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authorWang Haoran <haoranwangsec@gmail.com>2026-04-13 14:06:55 +0800
committerChristian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>2026-05-21 09:32:47 +0200
commit30beced6ec4931db201b77493d41d0df7d7eb5aa (patch)
treece87c1ddf8704cdfb2655172d157dab430195f37
parent1ca179a8538467ef770bfe68a184f6c74c657fef (diff)
iov_iter: use kmemdup_array for dup_iter to harden against overflow
While auditing the Linux 7.0-rc2 kernel, I identified a potential security vulnerability in the iov_iter framework's memory allocation logic. The dup_iter() function, which is exported via EXPORT_SYMBOL, currently uses kmemdup() with a raw multiplication to allocate the duplicate iovec array: new->iov = kmemdup(from->iov, nr_segs * sizeof(struct iovec), gfp); The hazard here is that dup_iter() relies on a primitive multiplication without any integrated overflow check. Since nr_segs is often derived from user-space input, this line is vulnerable to integer overflow (on 32-bit systems or via type narrowing), potentially leading to a small allocation followed by a large out-of-bounds memory copy. Furthermore, it allows for unbounded memory allocations, as the function lacks intrinsic knowledge of safe limits. On the 7.0-rc2 branch, several high-impact callchains still rely on this exported function: drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c: The ffs_epfile_read_iter() path demonstrates why relying on dup_iter() is dangerous: it performs allocation based on user input before verifying driver state. This confirms that dup_iter() must be hardened internally as it cannot assume pre-validated input. drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c: The ep_read_iter() path illustrates how dup_iter()’s lack of boundary awareness compounds resource risks. When combined with other allocations, it creates a multiplier effect for kernel memory pressure. This patch replaces kmemdup() with kmemdup_array(), which utilizes check_mul_overflow() to ensure the allocation size is calculated safely, hardening dup_iter() against malicious or malformed inputs from its callers Signed-off-by: Wang Haoran <haoranwangsec@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413060655.1139141-1-haoranwangsec@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--lib/iov_iter.c8
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
index 243662af1af7..273919b16161 100644
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c
+++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -1224,13 +1224,13 @@ const void *dup_iter(struct iov_iter *new, struct iov_iter *old, gfp_t flags)
{
*new = *old;
if (iov_iter_is_bvec(new))
- return new->bvec = kmemdup(new->bvec,
- new->nr_segs * sizeof(struct bio_vec),
+ return new->bvec = kmemdup_array(new->bvec,
+ new->nr_segs, sizeof(struct bio_vec),
flags);
else if (iov_iter_is_kvec(new) || iter_is_iovec(new))
/* iovec and kvec have identical layout */
- return new->__iov = kmemdup(new->__iov,
- new->nr_segs * sizeof(struct iovec),
+ return new->__iov = kmemdup_array(new->__iov,
+ new->nr_segs, sizeof(struct iovec),
flags);
return NULL;
}