ksmbd: validate out_buf_len before FSCTL_CREATE_OR_GET_OBJECT_ID and FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT writes

Both cases write a fixed-size response structure into rsp->Buffer
without first checking that out_buf_len (the space smb2_ioctl()
actually has available, computed by smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len() from
the client's OutputBufferLength minus space already consumed earlier
in a compound request) is large enough. Every comparable case in this
same switch (FSCTL_SRV_ENUMERATE_SNAPSHOTS, FSCTL_GET_COMPRESSION,
FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO, FSCTL_SRV_REQUEST_RESUME_KEY,
FSCTL_SRV_COPYCHUNK) validates this first; these two don't.

A client can send a compound SMB2 request where an earlier command in
the same compound chain consumes most of work->response_buf, leaving
smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len() only a few bytes of out_buf_len for a
trailing FSCTL_CREATE_OR_GET_OBJECT_ID or FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT.
Both then unconditionally write their full fixed-size structure
(64 bytes and 8 bytes respectively) at rsp->Buffer[0] regardless,
overflowing past the actual remaining space in the response buffer.

Add the same out_buf_len check used by every other fixed-size-response
case in this function, before the write.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Gael Blivet <gael.blivet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions