ENOTCONN for a peer, and the stale replay can call
o2net_hb_node_up() for that same peer and queue reconnect work even
though heartbeat is already down.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
local-node teardown: heartbeat node-down callback:
1. configfs local-off enters 1. o2hb_run_event_list() invokes
o2net_stop_listening(). o2net_hb_node_down_cb().
2. teardown heads for 2. the callback reaches
destroy_workqueue(o2net_wq). o2net_disconnect_node() and
o2net_set_nn_state().
3. teardown destroys and NULLs 3. the callback flushes or queues
o2net_wq. work through o2net_wq.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260624095310.763763-1-zzzccc427@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260624095310.763763-2-zzzccc427@gmail.com
Fixes: 98211489d414 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
lsetxattr() panics the kernel when setting a large xattr value on a
fragmented filesystem where the file already has an external xattr
block.
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_calc_xattr_set_need() never reserves metadata blocks for a new
xattr value's extent tree when the file already has an external xattr
block. The not_found path leaves meta_add at zero, so meta_ac is NULL
when ocfs2_xattr_extend_allocation() runs.
A new value root has room for a single extent record. On a fragmented
filesystem, the allocator cannot satisfy the xattr value in one
contiguous run, so each non-contiguous run requires its own extent
record. When the value root's extent list is full and meta_ac is NULL,
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree() returns RESTART_META, and
ocfs2_xattr_extend_allocation() hits BUG_ON(why == RESTART_META).
[FIX]
The case where no xattr block exists yet already calls
ocfs2_extend_meta_needed(&def_xv.xv.xr_list) to reserve value tree
metadata. Add the same reservation to the case where an xattr block
already exists, making the two cases consistent.
Replace the BUG_ON with a -ENOSPC return so that if RESTART_META is
returned despite the reservation, the error propagates to userspace
instead of panicking the kernel.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/amLwn3i9tET8yhG7@dev
Fixes: a78f9f466894 ("ocfs2: make xattr extension work with new local alloc reservation.")
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+e538032956b1157914a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e538032956b1157914a3
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In o2hb_region_inc_user(), o2hb_dependent_users is incremented
unconditionally before calling o2hb_region_pin(). If the pin fails, the
counter is never decremented and any partially-pinned regions are never
unpinned, since the caller does not call o2hb_region_dec_user() on error.
The leaked counter causes subsequent o2hb_region_inc_user() calls to skip
pinning entirely (the > 1 check), leaving heartbeat regions unprotected.
Fix by rolling back on failure: call o2hb_region_unpin(NULL) to release
any partially-pinned regions and decrement o2hb_dependent_users to restore
the pre-increment state.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-4-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 58a3158a5d17 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
o2hb_heartbeat_group_drop_item() is called from configfs rmdir with the
parent directory's inode_lock held. It calls o2hb_region_pin() ->
o2nm_depend_item() -> configfs_depend_item(), which acquires the configfs
root inode_lock. This creates a parent -> root inode_lock nesting that
could deadlock against paths taking root -> parent (e.g. subsystem
unregistration).
Fix this by using configfs_depend_item_unlocked() when o2hb_region_pin()
is called from a configfs callback context. This variant skips the root
inode_lock when caller and target are in the same subsystem, which is safe
because VFS already holds a lock preventing unregistration.
Add o2nm_depend_item_unlocked() wrapper and a from_callback parameter to
o2hb_region_pin() to select the appropriate variant.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-3-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 58a3158a5d17 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "ocfs2: cluster: o2hb_region_pin() fixes", v2.
This series fixes three related issues in o2hb_region_pin(), all are from
the original implementation in commit: 58a3158a5d17 ("ocfs2/cluster:
Pin/unpin o2hb regions"):
1) It is called with o2hb_live_lock (a spinlock) held, but the
underlying configfs_depend_item() sleeps (takes inode rwsem and
pins the filesystem). This triggers BUG under
CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP.
2) When called from the configfs drop_item callback, it creates a
lock order inversion: parent inode_lock -> configfs root
inode_lock, which can deadlock against subsystem unregistration
paths taking root -> parent.
3) If pinning fails partway through o2hb_region_inc_user(), the
o2hb_dependent_users counter is leaked and partially-pinned
regions are never released, leaving heartbeat regions
unprotected on subsequent mounts.
Patch 1 reworks o2hb_region_pin() to drop o2hb_live_lock across each
sleeping configfs_depend_item() call, using a config_item reference to
keep the region alive while unlocked.
Patch 2 adds a from_callback parameter to select
configfs_depend_item_unlocked() when called from configfs context,
avoiding the inode_lock nesting.
Patch 3 fixes the error path in o2hb_region_inc_user() to unpin and
decrement the counter on failure.
This patch (of 3):
o2hb_region_pin() is always called with the o2hb_live_lock spinlock held
(from o2hb_region_inc_user() and o2hb_heartbeat_group_drop_item()), but it
calls o2nm_depend_item() -> configfs_depend_item(), which sleeps: it pins
the configfs filesystem and takes the configfs root inode rwsem. Under
CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP this triggers:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c
in_atomic(): 1, ... name: mount.ocfs2
down_write
configfs_depend_item
o2hb_region_pin
o2hb_region_inc_user
o2hb_register_callback
dlm_register_domain_handlers
...
ocfs2_dlm_init
ocfs2_mount_volume
ocfs2_fill_super
Rework o2hb_region_pin() to pin one region at a time with the lock dropped
across the sleeping call: under o2hb_live_lock find the next eligible
region and take a config_item reference to keep it alive, drop the lock,
call o2nm_depend_item(), then retake the lock and record the pin. The
config_item_put() is done with the lock released as well, since
o2hb_region_release() also acquires o2hb_live_lock and can sleep. The
region list may change while unlocked, so the scan restarts from the top
after each pin. Local heartbeat still pins only the matching region;
global heartbeat pins all eligible regions.
The unpin path is unaffected: configfs_undepend_item() only takes a
spinlock and does not sleep.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-2-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 58a3158a5d17 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Local fuzzing of 6.12.94 has found the following memory leak
caused by doing 'copy_file_range()' within the same filesystem:
unreferenced object 0xffff88812192c980 (size 32):
comm "syz.0.49", pid 12095, jiffies 4294964143
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
c0 c5 92 21 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 06 00 00 ...!............
backtrace (crc 7068d63f):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline]
ocfs2_find_per_slot_free_list fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6618 [inline]
ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc+0x155/0x4b0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6786
ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6819 [inline]
ocfs2_unlink_path+0x286/0x450 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2613
ocfs2_rotate_subtree_left fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2779 [inline]
__ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x1f6f/0x2da0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2985
ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x283/0xe00 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3237
ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent+0xf56/0x1a20 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3825
ocfs2_split_extent+0x15f4/0x2940 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5138
ocfs2_clear_ext_refcount+0x2f6/0x550 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3098
ocfs2_replace_clusters fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3131 [inline]
ocfs2_make_clusters_writable fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3255 [inline]
ocfs2_replace_cow+0x991/0x1660 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3349
ocfs2_refcount_cow_hunk fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3427 [inline]
ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x5e1/0x9f0 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3470
ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write fs/ocfs2/file.c:2340 [inline]
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xbda/0x1880 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2451
iter_file_splice_write+0x890/0xf60 fs/splice.c:743
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:944 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x232/0x480 fs/splice.c:1167
splice_direct_to_actor+0x4b4/0xb60 fs/splice.c:1111
do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1210 [inline]
do_splice_direct+0x10f/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1236
do_sendfile+0x430/0xbf0 fs/read_write.c:1388
unreferenced object 0xffff88812192c5c0 (size 32):
comm "syz.0.49", pid 12095, jiffies 4294964143
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
29 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 )p..............
backtrace (crc afec850f):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline]
ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc+0x25c/0x4b0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6793
ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6819 [inline]
ocfs2_unlink_path+0x286/0x450 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2613
ocfs2_rotate_subtree_left fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2779 [inline]
__ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x1f6f/0x2da0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2985
ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x283/0xe00 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3237
ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent+0xf56/0x1a20 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3825
ocfs2_split_extent+0x15f4/0x2940 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5138
ocfs2_clear_ext_refcount+0x2f6/0x550 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3098
ocfs2_replace_clusters fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3131 [inline]
ocfs2_make_clusters_writable fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3255 [inline]
ocfs2_replace_cow+0x991/0x1660 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3349
ocfs2_refcount_cow_hunk fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3427 [inline]
ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x5e1/0x9f0 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3470
ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write fs/ocfs2/file.c:2340 [inline]
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xbda/0x1880 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2451
iter_file_splice_write+0x890/0xf60 fs/splice.c:743
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:944 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x232/0x480 fs/splice.c:1167
splice_direct_to_actor+0x4b4/0xb60 fs/splice.c:1111
do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1210 [inline]
do_splice_direct+0x10f/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1236
do_sendfile+0x430/0xbf0 fs/read_write.c:1388
This happens when 'ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc()' called from
'ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free()' uses the suballocator to
schedule extent removal, so 'ocfs2_run_deallocs()' should
be run unconditionally to complete the removal with
'ocfs2_free_cached_blocks()'. An extra semi-automated static
analysis [1] suspects that the same scenario looks possible in
'ocfs2_attach_refcount_tree()' and 'ocfs2_reflink_remap_blocks()'
as well, but, since 'ocfs2_run_deallocs()' is a safe no-op for
an empty dealloc context, 'ocfs2_create_reflink_node()' and
'ocfs2_reflink_xattrs()' may be adjusted in the same way too,
thus keeping the code pattern consistent.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260721102840.387663-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/f1d7e266-4b44-41b9-98c0-5b3868a8d9c3@yandex.ru [1]
Fixes: 6f70fa519976 ("ocfs2: Add CoW support.")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Suggested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_validate_dx_leaf() and ocfs2_validate_dx_root() check the ECC and
signature of an indexed-directory block before it reaches higher-level
callers, but neither validator bounds the ocfs2_dx_entry_list counts
against the capacity of the block that holds them.
ocfs2_dx_dir_search() then walks
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(entry_list->de_num_used); i++)
dx_entry = &entry_list->de_entries[i];
over de_num_used entries with no bounds check. entry_list is either
dx_leaf->dl_list (from ocfs2_read_dx_leaf) or, for an inline root,
dx_root->dr_entries. A crafted on-disk image can set de_num_used (and
de_count, which is the __counted_by_le() bound of de_entries) to 0xffff
and make the walk read far past the end of the 4KB metadata block, giving
a slab out-of-bounds read reachable from any path lookup, stat() or open()
on an indexed directory once the image is mounted.
Commit 775c17386a6f ("ocfs2: validate dx_root extent list fields during
block read") already bounds dr_list for the non-inline dx_root, but left
the inline dr_entries path and the dx_leaf dl_list unchecked. Add the
same read-time validation for both entry lists: de_count must equal the
capacity of the block (ocfs2_dx_entries_per_leaf()/per_root()) and
de_num_used must not exceed de_count, rejecting corrupted metadata with
-EFSCORRUPTED before ocfs2_dx_dir_search() can walk an out-of-range entry
array.
de_count is always written as exactly the block capacity when a leaf or
inline root is formatted, so the equality check does not reject any valid
image.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260713205625.92391-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Fixes: 9b7895efac90 ("ocfs2: Add a name indexed b-tree to directory inodes")
Fixes: 4ed8a6bb083b ("ocfs2: Store dir index records inline")
Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The disk heartbeat write always covers this node's own single slot, i.e.
one heartbeat block that lives within a single page. It is submitted by
o2hb_issue_node_write() and waited on by the caller before the ctxt goes
out of scope, so its lifetime is well bounded.
Turn it into an on-stack bio embedded in struct o2hb_bio_wait_ctxt rather
than allocating one from the mempool. This removes any allocation from
the fence-critical write path entirely: a delayed or blocked heartbeat
write is what leads to the local node being fenced, so it should not
depend on the state of a shared bio pool.
Because the bio is embedded rather than allocated, add a dedicated
o2hb_write_bio_end_io() that does not call bio_put(), and tear the bio
down with bio_uninit() once the caller has waited on the I/O.
The read path still allocates via o2hb_setup_one_bio() with GFP_NOFS,
since it issues a variable number of bios in a loop.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260710071756.3586797-2-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
o2hb_setup_one_bio() allocates the heartbeat bio with GFP_ATOMIC. The
disk heartbeat runs in the o2hb kernel thread (o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat),
which is process context and can sleep, so there is no atomicity
requirement here.
GFP_ATOMIC lacks __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so the allocation is not served
from the fs_bio_set mempool reserve and can return NULL under memory
pressure. A failed heartbeat allocation aborts the heartbeat and can lead
to the local node being fenced, which is exactly what the old comment
worried about.
Use GFP_NOFS instead. It keeps __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so the allocation is
backed by the fs_bio_set mempool and cannot fail, while avoiding recursion
back into the filesystem during heartbeat I/O. As the allocation can no
longer fail, drop the dead ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) path in o2hb_setup_one_bio()
and the now-redundant IS_ERR() handling in its callers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260710071756.3586797-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array
with:
for (; i < le16_to_cpu(rb->rf_records.rl_used); i++) {
rec = &rb->rf_records.rl_recs[i];
...
rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common
configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by
ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the
16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly
off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against
that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW
operation walks the array.
A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the
loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i]
for i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling
ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does:
if (index < le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used))
memmove(&rf_list->rl_recs[index + 1],
&rf_list->rl_recs[index],
(le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used) - index) *
sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec));
i.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an
offset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink
(FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent
whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to
run off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model
is local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a
raw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem.
ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block's ECC,
signature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used
against the block's actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of
gap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes
for the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity
and the "used" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]:
if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_next_free_rec) >
le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}
Add the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block():
reject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block
capacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used >
rl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set,
because in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list
(rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is
already validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the
referenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing
"!(rb->rf_flags & OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)" guard used elsewhere in this
file (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or
rf_list is the live member of the union.
With this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block
validation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption
check in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in
ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove()
in ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec().
Verified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build:
replaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in
__ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch,
and triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the
forged rl_used/rl_count.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260709132609.44233-1-security@auditcode.ai
Fixes: f2c870e3b12e ("ocfs2: Add ocfs2_read_refcount_block.")
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This reverts commit 58b6fcd2ab34 ("ocfs2: mark inode bad upon validation
failure during read").
Since 'make_bad_inode()' resets inode type to S_IFREG, doing this for
directory inode during active VFS lookup is likely to confuse the latter,
including VFS_BUG_ON_INODE() triggered in this case.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260709060101.207262-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru
Fixes: 58b6fcd2ab34 ("ocfs2: mark inode bad upon validation failure during read")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+d222f4b7129379c3d5bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d222f4b7129379c3d5bc
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_validate_xattr_block() checks the xattr block header before the
block reaches higher-level xattr users, but it does not verify that a
non-indexed block's xh_count and entry offsets fit inside the block.
Indexed buckets likewise reach list/get consumers after ECC without an
entry-bounds check.
Use the flat xattr entry validator for non-indexed external xattr blocks,
and use a bucket-specific validator for indexed buckets at metadata read
time. The bucket validator keeps the entry array bounded by the first
bucket block while checking name/value offsets against the bucket block
they target.
Reject corrupted external xattr metadata before listxattr() or getxattr()
can walk out-of-range entry arrays or name/value offsets.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a654007 by task ocfs2_xattr_lis/630
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190
ocfs2_listxattr+0x3f6/0x610
listxattr+0x90/0xe0
path_listxattrat+0xed/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260705025311.3429854-3-zzzccc427@gmail.com
Fixes: cf1d6c763fbc ("ocfs2: Add extended attribute support")
Fixes: 0c044f0b24b9 ("ocfs2: Add xattr bucket iteration for large numbers of EAs")
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds", v7.
This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.
This patch (of 2):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers. The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does
not reject entry name/value bounds.
Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation
for inline xattrs. Keep the operation paths on their existing
header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the
inode block is validated at read time.
Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or
listxattr() can walk past the inline storage.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170
ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820
ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0
__vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130
vfs_getxattr+0x185/0x1b0
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260705025311.3429854-1-zzzccc427@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260705025311.3429854-2-zzzccc427@gmail.com
Fixes: cf1d6c763fbc ("ocfs2: Add extended attribute support")
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
A crafted OCFS2 image with corrupted orphan-directory extent metadata can
make umount hang.
During unmount, ocfs2_recovery_disable() waits for the
ocfs2_complete_recovery work item to finish. The worker scans the orphan
directory through ocfs2_queue_orphans() and ocfs2_dir_foreach(). If
ocfs2_read_dir_block() fails on a corrupted directory block,
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() skips the block and continues walking. On a
badly corrupted directory this can keep orphan recovery busy for a long
time, leaving umount blocked while flushing osb->ocfs2_wq.
Return the read error immediately for full directory scans and propagate
the error from ocfs2_dir_foreach(). When ocfs2_empty_dir() receives such
an error, report the directory as non-empty so unlink/rmdir does not
proceed on an unreadable directory.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260702090507.446517-1-r772577952@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANypQFbWH76Y6LWHEwAvTP7aQL04uMJ=dDyL6YDmxa3fv3Tyjg@mail.gmail.com/
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5-xhigh
Signed-off-by: Jiaming Zhang <r772577952@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
A node receiving a DLM_MIG_LOCKRES message trusts several fields of the
peer-supplied dlm_migratable_lockres without validation. num_locks and
lockname_len are bounded only on the sending side, and the message is
never checked to actually carry num_locks migratable_lock entries. As a
result dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[0..num_locks) past the
kmalloc(data_len) copy of the message (an out-of-bounds read that ends in
a BUG_ON panic), and dlm_init_lockres() copies lockname_len bytes into the
fixed 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object (a heap out-of-bounds write).
Both are reachable by any node in the domain.
Validate these fields right after dlm_grab(), before anything uses them --
including the not-joined error path, which already prints mres->lockname
with the unbounded lockname_len as a %.*s precision. Reject the message
unless lockname_len <= DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX, num_locks <=
DLM_MAX_MIGRATABLE_LOCKS (the bound the sender already asserts), and the
payload is large enough to hold the claimed locks. Conforming recovery
and migration messages are unaffected.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-2-6953bcc0421f@proton.me
Fixes: 6714d8e86bf4 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm".
The o2dlm receive handlers trust u8 length and count fields from the wire
without bounding them, so a node in a DLM domain can corrupt or panic any
other node with a malformed message. Three defects:
- dlm_migrate_request_handler() passes migrate->namelen unchecked to
dlm_init_mle(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte mname[] of an
o2dlm_mle slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~215
attacker-controlled bytes.
- dlm_mig_lockres_handler() passes mres->lockname_len unchecked to
dlm_init_lockres(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte o2dlm_lockname
slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~223 bytes.
- the same handler trusts mres->num_locks without checking that the
message is large enough to hold that many entries, so
dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[] past the kmalloc(data_len)
copy and trips a BUG_ON (an out-of-bounds read ending in a panic).
The other o2dlm receive handlers already reject an oversized name; the
migration and recovery handlers have omitted it since the DLM was added
(see the Fixes tags). Patch 1 bounds namelen; patch 2 validates
lockname_len, num_locks, and the payload size. Conforming recovery and
migration traffic is unaffected.
o2net authenticates peers only by the DLM domain key, so any node that has
joined the domain -- including a compromised or malicious member -- can
send these messages. There is no local trigger; the attacker must already
be a member of the cluster.
Each sink was confirmed under KASAN with an out-of-tree module mirroring
it exactly -- a kmem_cache/kmalloc of the real destination size, then the
same unclamped memcpy/loop: slab-out-of-bounds Write for the two writes,
Read for the recovery walk, and a panic. A userspace AddressSanitizer
build faults identically under -m32 and -m64. Scrubbed logs are available
on request.
I reported this privately to security@kernel.org and the ocfs2 maintainers
on 2026-06-20; with no response after the standard embargo period I am
posting the fix publicly. I have no embargo requirement.
This patch (of 2):
A node receiving a DLM_MIGRATE_REQUEST message trusts the peer-supplied
name length (migrate->namelen) without bounding it. dlm_init_mle() then
copies that many bytes into the fixed DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX-byte mname[]
array of an o2dlm_mle slab object, so a malformed message from a cluster
peer overflows the slab object by up to ~215 bytes: a heap out-of-bounds
write of attacker-controlled data, reachable by any node in the domain.
Reject an oversized name, the way dlm_master_request_handler() and the
other o2dlm receive handlers already do; the migration handler omits the
check entirely. Conforming messages are unaffected.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-0-6953bcc0421f@proton.me
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-1-6953bcc0421f@proton.me
Fixes: 6714d8e86bf4 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
PREEMPT_RT's rtmutex PI chain walker warns about a lock dependency cycle
when inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) is called while holding
inode_lock(file_inode):
ocfs2_file_write_iter()
inode_lock(file_inode) [class 0]
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write()
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan()
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) [class 0] <- warning!
However this is a false positive. write_iter() is never called on a
directory, and orphan_dir is always a directory, so these two locks can
never actually conflict in practice.
Fix by using inode_lock_nested(orphan_dir_inode, I_MUTEX_NONDIR2) in all
three places where orphan_dir_inode is locked in namei.c, placing it in a
separate lock class so the rtmutex PI chain walker understands these locks
have distinct roles and does not warn about their ordering.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260620231223.46588-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+ce129763ce7d7e914739@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ce129763ce7d7e914739
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
o2nm_node_local_store() handles local=0 by stopping o2net and setting
cl_local_node to O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM, but it leaves cl_has_local set.
That stale state makes o2nm_this_node() return 255, blocks a later local=1
attempt with -EBUSY, and can feed 255 to heartbeat users that call
o2nm_this_node() dynamically.
Clearing cl_has_local is required when the local node is reset. But
heartbeat threads can still be running at that point. They pin the local
node config item at startup, yet o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat() and thread
teardown re-read o2nm_this_node() for the local slot and for
o2nm_undepend_this_node(). Once local=0 has cleared the live local-node
state, those dynamic reads return O2NM_MAX_NODES, which is also the
invalid node number 255.
Store the local node number in the heartbeat region when the region
starts. Use that stable node for heartbeat slot writes/checks,
negotiation messages, and the final configfs undepend. Stop the heartbeat
loop when the current local node no longer matches the stored node, and
clear cl_has_local together with cl_local_node in the local=0 path so
nodemanager state matches node removal.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30
RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xd0/0x630
o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120
o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x5/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079)
o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770
kthread_affine_node+0x139/0x180
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190
trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
kthread+0x19d/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x4d0
__switch_to+0x2d5/0x6f0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260616074931.3774929-1-zzzccc427@gmail.com
Fixes: a7f6a5fb4bde ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The only time that 'false' is passed as the 'excl' arg to the ->create
inode_operation is in lookup_open() when ->atomic_open is not provided
by the parent directory.
*all* directory inode_operations which do not have ->atomic_open
completely ignore the 'excl' arg.
Therefore we don't need the 'excl' arg. Those few ->create operations
which pay attention to the arg are only ever called with a value of
'true'.
We remove that arg and change all ->create operations to behave as those
thhe arg were 'true'.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/178290671516.27465.15984496764174914338@noble.neil.brown.name
Reviewed-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit 390ac56cf0f6 ("ocfs2: add boundary check to
ocfs2_check_dir_entry()") added an out-of-bounds guard using the
caller-supplied 'offset' argument:
if (offset > size - OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1))
return 0;
However, 'offset' and 'size' are not measured against the same base for
all callers. In the block-based lookup path, ocfs2_find_entry_el() passes
'offset' as an absolute offset into the whole directory:
i = ocfs2_search_dirblock(bh, dir, name, namelen,
block << sb->s_blocksize_bits,
bh->b_data, sb->s_blocksize, res_dir);
while 'size' is a single block size (sb->s_blocksize). For any directory
entry located in the second or later block, 'offset' is >=
sb->s_blocksize, so the guard rejects every such entry even though it is
perfectly valid and lies entirely within its block buffer.
This makes mounting fail for filesystems whose system directory spans more
than one block, e.g. a volume formatted with a small block size:
mkfs.ocfs2 -b 512 -C 4096 -N 2 -T datafiles --fs-features=usrquota,grpquota
ocfs2_check_dir_entry:314 ERROR: directory entry (#18: offset=512) too close to end or out-of-bounds
ocfs2_init_local_system_inodes:496 ERROR: status=-22, sysfile=12, slot=0
ocfs2_mount_volume:1757 ERROR: status = -22
The dirent's position within the buffer being validated is ((char *)de -
buf), which is what the rest of the function already uses (via
next_offset) and what must be bounds-checked against 'size'. Compute that
buffer-relative offset and use it for the guard. The subtraction is
reordered to size - buf_offset < OCFS2_DIR_REC_LEN(1) to avoid an unsigned
underflow when size is smaller than the minimal record length.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260710040512.3310736-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 390ac56cf0f6 ("ocfs2: add boundary check to ocfs2_check_dir_entry()")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Tested-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
vfs_mkdir() now sets the S_IFDIR type bit in the mode it passes to
->mkdir(), so OR-ing S_IFDIR into the mode again in dlmfs_mkdir() is
redundant. Drop it.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260630105400.68459-23-jkoolstra@xs4all.nl
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
vfs_mkdir() now sets the S_IFDIR type bit in the mode it passes to
->mkdir(), so OR-ing S_IFDIR into the mode again in ocfs2_mkdir() is
redundant. Drop it.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260630105400.68459-22-jkoolstra@xs4all.nl
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
ocfs2_dismount_volume() has reset sb->s_dev to zero since the original
merge in ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster
Filesystem") as part of scrubbing the super_block. Nothing reads the
field afterwards: all ocfs2-internal uses are mount-time log and trace
prints, and dev_t-keyed superblock lookups skip a dying superblock
anyway - s_root is gone before ->put_super runs and super_lock()
refuses SB_DYING superblocks.
The upcoming device-to-superblock table registers every superblock
under its s_dev. Drop the reset instead of leaving a superblock around
whose s_dev contradicts its registration.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616-work-super-bdev_holder_global-v2-6-7df6b864028e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- "taskstats: fix TGID dead-thread stat retention" (Yiyang Chen)
Fix a taskstats TGID aggregation bug where fields added in the TGID
query path were not preserved after thread exit, and adds a kselftest
covering the regression.
- "lib/tests: string_helpers: Slight improvements" (Andy Shevchenko)
Improve lib/tests/string_helpers_kunit.c a little
- "lib/base64: decode fixes" (Josh Law)
Address minor issues in lib/base64.c
- "selftests/filelock: Make output more kselftestish" (Mark Brown)
Make the output from the ofdlocks test a bit easier for tooling to
work with. Also ignore the generated file
- "uaccess: unify inline vs outline copy_{from,to}_user() selection"
(Yury Norov)
Simplify the usercopy code by removing the selectability of inlining
copy_{from,to}_user().
- "ocfs2: validate inline xattr header consumers" (ZhengYuan Huang)
Fix a number of possible issues in the ocfs2 xattr code
- "lib and lib/cmdline enhancements" (Dmitry Antipov)
Provide additional robustness checking in the cmdline handling code
and its in-kernel testing and selftests
- "cleanup the RAID6 P/Q library" (Christoph Hellwig)
Clean up the RAID6 P/Q library to match the recent updates to the
RAID 5 XOR library and other CRC/crypto libraries
- "ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata" (Michael
Bommarito)
Add three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so malformed
on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them
into the in-core inode
- "lib/raid: replace __get_free_pages() call with kmalloc()" (Mike
Rapoport)
Clean up the lib/raid code by using kmalloc() in more places
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-06-21-10-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (108 commits)
ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2: fix NULL h_transaction deref in ocfs2_assure_trans_credits
lib: interval_tree_test: validate benchmark parameters
ocfs2: avoid moving extents to occupied clusters
treewide: fix transposed "sign" typos and update spelling.txt
ocfs2: fix UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_sum_rightmost_rec
fat: reject BPB volumes whose data area starts beyond total sectors
selftests/uevent: increase __UEVENT_BUFFER_SIZE to avoid ENOBUFS on busy systems
lib/test_firmware: allocate the configured into_buf size
fs: efs: remove unneeded debug prints
checkpatch: cuppress warnings when Reported-by: is followed by Link:
MAINTAINERS: add Alexander as a kcov reviewer
mailmap: update Alexander Sverdlin's Email addresses
fs: fat: inode: replace sprintf() with scnprintf()
ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent
ocfs2: fix race between ocfs2_control_install_private() and ocfs2_control_release()
ocfs2/dlm: require a ref for locking_state debugfs open
ocfs2: reject FITRIM ranges shorter than a cluster
ocfs2: validate fast symlink target during inode read
ocfs2: add journal NULL check in ocfs2_checkpoint_inode()
...
|
|
A circular locking dependency involves INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE,
EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, and ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE.
1. ocfs2_mknod() acquires INODE_ALLOC then EXTENT_ALLOC.
2. ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() acquires EXTENT_ALLOC for unwritten
extents, then ORPHAN_DIR via ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() while still
holding EXTENT_ALLOC.
3. ocfs2_wipe_inode() acquires ORPHAN_DIR then INODE_ALLOC via
ocfs2_remove_inode.
Break the cycle in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() by freeing the allocation
contexts (releasing EXTENT_ALLOC) before acquiring ORPHAN_DIR.
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8881e78b33a0
(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881e78b4fa0
(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
ocfs2_evict_inode+0xe97/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}:
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline]
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan+0x12e/0x7a0 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:2728
ocfs2_dio_end_io+0xf9c/0x1370 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:2418
dio_complete+0x25b/0x790 fs/direct-io.c:281
-> #1 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}:
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline]
ocfs2_reserve_suballoc_bits+0x16d/0x4840 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:882
ocfs2_reserve_new_metadata_blocks+0x415/0x9a0
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1078
ocfs2_mknod+0x10f3/0x2260 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:351
-> #0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__lock_acquire+0x15a5/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline]
ocfs2_remove_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:733 [inline]
ocfs2_wipe_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:896 [inline]
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1157 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299
Chain exists of:
&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] -->
&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] -->
&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]);
lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]);
lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]);
lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/97c902a6-3bcf-43ea-9b70-f1f136a6c3f2@mail.kernel.org
Fixes: d647c5b2fbf8 ("ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion")
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Gemini:gemini-3-flash-preview syzbot
Reported-by: syzbot+b225d4dfce6219600c42@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b225d4dfce6219600c42
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=0b53ce1e-2972-4192-aa85-8097a702762c
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
A direct write over unwritten extents can panic the kernel in
ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() when the journal aborts during DIO
completion. The crash is a general protection fault from a NULL pointer
dereference.
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() loops over a direct write's unwritten extents,
marking each written under a single journal handle. If the journal
aborts (for example after an I/O error) while the extent tree is being
updated, the handle is left aborted with its transaction pointer
cleared. The extent merge treats that failure as not critical and
reports success, so the loop keeps using the handle.
ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() reads the handle's remaining credits
without first checking whether the handle is aborted, and that read
dereferences the cleared transaction pointer.
[FIX]
A journal abort is recorded in the handle itself, so callers are
expected to test the handle rather than rely on a returned error.
Make ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() do that, as the other ocfs2 journal
helpers already do, and return -EROFS when the handle is aborted.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/airKTsM1fRVN-Wj7@dev
Fixes: be346c1a6eeb ("ocfs2: fix DIO failure due to insufficient transaction credits")
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+e9c15ff790cea6a0cfae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e9c15ff790cea6a0cfae
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
For non-auto OCFS2_IOC_MOVE_EXT operations, userspace supplies a physical
me_goal. ocfs2_move_extent() initializes new_phys_cpos from that goal and
expects ocfs2_probe_alloc_group() to replace it with a free run in the
target block group.
The probe currently leaves *phys_cpos unchanged if the scan reaches the
end of the group without finding a free run. An occupied goal at the last
bit can therefore survive the probe and be passed to
__ocfs2_move_extent(), which copies file data into a cluster still owned
by another inode before the bitmap is updated.
When the probe does find a free run, it also subtracts move_len from the
ending bit. The start of an N-bit run ending at i is i - N + 1, so the
current calculation can report the bit immediately before the free run.
Clear *phys_cpos before scanning and use the correct free-run start.
Callers already treat a zero result as -ENOSPC, so failed probes no longer
continue with an occupied caller-controlled goal.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260611213510.16956-1-kylebot@openai.com
Fixes: e6b5859cccfa ("Ocfs2/move_extents: helper to probe a proper region to move in an alloc group.")
Fixes: 236b9254f8d1 ("ocfs2: fix non-auto defrag path not working issue")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
On-disk corruption setting l_next_free_rec to 0 in an inode's embedded
extent list triggers a UBSAN panic on the next write to that file.
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_sum_rightmost_rec() computes
i = le16_to_cpu(el->l_next_free_rec) - 1
and accesses el->l_recs[i] without validating i. When l_next_free_rec
is 0, i becomes -1; when l_next_free_rec exceeds l_count, i falls
past the end of the array. Either case violates the
__counted_by_le(l_count) annotation on l_recs[] and triggers UBSAN.
[FIX]
Validate the inode's embedded extent list when the inode is read, in
ocfs2_validate_inode_block(): l_count must be non-zero and no larger
than the inode block can hold, and l_next_free_rec must not exceed
l_count. A corrupt list is rejected at read time, before the b-tree
code can index l_recs[] out of bounds.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ain_780qc0P4ypNd@dev
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+be16e33db01e6644db7a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be16e33db01e6644db7a
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull procfs updates from Christian Brauner:
- Revamp fs/filesystems.c
The file was a mess with a hand-rolled linked list in desperate need
of a cleanup. The filesystems list is now RCU-ified, /proc files can
be marked permanent from outside fs/proc/, and the string emitted
when reading /proc/filesystems is pre-generated and cached instead of
pointer-chasing and printfing entry by entry on every read.
The file is read frequently because libselinux reads it and is linked
into numerous frequently used programs (even ones you would not
suspect, like sed!). Scalability also improves since reference
maintenance on open/close is bypassed.
open+read+close cycle single-threaded (ops/s):
before: 442732
after: 1063462 (+140%)
open+read+close cycle with 20 processes (ops/s):
before: 606177
after: 3300576 (+444%)
A follow-up patch adds missing unlocks in some corner cases and
tidies things up.
- Relax the mount visibility check for subset=pid mounts
When procfs is mounted with subset=pid, all static files become
unavailable and only the dynamic pid information is accessible. In
that case there is no point in imposing the full mount visibility
restrictions on the mounter - everything that can be hidden in procfs
is already inaccessible. These restrictions prevented procfs from
being mounted inside rootless containers since almost all container
implementations overmount parts of procfs to hide certain
directories.
As part of this /proc/self/net is only shown in subset=pid mounts for
CAP_NET_ADMIN, reconfiguring subset=pid is rejected, the
SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE superblock flag is replaced with an
FS_USERNS_MOUNT_RESTRICTED filesystem flag, fully visible mounts are
recorded in a list, and the mount restrictions are finally
documented.
- Protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock in procfs
Most uses of ptrace_may_access() in procfs should hold
exec_update_lock to avoid TOCTOU issues with concurrent privileged
execve() (like setuid binary execution).
This fixes the easy cases - the owner and visibility checks and the
FD link permission checks - with the gnarlier ones to follow later.
* tag 'vfs-7.2-rc1.procfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
fs: fix ups and tidy ups to /proc/filesystems caching
proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links)
proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1)
docs: proc: add documentation about mount restrictions
proc: handle subset=pid separately in userns visibility checks
proc: prevent reconfiguring subset=pid
proc: subset=pid: Show /proc/self/net only for CAP_NET_ADMIN
fs: cache the string generated by reading /proc/filesystems
sysfs: remove trivial sysfs_get_tree() wrapper
fs: RCU-ify filesystems list
fs: move SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE to FS_USERNS_MOUNT_RESTRICTED
proc: allow to mark /proc files permanent outside of fs/proc/
namespace: record fully visible mounts in list
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
"Features:
- Reduce pipe->mutex contention by pre-allocating pages outside the
lock in anon_pipe_write().
anon_pipe_write() called alloc_page() once per page while holding
pipe->mutex. The allocation can sleep doing direct reclaim and runs
memcg charging, which extends the critical section and stalls any
concurrent reader on the same mutex. Now up to 8 pages are
pre-allocated before the mutex is taken, leftovers are recycled
into the per-pipe tmp_page[] cache before unlock, and any remainder
is released after unlock, keeping the allocator out of the critical
section on both sides. On a writers x readers sweep with 64KB
writes against a 1 MB pipe throughput improves 6-28% and average
write latency drops 5-22%; under memory pressure - when the cost of
holding the mutex across reclaim is highest - throughput improves
21-48% and latency drops 17-33%. The microbenchmark is added to
selftests.
- uaccess/sockptr: fix the ignored_trailing logic in
copy_struct_to_user() to behave as documented and the usize check
in copy_struct_from_sockptr() for user pointers, and add
copy_struct_{from,to}_bounce_buffer() and copy_struct_to_sockptr()
helpers for upcoming users (IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT, IPPROTO_QUIC).
- bpf: add a sleepable bpf_real_inode() kfunc that resolves the real
inode backing a dentry via d_real_inode(). On overlayfs the inode
attached to the dentry doesn't carry the underlying device
information; this is used by the filesystem restriction BPF program
that was merged into systemd.
- docs: add guidelines for submitting new filesystems, motivated by
the maintenance burden abandoned and untestable filesystems impose
on VFS developers, blocking infrastructure work like folio
conversions and iomap migration.
Fixes:
- libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()
and drop the now-redundant assignments in callers. This began as a
one-line dma-buf fix for a path_noexec() warning; a pseudo
filesystem has no reason not to set SB_I_NOEXEC. All init_pseudo()
callers were audited: the only visible effect is on dma-buf where
SB_I_NOEXEC silences the warning.
- Handle set_blocksize() failures in legacy filesystems (bfs, hpfs,
qnx4, jfs, befs, affs, isofs, minix, ntfs3, omfs). Mounting a
device with a sector size > PAGE_SIZE crashed roughly half of them;
the rest had the same missing error handling pattern. Plus a
follow-up releasing the superblock buffer_head when setting the
minix v3 block size fails.
- mount: honour SB_NOUSER in the new mount API.
- fs/fcntl: fix a SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling by
switching the process-group paths of send_sigio() and send_sigurg()
from read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to RCU, matching the single-PID
path.
- vfs: add an FS_USERNS_DELEGATABLE flag and set it for NFS, fixing
delegated NFS mounts (fsopen() in a container with the mount
performed by a privileged daemon) that broke when non-init
s_user_ns was tied to FS_USERNS_MOUNT.
- selftests/namespaces: fix a hang in nsid_test where an unreaped
grandchild kept the TAP pipe write-end open, a waitpid(-1) race in
listns_efault_test, and a false FAIL on kernels without listns()
where the tests should SKIP.
- filelock: fix the break_lease() stub signature for
CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=n.
- init/initramfs_test: wait for the async initramfs unpacking before
running; the test and do_populate_rootfs() share the parser state.
- fs/coredump: reduce redundant log noise in
validate_coredump_safety().
- iomap: pass the correct length to fserror_report_io() in
__iomap_write_begin().
- backing-file: fix the backing_file_open() kerneldoc.
Cleanups:
- initramfs: refactor the cpio hex header parsing to use hex2bin()
instead of the hand-rolled simple_strntoul() which is reverted, and
extend the initramfs KUnit tests to cover header fields with 0x
prefixes.
- Replace __get_free_pages() and friends with kmalloc()/kzalloc()
across quota, proc, ocfs2/dlm, nilfs2, nfs, nfsd, libfs, jfs, jbd2,
isofs, fuse, select, namespace, configfs, binfmt_misc, bfs, and the
do_mounts init code - part of the larger work of replacing page
allocator calls with kmalloc().
- Use clear_and_wake_up_bit() in unlock_buffer() and
journal_end_buffer_io_sync() instead of open-coding the sequence.
- Drop unused VFS exports: unexport drop_super_exclusive(), remove
start_removing_user_path_at(), and fold __start_removing_path()
into start_removing_path().
- fs/read_write: narrow the __kernel_write() export with
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES().
- vfs: uapi: retire octal and hex constants in favor of (1 << n) for
the O_ flags. Finding a free bit for a new flag across the
architectures was needlessly hard with the mixed bases.
- dcache: add extra sanity checks of dead dentries in dentry_free()
via a new DENTRY_WARN_ONCE() that also prints d_flags.
- iov_iter: use kmemdup_array() in dup_iter() to harden the
allocation against multiplication overflow.
- fs/pipe: write to ->poll_usage only once.
- vfs: remove an always-taken if-branch in find_next_fd().
- dcache: use kmalloc_flex() for struct external_name in __d_alloc().
- namei: use QSTR() instead of QSTR_INIT() in path_pts().
- sync_file_range: delete dead S_ISLNK code.
- Comment fixes: retire a stale comment in fget_task_next() and fix
assorted spelling mistakes"
* tag 'vfs-7.2-rc1.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (73 commits)
backing-file: fix backing_file_open() kerneldoc parameter
iomap: pass the correct len to fserror_report_io in __iomap_write_begin
vfs: add FS_USERNS_DELEGATABLE flag and set it for NFS
filelock: fix break_lease() stub signature for CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=n
vfs: uapi: retire octal and hex numbers in favor of (1 << n) for O_ flags
bpf: add bpf_real_inode() kfunc
fs/read_write: Do not export __kernel_write() to the entire world
libfs: drop redundant SB_I_NOEXEC/SB_I_NODEV in init_pseudo() callers
libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()
mount: honour SB_NOUSER in the new mount API
fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling
selftests/pipe: add pipe_bench microbenchmark
fs/pipe: pre-allocate pages outside pipe->mutex in anon_pipe_write
fs: retire stale comment in fget_task_next()
fs: fix spelling mistakes in comment
bfs: replace get_zeroed_page() with kzalloc()
binfmt_misc: replace __get_free_page() with kmalloc()
configfs: replace __get_free_pages() with kzalloc()
fs/namespace: use __getname() to allocate mntpath buffer
fs/select: replace __get_free_page() with kmalloc()
...
|
|
[BUG]
Unlinking a refcounted file whose refcount tree has leaf blocks
triggers a fortify panic due to an out-of-bounds write.
[CAUSE]
When the last leaf block is removed from a refcount tree,
ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent() converts the root back to leaf mode
with a bulk memset on &rb->rf_records. rf_records sits in an anonymous
union with rf_list. rf_list.l_tree_depth aliases rf_records.rl_count,
and is 0 for a single-level tree. With rl_count equal to 0, the memset
writes past the 16-byte declared size of rf_records, which the fortify
checker catches.
[FIX]
Replace the bulk memset on &rb->rf_records with a correctly-bounded
memset on rl_recs[] alone, after setting rl_count to the correct value.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ah3TESOsEO9j_JLU@dev
Fixes: 2f26f58df041 ("ocfs2: annotate flexible array members with __counted_by_le()")
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+3ef989aae096b30f1663@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3ef989aae096b30f1663
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_control_release()
Move atomic_inc(&ocfs2_control_opened) and the handshake state update
inside ocfs2_control_lock to close a race window where
ocfs2_control_release() can observe ocfs2_control_opened dropping to zero
(resetting ocfs2_control_this_node and running_proto) while
ocfs2_control_install_private() is about to bump the counter and mark the
connection valid.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260601121618.1263346-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 3cfd4ab6b6b4 ("ocfs2: Add the local node id to the handshake.")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: Ginger <ginger.jzllee@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
debug_lockres_open() copies inode->i_private into struct debug_lockres and
debug_lockres_release() later drops that pointer with dlm_put(). That
only works if open successfully pins the struct dlm_ctxt.
Today open calls dlm_grab(dlm) but ignores its return value. Once the
last domain unregister has removed the context from dlm_domains,
dlm_grab() returns NULL, yet open still stores the raw pointer and returns
success. The later release path is outside the debugfs removal barrier,
so it can call dlm_put() after dlm_free_ctxt_mem() has freed the context.
KASAN reports this as a slab-use-after-free in dlm_put() called from
debug_lockres_release().
Fail the open when dlm_grab() cannot acquire the reference and unwind the
seq_file private state before returning. That keeps locking_state from
handing out a file descriptor whose release path does not own the
dlm_ctxt.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
locking_state debugfs open: last domain unregister:
1. debug_lockres_open() reads 1. dlm_unregister_domain() calls
inode->i_private. dlm_complete_dlm_shutdown().
2. debug_lockres_open() calls 2. shutdown removes the dlm_ctxt from
dlm_grab(dlm) and gets NULL. dlm_domains.
3. open still stores the raw dlm 3. final teardown reaches
pointer in dl->dl_ctxt and dlm_free_ctxt_mem() and frees it.
returns success.
4. debug_lockres_release() later
calls dlm_put(dl->dl_ctxt).
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in dlm_put+0x82/0x200
RIP: 0033:0x7f4d349bc9e0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888103a3c000 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 816 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region
[ffff888103a3c000, ffff888103a3c800)
Write of size 4
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
dlm_put+0x82/0x200 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?)
debug_lockres_release+0x53/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587)
dlm_put+0x9/0x200 (?:?)
debug_lockres_release+0x5c/0x80 (fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmdebug.c:587)
full_proxy_release+0x67/0x90 (?:?)
__fput+0x1df/0x4b0 (?:?)
do_raw_spin_lock+0x10f/0x1b0 (?:?)
fput_close_sync+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
__x64_sys_close+0x55/0x90 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x10c/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
irqentry_exit+0xac/0x6e0 (?:?)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Freed by task stack:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 (?:?)
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 (?:?)
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 (?:?)
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 (?:?)
kfree+0x30f/0x580 (?:?)
dlm_put+0x1ce/0x200 (?:?)
dlm_unregister_domain+0xf6/0xb30 (?:?)
o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0x6b/0x90 (?:?)
ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x41/0x70 (?:?)
ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x1c4/0x220 (?:?)
ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x38a/0x550 (?:?)
generic_shutdown_super+0xc3/0x220 (?:?)
kill_block_super+0x29/0x60 (?:?)
deactivate_locked_super+0x66/0xe0 (?:?)
cleanup_mnt+0x13d/0x210 (?:?)
task_work_run+0xfa/0x170 (?:?)
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd6/0x430 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x3cb/0x640 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260531044714.1640172-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: 4e3d24ed1a12 ("ocfs2/dlm: Dumps the lockres' into a debugfs file")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_trim_mainbm() trims the global bitmap in cluster units, but its
too-short range validation only checks sb->s_blocksize.
On filesystems with a cluster size larger than the block size, a FITRIM
range that is at least one block but shorter than one cluster is accepted
and shifted down to len == 0. The later start + len - 1 and len -= ...
arithmetic then underflows and can drive trimming past the requested
range.
Reject ranges shorter than s_clustersize instead. That preserves the
existing -EINVAL behavior for requests that cannot discard even one
allocation unit and keeps zero-cluster trims out of the group walk.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260528151247.361854-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: aa89762c5480 ("ocfs2: return EINVAL if the given range to discard is less than block size")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() already rejects several inconsistent
self-contained dinodes before they are exposed to the rest of the
filesystem. Fast symlinks need the same treatment.
A zero-cluster symlink is treated as a fast symlink and later read through
page_get_link() and ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio(). That path uses
strnlen() on the inline payload and then copies len + 1 bytes into the
folio. If a corrupt dinode stores an i_size that does not fit the inline
area or omits the terminating NUL at i_size, that copy reads past the end
of the inode block buffer.
Reject zero-cluster symlink dinodes whose i_size exceeds the inline
fast-symlink capacity or whose inline payload is not NUL-terminated
exactly at i_size when the inode block is validated. This keeps malformed
fast symlinks from reaching the read path.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0
RIP: 0033:0x7f5c6d859aa7
Read of size 3905
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0 (fs/ocfs2/inode.c:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?)
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 (?:?)
filemap_read_folio+0x27/0xe0 (?:?)
filemap_read_folio+0x35/0xe0 (?:?)
do_read_cache_folio+0x138/0x230 (?:?)
__page_get_link+0x26/0x110 (?:?)
page_get_link+0x2e/0x70 (?:?)
vfs_readlink+0x15e/0x250 (?:?)
touch_atime+0x4d/0x370 (?:?)
do_readlinkat+0x186/0x200 (?:?)
do_user_addr_fault+0x65a/0x890 (?:?)
__x64_sys_readlink+0x46/0x60 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260528151230.361127-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: ea022dfb3c2a ("ocfs: simplify symlink handling")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
During unmount, ocfs2_journal_shutdown() frees the journal and sets
osb->journal to NULL. Later, when VFS evicts remaining cached inodes,
ocfs2_evict_inode() -> ocfs2_clear_inode() -> ocfs2_checkpoint_inode()
-> ocfs2_ci_fully_checkpointed() dereferences osb->journal, causing a
NULL pointer dereference.
Fix this by adding a NULL check for osb->journal in
ocfs2_checkpoint_inode(). If the journal is NULL, it has already been
fully flushed and destroyed during shutdown, so there is nothing to
checkpoint.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260531131645.3650299-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Reported-by: Farhad Alemi <farhad.alemi@berkeley.edu>
Fixes: da5e7c87827e ("ocfs2: cleanup journal init and shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Farhad Alemi <farhad.alemi@berkeley.edu>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In ocfs2_read_blocks(), caller should't assume that buffer head returned
by 'sb_getblk()' is exclusively owned and so 'put_bh()' always drops
b_count from 1 to 0. If it is not so, buffer head remains on hold and
likely to be returned by the next call to 'sb_getblk()' unchanged - that
is, with BH_Uptodate bit set even if it has failed validation previously,
thus allowing to insert that buffer head into OCFS2 metadata cache and
submit it to upper layers. To avoid such a scenario, BH_Uptodate should
be cleared immediately after 'validate()' callback has detected some data
inconsistency.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260529094128.494293-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru
Fixes: cf76c78595ca ("ocfs2: don't put and assigning null to bh allocated outside")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Reported-by: syzbot+caacd220635a9cc3bac9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=caacd220635a9cc3bac9
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent
allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a
bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in
the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run
past bg_bitmap.
Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent
allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that
capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk
bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor
is used.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
_find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
__bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
__ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260524111248.1429884-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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