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authorAlexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>2026-05-22 02:45:29 +0200
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-07-07 13:43:22 +0200
commitf9654207e92283e0acac5d64fe5f8835383b5a23 (patch)
tree9f0f8ae90d646446bb0e289c80b0d083bf9fd0c9 /include/linux/device-id/git@git.tavy.me:linux-stable.git
parentf8001e1a516ba3b495728c65b61f799cbfad6bd0 (diff)
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-6-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/device-id/git@git.tavy.me:linux-stable.git')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions