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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/af_unix.c71
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c113
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c58
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c12
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h12
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/label.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/net.c1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c20
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c6
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/procattr.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/task.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c16
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c2
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/fs.c14
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/fs.h10
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/net.c11
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/task.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c80
21 files changed, 327 insertions, 126 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
index fdb4a9f212c3..834a3b1c2f0a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
@@ -674,9 +674,11 @@ static void update_sk_ctx(struct sock *sk, struct aa_label *label,
old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock));
if (old == plabel) {
- rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, plabel);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate,
+ aa_get_label(plabel));
} else if (aa_label_is_subset(plabel, old)) {
- rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, plabel);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate,
+ aa_get_label(plabel));
rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, aa_get_label(plabel));
aa_put_label(old);
} /* else race or a subset - don't update */
@@ -748,42 +750,47 @@ int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
if (!peer_sk)
goto out;
- peer_addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &peer_addrlen);
-
- struct path peer_path;
-
- peer_path = unix_sk(peer_sk)->path;
- if (!is_sk_fs && is_unix_fs(peer_sk)) {
- last_error(error,
- unix_fs_perm(op, request, subj_cred, label,
- is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ? &peer_path : NULL));
- } else if (!is_sk_fs) {
- struct aa_label *plabel;
- struct aa_sk_ctx *pctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- plabel = aa_get_label_rcu(&pctx->label);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- /* no fs check of aa_unix_peer_perm because conditions above
- * ensure they will never be done
- */
- last_error(error,
- xcheck(unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op,
+ if (!is_sk_fs) {
+ bool is_peer_fs = is_unix_fs(peer_sk);
+
+ peer_addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &peer_addrlen);
+ if (is_peer_fs) {
+ struct path peer_path;
+
+ unix_state_lock(peer_sk);
+ peer_path = unix_sk(peer_sk)->path;
+ if (peer_path.dentry)
+ path_get(&peer_path);
+ unix_state_unlock(peer_sk);
+
+ last_error(error,
+ unix_fs_perm(op, request, subj_cred, label,
+ &peer_path));
+ if (peer_path.dentry)
+ path_put(&peer_path);
+ } else {
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *pctx = aa_sock(peer_sk);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ plabel = aa_get_newest_label(pctx->label);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ /* no fs check of aa_unix_peer_perm because conditions
+ * above ensure they will never be done
+ */
+ last_error(error,
+ xcheck(unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op,
MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, sock->sk,
is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL,
peer_addr, peer_addrlen,
- is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ?
- &peer_path : NULL,
- plabel),
- unix_peer_perm(file->f_cred, plabel, op,
+ NULL, plabel),
+ unix_peer_perm(file->f_cred, plabel, op,
MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, peer_sk,
- is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ?
- &peer_path : NULL,
- addr, addrlen,
+ NULL, addr, addrlen,
is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL,
label)));
- if (!error && !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(plabel, label))
- update_peer_ctx(peer_sk, pctx, label);
+ if (!error && !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(plabel, label))
+ update_peer_ctx(peer_sk, pctx, label);
+ }
}
sock_put(peer_sk);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index ededaf46f3ca..95deb867a76b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@
struct rawdata_f_data {
struct aa_loaddata *loaddata;
+ DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, data);
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
-#define RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(p) (char *)(p + 1)
static void rawdata_f_data_free(struct rawdata_f_data *private)
{
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static struct aa_proxy *get_proxy_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
return NULL;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
static struct aa_loaddata *get_loaddata_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
{
if (ref)
@@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *get_loaddata_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
count));
return NULL;
}
+#endif
static void aa_put_common_ref(struct aa_common_ref *ref)
{
@@ -1434,7 +1436,7 @@ static ssize_t rawdata_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t size,
struct rawdata_f_data *private = file->private_data;
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos,
- RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(private),
+ private->data,
private->loaddata->size);
}
@@ -1467,8 +1469,7 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
private->loaddata = loaddata;
error = decompress_zstd(loaddata->data, loaddata->compressed_size,
- RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(private),
- loaddata->size);
+ private->data, loaddata->size);
if (error)
goto fail_decompress;
@@ -1756,6 +1757,80 @@ static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = {
static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = {
.get_link = rawdata_get_link_data,
};
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH]);
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = NULL;
+ aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI]);
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = NULL;
+ aafs_remove(profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA]);
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline int create_symlink_dent(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ const char *name,
+ enum aafs_prof_type type,
+ const struct inode_operations *iops)
+{
+ struct dentry *dent = NULL;
+ struct dentry *dir = prof_dir(profile);
+
+ if (profile->dents[type])
+ return 0;
+
+ dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
+ &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL, NULL, iops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ return PTR_ERR(dent);
+
+ profile->dents[type] = dent;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
+ */
+int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (!profile ||
+ (profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] &&
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] &&
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA]))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!profile->rawdata)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
+ error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_sha256",
+ AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH,
+ &rawdata_link_sha256_iops);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_abi",
+ AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI,
+ &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+
+ error = create_symlink_dent(profile, "raw_data",
+ AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA,
+ &rawdata_link_data_iops);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
/*
@@ -1831,31 +1906,9 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_HASH] = dent;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
- if (profile->rawdata) {
- if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
- dent = aafs_create("raw_sha256", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
- &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL,
- NULL, &rawdata_link_sha256_iops);
- if (IS_ERR(dent))
- goto fail;
- profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent;
- }
- dent = aafs_create("raw_abi", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
- &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL, NULL,
- &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
- if (IS_ERR(dent))
- goto fail;
- profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = dent;
-
- dent = aafs_create("raw_data", S_IFLNK | 0444, dir,
- &profile->label.proxy->count, NULL, NULL,
- &rawdata_link_data_iops);
- if (IS_ERR(dent))
- goto fail;
- profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = dent;
- }
-#endif /*CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
+ error = __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(profile);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail2;
list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list) {
error = __aafs_profile_mkdir(child, prof_child_dir(profile));
@@ -1922,7 +1975,7 @@ out:
mutex_unlock(&parent->lock);
aa_put_ns(parent);
- return ERR_PTR(error);
+ return error ? ERR_PTR(error) : NULL;
}
static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index f02bf770f638..c2652165a588 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -1109,6 +1110,7 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
int count, int flags)
{
struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL;
+ struct aa_ns *ns, *new_ns;
struct aa_label *new;
struct label_it it;
bool sibling = false;
@@ -1119,6 +1121,32 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
AA_BUG(!hats);
AA_BUG(count < 1);
+ /*
+ * Acquire the newest label and then hold the lock until we choose a
+ * hat, so that profile replacement doesn't atomically truncate the
+ * list of potential hats. Because we are getting the namespaces from
+ * the profiles and label, we can rely on the namespaces being live
+ * and avoid incrementing their refcounts while grabbing the lock.
+ */
+ label = aa_get_label(label);
+ ns = labels_ns(label);
+
+retry:
+ mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level);
+ if (label_is_stale(label)) {
+ new = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+ new_ns = labels_ns(new);
+ if (new_ns != ns) {
+ aa_put_label(new);
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ ns = new_ns;
+ label = new;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ aa_put_label(label);
+ label = new;
+ }
+
if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(labels_profile(label)))
sibling = true;
@@ -1127,7 +1155,7 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
name = hats[i];
label_for_each_in_scope(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
if (sibling && PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
- root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent);
+ root = aa_get_profile(profile->parent);
} else if (!sibling && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
root = aa_get_profile(profile);
} else { /* conflicting change type */
@@ -1187,6 +1215,7 @@ fail:
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
}
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
return ERR_PTR(error);
build:
@@ -1199,7 +1228,7 @@ build:
error = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
} /* else if (IS_ERR) build_change_hat has logged error so return new */
-
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
return new;
}
@@ -1527,6 +1556,8 @@ check:
new = fn_label_build_in_scope(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
aa_get_label(target),
aa_get_label(&profile->label));
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new))
+ goto build_fail;
/*
* no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
* reduce restrictions.
@@ -1545,16 +1576,8 @@ check:
/* only transition profiles in the current ns */
if (stack)
new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) {
- info = "failed to build target label";
- if (!new)
- error = -ENOMEM;
- else
- error = PTR_ERR(new);
- new = NULL;
- perms.allow = 0;
- goto audit;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new))
+ goto build_fail;
error = aa_replace_current_label(new);
} else {
if (new) {
@@ -1566,6 +1589,17 @@ check:
aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
}
+ goto audit;
+
+build_fail:
+ info = "failed to build target label";
+ if (!new)
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ else
+ error = PTR_ERR(new);
+ new = NULL;
+ perms.allow = 0;
+
audit:
error = fn_for_each_in_scope(label, profile,
aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 694e157149e8..c9d55fe1086f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -157,10 +157,10 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
if (unlikely(path->dentry == aa_null.dentry))
- error = -EACCES;
- else
- error = aa_path_name(path, flags, buffer, name, &info,
- labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(path, flags, buffer, name, &info,
+ labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
if (error) {
fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
struct aa_perms *perms)
{
- const char *name;
+ const char *name = NULL;
int error;
if (profile_unconfined(profile))
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
- const char *lname, *tname = NULL;
+ const char *lname = NULL, *tname = NULL;
struct aa_perms lperms = {}, perms;
const char *info = NULL;
u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
index dd580594dfb7..33243d11fd10 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ struct aa_loaddata;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata);
+void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile);
#else
static inline void __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata)
{
@@ -131,6 +133,16 @@ static inline int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns,
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline void __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ /* empty stub */
+}
+
+static inline int __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
#endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 3a721fdf1833..c6a96355e8d9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_alloc(int size, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp)
return new;
fail:
- kfree(new);
+ aa_label_free(new);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index e01efdf50efa..1f2bbc3175d2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -2143,7 +2143,7 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
*/
static void cache_hold_inc(unsigned int *hold)
{
- if (*hold > MAX_HOLD_COUNT)
+ if (*hold < MAX_HOLD_COUNT)
(*hold)++;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index 1fc6145ccbb8..cf590dd08540 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
return PTR_ERR(label);
secmark->secid = label->secid;
+ aa_put_label(label);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index e103cce6f4af..567f6a1c2d65 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1346,6 +1346,16 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
goto skip;
}
+ if (!aa_g_export_binary) {
+ if (ent->old && ent->old->rawdata &&
+ ent->old->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]) {
+ /* remove rawdata symlinks because the symlink
+ * target will be removed
+ */
+ __aa_remove_rawdata_symlink_dents(ent->old);
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* TODO: finer dedup based on profile range in data. Load set
* can differ but profile may remain unchanged
@@ -1356,6 +1366,11 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
if (ent->old) {
share_name(ent->old, ent->new);
__replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new);
+ if (aa_g_export_binary) {
+ /* recreate rawdata symlinks */
+ if (!ent->old->rawdata)
+ __aa_create_rawdata_symlink_dents(ent->new);
+ }
} else {
struct list_head *lh;
@@ -1376,12 +1391,15 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
out:
aa_put_ns(ns);
+
+ ssize_t udata_sz = udata->size;
+
aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
kfree(ns_name);
if (error)
return error;
- return udata->size;
+ return udata_sz;
fail_lock:
mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 9f45d5513d2c..d9dcff167c48 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy,
}
/* accept2 is in some cases being allocated, even with perms */
- if (pdb->perms && !pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
+ if (pdb->dfa && pdb->perms && !pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
/* add dfa flags table missing in v2 */
u32 noents = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen;
u16 tdflags = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_flags;
@@ -1054,7 +1054,8 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy,
pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2] = kvzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) {
*info = "failed to alloc dfa flags table";
- goto out;
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail;
}
pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen = noents;
pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_flags = tdflags;
@@ -1079,7 +1080,6 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy,
* - move free of unneeded trans table here, has to be done
* after perm mapping.
*/
-out:
*policy = pdb;
return 0;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index ce40f15d4952..c07b6e8fd9c9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED);
if (len < 0) {
+ kfree(*string);
+ *string = NULL;
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
return len;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index 0db0e81b4600..b9fb3738124e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static const char *get_current_exe_path(char *buffer, int buffer_size)
path_get(&p);
if (aa_path_name(&p, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, buffer, &path_str, NULL, NULL))
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ path_str = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
fput(exe_file);
path_put(&p);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index acd840461902..4baf5e23bc97 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *temp;
- int offset = 0;
- ssize_t rc, size = 0;
+ size_t offset = 0, size = 0;
+ ssize_t rc;
struct xattr_list *xattr;
if (*ppos != 0)
@@ -151,16 +151,22 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ temp[size] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * No truncation possible: size is computed over the same enabled
+ * xattrs under xattr_list_mutex, so offset never exceeds size.
+ */
list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
if (!xattr->enabled)
continue;
- sprintf(temp + offset, "%s\n", xattr->name);
- offset += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+ offset += snprintf(temp + offset, size + 1 - offset, "%s\n",
+ xattr->name);
}
mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
- rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, offset);
kfree(temp);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index de963b9f3634..2dd231567710 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -195,8 +195,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return sig->hash_algo;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
- if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
- || sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ if ((sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3) ||
+ xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+ sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ima_hash_algo;
return sig->hash_algo;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f7f940a76922..b1c010e8eb13 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1313,7 +1313,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
- IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+ IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+ IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED))
return false;
break;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 5a9887d6b7be..7a2ee0ded7c9 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
- short state = READ_ONCE(key->state);
+ short state = key_read_state(key);
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index c1ecfe239032..664962a416d7 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1901,6 +1901,14 @@ static bool control_current_fowner(struct fown_struct *const fown)
lockdep_assert_held(&fown->lock);
/*
+ * A process-group or session owner (PIDTYPE_PGID/PIDTYPE_SID) fans the
+ * signal out to every member at delivery time, so record the domain and
+ * let hook_file_send_sigiotask() check the live scope per recipient.
+ */
+ if (fown->pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID && fown->pid_type != PIDTYPE_TGID)
+ return true;
+
+ /*
* Some callers (e.g. fcntl_dirnotify) may not be in an RCU read-side
* critical section.
*/
@@ -1916,6 +1924,7 @@ static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *prev_dom;
struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject = {};
+ struct pid *prev_tg, *fown_tg = NULL;
size_t fown_layer = 0;
if (control_current_fowner(file_f_owner(file))) {
@@ -1928,21 +1937,26 @@ static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
if (new_subject) {
landlock_get_ruleset(new_subject->domain);
fown_subject = *new_subject;
+ fown_tg = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
}
}
prev_dom = landlock_file(file)->fown_subject.domain;
+ prev_tg = landlock_file(file)->fown_tg;
landlock_file(file)->fown_subject = fown_subject;
+ landlock_file(file)->fown_tg = fown_tg;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
landlock_file(file)->fown_layer = fown_layer;
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT*/
/* May be called in an RCU read-side critical section. */
landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(prev_dom);
+ put_pid(prev_tg);
}
static void hook_file_free_security(struct file *file)
{
+ put_pid(landlock_file(file)->fown_tg);
landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(landlock_file(file)->fown_subject.domain);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index bf9948941f2f..911b83669e20 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -78,6 +78,16 @@ struct landlock_file_security {
* euid.
*/
struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject;
+ /**
+ * @fown_tg: Thread group of the task that set the file owner, pinned
+ * while @fown_subject holds a domain. It lets
+ * hook_file_send_sigiotask() always allow a SIGIO delivered to the
+ * owner's own process -- e.g. the thread-group leader reached through a
+ * process-group owner -- matching the same-process exemption of
+ * hook_task_kill(). NULL when no domain is recorded. Protected by
+ * file->f_owner->lock, like @fown_subject.
+ */
+ struct pid *fown_tg;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index a38bdfcffc22..4ee4002a8f56 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
const int addrlen,
access_mask_t access_request)
{
+ unsigned short sock_family;
__be16 port;
struct layer_access_masks layer_masks = {};
const struct landlock_rule *rule;
@@ -66,6 +67,12 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * The socket is not locked, so sk_family can change concurrently due to
+ * e.g. setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM).
+ */
+ sock_family = READ_ONCE(sock->sk->sk_family);
+
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
@@ -102,7 +109,7 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
* these checks, but it is safer to return a proper
* error and test consistency thanks to kselftest.
*/
- if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family == AF_INET) {
+ if (sock_family == AF_INET) {
const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
(struct sockaddr_in *)address;
@@ -180,7 +187,7 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
* check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
* consistency thanks to kselftest.
*/
- if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family &&
+ if (address->sa_family != sock_family &&
address->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index 6d46042132ce..7ddf211f75c3 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -411,6 +411,17 @@ static int hook_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (!subject->domain)
return 0;
+ /*
+ * Always allow delivery to the file owner's own process, including a
+ * thread-group leader reached through a process-group owner. This
+ * mirrors hook_task_kill()'s same-process exemption and preserves the
+ * guarantee of commit 18eb75f3af40 ("landlock: Always allow signals
+ * between threads of the same process"), which the registration-time
+ * check cannot honor for a process-group target.
+ */
+ if (task_tgid(tsk) == landlock_file(fown->file)->fown_tg)
+ return 0;
+
scoped_guard(rcu)
{
is_scoped = domain_is_scoped(subject->domain,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0f704380a8c8..e810f3929167 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3973,9 +3973,9 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
-static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
- const struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
- bool shared, bool bf_user_file)
+static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ bool shared, bool mounter_check,
+ bool bf_user_file)
{
struct inode *inode = NULL;
bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC;
@@ -3988,10 +3988,10 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
inode = file_inode(file);
}
- if (default_noexec && prot_exec &&
+ if (!mounter_check && default_noexec && prot_exec &&
(!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) {
int rc;
- u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
/*
* We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private
@@ -4004,6 +4004,8 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
}
if (file) {
+ const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ?
+ file->f_cred : current_cred();
/* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */
u32 av = FILE__READ;
if (shared && prot_write)
@@ -4017,11 +4019,11 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
return 0;
}
-static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
- const struct file *file,
- unsigned long prot, bool shared)
+static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file,
+ unsigned long prot, bool shared,
+ bool mounter_check)
{
- return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false);
+ return __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check, false);
}
static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
@@ -4037,12 +4039,14 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
- unsigned long prot, bool shared)
+static int selinux_mmap_file_common(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ bool shared, bool mounter_check)
{
if (file) {
int rc;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ?
+ file->f_cred : current_cred();
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
ad.u.file = file;
@@ -4051,15 +4055,16 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
return rc;
}
- return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared);
+ return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check);
}
static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
- return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot,
- (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+ return selinux_mmap_file_common(file, prot,
+ (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED,
+ false);
}
/**
@@ -4091,8 +4096,9 @@ static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
- return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file,
- prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
+ return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file, prot,
+ vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED,
+ true);
}
static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -4153,11 +4159,11 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
}
}
- rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file);
+ rc = __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, false, backing_file);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (backing_file) {
- rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared);
+ rc = file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, true);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -4998,9 +5004,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
permission check between the socket and the port number. */
-static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+static int __selinux_socket_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -5130,13 +5135,17 @@ err_af:
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
+static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ return __selinux_socket_bind(sock->sk, address, addrlen);
+}
+
/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
* and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
*/
-static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
@@ -5225,7 +5234,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
int err;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
+ err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sk, address, addrlen);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5266,7 +5275,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
- return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
+ int rc;
+ struct sockaddr *const addr = msg->msg_name;
+ const int addrlen = msg->msg_namelen;
+
+ rc = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (addr && (msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) &&
+ (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) ||
+ (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+ sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP))) {
+ rc = selinux_socket_connect(sock, addr, addrlen);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
@@ -5710,13 +5736,11 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
void *addr_buf;
struct sockaddr *addr;
- struct socket *sock;
if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
return 0;
/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
- sock = sk->sk_socket;
addr_buf = address;
while (walk_size < addrlen) {
@@ -5745,14 +5769,14 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
- err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
+ err = __selinux_socket_bind(sk, addr, len);
break;
/* Connect checks */
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
- err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
+ err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr, len);
if (err)
return err;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2026-08-03 05:41:05 +0000