Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:

 - TPM initialization is sometimes delayed until deferred_probe_initcall

   Since ordering is not guaranteed within the same initcall level, IMA
   may initialize before the TPM and fall back to TPM-bypass mode. A new
   config option, CONFIG_IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC, allows those building the
   kernel to defer IMA initialization to late_initcall_sync, accepting
   the integrity risk of missing early measurements in exchange for
   avoiding TPM-bypass mode.

 - The raw policy rules are now measured, as well as the complete
   policy, closing a gap in integrity measurement coverage

* tag 'integrity-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: measure userspace policy writes before parsing
  ima: add critical data measurement for loaded policy
  security: ima: rename boot_aggregate when ima is initialised at late_sync
  security: ima: introduce IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC option
  security: lsm: allow LSMs to register for late_initcall_sync init

Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:

 - Spelling fix

 - Code optimization in smackfs

 - Fix credential mis-uses

 - Place limits on two of the smackfs interfaces

* tag 'Smack-for-7.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  smack: fix cred UAF in smack_file_send_sigiotask()
  smack: restrict smackfs/{direct,mapped} values to 0-255
  smack: deduplicate smackfs/{direct,mapped} file_operations
  smack: show msgrcv() subject task in audit
  smack: fix incorrect task context in smack_msg_queue_msgrcv
  security: smack: fix spelling mistake
  smack: simplify write handlers of sysfs entries
  Smack: Fix error in capability bypass

Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:

 - Remove task_euid()

   The task_euid(), and Rust counterpart, was never widely used, for
   good reason, and now that the only user is gone we're removing it to
   rid ourselves of both dead and funky code.

 - Documentation improvements

   Correct some of the kdoc comments for security_task_prctl() and
   clarify the rust comments on task UID accessors.

 - Fix a memory leak in the LSM syscall selftests

* tag 'lsm-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  selftests/lsm: Fix memory leak in attr_lsm_count
  cred: delete task_euid()
  rust: task: clarify comments on task UID accessors
  lsm: clarify security_task_prctl() hook documentation

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:

 - Convert a __get_free_page() call into a kmalloc() call

   We had some very old code that called out to __get_free_page() for
   allocating a pathname. There is no reason this couldn't be done with
   a call to kmalloc() so we've done the conversion and now there is one
   less __get_free_page() caller in the kernel.

 - Limit the number of retired/unknown DCCP netlink messages

   While DCCP is gone from the kernel, there are still userspace tools
   which try to talk to the kernel about DCCP sockets which were
   generating SELinux related log noise (unrecognized netlink message).
   This pull request both limits the log messages to just the first
   instance and also explains to the user that DCCP support has been
   removed.

 - Convert the SELinux strlcat() calls to seq_buf_XXX() calls

   As part of the effort to drop the strlcat() API from the kernel, the
   SELinux/IMA code was converted over to using seq_buf_XXX() calls.

 - Only calculate the SELinux IMA configuration string length once

   Previously each call to generate a SELinux configuration string for
   IMA would have to calculate the length of the string. While the
   contents of the string will likely change over the lifetime of the
   system, the length of the string will not. Calculate the string
   length once at boot and reuse the length value throughout the
   lifetime of the system.

 - Further validation of the SELinux policy at policy load time

   Perform additional sanity checks on the policy constraints and types.

 - Proper cleanup and error handling for selinuxfs init failures

   We were not properly cleaning up some state in the case where
   selinuxfs fails to initialize properly. It's somewhat of an academic
   exercise as a failure to initialize selinuxfs will cause the system
   to fail on boot, but it's arguably better to make sure we do things
   the proper way.

 - Various code cleanups

   Convert integer flags to boolean types and drop an uncessary goto
   from the SELinux code.

* tag 'selinux-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: validate constraint expression attr and op at load time
  selinux: compute the IMA configuration settings string length once at boot
  selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state()
  selinux: suppress warning flood for retired DCCP netlink messages
  selinux: tighten type validation during policy load
  selinux: drop unnecessary goto and label from avc_alloc_node()
  selinux: convert int flags to bool flags in ss/services.c
  selinux: clean up selinuxfs resources on init failure
  selinux: hooks: use kmalloc() to allocate path buffer

When inspecting the credentials of another task, objective credentials
(->real_cred, accessed with __task_cred()) must always be used.

Accessing ->cred on a non-current task is forbidden unless that task is
being created or destroyed; a task is allowed to change its own ->cred
pointer with no synchronization, and changing ->cred should only affect the
current syscall.

smack_file_send_sigiotask() was accessing both sets of credentials: First
tsk->cred, then __task_cred(tsk).

Fix it, always access the objective credentials here.

I have tested that this bug can lead to a KASAN-reported UAF of struct cred
in smack_file_send_sigiotask(), and that this fix prevents the race.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:

 - Continue to improve the validation of SELinux policies during load

 - Fix a SELinux regression caused by bpffs changes in v7.2-rc1

 - Fix a SELinux preformance regression caused by SELinux changes in
   v7.2-rc1

* tag 'selinux-pr-20260805' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: check level category sets once at load time
  selinux: require every boolean value to be defined
  selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes()
  selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count
  selinux: do not cancel a policy conversion that never started
  selinux: bpf: check SBLABEL_MNT before isec init
  selinux: reject a class permission count below its inherited common
  selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count

When a signed policy is not mandatory, userspace can write IMA policy rules
directly to the securityfs policy file:

echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
        "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
     > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy

or by cat'ing the entire IMA custom policy file:

cat ima-policy-file > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy

Because these rules originate from userspace and cross the userspace/kernel
trust boundary, measure the raw write buffer before parsing, regardless of
whether the new policy will be accepted or not. This can be caught when
'measure func=POLICY_CHECK' is enabled (e.g., ima_policy=tcb). The
measurement template is forced to ima-buf.
This follows the "measure & load" paradigm, exposing potential bugs in
the policy code and detecting attempts to corrupt IMA. It also completes
the POLICY_CHECK hook, which already measures partial policy load by file.

To verify the template data hash value, convert the buffer policy data
to binary:
grep "ima_policy_written" \
	/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | \
	tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum

Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

IMA policy can be written multiple times in the securityfs policy file
at runtime if CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=y. When IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY is
required, the policy needs to be signed to be loaded, writing the absolute
path of the file containing the new policy:

echo /path/of/custom_ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy

When this is not required, policy can be written directly, rule by rule:

echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
        "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
     > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy

In this case, a new policy can be loaded without being measured or
appraised.

Add a new critical data record to measure the textual policy
representation when it becomes effective. Include in the
architecture-specific policy the new critical data record only when it
is not mandatory to load a signed policy. Additionally, enable the
policy serialization code even when CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=n.

To verify the template data hash value, convert the buffer policy data
to binary:
grep "ima_policy_loaded" \
        /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | \
        tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum

Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Instantiate the file_truncate and path_truncate LSM hooks to reset the
action cache flags (IMA_DONE_MASK) as soon as truncation is requested,
so the file, based on policy, is re-collected, re-measured, re-audited,
and re-appraised on next access.

Tested-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The Linux IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) subsystem used for
secure boot, file integrity, or remote attestation cannot be a loadable
module for few reasons listed below:

 o Boot-Time Integrity: IMA’s main role is to measure and appraise files
   before they are used. This includes measuring critical system files
   during early boot (e.g., init, init scripts, login binaries). If IMA
   were a module, it would be loaded too late to cover those.

 o TPM Dependency: IMA integrates tightly with the TPM to record
   measurements into PCRs. The TPM must be initialized early (ideally
   before init_ima()), which aligns with IMA being built-in.

 o Security Model: IMA is part of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Making
   it a module would weaken the security model, as a potentially
   compromised system could delay or tamper with its initialization.

IMA must be built-in to ensure it starts measuring from the earliest
possible point in boot which inturn implies TPM must be initialised and
ready to use before IMA.

Unfortunately some TPM drivers (such as Arm FF-A, or SPI attached TPM
devices) are not reliably available during the initcall_late stage,
resulting in a log error:

  ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!

To address this issue, IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC is introduced.
However, a remote attestation service cannot determine when IMA has been
initialized because the boot_aggregate measurement name remains unchanged,
even though IMA is initialized later at late_initcall_sync when
IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC is enabled.

Therefore, use a distinct boot_aggregate name when IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC
is enabled, allowing the remote attestation service to identify
when IMA has been initialized.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
[yeoreum.yun@arm.com: modified to align with the IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC change]
Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>