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2025-07-30apparmor: fix Regression on linux-next (next-20250721)John Johansen
sk lock initialization was incorrectly removed, from apparmor_file_alloc_security() while testing changes to changes to apparmor_sk_alloc_security() resulting in the following regression. [ 48.056654] INFO: trying to register non-static key. [ 48.057480] The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe [ 48.058416] you didn't initialize this object before use? [ 48.059209] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 48.060040] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 648 Comm: chronyd Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7-test-next-20250721-11410-g1ee809985e11-dirty #577 NONE [ 48.060049] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 48.060055] Call Trace: [ 48.060059] <TASK> [ 48.060063] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 48.060075] register_lock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:988 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1302) [ 48.060084] ? path_name (security/apparmor/file.c:159) [ 48.060093] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5116) [ 48.060103] lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:473 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5873 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 (discriminator 4)) [ 48.060109] ? update_file_ctx (security/apparmor/file.c:464) [ 48.060115] ? __pfx_profile_path_perm (security/apparmor/file.c:247) [ 48.060121] _raw_spin_lock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:134 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154) [ 48.060130] ? update_file_ctx (security/apparmor/file.c:464) [ 48.060134] update_file_ctx (security/apparmor/file.c:464) [ 48.060140] aa_file_perm (security/apparmor/file.c:532 (discriminator 1) security/apparmor/file.c:642 (discriminator 1)) [ 48.060147] ? __pfx_aa_file_perm (security/apparmor/file.c:607) [ 48.060152] ? do_mmap (mm/mmap.c:558) [ 48.060160] ? __pfx_userfaultfd_unmap_complete (fs/userfaultfd.c:841) [ 48.060170] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4677 (discriminator 1) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5194 (discriminator 1)) [ 48.060176] ? common_file_perm (security/apparmor/lsm.c:535 (discriminator 1)) [ 48.060185] security_mmap_file (security/security.c:3012 (discriminator 2)) [ 48.060192] vm_mmap_pgoff (mm/util.c:574 (discriminator 1)) [ 48.060200] ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5353 (discriminator 1)) [ 48.060206] ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff (mm/util.c:568) [ 48.060212] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5539 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5892 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5878) [ 48.060219] ? __fget_files (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 (discriminator 13) include/linux/rcupdate.h:100 (discriminator 13) include/linux/rcupdate.h:873 (discriminator 13) fs/file.c:1072 (discriminator 13)) [ 48.060229] ksys_mmap_pgoff (mm/mmap.c:604) [ 48.060239] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) [ 48.060248] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) [ 48.060254] RIP: 0033:0x7fb6920e30a2 [ 48.060265] Code: 08 00 04 00 00 eb e2 90 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 33 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5e 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 c7 05 e6 41 01 00 16 00 All code ======== 0: 08 00 or %al,(%rax) 2: 04 00 add $0x0,%al 4: 00 eb add %ch,%bl 6: e2 90 loop 0xffffffffffffff98 8: 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 test $0xfff,%r9d f: 75 27 jne 0x38 11: 55 push %rbp 12: 89 cd mov %ecx,%ebp 14: 53 push %rbx 15: 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx 18: 48 85 ff test %rdi,%rdi 1b: 74 33 je 0x50 1d: 41 89 ea mov %ebp,%r10d 20: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi 23: b8 09 00 00 00 mov $0x9,%eax 28: 0f 05 syscall 2a:* 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff000,%rax <-- trapping instruction 30: 77 5e ja 0x90 32: 5b pop %rbx 33: 5d pop %rbp 34: c3 ret 35: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) 38: c7 .byte 0xc7 39: 05 e6 41 01 00 add $0x141e6,%eax 3e: 16 (bad) ... Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff000,%rax 6: 77 5e ja 0x66 8: 5b pop %rbx 9: 5d pop %rbp a: c3 ret b: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) e: c7 .byte 0xc7 f: 05 e6 41 01 00 add $0x141e6,%eax 14: 16 (bad) ... [ 48.060270] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2c0d3528 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 [ 48.060279] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb691fc8000 RCX: 00007fb6920e30a2 [ 48.060283] RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000007d000 RDI: 00007fb691fc8000 [ 48.060287] RBP: 0000000000000812 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000011000 [ 48.060290] R10: 0000000000000812 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd2c0d3578 [ 48.060293] R13: 00007fb6920b6160 R14: 00007ffd2c0d39f0 R15: 00000fffa581a6a8 Fixes: 88fec3526e84 ("apparmor: make sure unix socket labeling is correctly updated.") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-30apparmor: fix test error: WARNING in apparmor_unix_stream_connectJohn Johansen
commit 88fec3526e84 ("apparmor: make sure unix socket labeling is correctly updated.") added the use of security_sk_alloc() which ensures the sk label is initialized. This means that the AA_BUG in apparmor_unix_stream_connect() is no longer correct, because while the sk is still not being initialized by going through post_create, it is now initialize in sk_alloc(). Remove the now invalid check. Reported-by: syzbot+cd38ee04bcb3866b0c6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 88fec3526e84 ("apparmor: make sure unix socket labeling is correctly updated.") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-30apparmor: Remove the unused variable rulesJiapeng Chong
Variable rules is not effectively used, so delete it. security/apparmor/lsm.c:182:23: warning: variable ‘rules’ set but not used. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=22942 Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-29Merge tag 'powerpc-6.17-1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux Pull powerpc updates from Madhavan Srinivasan: - CONFIG_HZ changes to move the base_slice from 10ms to 1ms - Patchset to move some of the mutex handling to lock guard - Expose secvars relevant to the key management mode - Misc cleanups and fixes Thanks to Ankit Chauhan, Christophe Leroy, Donet Tom, Gautam Menghani, Haren Myneni, Johan Korsnes, Madadi Vineeth Reddy, Paul Mackerras, Shrikanth Hegde, Srish Srinivasan, Thomas Fourier, Thomas Huth, Thomas Weißschuh, Souradeep, Amit Machhiwal, R Nageswara Sastry, Venkat Rao Bagalkote, Andrew Donnellan, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Mimi Zohar, Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya, Nayna Jain, Ritesh Harjani (IBM), Sourabh Jain, Srikar Dronamraju, Stefan Berger, Tyrel Datwyler, and Kowshik Jois. * tag 'powerpc-6.17-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (23 commits) arch/powerpc: Remove .interp section in vmlinux powerpc: Drop GPL boilerplate text with obsolete FSF address powerpc: Don't use %pK through printk arch: powerpc: defconfig: Drop obsolete CONFIG_NET_CLS_TCINDEX misc: ocxl: Replace scnprintf() with sysfs_emit() in sysfs show functions integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in the static key management mode powerpc/secvar: Expose secvars relevant to the key management mode powerpc/pseries: Correct secvar format representation for static key management (powerpc/512) Fix possible `dma_unmap_single()` on uninitialized pointer powerpc: floppy: Add missing checks after DMA map book3s64/radix : Optimize vmemmap start alignment book3s64/radix : Handle error conditions properly in radix_vmemmap_populate powerpc/pseries/dlpar: Search DRC index from ibm,drc-indexes for IO add KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add H_VIRT mapping for tracing exits powerpc: sysdev: use lock guard for mutex powerpc: powernv: ocxl: use lock guard for mutex powerpc: book3s: vas: use lock guard for mutex powerpc: fadump: use lock guard for mutex powerpc: rtas: use lock guard for mutex powerpc: eeh: use lock guard for mutex ...
2025-07-28Merge tag 'landlock-6.17-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull landlock update from Mickaël Salaün: "Fix test issues, improve build compatibility, and add new tests" * tag 'landlock-6.17-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: landlock: Fix cosmetic change samples/landlock: Fix building on musl libc landlock: Fix warning from KUnit tests selftests/landlock: Add test to check rule tied to covered mount point selftests/landlock: Fix build of audit_test selftests/landlock: Fix readlink check
2025-07-28ipe: use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash APIEric Biggers
audit_policy() does not support any other algorithm, so the crypto_shash abstraction provides no value. Just use the SHA-256 library API instead, which is much simpler and easier to use. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-07-28Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250725' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Introduce the concept of a SELinux "neveraudit" type which prevents all auditing of the given type/domain. Taken by itself, the benefit of marking a SELinux domain with the "neveraudit" tag is likely not very interesting, especially given the significant overlap with the "dontaudit" tag. However, given that the "neveraudit" tag applies to *all* auditing of the tagged domain, we can do some fairly interesting optimizations when a SELinux domain is marked as both "permissive" and "dontaudit" (think of the unconfined_t domain). While this pull request includes optimized inode permission and getattr hooks, these optimizations require SELinux policy changes, therefore the improvements may not be visible on standard downstream Linux distos for a period of time. - Continue the deprecation process of /sys/fs/selinux/user. After removing the associated userspace code in 2020, we marked the /sys/fs/selinux/user interface as deprecated in Linux v6.13 with pr_warn() and the usual documention update. This adds a five second sleep after the pr_warn(), following a previous deprecation process pattern that has worked well for us in the past in helping identify any existing users that we haven't yet reached. - Add a __GFP_NOWARN flag to our initial hash table allocation. Fuzzers such a syzbot often attempt abnormally large SELinux policy loads, which the SELinux code gracefully handles by checking for allocation failures, but not before the allocator emits a warning which causes the automated fuzzing to flag this as an error and report it to the list. While we want to continue to support the work done by the fuzzing teams, we want to focus on proper issues and not an error case that is already handled safely. Add a NOWARN flag to quiet the allocator and prevent syzbot from tripping on this again. - Remove some unnecessary selinuxfs cleanup code, courtesy of Al. - Update the SELinux in-kernel documentation with pointers to additional information. * tag 'selinux-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: don't bother with selinuxfs_info_free() on failures selinux: add __GFP_NOWARN to hashtab_init() allocations selinux: optimize selinux_inode_getattr/permission() based on neveraudit|permissive selinux: introduce neveraudit types documentation: add links to SELinux resources selinux: add a 5 second sleep to /sys/fs/selinux/user
2025-07-28Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250725' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Add Nicolas Bouchinet and Xiu Jianfeng as Lockdown maintainers The Lockdown LSM has been without a dedicated mantainer since its original acceptance upstream, and it has suffered as a result. Thankfully we have two new volunteers who together I believe have the background and desire to help ensure Lockdown is properly supported. - Remove the unused cap_mmap_file() declaration * tag 'lsm-pr-20250725' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: MAINTAINERS: Add Xiu and myself as Lockdown maintainers security: Remove unused declaration cap_mmap_file() lsm: trivial comment fix
2025-07-28Merge tag 'libcrypto-conversions-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux Pull crypto library conversions from Eric Biggers: "Convert fsverity and apparmor to use the SHA-2 library functions instead of crypto_shash. This is simpler and also slightly faster" * tag 'libcrypto-conversions-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux: fsverity: Switch from crypto_shash to SHA-2 library fsverity: Explicitly include <linux/export.h> apparmor: use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash API
2025-07-28Merge tag 'hardening-v6.17-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook: - Introduce and start using TRAILING_OVERLAP() helper for fixing embedded flex array instances (Gustavo A. R. Silva) - mux: Convert mux_control_ops to a flex array member in mux_chip (Thorsten Blum) - string: Group str_has_prefix() and strstarts() (Andy Shevchenko) - Remove KCOV instrumentation from __init and __head (Ritesh Harjani, Kees Cook) - Refactor and rename stackleak feature to support Clang - Add KUnit test for seq_buf API - Fix KUnit fortify test under LTO * tag 'hardening-v6.17-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (22 commits) sched/task_stack: Add missing const qualifier to end_of_stack() kstack_erase: Support Clang stack depth tracking kstack_erase: Add -mgeneral-regs-only to silence Clang warnings init.h: Disable sanitizer coverage for __init and __head kstack_erase: Disable kstack_erase for all of arm compressed boot code x86: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches arm64: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches s390: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches arm: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches mips: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatch powerpc/mm/book3s64: Move kfence and debug_pagealloc related calls to __init section configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON configs/hardening: Enable CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE stackleak: Split KSTACK_ERASE_CFLAGS from GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS stackleak: Rename stackleak_track_stack to __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth stackleak: Rename STACKLEAK to KSTACK_ERASE seq_buf: Introduce KUnit tests string: Group str_has_prefix() and strstarts() kunit/fortify: Add back "volatile" for sizeof() constants acpi: nfit: intel: avoid multiple -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings ...
2025-07-28Merge tag 'vfs-6.17-rc1.fileattr' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs Pull fileattr updates from Christian Brauner: "This introduces the new file_getattr() and file_setattr() system calls after lengthy discussions. Both system calls serve as successors and extensible companions to the FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR system calls which have started to show their age in addition to being named in a way that makes it easy to conflate them with extended attribute related operations. These syscalls allow userspace to set filesystem inode attributes on special files. One of the usage examples is the XFS quota projects. XFS has project quotas which could be attached to a directory. All new inodes in these directories inherit project ID set on parent directory. The project is created from userspace by opening and calling FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR on each inode. This is not possible for special files such as FIFO, SOCK, BLK etc. Therefore, some inodes are left with empty project ID. Those inodes then are not shown in the quota accounting but still exist in the directory. This is not critical but in the case when special files are created in the directory with already existing project quota, these new inodes inherit extended attributes. This creates a mix of special files with and without attributes. Moreover, special files with attributes don't have a possibility to become clear or change the attributes. This, in turn, prevents userspace from re-creating quota project on these existing files. In addition, these new system calls allow the implementation of additional attributes that we couldn't or didn't want to fit into the legacy ioctls anymore" * tag 'vfs-6.17-rc1.fileattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: fs: tighten a sanity check in file_attr_to_fileattr() tree-wide: s/struct fileattr/struct file_kattr/g fs: introduce file_getattr and file_setattr syscalls fs: prepare for extending file_get/setattr() fs: make vfs_fileattr_[get|set] return -EOPNOTSUPP selinux: implement inode_file_[g|s]etattr hooks lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattr fs: split fileattr related helpers into separate file
2025-07-28Merge tag 'pull-misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro: "VFS-related cleanups in various places (mostly of the "that really can't happen" or "there's a better way to do it" variety)" * tag 'pull-misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: gpib: use file_inode() binder_ioctl_write_read(): simplify control flow a bit secretmem: move setting O_LARGEFILE and bumping users' count to the place where we create the file apparmor: file never has NULL f_path.mnt landlock: opened file never has a negative dentry
2025-07-28Merge tag 'pull-securityfs' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull securityfs updates from Al Viro: "Securityfs cleanups and fixes: - one extra reference is enough to pin a dentry down; no need for two. Switch to regular scheme, similar to shmem, debugfs, etc. This fixes a securityfs_recursive_remove() dentry leak, among other things. - we need to have the filesystem pinned to prevent the contents disappearing; what we do not need is pinning it for each file. Doing that only for files and directories in the root is enough. - the previous two changes allow us to get rid of the racy kludges in efi_secret_unlink(), where we can use simple_unlink() instead of securityfs_remove(). Which does not require unlocking and relocking the parent, with all deadlocks that invites. - Make securityfs_remove() take the entire subtree out, turning securityfs_recursive_remove() into its alias. Makes a lot more sense for callers and fixes a mount leak, while we are at it. - Making securityfs_remove() remove the entire subtree allows for much simpler life in most of the users - efi_secret, ima_fs, evm, ipe, tmp get cleaner. I hadn't touched apparmor use of securityfs, but I suspect that it would be useful there as well" * tag 'pull-securityfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: tpm: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing ipe: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing evm_secfs: clear securityfs interactions ima_fs: get rid of lookup-by-dentry stuff ima_fs: don't bother with removal of files in directory we'll be removing efi_secret: clean securityfs use up make securityfs_remove() remove the entire subtree fix locking in efi_secret_unlink() securityfs: pin filesystem only for objects directly in root securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough...
2025-07-26kstack_erase: Support Clang stack depth trackingKees Cook
Wire up CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE to Clang 21's new stack depth tracking callback[1] option. Link: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/SanitizerCoverage.html#tracing-stack-depth [1] Acked-by: Nicolas Schier <n.schier@avm.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724055029.3623499-4-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-07-21stackleak: Rename stackleak_track_stack to __sanitizer_cov_stack_depthKees Cook
The Clang stack depth tracking implementation has a fixed name for the stack depth tracking callback, "__sanitizer_cov_stack_depth", so rename the GCC plugin function to match since the plugin has no external dependencies on naming. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717232519.2984886-2-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-07-21stackleak: Rename STACKLEAK to KSTACK_ERASEKees Cook
In preparation for adding Clang sanitizer coverage stack depth tracking that can support stack depth callbacks: - Add the new top-level CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE option which will be implemented either with the stackleak GCC plugin, or with the Clang stack depth callback support. - Rename CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK as needed to CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE, but keep it for anything specific to the GCC plugin itself. - Rename all exposed "STACKLEAK" names and files to "KSTACK_ERASE" (named for what it does rather than what it protects against), but leave as many of the internals alone as possible to avoid even more churn. While here, also split "prev_lowest_stack" into CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS, since that's the only place it is referenced from. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717232519.2984886-1-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-07-20apparmor: fix: accept2 being specifie even when permission table is presntJohn Johansen
The transition to the perms32 permission table dropped the need for the accept2 table as permissions. However accept2 can be used for flags and may be present even when the perms32 table is present. So instead of checking on version, check whether the table is present. Fixes: 2e12c5f06017 ("apparmor: add additional flags to extended permission.") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: transition from a list of rules to a vector of rulesJohn Johansen
The set of rules on a profile is not dynamically extended, instead if a new ruleset is needed a new version of the profile is created. This allows us to use a vector of rules instead of a list, slightly reducing memory usage and simplifying the code. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: fix documentation mismatches in val_mask_to_str and socket functionsPeng Jiang
This patch fixes kernel-doc warnings: 1. val_mask_to_str: - Added missing descriptions for `size` and `table` parameters. - Removed outdated str_size and chrs references. 2. Socket Functions: - Makes non-null requirements clear for socket/address args. - Standardizes return values per kernel conventions. - Adds Unix domain socket protocol details. These changes silence doc validation warnings and improve accuracy for AppArmor LSM docs. Signed-off-by: Peng Jiang <jiang.peng9@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: remove redundant perms.allow MAY_EXEC bitflag setRyan Lee
This section of profile_transition that occurs after x_to_label only happens if perms.allow already has the MAY_EXEC bit set, so we don't need to set it again. Fixes: 16916b17b4f8 ("apparmor: force auditing of conflicting attachment execs from confined") Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: fix kernel doc warnings for kernel test robotJohn Johansen
Fix kernel doc warnings for the functions - apparmor_socket_bind - apparmor_unix_may_send - apparmor_unix_stream_connect - val_mask_to_str Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202506070127.B1bc3da4-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: Fix unaligned memory accesses in KUnit testHelge Deller
The testcase triggers some unnecessary unaligned memory accesses on the parisc architecture: Kernel: unaligned access to 0x12f28e27 in policy_unpack_test_init+0x180/0x374 (iir 0x0cdc1280) Kernel: unaligned access to 0x12f28e67 in policy_unpack_test_init+0x270/0x374 (iir 0x64dc00ce) Use the existing helper functions put_unaligned_le32() and put_unaligned_le16() to avoid such warnings on architectures which prefer aligned memory accesses. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Fixes: 98c0cc48e27e ("apparmor: fix policy_unpack_test on big endian systems") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: Fix 8-byte alignment for initial dfa blob streamsHelge Deller
The dfa blob stream for the aa_dfa_unpack() function is expected to be aligned on a 8 byte boundary. The static nulldfa_src[] and stacksplitdfa_src[] arrays store the initial apparmor dfa blob streams, but since they are declared as an array-of-chars the compiler and linker will only ensure a "char" (1-byte) alignment. Add an __aligned(8) annotation to the arrays to tell the linker to always align them on a 8-byte boundary. This avoids runtime warnings at startup on alignment-sensitive platforms like parisc such as: Kernel: unaligned access to 0x7f2a584a in aa_dfa_unpack+0x124/0x788 (iir 0xca0109f) Kernel: unaligned access to 0x7f2a584e in aa_dfa_unpack+0x210/0x788 (iir 0xca8109c) Kernel: unaligned access to 0x7f2a586a in aa_dfa_unpack+0x278/0x788 (iir 0xcb01090) Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 98b824ff8984 ("apparmor: refcount the pdb") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: shift uid when mediating af_unix in usernsGabriel Totev
Avoid unshifted ouids for socket file operations as observed when using AppArmor profiles in unprivileged containers with LXD or Incus. For example, root inside container and uid 1000000 outside, with `owner /root/sock rw,` profile entry for nc: /root$ nc -lkU sock & nc -U sock ==> dmesg apparmor="DENIED" operation="connect" class="file" namespace="root//lxd-podia_<var-snap-lxd-common-lxd>" profile="sockit" name="/root/sock" pid=3924 comm="nc" requested_mask="wr" denied_mask="wr" fsuid=1000000 ouid=0 [<== should be 1000000] Fix by performing uid mapping as per common_perm_cond() in lsm.c Signed-off-by: Gabriel Totev <gabriel.totev@zetier.com> Fixes: c05e705812d1 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: shift ouid when mediating hard links in usernsGabriel Totev
When using AppArmor profiles inside an unprivileged container, the link operation observes an unshifted ouid. (tested with LXD and Incus) For example, root inside container and uid 1000000 outside, with `owner /root/link l,` profile entry for ln: /root$ touch chain && ln chain link ==> dmesg apparmor="DENIED" operation="link" class="file" namespace="root//lxd-feet_<var-snap-lxd-common-lxd>" profile="linkit" name="/root/link" pid=1655 comm="ln" requested_mask="l" denied_mask="l" fsuid=1000000 ouid=0 [<== should be 1000000] target="/root/chain" Fix by mapping inode uid of old_dentry in aa_path_link() rather than using it directly, similarly to how it's mapped in __file_path_perm() later in the file. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Totev <gabriel.totev@zetier.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-20apparmor: make sure unix socket labeling is correctly updated.John Johansen
When a unix socket is passed into a different confinement domain make sure its cached mediation labeling is updated to correctly reflect which domains are using the socket. Fixes: c05e705812d1 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-19landlock: Fix cosmetic changeMickaël Salaün
This line removal should not be there and it makes it more difficult to backport the following patch. Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> Fixes: 7a11275c3787 ("landlock: Refactor layer helpers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250719104204.545188-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2025-07-15apparmor: fix regression in fs based unix sockets when using old abiJohn Johansen
Policy loaded using abi 7 socket mediation was not being applied correctly in all cases. In some cases with fs based unix sockets a subset of permissions where allowed when they should have been denied. This was happening because the check for if the socket was an fs based unix socket came before the abi check. But the abi check is where the correct path is selected, so having the fs unix socket check occur early would cause the wrong code path to be used. Fix this by pushing the fs unix to be done after the abi check. Fixes: dcd7a559411e ("apparmor: gate make fine grained unix mediation behind v9 abi") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15apparmor: fix AA_DEBUG_LABEL()John Johansen
AA_DEBUG_LABEL() was not specifying it vargs, which is needed so it can output debug parameters. Fixes: 71e6cff3e0dd ("apparmor: Improve debug print infrastructure") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15apparmor: fix af_unix auditing to include all address informationJohn Johansen
The auditing of addresses currently doesn't include the source address and mixes source and foreign/peer under the same audit name. Fix this so source is always addr, and the foreign/peer is peer_addr. Fixes: c05e705812d1 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15apparmor: Remove use of the double lockJohn Johansen
The use of the double lock is not necessary and problematic. Instead pull the bits that need locks into their own sections and grab the needed references. Fixes: c05e705812d1 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15apparmor: update kernel doc comments for xxx_label_crit_sectionJohn Johansen
Add a kernel doc header for __end_current_label_crit_section(), and update the header for __begin_current_label_crit_section(). Fixes: b42ecc5f58ef ("apparmor: make __begin_current_label_crit_section() indicate whether put is needed") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15apparmor: make __begin_current_label_crit_section() indicate whether put is ↵Mateusz Guzik
needed Same as aa_get_newest_cred_label_condref(). This avoids a bunch of work overall and allows the compiler to note when no clean up is necessary, allowing for tail calls. This in particular happens in apparmor_file_permission(), which manages to tail call aa_file_perm() 105 bytes in (vs a regular call 112 bytes in followed by branches to figure out if clean up is needed). Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15Revert "apparmor: use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash API"John Johansen
This reverts commit e9ed1eb8f6217e53843d82ecf2d50f8d1a93e77c. Eric has requested that this patch be taken through the libcrypto-next tree, instead. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-15apparmor: mitigate parser generating large xtablesJohn Johansen
Some versions of the parser are generating an xtable transition per state in the state machine, even when the state machine isn't using the transition table. The parser bug is triggered by commit 2e12c5f06017 ("apparmor: add additional flags to extended permission.") In addition to fixing this in userspace, mitigate this in the kernel as part of the policy verification checks by detecting this situation and adjusting to what is actually used, or if not used at all freeing it, so we are not wasting unneeded memory on policy. Fixes: 2e12c5f06017 ("apparmor: add additional flags to extended permission.") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2025-07-14apparmor: use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash APIEric Biggers
This user of SHA-256 does not support any other algorithm, so the crypto_shash abstraction provides no value. Just use the SHA-256 library API instead, which is much simpler and easier to use. Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630174805.59010-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
2025-07-09integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in the static key management ↵Srish Srinivasan
mode On PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR, there is no provision to load signed third-party kernel modules when the key management mode is static. This is because keys from secure boot secvars are only loaded when the key management mode is dynamic. Allow loading of the trustedcadb and moduledb keys even in the static key management mode, where the secvar format string takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v0". Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610211907.101384-4-ssrish@linux.ibm.com
2025-07-04tree-wide: s/struct fileattr/struct file_kattr/gChristian Brauner
Now that we expose struct file_attr as our uapi struct rename all the internal struct to struct file_kattr to clearly communicate that it is a kernel internal struct. This is similar to struct mount_{k}attr and others. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250703-restlaufzeit-baurecht-9ed44552b481@brauner Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-07-01selinux: implement inode_file_[g|s]etattr hooksAndrey Albershteyn
These hooks are called on inode extended attribute retrieval/change. Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250630-xattrat-syscall-v6-3-c4e3bc35227b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-07-01lsm: introduce new hooks for setting/getting inode fsxattrAndrey Albershteyn
Introduce new hooks for setting and getting filesystem extended attributes on inode (FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR). Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250630-xattrat-syscall-v6-2-c4e3bc35227b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-06-30smack: fix kernel-doc warnings for smk_import_valid_label()Konstantin Andreev
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202506251712.x5SJiNlh-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-27landlock: Fix warning from KUnit testsTingmao Wang
get_id_range() expects a positive value as first argument but get_random_u8() can return 0. Fix this by clamping it. Validated by running the test in a for loop for 1000 times. Note that MAX() is wrong as it is only supposed to be used for constants, but max() is good here. [..] ok 9 test_range2_rand1 [..] ok 10 test_range2_rand2 [..] ok 11 test_range2_rand15 [..] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [..] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 104 at security/landlock/id.c:99 test_range2_rand16 (security/landlock/id.c:99 (discriminator 1) security/landlock/id.c:234 (discriminator 1)) [..] Modules linked in: [..] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 104 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G N 6.16.0-rc1-dev-00001-g314a2f98b65f #1 PREEMPT(undef) [..] Tainted: [N]=TEST [..] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [..] RIP: 0010:test_range2_rand16 (security/landlock/id.c:99 (discriminator 1) security/landlock/id.c:234 (discriminator 1)) [..] Code: 49 c7 c0 10 70 30 82 4c 89 ff 48 c7 c6 a0 63 1e 83 49 c7 45 a0 e0 63 1e 83 e8 3f 95 17 00 e9 1f ff ff ff 0f 0b e9 df fd ff ff <0f> 0b ba 01 00 00 00 e9 68 fe ff ff 49 89 45 a8 49 8d 4d a0 45 31 [..] RSP: 0000:ffff888104eb7c78 EFLAGS: 00010246 [..] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000870822c RCX: 0000000000000000 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ [..] [..] Call Trace: [..] [..] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [..] ok 12 test_range2_rand16 [..] # landlock_id: pass:12 fail:0 skip:0 total:12 [..] # Totals: pass:12 fail:0 skip:0 total:12 [..] ok 1 landlock_id Fixes: d9d2a68ed44b ("landlock: Add unique ID generator") Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/73e28efc5b8cc394608b99d5bc2596ca917d7c4a.1750003733.git.m@maowtm.org [mic: Minor cosmetic improvements] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2025-06-24selinux: don't bother with selinuxfs_info_free() on failuresAl Viro
Failures in sel_fill_super() will be followed by sel_kill_sb(), which will call selinuxfs_info_free() anyway. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> [PM: subj and description tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2025-06-24smack: fix bug: setting task label silently ignores input garbageKonstantin Andreev
This command: # echo foo/bar >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current gives the task a label 'foo' w/o indication that label does not match input. Setting the label with lsm_set_self_attr() syscall behaves identically. This occures because: 1) smk_parse_smack() is used to convert input to a label 2) smk_parse_smack() takes only that part from the beginning of the input that looks like a label. 3) `/' is prohibited in labels, so only "foo" is taken. (2) is by design, because smk_parse_smack() is used for parsing strings which are more than just a label. Silent failure is not a good thing, and there are two indicators that this was not done intentionally: (size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) ~> invalid clause at the beginning of the do_setattr() and the "Returns the length of the smack label" claim in the do_setattr() description. So I fixed this by adding one tiny check: the taken label length == input length. Since input length is now strictly controlled, I changed the two ways of setting label smack_setselfattr(): lsm_set_self_attr() syscall smack_setprocattr(): > /proc/.../current to accommodate the divergence in what they understand by "input length": smack_setselfattr counts mandatory \0 into input length, smack_setprocattr does not. smack_setprocattr allows various trailers after label Related changes: * fixed description for smk_parse_smack * allow unprivileged tasks validate label syntax. * extract smk_parse_label_len() from smk_parse_smack() so parsing may be done w/o string allocation. * extract smk_import_valid_label() from smk_import_entry() to avoid repeated parsing. * smk_parse_smack(): scan null-terminated strings for no more than SMK_LONGLABEL(256) characters * smack_setselfattr(): require struct lsm_ctx . flags == 0 to reserve them for future. Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-24smack: fix bug: unprivileged task can create labelsKonstantin Andreev
If an unprivileged task is allowed to relabel itself (/smack/relabel-self is not empty), it can freely create new labels by writing their names into own /proc/PID/attr/smack/current This occurs because do_setattr() imports the provided label in advance, before checking "relabel-self" list. This change ensures that the "relabel-self" list is checked before importing the label. Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-23exec: Correct the permission check for unsafe execEric W. Biederman
Max Kellerman recently experienced a problem[1] when calling exec with differing uid and euid's and he triggered the logic that is supposed to only handle setuid executables. When exec isn't changing anything in struct cred it doesn't make sense to go into the code that is there to handle the case when the credentials change. When looking into the history of the code I discovered that this issue was not present in Linux-2.4.0-test12 and was introduced in Linux-2.4.0-prerelease when the logic for handling this case was moved from prepare_binprm to compute_creds in fs/exec.c. The bug introdused was to comparing euid in the new credentials with uid instead of euid in the old credentials, when testing if setuid had changed the euid. Since triggering the keep ptrace limping along case for setuid executables makes no sense when it was not a setuid exec revert back to the logic present in Linux-2.4.0-test12. This removes the confusingly named and subtlety incorrect helpers is_setuid and is_setgid, that helped this bug to persist. The varaiable is_setid is renamed to id_changed (it's Linux-2.4.0-test12) as the old name describes what matters rather than it's cause. The code removed in Linux-2.4.0-prerelease was: - /* Set-uid? */ - if (mode & S_ISUID) { - bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid; - if (bprm->e_uid != current->euid) - id_change = 1; - } - - /* Set-gid? */ - /* - * If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this - * is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid - * executable. - */ - if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { - bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid; - if (!in_group_p(bprm->e_gid)) - id_change = 1; Linux-2.4.0-prerelease added the current logic as: + if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || + !cap_issubset(new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { + current->dumpable = 0; + + lock_kernel(); + if (must_not_trace_exec(current) + || atomic_read(&current->fs->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(&current->files->count) > 1 + || atomic_read(&current->sig->count) > 1) { + if(!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + if(!capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) { + new_permitted = cap_intersect(new_permitted, + current->cap_permitted); + } + } + do_unlock = 1; + } I have condenced the logic from Linux-2.4.0-test12 to just: id_changed = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) || !in_group_p(new->egid); This change is userspace visible, but I don't expect anyone to care. For the bug that is being fixed to trigger bprm->unsafe has to be set. The variable bprm->unsafe is set when ptracing an executable, when sharing a working directory, or when no_new_privs is set. Properly testing for cases that are safe even in those conditions and doing nothing special should not affect anyone. Especially if they were previously ok with their credentials getting munged To minimize behavioural changes the code continues to set secureexec when euid != uid or when egid != gid. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250306082615.174777-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com Reported-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Fixes: 64444d3d0d7f ("Linux version 2.4.0-prerelease") v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/878qmxsuy8.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-06-22smack: fix bug: invalid label of unix socket fileKonstantin Andreev
According to [1], the label of a UNIX domain socket (UDS) file (i.e., the filesystem object representing the socket) is not supposed to participate in Smack security. To achieve this, [1] labels UDS files with "*" in smack_d_instantiate(). Before [2], smack_d_instantiate() was responsible for initializing Smack security for all inodes, except ones under /proc [2] imposed the sole responsibility for initializing inode security for newly created filesystem objects on smack_inode_init_security(). However, smack_inode_init_security() lacks some logic present in smack_d_instantiate(). In particular, it does not label UDS files with "*". This patch adds the missing labeling of UDS files with "*" to smack_inode_init_security(). Labeling UDS files with "*" in smack_d_instantiate() still works for stale UDS files that already exist on disk. Stale UDS files are useless, but I keep labeling them for consistency and maybe to make easier for user to delete them. Compared to [1], this version introduces the following improvements: * UDS file label is held inside inode only and not saved to xattrs. * relabeling UDS files (setxattr, removexattr, etc.) is blocked. [1] 2010-11-24 Casey Schaufler commit b4e0d5f0791b ("Smack: UDS revision") [2] 2023-11-16 roberto.sassu Fixes: e63d86b8b764 ("smack: Initialize the in-memory inode in smack_inode_init_security()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231116090125.187209-5-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com/ Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-22smack: always "instantiate" inode in smack_inode_init_security()Konstantin Andreev
If memory allocation for the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr value fails in smack_inode_init_security(), the SMK_INODE_INSTANT flag is not set in (struct inode_smack *issp)->smk_flags, leaving the inode as not "instantiated". It does not matter if fs frees the inode after failed smack_inode_init_security() call, but there is no guarantee for this. To be safe, mark the inode as "instantiated", even if allocation of xattr values fails. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-22smack: deduplicate xattr setting in smack_inode_init_security()Konstantin Andreev
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-22smack: fix bug: SMACK64TRANSMUTE set on non-directoryKonstantin Andreev
When a new file system object is created and the conditions for label transmutation are met, the SMACK64TRANSMUTE extended attribute is set on the object regardless of its type: file, pipe, socket, symlink, or directory. However, SMACK64TRANSMUTE may only be set on directories. This bug is a combined effect of the commits [1] and [2] which both transfer functionality from smack_d_instantiate() to smack_inode_init_security(), but only in part. Commit [1] set blank SMACK64TRANSMUTE on improper object types. Commit [2] set "TRUE" SMACK64TRANSMUTE on improper object types. [1] 2023-06-10, Fixes: baed456a6a2f ("smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20230610075738.3273764-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com/ [2] 2023-11-16, Fixes: e63d86b8b764 ("smack: Initialize the in-memory inode in smack_inode_init_security()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231116090125.187209-5-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com/ Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2026-09-10 18:16:13 +0000