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| author | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2026-01-16 15:30:34 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> | 2026-01-19 15:21:10 +0100 |
| commit | 033724b1c627885aed049f775e4b10583d895af6 (patch) | |
| tree | 3a2d6ba1b50588b47e6f5264f68867874119207b /tools/perf/lib/Documentation/tutorial/git@git.tavy.me:linux.git | |
| parent | fb8a6c18fb9a6561f7a15b58b272442b77a242dd (diff) | |
dm-verity: add dm-verity keyring
Add a dedicated ".dm-verity" keyring for root hash signature
verification, similar to the ".fs-verity" keyring used by fs-verity.
By default the keyring is unused retaining the exact same old behavior.
For systems that provision additional keys only intended for dm-verity
images during boot, the dm_verity.keyring_unsealed=1 kernel parameter
leaves the keyring open.
We want to use this in systemd as a way add keys during boot that are
only used for creating dm-verity devices for later mounting and nothing
else. The discoverable disk image (DDI) spec at [1] heavily relies on
dm-verity and we would like to expand this even more. This will allow us
to do that in a fully backward compatible way.
Once provisioning is complete, userspace restricts and activates it for
dm-verity verification. If userspace fully seals the keyring then it
gains the guarantee that no new keys can be added.
Link: https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/discoverable_partitions_specification [1]
Co-developed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/lib/Documentation/tutorial/git@git.tavy.me:linux.git')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
