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| author | Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> | 2026-06-12 01:40:01 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 2026-06-12 12:49:27 +0200 |
| commit | 3ec997bd5508e9b25210b5bbec89031629cdb093 (patch) | |
| tree | 523e6d8cc9c34e3b7e86f440532b5dd8de8e6c7e /include/linux/timerqueue.h | |
| parent | 5fa1d6a5ec2356d2107dead614437c66fa7138b1 (diff) | |
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that
must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte
sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) {
struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i];
... entry->origLocation ...
}
in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A
reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever
sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index
sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the
block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in
udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the
same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the
block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds
write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with
struct_size().
Fixes: 1df2ae31c724 ("udf: Fortify loading of sparing table")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-91780c4e-v1-1-f15112ff6882@proton.me
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/timerqueue.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
