Merge tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf

Pull BPF fixes from Daniel Borkmann:

 - Initialize task local storage before fork bails out to free the task
   (Jann Horn)

 - Fix insn_aux_data leak on verifier error path (KaFai Wan)

 - Reject BPF inode storage map creation when BPF LSM is uninitialized
   (Matt Bobrowski)

 - Mask pseudo pointer values in verifier logs when pointer leaks are
   not allowed (Nuoqi Gui)

 - Harden BPF JIT against spraying via IBPB flush (Pawan Gupta)

 - Reject a skb-modifying SK_SKB stream parser since the latter is only
   meant to measure the next message (Sechang Lim)

 - Fix bpf_refcount_acquire to reject refcounted allocation arguments
   with a non-zero fixed offset (Yiyang Chen)

* tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
  bpf: Prefer dirty packs for eBPF allocations
  bpf: Prefer packs that won't trigger an IBPB flush on allocation
  bpf: Skip redundant IBPB in pack allocator
  bpf: Restrict JIT predictor flush to cBPF
  x86/bugs: Enable IBPB flush on BPF JIT allocation
  bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying
  bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized
  bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it
  bpf: Fix insn_aux_data leak on verifier err_free_env path
  selftests/bpf: Cover pseudo-BTF ksym log masking
  bpf: Mask pseudo pointer values in verifier logs
  selftests/bpf: Cover refcount acquire node offsets
  bpf: Reject offset refcount acquire arguments
  selftests/bpf: test rejection of a packet-modifying SK_SKB stream parser
  bpf, sockmap: reject a packet-modifying SK_SKB stream parser
  selftests/bpf: don't modify the skb in the strparser parser prog

23 files changed, 297 insertions, 62 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index f6bcc0e1a950..b0075ece4a6e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -2177,7 +2177,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 	image_size = extable_offset + extable_size;
 	ro_header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(image_size, &ro_image_ptr,
 					      sizeof(u64), &header, &image_ptr,
-					      jit_fill_hole);
+					      jit_fill_hole, was_classic);
 	if (!ro_header)
 		goto out_off;
 
@@ -2870,7 +2870,7 @@ int arch_bpf_trampoline_size(const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
 
 void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size)
 {
-	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole);
+	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole, false);
 }
 
 void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size)
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
index ad7e28375aa9..2738b4db1165 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c
@@ -1790,7 +1790,7 @@ static int invoke_bpf(struct jit_ctx *ctx, struct bpf_tramp_nodes *tn,
 
 void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size)
 {
-	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole);
+	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole, false);
 }
 
 void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size)
@@ -2256,7 +2256,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 	image_size = prog_size + extable_size;
 	/* Now we know the size of the structure to make */
 	ro_header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(image_size, &ro_image_ptr, sizeof(u32),
-					      &header, &image_ptr, jit_fill_hole);
+					      &header, &image_ptr, jit_fill_hole,
+					      bpf_prog_was_classic(prog));
 	if (!ro_header)
 		goto out_offset;
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index d4a17e18c9fb..7b07b43575f1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 	alloclen = proglen + FUNCTION_DESCR_SIZE + fixup_len + extable_len;
 
 	fhdr = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(alloclen, &fimage, 4, &hdr, &image,
-					      bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns);
+					 bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns, bpf_prog_was_classic(fp));
 	if (!fhdr)
 		goto out_err;
 
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(s32 imm)
 
 void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size)
 {
-	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns);
+	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns, false);
 }
 
 void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
index c03c1de16b79..f9d5347ba966 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ int arch_bpf_trampoline_size(const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
 
 void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size)
 {
-	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns);
+	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns, false);
 }
 
 void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
index 4365d07aaf54..ce3bd3762e08 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr
 				bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(prog_size + extable_size,
 							  &jit_data->ro_image, sizeof(u32),
 							  &jit_data->header, &jit_data->image,
-							  bpf_fill_ill_insns);
+							  bpf_fill_ill_insns,
+							  bpf_prog_was_classic(prog));
 			if (!jit_data->ro_header)
 				goto out_offset;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 4f4b5e8a1574..b68892e6d58c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -388,6 +388,10 @@ extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
 extern void entry_untrain_ret(void);
 extern void write_ibpb(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
+extern void bpf_arch_ibpb(void);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 extern void clear_bhb_loop(void);
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 83f51cab0b1e..d9af230c0512 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/smt.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
 
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
@@ -1651,8 +1652,21 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
 {
 	return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
 }
+
+/*
+ * The "retpoline sequence" is the "call;mov;ret" sequence that
+ * replaces normal indirect branch instructions. Differentiate
+ * *the* retpoline sequence from the LFENCE-prefixed indirect
+ * branches that simply use the retpoline infrastructure.
+ */
+static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void)
+{
+	return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
+}
+
 #else
 static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
+static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void) { return false; }
 #endif
 
 #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
@@ -2095,8 +2109,7 @@ static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 
 	/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
+	if (retpoline_seq_enabled()) {
 		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
 		if (rrsba_disabled)
 			return;
@@ -2238,6 +2251,27 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void)
 		pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
+static void __bpf_arch_ibpb(void *unused)
+{
+	write_ibpb();
+}
+
+void bpf_arch_ibpb(void)
+{
+	on_each_cpu(__bpf_arch_ibpb, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+static bool __init cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf(void)
+{
+	/* A genuine retpoline already neutralizes ring0 indirect predictions */
+	if (retpoline_seq_enabled())
+		return false;
+
+	return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+}
+#endif
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
@@ -2314,6 +2348,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
+	if (cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf()) {
+		static_call_update(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_ibpb);
+		static_branch_enable(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled);
+		pr_info("Enabling IBPB for BPF\n");
+	}
+#endif
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
@@ -3490,9 +3532,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
 		return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
-	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
-		 !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) &&
-		 rrsba_disabled)
+	else if (retpoline_seq_enabled() && rrsba_disabled)
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_VMEXIT))
 		return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop";
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 054e043ffcd2..de7515ea1bea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -3653,7 +3653,7 @@ cleanup:
 
 void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size)
 {
-	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole);
+	return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole, false);
 }
 
 void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size)
@@ -3965,7 +3965,8 @@ out_image:
 			/* allocate module memory for x86 insns and extable */
 			header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(roundup(proglen, align) + extable_size,
 							   &image, align, &rw_header, &rw_image,
-							   jit_fill_hole);
+							   jit_fill_hole,
+							   bpf_prog_was_classic(prog));
 			if (!header)
 				goto out_addrs;
 			prog->aux->extable = (void *) image + roundup(proglen, align);
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
index 143775a27a2a..dda272d78f01 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
 
+extern bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init;
+
 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
 	RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__);
 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
@@ -56,6 +58,8 @@ bool bpf_lsm_hook_returns_errno(u32 btf_id);
 
 #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
 
+#define bpf_lsm_initialized false
+
 static inline bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id)
 {
 	return false;
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 67d337ede91b..14acb2455746 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/sockptr.h>
+#include <linux/static_call.h>
 #include <linux/u64_stats_sync.h>
 
 #include <net/sch_generic.h>
@@ -1314,6 +1315,15 @@ extern long bpf_jit_limit_max;
 
 typedef void (*bpf_jit_fill_hole_t)(void *area, unsigned int size);
 
+/*
+ * Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory, so that
+ * indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions left
+ * behind by an old program that occupied the same space.
+ */
+void bpf_arch_pred_flush(void);
+DECLARE_STATIC_CALL(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_pred_flush);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(bpf_pred_flush_enabled);
+
 void bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero(void *area, unsigned int size);
 
 struct bpf_binary_header *
@@ -1328,7 +1338,7 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp);
 struct bpf_binary_header *
 bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr(const struct bpf_prog *fp);
 
-void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns);
+void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool was_classic);
 void bpf_prog_pack_free(void *ptr, u32 size);
 
 static inline bool bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off(const struct bpf_prog *fp)
@@ -1342,7 +1352,8 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **ro_image,
 			  unsigned int alignment,
 			  struct bpf_binary_header **rw_hdr,
 			  u8 **rw_image,
-			  bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns);
+			  bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns,
+			  bool was_classic);
 int bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header,
 				 struct bpf_binary_header *rw_header);
 void bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
index 0da8d923e39d..f9e81060c1f4 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
@@ -178,6 +178,15 @@ static int notsupp_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
 
 static struct bpf_map *inode_storage_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Do not allow allocation of BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE if the BPF LSM
+	 * was not initialized by the LSM framework at boot. Without proper
+	 * initialization, the BPF inode security blob offset remains unprepared,
+	 * causing bpf_inode() to calculate an invalid memory offset and corrupt
+	 * inode->i_security.
+	 */
+	if (!bpf_lsm_initialized)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 	return bpf_local_storage_map_alloc(attr, &inode_cache);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 649cce41e13f..6e19a030da6f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/static_call.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/prandom.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
@@ -875,6 +876,7 @@ int bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(struct bpf_prog *prog,
 struct bpf_prog_pack {
 	struct list_head list;
 	void *ptr;
+	bool arch_flush_needed;
 	unsigned long bitmap[];
 };
 
@@ -883,6 +885,15 @@ void bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero(void *area, unsigned int size)
 	memset(area, 0, size);
 }
 
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_pred_flush);
+
+/*
+ * Enabled once bpf_arch_pred_flush points at a real flush routine. Lets the
+ * pack allocator test "is a predictor flush wired up at all" with a cheap
+ * static branch instead of repeatedly querying the static call target.
+ */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(bpf_pred_flush_enabled);
+
 #define BPF_PROG_SIZE_TO_NBITS(size)	(round_up(size, BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE) / BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE)
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(pack_mutex);
@@ -918,6 +929,8 @@ static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_ins
 	bpf_fill_ill_insns(pack->ptr, BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE);
 	bitmap_zero(pack->bitmap, BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE / BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE);
 
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled))
+		pack->arch_flush_needed = true;
 	set_vm_flush_reset_perms(pack->ptr);
 	err = set_memory_rox((unsigned long)pack->ptr,
 			     BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -932,15 +945,23 @@ out:
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns)
+void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool was_classic)
 {
 	unsigned int nbits = BPF_PROG_SIZE_TO_NBITS(size);
-	struct bpf_prog_pack *pack;
-	unsigned long pos;
+	struct bpf_prog_pack *pack, *fallback_pack = NULL;
+	unsigned long pos, fallback_pos = 0;
 	void *ptr = NULL;
 
 	mutex_lock(&pack_mutex);
 	if (size > BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE) {
+		/*
+		 * Allocations larger than a pack get their own pages, and
+		 * predictors are not flushed for such allocation. This is only
+		 * safe because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface)
+		 * are bounded well below a pack size.
+		 */
+		if (was_classic && static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled))
+			pr_warn_once("BPF: Predictors not flushed for allocations greater than BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE\n");
 		size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
 		ptr = bpf_jit_alloc_exec(size);
 		if (ptr) {
@@ -960,8 +981,29 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns)
 	list_for_each_entry(pack, &pack_list, list) {
 		pos = bitmap_find_next_zero_area(pack->bitmap, BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT, 0,
 						 nbits, 0);
-		if (pos < BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT)
+		if (pos >= BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT)
+			continue;
+		/* Flush not enabled, use any pack */
+		if (!static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled))
 			goto found_free_area;
+		/*
+		 * cBPF reuse of a dirty pack triggers a flush, so prefer a
+		 * clean pack for cBPF. eBPF never flushes, so steer it to a
+		 * dirty pack and keep clean packs free for cBPF.
+		 */
+		if (was_classic ^ pack->arch_flush_needed)
+			goto found_free_area;
+		if (!fallback_pack) {
+			fallback_pack = pack;
+			fallback_pos = pos;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* No preferred pack found */
+	if (fallback_pack) {
+		pack = fallback_pack;
+		pos = fallback_pos;
+		goto found_free_area;
 	}
 
 	pack = alloc_new_pack(bpf_fill_ill_insns);
@@ -971,6 +1013,16 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns)
 	pos = 0;
 
 found_free_area:
+	/* Flush only for cBPF as it may contain a crafted gadget */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled) &&
+	    pack->arch_flush_needed &&
+	    was_classic) {
+		struct bpf_prog_pack *p;
+
+		static_call_cond(bpf_arch_pred_flush)();
+		list_for_each_entry(p, &pack_list, list)
+			p->arch_flush_needed = false;
+	}
 	bitmap_set(pack->bitmap, pos, nbits);
 	ptr = (void *)(pack->ptr) + (pos << BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SHIFT);
 
@@ -1008,6 +1060,9 @@ void bpf_prog_pack_free(void *ptr, u32 size)
 		  "bpf_prog_pack bug: missing bpf_arch_text_invalidate?\n");
 
 	bitmap_clear(pack->bitmap, pos, nbits);
+
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled))
+		pack->arch_flush_needed = true;
 	if (bitmap_find_next_zero_area(pack->bitmap, BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT, 0,
 				       BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT, 0) == 0) {
 		list_del(&pack->list);
@@ -1130,7 +1185,8 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr,
 			  unsigned int alignment,
 			  struct bpf_binary_header **rw_header,
 			  u8 **rw_image,
-			  bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns)
+			  bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns,
+			  bool was_classic)
 {
 	struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header;
 	u32 size, hole, start;
@@ -1143,7 +1199,7 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr,
 
 	if (bpf_jit_charge_modmem(size))
 		return NULL;
-	ro_header = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns);
+	ro_header = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns, was_classic);
 	if (!ro_header) {
 		bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(size);
 		return NULL;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
index f8a3c7eb451e..0391b3bc0073 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
@@ -323,7 +323,10 @@ void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_insn_cbs *cbs,
 			 */
 			u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
 			bool is_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
-				      insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE;
+				      insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE ||
+				      insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX ||
+				      insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE ||
+				      insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID;
 			char tmp[64];
 
 			if (is_ptr && !allow_ptr_leaks)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c b/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c
index b77db7413f8c..ea2d60dc1fee 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void bpf_dispatcher_change_prog(struct bpf_dispatcher *d, struct bpf_prog *from,
 
 	mutex_lock(&d->mutex);
 	if (!d->image) {
-		d->image = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero);
+		d->image = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero, false);
 		if (!d->image)
 			goto out;
 		d->rw_image = bpf_jit_alloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 21a365d436a5..6515d4d3c003 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7996,9 +7996,10 @@ reg_find_field_offset(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, s32 off, u32 fields)
 	return field;
 }
 
-static int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,
-				  enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
+static int __check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				    const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,
+				    enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
+				    bool btf_id_fixed_off_ok)
 {
 	u32 type = reg->type;
 
@@ -8055,12 +8056,11 @@ static int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF | MEM_RCU:
 		/* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function,
 		 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset
-		 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass
-		 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other
-		 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we
-		 * still need to do checks instead of returning.
+		 * can be non-zero unless the caller requires otherwise.
+		 * var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we still
+		 * need to do checks instead of returning.
 		 */
-		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, argno, true);
+		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, argno, btf_id_fixed_off_ok);
 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
 		/*
 		 * Allow fixed and variable offsets for syscall context, but
@@ -8076,6 +8076,13 @@ static int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	}
 }
 
+static int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				  const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,
+				  enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
+{
+	return __check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, argno, arg_type, true);
+}
+
 static int check_arg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno)
 {
@@ -11947,6 +11954,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 		enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE;
 		argno_t argno = argno_from_arg(i + 1);
 		int regno = reg_from_argno(argno);
+		bool btf_id_fixed_off_ok = true;
 		u32 ref_id, type_size;
 		bool is_ret_buf_sz = false;
 		int kf_arg_type;
@@ -12120,7 +12128,6 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE:
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:
-		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR:
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_WORKQUEUE:
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER:
@@ -12134,6 +12141,10 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX:
 			arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX;
 			break;
+		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
+			arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
+			btf_id_fixed_off_ok = false;
+			break;
 		default:
 			verifier_bug(env, "unknown kfunc arg type %d", kf_arg_type);
 			return -EFAULT;
@@ -12141,7 +12152,8 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 
 		if (regno == meta->release_regno)
 			arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE;
-		ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, argno, arg_type);
+		ret = __check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, argno, arg_type,
+					       btf_id_fixed_off_ok);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 
@@ -19994,13 +20006,13 @@ err_unlock:
 	if (!is_priv)
 		mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
 	bpf_clear_insn_aux_data(env, 0, env->prog->len);
-	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
 err_free_env:
 	bpf_stack_liveness_free(env);
 	kvfree(env->cfg.insn_postorder);
 	kvfree(env->scc_info);
 	kvfree(env->succ);
 	kvfree(env->gotox_tmp_buf);
+	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
 	kvfree(env);
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 13e38e89a1f3..f0e2e131a9a5 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1009,6 +1009,11 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
 	tsk->mm_cid.active = 0;
 	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&tsk->mm_cid.node);
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+	RCU_INIT_POINTER(tsk->bpf_storage, NULL);
+	tsk->bpf_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
 	return tsk;
 
 free_stack:
@@ -2247,10 +2252,6 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
 	p->sequential_io	= 0;
 	p->sequential_io_avg	= 0;
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-	RCU_INIT_POINTER(p->bpf_storage, NULL);
-	p->bpf_ctx = NULL;
-#endif
 
 	unwind_task_init(p);
 
diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index 99e3789492a0..c60ba6d292f9 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -1515,6 +1515,17 @@ static int sock_map_prog_link_lookup(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_prog ***ppr
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int sock_map_prog_attach_check(enum bpf_attach_type attach_type,
+				      struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	/* A stream parser must not modify the skb, only measure it. */
+	if (prog && attach_type == BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER &&
+	    prog->aux->changes_pkt_data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Handle the following four cases:
  * prog_attach: prog != NULL, old == NULL, link == NULL
  * prog_detach: prog == NULL, old != NULL, link == NULL
@@ -1533,6 +1544,10 @@ static int sock_map_prog_update(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_prog *prog,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	ret = sock_map_prog_attach_check(which, prog);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	/* for prog_attach/prog_detach/link_attach, return error if a bpf_link
 	 * exists for that prog.
 	 */
@@ -1776,6 +1791,11 @@ static int sock_map_link_update_prog(struct bpf_link *link,
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
+
+	ret = sock_map_prog_attach_check(link->attach_type, prog);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
 	if (!sockmap_link->map) {
 		ret = -ENOLINK;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index 40efde233f3a..7b98f5d1e2be 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
 
+bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init;
+
 static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
@@ -24,6 +26,7 @@ static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
 {
 	security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
 			   &bpf_lsmid);
+	bpf_lsm_initialized = true;
 	pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_strp.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_strp.c
index 621b3b71888e..1d7231728eaf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_strp.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_strp.c
@@ -431,6 +431,35 @@ out:
 	test_sockmap_strp__destroy(strp);
 }
 
+static void test_sockmap_strp_parser_reject(void)
+{
+	struct test_sockmap_strp *strp = NULL;
+	int parser_mod, parser_ro, link;
+	int err, map;
+
+	strp = test_sockmap_strp__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(strp, "test_sockmap_strp__open_and_load"))
+		return;
+
+	map = bpf_map__fd(strp->maps.sock_map);
+	parser_mod = bpf_program__fd(strp->progs.prog_skb_parser_resize);
+	parser_ro = bpf_program__fd(strp->progs.prog_skb_parser);
+
+	err = bpf_prog_attach(parser_mod, map, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER, 0);
+	ASSERT_ERR(err, "bpf_prog_attach parser_mod");
+
+	link = bpf_link_create(parser_ro, map, BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER, NULL);
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(link, 0, "bpf_link_create parser_ro"))
+		goto out;
+
+	err = bpf_link_update(link, parser_mod, NULL);
+	ASSERT_ERR(err, "bpf_link_update parser_mod");
+out:
+	if (link >= 0)
+		close(link);
+	test_sockmap_strp__destroy(strp);
+}
+
 void test_sockmap_strp(void)
 {
 	if (test__start_subtest("sockmap strp tcp pass"))
@@ -451,4 +480,6 @@ void test_sockmap_strp(void)
 		test_sockmap_strp_multiple_pkt(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM);
 	if (test__start_subtest("sockmap strp tcp dispatch"))
 		test_sockmap_strp_dispatch_pkt(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM);
+	if (test__start_subtest("sockmap strp parser reject pkt mod"))
+		test_sockmap_strp_parser_reject();
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c
index 7247a20c0a3b..024ef2aae200 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c
@@ -13,12 +13,20 @@ struct node_acquire {
 	struct bpf_refcount refcount;
 };
 
+struct node_refcounted {
+	long key;
+	struct bpf_list_node list;
+	struct bpf_refcount refcount;
+};
+
 extern void bpf_rcu_read_lock(void) __ksym;
 extern void bpf_rcu_read_unlock(void) __ksym;
 
 #define private(name) SEC(".data." #name) __hidden __attribute__((aligned(8)))
 private(A) struct bpf_spin_lock glock;
 private(A) struct bpf_rb_root groot __contains(node_acquire, node);
+private(B) struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
+private(B) struct bpf_list_head head __contains(node_refcounted, list);
 
 static bool less(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b)
 {
@@ -93,6 +101,32 @@ long rbtree_refcounted_node_ref_escapes_owning_input(void *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+SEC("?tc")
+__failure __msg("dereference of modified ptr_ ptr R1")
+long refcount_acquire_list_node_offset(void *ctx)
+{
+	struct node_refcounted *node, *base, *ref;
+	struct bpf_list_node *list_node;
+
+	node = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*node));
+	if (!node)
+		return 1;
+
+	bpf_spin_lock(&lock);
+	bpf_list_push_front(&head, &node->list);
+	list_node = bpf_list_pop_front(&head);
+	bpf_spin_unlock(&lock);
+	if (!list_node)
+		return 2;
+
+	base = container_of(list_node, struct node_refcounted, list);
+	ref = bpf_refcount_acquire(list_node);
+	if (ref)
+		bpf_obj_drop(ref);
+	bpf_obj_drop(base);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid")
 __failure __msg("function calls are not allowed while holding a lock")
 int BPF_PROG(rbtree_fail_sleepable_lock_across_rcu,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c
index c9abfe3a11af..56e9aebf05f2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/sockmap_parse_prog.c
@@ -5,28 +5,6 @@
 SEC("sk_skb1")
 int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	void *data_end = (void *)(long) skb->data_end;
-	void *data = (void *)(long) skb->data;
-	__u8 *d = data;
-	int err;
-
-	if (data + 10 > data_end) {
-		err = bpf_skb_pull_data(skb, 10);
-		if (err)
-			return SK_DROP;
-
-		data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
-		data = (void *)(long)skb->data;
-		if (data + 10 > data_end)
-			return SK_DROP;
-	}
-
-	/* This write/read is a bit pointless but tests the verifier and
-	 * strparser handler for read/write pkt data and access into sk
-	 * fields.
-	 */
-	d = data;
-	d[7] = 1;
 	return skb->len;
 }
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_strp.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_strp.c
index dde3d5bec515..fe88fa6d40bc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_strp.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_strp.c
@@ -50,4 +50,11 @@ int prog_skb_parser_partial(struct __sk_buff *skb)
 	return 10;
 }
 
+SEC("sk_skb/stream_parser")
+int prog_skb_parser_resize(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	bpf_skb_change_tail(skb, skb->len, 0);
+	return skb->len;
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
index 49f7bd05edad..42de5cff7e52 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include "../../../include/linux/filter.h"
 #include "bpf_misc.h"
 
+extern const int bpf_prog_active __ksym;
+
 #define BPF_SK_LOOKUP(func) \
 	/* struct bpf_sock_tuple tuple = {} */ \
 	"r2 = 0;"			\
@@ -78,6 +80,23 @@ __naked void dummy_prog_loop1_socket(void)
 }
 
 SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: pseudo btf id log masks address")
+__success_unpriv
+__msg_unpriv("0: (18) r1 = 0x0")
+__not_msg_unpriv("0: (18) r1 = 0x{{[1-9a-f][0-9a-f]*}}")
+__retval_unpriv(0)
+__log_level(2)
+__naked void pseudo_btf_id_log_masks_address(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("r1 = %[bpf_prog_active] ll;"
+		      "r0 = 0;"
+		      "exit;"
+	:
+	: __imm_addr(bpf_prog_active)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
 __description("unpriv: return pointer")
 __success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr")
 __retval(POINTER_VALUE)