Merge v6.12.66linux-rolling-lts

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

2 files changed, 95 insertions, 42 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index b58a8a7e1564..d7aabb66a4d1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -253,7 +253,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 	}
 
 	if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
-		tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
+		rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
+		if (rc) {
+			tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+			return rc;
+		}
 		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0);
 	} else {
 		tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx);
@@ -268,8 +272,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 			       chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size);
 	}
 
-	if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
-		tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+	if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
+		rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+		if (rc) {
+			tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
 	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value");
 	if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
 		rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
@@ -327,7 +337,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 						| TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
 						NULL, 0);
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
-		tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+		err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
+		if (err) {
+			tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+			return err;
+		}
+
 		err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
 				       offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
 						buffer),
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index a10db4a4aced..4d9acfb1787e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -144,16 +144,23 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
 /*
  * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255)
  */
-static u8 name_size(const u8 *name)
+static int name_size(const u8 *name)
 {
-	static u8 size_map[] = {
-		[TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		[TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		[TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		[TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	};
-	u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name);
-	return size_map[alg] + 2;
+	u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name);
+
+	switch (hash_alg) {
+	case TPM_ALG_SHA1:
+		return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2;
+	case TPM_ALG_SHA256:
+		return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2;
+	case TPM_ALG_SHA384:
+		return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2;
+	case TPM_ALG_SHA512:
+		return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2;
+	default:
+		pr_warn("tpm: unsupported name algorithm: 0x%04x\n", hash_alg);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 }
 
 static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
@@ -234,9 +241,11 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
  * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
  * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
  * kernel message.
+ *
+ * Ends the authorization session on failure.
  */
-void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
-			 u32 handle, u8 *name)
+int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+			u32 handle, u8 *name)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
 	enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
@@ -247,18 +256,22 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 
 	if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
 		tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
 	slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4;
 	if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
-		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
-		return;
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n");
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto err;
 	}
 	auth = chip->auth;
-	WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf),
-	     "name added in wrong place\n");
+	if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed");
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto err;
+	}
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
 	auth->session += 4;
 
@@ -271,17 +284,29 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 				goto err;
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (name)
-			dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n");
+		if (name) {
+			dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n",
+				handle);
+			ret = -EIO;
+			goto err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
-	if (name)
-		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
-	return;
+	if (name) {
+		ret = name_size(name);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret);
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
 err:
 	tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+	return tpm_ret_to_err(ret);
 #endif
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
@@ -599,11 +624,9 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip,
  * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command
  * buffer with it.
  *
- * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
- * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
- * kernel message.
+ * Ends the authorization session on failure.
  */
-void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
+int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 {
 	u32 cc, handles, val;
 	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
@@ -614,9 +637,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 	u32 attrs;
 	u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	struct sha256_state sctx;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (!auth)
-		return;
+	if (!auth) {
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	/* save the command code in BE format */
 	auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
@@ -625,9 +651,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 
 	i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
 	if (i < 0) {
-		dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc);
-		return;
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "command 0x%08x not found\n", cc);
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto err;
 	}
+
 	attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
 
 	handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
@@ -641,9 +669,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 		u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
 
 		if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) {
-			dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n",
-				  i);
-			return;
+			dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle);
+			ret = -EIO;
+			goto err;
 		}
 	}
 	/* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */
@@ -674,12 +702,14 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 		offset_s += len;
 	}
 	if (offset_s != offset_p) {
-		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n");
-		return;
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n");
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto err;
 	}
 	if (!hmac) {
-		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n");
-		return;
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n");
+		ret = -EIO;
+		goto err;
 	}
 
 	/* encrypt before HMAC */
@@ -711,8 +741,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 		if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
 		    mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
 		    mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
-			sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i],
-				      name_size(auth->name[i]));
+			ret = name_size(auth->name[i]);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto err;
+
+			sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret);
 		} else {
 			__be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]);
 
@@ -733,6 +766,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 	sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1);
 	tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
 			+ auth->passphrase_len, hmac);
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
+	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session);