<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security, branch v6.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging</title>
<updated>2024-08-31T21:18:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-31T21:18:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6cd90e5ea72f35fa40f971c419e16142cd8272bf'/>
<id>6cd90e5ea72f35fa40f971c419e16142cd8272bf</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc fixes from Guenter Roeck.

These are fixes for regressions that Guenther has been reporting, and
the maintainers haven't picked up and sent in. With rc6 fairly imminent,
I'm taking them directly from Guenter.

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging:
  apparmor: fix policy_unpack_test on big endian systems
  Revert "MIPS: csrc-r4k: Apply verification clocksource flags"
  microblaze: don't treat zero reserved memory regions as error
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull misc fixes from Guenter Roeck.

These are fixes for regressions that Guenther has been reporting, and
the maintainers haven't picked up and sent in. With rc6 fairly imminent,
I'm taking them directly from Guenter.

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging:
  apparmor: fix policy_unpack_test on big endian systems
  Revert "MIPS: csrc-r4k: Apply verification clocksource flags"
  microblaze: don't treat zero reserved memory regions as error
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240830' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-08-30T18:33:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-30T18:33:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fb24560f31f9dff2c97707cfed6029bfebebaf1c'/>
<id>fb24560f31f9dff2c97707cfed6029bfebebaf1c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull lsm fix from Paul Moore:
 "One small patch to correct a NFS permissions problem with SELinux and
  Smack"

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240830' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull lsm fix from Paul Moore:
 "One small patch to correct a NFS permissions problem with SELinux and
  Smack"

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240830' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook</title>
<updated>2024-08-28T23:12:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Scott Mayhew</name>
<email>smayhew@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-28T19:51:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7'/>
<id>76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7</id>
<content type='text'>
Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to
change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is
exported with root squashing enabled.

The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:

 *  This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
 *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
 *  permission checks.

nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and
nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks
that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.

Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(),
simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to
__vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked().  This
fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to
recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change
its security label.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Gresko &lt;marek.gresko@protonmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew &lt;smayhew@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to
change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is
exported with root squashing enabled.

The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:

 *  This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
 *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
 *  permission checks.

nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and
nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks
that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.

Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(),
simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to
__vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked().  This
fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to
recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change
its security label.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Gresko &lt;marek.gresko@protonmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew &lt;smayhew@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix policy_unpack_test on big endian systems</title>
<updated>2024-08-25T22:26:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guenter Roeck</name>
<email>linux@roeck-us.net</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-08T15:50:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=98c0cc48e27e9d269a3e4db2acd72b486c88ec77'/>
<id>98c0cc48e27e9d269a3e4db2acd72b486c88ec77</id>
<content type='text'>
policy_unpack_test fails on big endian systems because data byte order
is expected to be little endian but is generated in host byte order.
This results in test failures such as:

 # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:150
    Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
        array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
        (u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1
    not ok 3 policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:164
    Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
        array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
        (u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1

Add the missing endianness conversions when generating test data.

Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack")
Cc: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
policy_unpack_test fails on big endian systems because data byte order
is expected to be little endian but is generated in host byte order.
This results in test failures such as:

 # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:150
    Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
        array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
        (u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1
    not ok 3 policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:164
    Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
        array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
        (u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1

Add the missing endianness conversions when generating test data.

Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack")
Cc: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key</title>
<updated>2024-08-15T19:01:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-17T11:28:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0e28bf61a5f9ab30be3f3b4eafb8d097e39446bb'/>
<id>0e28bf61a5f9ab30be3f3b4eafb8d097e39446bb</id>
<content type='text'>
Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in
the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply
convert this field to hex and send it to userspace.

With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK)
in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload.
BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob
field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text.
Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead
of the encrypted BEK to userspace.

This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and
then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases
are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key
blob and then just use it without exporting it again.

Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated
buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking
the key via uninitialized memory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in
the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply
convert this field to hex and send it to userspace.

With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK)
in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload.
BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob
field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text.
Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead
of the encrypted BEK to userspace.

This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and
then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases
are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key
blob and then just use it without exporting it again.

Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated
buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking
the key via uninitialized memory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment</title>
<updated>2024-08-15T19:01:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-17T11:28:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6486cad00a8b7f8585983408c152bbe33dda529b'/>
<id>6486cad00a8b7f8585983408c152bbe33dda529b</id>
<content type='text'>
The DCP trusted key type uses the wrong helper function to store
the blob's payload length which can lead to the wrong byte order
being used in case this would ever run on big endian architectures.

Fix by using correct helper function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Suggested-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202405240610.fj53EK0q-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The DCP trusted key type uses the wrong helper function to store
the blob's payload length which can lead to the wrong byte order
being used in case this would ever run on big endian architectures.

Fix by using correct helper function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Suggested-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202405240610.fj53EK0q-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap()</title>
<updated>2024-08-08T20:22:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-08T15:57:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=05a3d6e9307250a5911d75308e4363466794ab21'/>
<id>05a3d6e9307250a5911d75308e4363466794ab21</id>
<content type='text'>
Unfortunately it appears that vma_is_initial_heap() is currently broken
for applications that do not currently have any heap allocated, e.g.
brk == start_brk.  The breakage is such that it will cause SELinux to
check for the process/execheap permission on memory regions that cross
brk/start_brk even when there is no heap.

The proper fix would be to correct vma_is_initial_heap(), but as there
are multiple callers I am hesitant to unilaterally modify the helper
out of concern that I would end up breaking some other subsystem.  The
mm developers have been made aware of the situation and hopefully they
will have a fix at some point in the future, but we need a fix soon so
we are simply going to revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap() in favor
of our old logic/code which works as expected, even in the face of a
zero size heap.  We can return to using vma_is_initial_heap() at some
point in the future when it is fixed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marc Reisner &lt;reisner.marc@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZrPmoLKJEf1wiFmM@marcreisner.com
Fixes: 68df1baf158f ("selinux: use vma_is_initial_stack() and vma_is_initial_heap()")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Unfortunately it appears that vma_is_initial_heap() is currently broken
for applications that do not currently have any heap allocated, e.g.
brk == start_brk.  The breakage is such that it will cause SELinux to
check for the process/execheap permission on memory regions that cross
brk/start_brk even when there is no heap.

The proper fix would be to correct vma_is_initial_heap(), but as there
are multiple callers I am hesitant to unilaterally modify the helper
out of concern that I would end up breaking some other subsystem.  The
mm developers have been made aware of the situation and hopefully they
will have a fix at some point in the future, but we need a fix soon so
we are simply going to revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap() in favor
of our old logic/code which works as expected, even in the face of a
zero size heap.  We can return to using vma_is_initial_heap() at some
point in the future when it is fixed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marc Reisner &lt;reisner.marc@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZrPmoLKJEf1wiFmM@marcreisner.com
Fixes: 68df1baf158f ("selinux: use vma_is_initial_stack() and vma_is_initial_heap()")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add the processing of the failure of avc_add_xperms_decision()</title>
<updated>2024-08-07T19:14:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhen Lei</name>
<email>thunder.leizhen@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-07T09:00:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6dd1e4c045afa6a4ba5d46f044c83bd357c593c2'/>
<id>6dd1e4c045afa6a4ba5d46f044c83bd357c593c2</id>
<content type='text'>
When avc_add_xperms_decision() fails, the information recorded by the new
avc node is incomplete. In this case, the new avc node should be released
instead of replacing the old avc node.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When avc_add_xperms_decision() fails, the information recorded by the new
avc node is incomplete. In this case, the new avc node should be released
instead of replacing the old avc node.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix potential counting error in avc_add_xperms_decision()</title>
<updated>2024-08-06T21:52:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhen Lei</name>
<email>thunder.leizhen@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-06T06:51:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=379d9af3f3da2da1bbfa67baf1820c72a080d1f1'/>
<id>379d9af3f3da2da1bbfa67baf1820c72a080d1f1</id>
<content type='text'>
The count increases only when a node is successfully added to
the linked list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The count increases only when a node is successfully added to
the linked list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2024-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor</title>
<updated>2024-07-27T20:28:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-27T20:28:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ff30564411ffdcee49d579cb15eb13185a36e253'/>
<id>ff30564411ffdcee49d579cb15eb13185a36e253</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
 "Cleanups
   - optimization: try to avoid refing the label in apparmor_file_open
   - remove useless static inline function is_deleted
   - use kvfree_sensitive to free data-&gt;data
   - fix typo in kernel doc

  Bug fixes:
   - unpack transition table if dfa is not present
   - test: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION()
   - take nosymfollow flag into account
   - fix possible NULL pointer dereference
   - fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation"

* tag 'apparmor-pr-2024-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
  apparmor: unpack transition table if dfa is not present
  apparmor: try to avoid refing the label in apparmor_file_open
  apparmor: test: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION()
  apparmor: take nosymfollow flag into account
  apparmor: fix possible NULL pointer dereference
  apparmor: fix typo in kernel doc
  apparmor: remove useless static inline function is_deleted
  apparmor: use kvfree_sensitive to free data-&gt;data
  apparmor: Fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation
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Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
 "Cleanups
   - optimization: try to avoid refing the label in apparmor_file_open
   - remove useless static inline function is_deleted
   - use kvfree_sensitive to free data-&gt;data
   - fix typo in kernel doc

  Bug fixes:
   - unpack transition table if dfa is not present
   - test: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION()
   - take nosymfollow flag into account
   - fix possible NULL pointer dereference
   - fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation"

* tag 'apparmor-pr-2024-07-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
  apparmor: unpack transition table if dfa is not present
  apparmor: try to avoid refing the label in apparmor_file_open
  apparmor: test: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION()
  apparmor: take nosymfollow flag into account
  apparmor: fix possible NULL pointer dereference
  apparmor: fix typo in kernel doc
  apparmor: remove useless static inline function is_deleted
  apparmor: use kvfree_sensitive to free data-&gt;data
  apparmor: Fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation
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