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authorHarald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>2026-07-29 13:40:09 +0200
committerVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>2026-07-31 13:31:19 +0200
commit36b230835b8a008266aad22168ca52afacc8a58d (patch)
treea276dafcbb3f3d0315000910fece206ef138d7ae /drivers/coresight/git@git.tavy.me:linux-stable.git
parenta9ae0f6dd45c3ccc1d69363f7aea8af179122730 (diff)
s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey
Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size. The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that were used in operations without proper validation against both the actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects as a over-read. So now a key must - key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct - the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of sizeof key token struct ... key buf length Fixes: 4bc123b18ce6 ("s390/zcrypt: Add low level functions for CCA AES cipher keys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/coresight/git@git.tavy.me:linux-stable.git')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions