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authorChristian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>2026-01-16 15:30:34 +0100
committerMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>2026-01-19 15:21:10 +0100
commit033724b1c627885aed049f775e4b10583d895af6 (patch)
tree3a2d6ba1b50588b47e6f5264f68867874119207b /tools/perf/lib/Documentation/tutorial/git@git.tavy.me:linux.git
parentfb8a6c18fb9a6561f7a15b58b272442b77a242dd (diff)
dm-verity: add dm-verity keyring
Add a dedicated ".dm-verity" keyring for root hash signature verification, similar to the ".fs-verity" keyring used by fs-verity. By default the keyring is unused retaining the exact same old behavior. For systems that provision additional keys only intended for dm-verity images during boot, the dm_verity.keyring_unsealed=1 kernel parameter leaves the keyring open. We want to use this in systemd as a way add keys during boot that are only used for creating dm-verity devices for later mounting and nothing else. The discoverable disk image (DDI) spec at [1] heavily relies on dm-verity and we would like to expand this even more. This will allow us to do that in a fully backward compatible way. Once provisioning is complete, userspace restricts and activates it for dm-verity verification. If userspace fully seals the keyring then it gains the guarantee that no new keys can be added. Link: https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/discoverable_partitions_specification [1] Co-developed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/lib/Documentation/tutorial/git@git.tavy.me:linux.git')
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