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authorAdrian Korwel <adriank20047@gmail.com>2026-05-25 09:58:31 -0500
committerJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>2026-06-02 12:08:52 +0200
commit183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74 (patch)
treeecf0a8d3c66ed1ee000aac8aa9107b1608121dee /Documentation/arm64/git@git.tavy.me:linux.git
parente43ffb69e0438cddd72aaa30898b4dc446f664f8 (diff)
USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()
get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes. The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size. A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377, causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host running this driver. valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access. Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling read_rom(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Adrian Korwel <adriank20047@gmail.com> [ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
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