tcp: send a challenge ACK on SEG.ACK > SND.NXT

RFC 5961 Section 5.2 validates an incoming segment's ACK value
against the range [SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND, SND.NXT] and states:

  "All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the above
   condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back."

Commit 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack
Mitigation") opted Linux into this mitigation and implements the
challenge ACK on the lower side (SEG.ACK < SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND),
but the symmetric upper side (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT) still takes the
pre-RFC-5961 path and silently returns
SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_ACK_UNSENT_DATA, even though RFC 793 Section 3.9
(now RFC 9293 Section 3.10.7.4) has always required:

  "If the ACK acknowledges something not yet sent (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT)
   then send an ACK, drop the segment, and return."

Complete the mitigation by sending a challenge ACK on that branch,
reusing the existing tcp_send_challenge_ack() path which already
enforces the per-socket RFC 5961 Section 7 rate limit via
__tcp_oow_rate_limited().  FLAG_NO_CHALLENGE_ACK is honoured for
symmetry with the lower-edge case.

Update the existing tcp_ts_recent_invalid_ack.pkt selftest, which
drives this exact path, to consume the new challenge ACK.

Fixes: 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422123605.320000-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions