<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security/keys, branch v5.1-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-03-11T00:37:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-11T00:37:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5af7f115886f7ec193171e2e49b8000ddd1e7147'/>
<id>5af7f115886f7ec193171e2e49b8000ddd1e7147</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:

 - Clean up the transmission flow

   Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
   done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
   taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
   tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
   out.

   Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
   without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
   patches by James Bottomley).

 - PPI 1.3 support

   TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
   may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
   requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.

   The PPI request file will show output like this then:

      # echo "23 16" &gt; request
      # cat request
      23 16

      # echo "5" &gt; request
      # cat request
      5

 - Extend all PCR banks in IMA

   Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
   is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
   dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
   list of hash algorithms.

   This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
   secure.

 - TPM 2.0 selftests

   Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
   of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts

* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
  tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
  tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
  tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
  tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
  tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
  KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
  tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
  tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
  tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
  tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
  tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
  tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
  tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
  tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
  tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:

 - Clean up the transmission flow

   Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
   done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
   taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
   tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
   out.

   Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
   without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
   patches by James Bottomley).

 - PPI 1.3 support

   TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
   may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
   requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.

   The PPI request file will show output like this then:

      # echo "23 16" &gt; request
      # cat request
      23 16

      # echo "5" &gt; request
      # cat request
      5

 - Extend all PCR banks in IMA

   Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
   is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
   dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
   list of hash algorithms.

   This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
   secure.

 - TPM 2.0 selftests

   Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
   of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts

* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
  tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
  tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
  tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
  tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
  tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
  KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
  tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
  tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
  tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
  tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
  tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
  tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
  tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
  tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
  tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-03-11T00:32:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-11T00:32:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c3665a6be5de16cf6670a00003642114c44d8a70'/>
<id>c3665a6be5de16cf6670a00003642114c44d8a70</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "Mimi Zohar says:

   'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
    kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
    request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
    verifying the PE kernel image signature.

    Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
    files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
    The remaining patches are cleanup'"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
  ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
  evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
  encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
  kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
  integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "Mimi Zohar says:

   'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
    kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
    request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
    verifying the PE kernel image signature.

    Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
    files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
    The remaining patches are cleanup'"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
  ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
  evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
  encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
  kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
  integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-03-07T19:44:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-07T19:44:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ae5906ceee038ea29ff5162d1bcd18fb50af8b94'/>
<id>ae5906ceee038ea29ff5162d1bcd18fb50af8b94</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and
   task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be
   merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This
   work is from Casey and Kees.

 - There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid
   family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given
   UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This
   feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits)
  keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
  LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
  LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified
  LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable
  security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
  tomoyo: Bump version.
  LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs()
  LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest
  LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include
  LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY
  LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM
  LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
  LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
  tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines.
  tomoyo: Coding style fix.
  tomoyo: Swicth from cred-&gt;security to task_struct-&gt;security.
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
  capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and
   task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be
   merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This
   work is from Casey and Kees.

 - There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid
   family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given
   UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This
   feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits)
  keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
  LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
  LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified
  LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable
  security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
  tomoyo: Bump version.
  LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs()
  LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest
  LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include
  LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY
  LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM
  LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
  LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
  tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines.
  tomoyo: Coding style fix.
  tomoyo: Swicth from cred-&gt;security to task_struct-&gt;security.
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
  security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
  capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY</title>
<updated>2019-03-04T23:48:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Dooks</name>
<email>ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-01T11:30:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=468e91cecb3218afd684b8c422490dfebe0691bb'/>
<id>468e91cecb3218afd684b8c422490dfebe0691bb</id>
<content type='text'>
The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on
it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning
for this:

security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43:    expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] &lt;asn:1&gt;*&lt;noident&gt;
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43:    got struct keyctl_pkey_query *&lt;noident&gt;

Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks &lt;ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on
it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning
for this:

security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43:    expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] &lt;asn:1&gt;*&lt;noident&gt;
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43:    got struct keyctl_pkey_query *&lt;noident&gt;

Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks &lt;ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_len</title>
<updated>2019-02-22T18:11:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-22T15:36:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ede0fa98a900e657d1fcd80b50920efc896c1a4c'/>
<id>ede0fa98a900e657d1fcd80b50920efc896c1a4c</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key-&gt;desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.

The problem is that we rely on -&gt;desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.

Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.

The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed.  If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.

    #include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
    #include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

    int main(void)
    {
            int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);

            keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
            setreuid(5000, 5000);
            request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
    }

Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key-&gt;desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.

The problem is that we rely on -&gt;desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.

Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.

The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed.  If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.

    #include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
    #include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

    int main(void)
    {
            int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);

            keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
            setreuid(5000, 5000);
            request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
    }

Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Timestamp new keys</title>
<updated>2019-02-15T22:12:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T16:20:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7c1857bdbdf1e4c541e45eab477ee23ed4333ea4'/>
<id>7c1857bdbdf1e4c541e45eab477ee23ed4333ea4</id>
<content type='text'>
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset.

Fixes: 31d5a79d7f3d ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset.

Fixes: 31d5a79d7f3d ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key</title>
<updated>2019-02-15T22:12:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T16:20:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d'/>
<id>822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d</id>
<content type='text'>
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the -&gt;request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.

Fix this by the following changes:

 (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.

 (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
     payload available outside of security/keys/.

 (3) The -&gt;request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
     record and operation name.

Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.

Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the -&gt;request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.

Fix this by the following changes:

 (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.

 (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
     payload available outside of security/keys/.

 (3) The -&gt;request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
     record and operation name.

Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.

Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly</title>
<updated>2019-02-15T22:12:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T16:20:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a08bf91ce28ed3ae7b6fef35d843fef8dc8c2cd9'/>
<id>a08bf91ce28ed3ae7b6fef35d843fef8dc8c2cd9</id>
<content type='text'>
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys.  Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls.  But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).

Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.

Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys.  Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls.  But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).

Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.

Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()</title>
<updated>2019-02-13T07:48:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-06T16:24:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400'/>
<id>0b6cf6b97b7ef1fa3c7fefab0cac897a1c4a3400</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.

This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.

tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip-&gt;nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.

Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt; (on x86 for TPM 1.2 &amp; PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.

This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.

tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip-&gt;nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.

Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt; (on x86 for TPM 1.2 &amp; PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()</title>
<updated>2019-02-13T07:48:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-06T16:24:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=240730437deb213a58915830884e1a99045624dc'/>
<id>240730437deb213a58915830884e1a99045624dc</id>
<content type='text'>
When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip-&gt;allocated_banks and
use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
passed to tpm_pcr_extend().

This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip-&gt;allocated_banks and
use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
passed to tpm_pcr_extend().

This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
