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| author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2026-07-08 09:53:43 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> | 2026-07-08 20:05:16 +0200 |
| commit | 84c42f515f184d4c9bc05da385f39f7ff406c302 (patch) | |
| tree | 695e2988ce7e6f962de7917d9b2303719acbc222 /tools/perf/scripts/python/bin | |
| parent | 99b321dde704e38d3e6c1f425613d7b138ba5696 (diff) | |
Documentation/bpf: Add BPF signing and enforcement doc
Describe the BPF signing design end to end: why a trusted loader is
needed, the signature(insns || metadata) contract, load-time
verification via fd_array (exclusive + frozen maps), the binary
BPF_SIG_{UNSIGNED,VERIFIED} verdict, and how [BPF] LSMs can enforce
policy on it.
This writes down the contract on the discussion points with the LSM /
integrity folks [0][1]: by the time security_bpf_prog_load() is
called, signature verification has fully completed and covers the
instructions plus the frozen contents of every bound exclusive map;
there is no intermediate "loader verified, payload pending" state
to reason about; and what BPF_SIG_VERIFIED means at each hook is
spelled out explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/bc823ddbaf63e0e177eb46d1cc15076e4e2e689d.camel@HansenPartnership.com [0]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAHC9VhSDkwGgPfrBUh7EgBKEJj_JjnY68c0YAmuuLT_i--GskQ@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708075343.358712-9-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/scripts/python/bin')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
