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authorBryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>2026-06-12 21:10:33 -0500
committerDmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>2026-06-22 20:44:12 -0700
commit5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04 (patch)
tree48447a3c1cc3b6897628eaad6850fd02d11dbea6 /include/uapi/linux/timerfd.h
parent66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 (diff)
Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count
goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration. Fixes: a7ac7c95d468 ("Input: goodix - use max touch number from device config") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6844625d-v1-1-df0aed080c9d@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi/linux/timerfd.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions