diff options
| author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> | 2026-04-27 10:27:23 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2026-04-30 09:38:56 +0200 |
| commit | 5eb0cfedb2588650b63f0a65963ad64272df938d (patch) | |
| tree | d7b194cac0c5545f58e7199c00748842d075d756 /include/linux/timerqueue.h | |
| parent | 28df22acc2751abf6e6316a9f1f9cd422741bd03 (diff) | |
net/tcp-ao: Drop support for most non-RFC-specified algorithms
RFC 5926 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5926) specifies the
use of AES-128-CMAC and HMAC-SHA1 with TCP-AO. This includes a
specification for how traffic keys shall be derived for each algorithm.
Support for any other algorithms with TCP-AO isn't standardized, though
an expired Internet Draft (a work-in-progress document, not a standard)
from 2019 does propose adding HMAC-SHA256 support:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nayak-tcp-sha2-03
Since both documents specify the KDF for each algorithm individually, it
isn't necessarily clear how any other algorithm should be integrated.
Nevertheless, the Linux implementation of TCP-AO allows userspace to
specify the MAC algorithm as a string tcp_ao_add::alg_name naming either
"cmac(aes128)" or an arbitrary algorithm in the crypto_ahash API. The
set of valid strings is undocumented. The implementation assumes that
"cmac(aes128)" is the only algorithm that requires an entropy extraction
step and that all algorithms accept keys with length equal to the
untruncated MAC; thus, arbitrary HMAC algorithms probably do work, but
some other MAC algorithms like AES-256-CMAC have never actually worked.
Unfortunately, this undocumented string allows many obsolete, insecure,
or redundant algorithms. For example, "hmac(md5)" and the
non-cryptographic "crc32" are accepted. It also ties the implementation
to crypto_ahash and requires that most memory be dynamically allocated,
making the implementation unnecessarily complex and inefficient. Still
furthermore, this implementation requires the crypto API to support
"transformation cloning", whose only user is this feature.
Fortunately, it's very likely that only a few algorithms are actually
used in practice. Let's restrict the set of allowed algorithms to
"cmac(aes128)" (or "cmac(aes)" with keylen=16), "hmac(sha1)", and
"hmac(sha256)". The first two are the actually standard ones, while
HMAC-SHA256 seems like a reasonable algorithm to continue supporting as
a Linux extension, considering the Internet Draft for it and the fact
that SHA-256 is the usual choice of upgrade from the outdated SHA-1.
If any other algorithm ever turns out to be needed, e.g. HMAC-SHA512, it
can of course be (re-)added in library form. However, note that the TCP
options space limits TCP-AO MACs to 20 bytes (160 bits) anyway, which
limits the potential benefit of any further upgrade to the algorithm.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260427172727.9310-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/timerqueue.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
