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authorQihang <q.h.hack.winter@gmail.com>2026-05-17 16:25:27 +0800
committerSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>2026-06-14 15:12:23 -0500
commit29f1005b8b4d3d3d8ac116d85f864a0b83bcf394 (patch)
tree5cfb4bb05b5c9394767b9200d7318396a6786692 /drivers/phy/eswin/git@git.tavy.me:linux.git
parentec457f9afe5ae9538bdcd58fd4cb442b9787e183 (diff)
cifs: validate full SID length in security descriptors
parse_sid() only verified that the fixed SID header fit in the returned security descriptor, but did not verify that the full SID body described by num_subauth was present. A malicious server can return a truncated owner or group SID whose header lies within the descriptor buffer while sub_auth[] extends past the end of the allocation, leading to an out-of-bounds read when the client later parses or copies that SID. Validate the full SID body in parse_sid(), centralize owner/group SID lookup and bounds checking in sid_from_sd(), and use that validation in parse_sec_desc(), build_sec_desc(), and copy_sec_desc() before sub_auth[] is accessed. Signed-off-by: Qihang <q.h.hack.winter@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/phy/eswin/git@git.tavy.me:linux.git')
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