diff options
| author | Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai> | 2026-07-12 14:21:49 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> | 2026-07-20 09:00:40 -0400 |
| commit | 126c757e4cd46f866ddc283143b58eb4d9bf52cd (patch) | |
| tree | 1f52379aa117514c0d4dff859be33807eb46e2fc | |
| parent | 6f7014237405e7f032b5c53a82d9eccf6161c291 (diff) | |
RDMA/rxe: Validate num_sge/cur_sge before indexing wqe->dma.sge[]
For a user QP, qp->sq.queue is a ring the application writes directly,
so rxe_post_send() takes the is_user branch and only schedules send_task
without validating the WQE. rxe_requester() consumes it in place via
req_next_wqe() and calls copy_data(), which indexes
&wqe->dma.sge[cur_sge] with the attacker-controlled num_sge/cur_sge.
Only the kernel path bounds num_sge (validate_send_wr()); the user WQE
is never checked, so a local unprivileged user can post a WQE with an
out-of-range cur_sge or oversized num_sge and force an out-of-bounds
read of the per-WQE sge array in copy_data() (vmalloc OOB read, local
DoS).
Bound num_sge to qp->sq.max_sge in rxe_requester() before use, the way
get_srq_wqe() already guards SRQ entries, and bound cur_sge only when
the WQE carries payload (dma.resid): copy_data() returns early on a
zero-length copy before touching dma->sge[], so a zero-payload WQE --
the only kind a max_sge == 0 QP can post -- stays valid.
Reproduced under KASAN; the vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_data() is gone.
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260712122149.78142-1-security@auditcode.ai
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c index 12d03f390b09..24f5c044363f 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c @@ -701,6 +701,21 @@ int rxe_requester(struct rxe_qp *qp) if (unlikely(!wqe)) goto exit; + /* + * Don't trust user space data: a user QP's WQE comes from an mmap'd + * ring, so num_sge/cur_sge are attacker-controlled. Bound num_sge like + * get_srq_wqe(); bound cur_sge only when payload exists (dma.resid), + * since copy_data() skips dma->sge[] on a zero-length copy (all a + * max_sge == 0 QP can post). + */ + if (unlikely(wqe->dma.num_sge > qp->sq.max_sge || + (wqe->dma.resid && + wqe->dma.cur_sge >= qp->sq.max_sge))) { + rxe_dbg_qp(qp, "invalid num_sge/cur_sge in send wqe\n"); + wqe->status = IB_WC_LOC_QP_OP_ERR; + goto err; + } + if (rxe_wqe_is_fenced(qp, wqe)) { qp->req.wait_fence = 1; goto exit; |
