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| author | Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> | 2026-05-22 02:45:25 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-07-07 13:43:10 +0200 |
| commit | ed51de4a86e173c3b0ef78e039c2e49e08b11f16 (patch) | |
| tree | 9fd90060e19c09582d98c316085525b77a90804a /rust/kernel/drm/gpuvm/git@git.tavy.me:linux-stable.git | |
| parent | a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 (diff) | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by
(pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len.
When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte
remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop
reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer.
Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE
to the handler functions.
Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len.
Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length
for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-2-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/kernel/drm/gpuvm/git@git.tavy.me:linux-stable.git')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
