<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security/keys/keyring.c, branch v2.6.28</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9'/>
<id>69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: check starting keyring as part of search</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kevin Coffman</name>
<email>kwc@citi.umich.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=dceba9944181b1fd5993417b5c8fa0e3dda38f8d'/>
<id>dceba9944181b1fd5993417b5c8fa0e3dda38f8d</id>
<content type='text'>
Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what
we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching.

The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in
its process session keyring.  The user then does an su to another user and
starts a new process, B.  The two processes now share the same process session
keyring.

Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd.  When gssd
attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session
keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key.

The order of calls is:

   keyctl_instantiate_key()
      lookup_user_key()				    (the default: case)
         search_process_keyrings(current)
	    search_process_keyrings(rka-&gt;context)   (recursive call)
	       keyring_search_aux()

keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level
keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor
checked to see if it is the thing being searched for.

This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to:
1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and
2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for

Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what
we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching.

The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in
its process session keyring.  The user then does an su to another user and
starts a new process, B.  The two processes now share the same process session
keyring.

Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd.  When gssd
attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session
keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key.

The order of calls is:

   keyctl_instantiate_key()
      lookup_user_key()				    (the default: case)
         search_process_keyrings(current)
	    search_process_keyrings(rka-&gt;context)   (recursive call)
	       keyring_search_aux()

keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level
keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor
checked to see if it is the thing being searched for.

This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to:
1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and
2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for

Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" &lt;bfields@fieldses.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[AF_RXRPC]: Key facility changes for AF_RXRPC</title>
<updated>2007-04-26T22:46:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-04-26T22:46:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7318226ea2931a627f3572e5f4804c91ca19ecbc'/>
<id>7318226ea2931a627f3572e5f4804c91ca19ecbc</id>
<content type='text'>
Export the keyring key type definition and document its availability.

Add alternative types into the key's type_data union to make it more useful.
Not all users necessarily want to use it as a list_head (AF_RXRPC doesn't, for
example), so make it clear that it can be used in other ways.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Export the keyring key type definition and document its availability.

Add alternative types into the key's type_data union to make it more useful.
Not all users necessarily want to use it as a list_head (AF_RXRPC doesn't, for
example), so make it clear that it can be used in other ways.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] security/keys/*: user kmemdup()</title>
<updated>2006-12-07T16:39:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Sesterhenn</name>
<email>snakebyte@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-12-07T04:33:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=48ad504ee7d598431cb2d0b2f01c6d1aff1d2a07'/>
<id>48ad504ee7d598431cb2d0b2f01c6d1aff1d2a07</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn &lt;snakebyte@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-By: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn &lt;snakebyte@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-By: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] keys: discard the contents of a key on revocation</title>
<updated>2006-06-26T16:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-26T07:24:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=31204ed925b067d2bb65adb89501656f8274a32a'/>
<id>31204ed925b067d2bb65adb89501656f8274a32a</id>
<content type='text'>
Cause the keys linked to a keyring to be unlinked from it when revoked and it
causes the data attached to a user-defined key to be discarded when revoked.

This frees up most of the quota a key occupied at that point, rather than
waiting for the key to actually be destroyed.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Cause the keys linked to a keyring to be unlinked from it when revoked and it
causes the data attached to a user-defined key to be discarded when revoked.

This frees up most of the quota a key occupied at that point, rather than
waiting for the key to actually be destroyed.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] keys: sort out key quota system</title>
<updated>2006-06-26T16:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-26T07:24:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7e047ef5fe2d52e83020e856b1bf2556a6a2ce98'/>
<id>7e047ef5fe2d52e83020e856b1bf2556a6a2ce98</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some
circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a
process that didn't previously have one.

This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a
new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some
circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a
process that didn't previously have one.

This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a
new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem</title>
<updated>2006-06-22T22:05:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael LeMay</name>
<email>mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-22T21:47:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d720024e94de4e8b7f10ee83c532926f3ad5d708'/>
<id>d720024e94de4e8b7f10ee83c532926f3ad5d708</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys.  Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated.  Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.

Has passed David's testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay &lt;mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys.  Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated.  Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.

Has passed David's testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay &lt;mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[Security] Keys: Fix oops when adding key to non-keyring</title>
<updated>2006-04-10T16:33:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-10T14:15:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c3a9d6541f84ac3ff566982d08389b87c1c36b4e'/>
<id>c3a9d6541f84ac3ff566982d08389b87c1c36b4e</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a
key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522].

The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the
keyring it's been given is actually a keyring.

I've fixed this problem by:

 (1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that
     the keyring is a keyring; and

 (2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring,
     and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't.

This can be tested by:

	keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s`

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a
key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522].

The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the
keyring it's been given is actually a keyring.

I've fixed this problem by:

 (1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that
     the keyring is a keyring; and

 (2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring,
     and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't.

This can be tested by:

	keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s`

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys</title>
<updated>2006-01-09T04:13:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-08T09:02:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b5f545c880a2a47947ba2118b2509644ab7a2969'/>
<id>b5f545c880a2a47947ba2118b2509644ab7a2969</id>
<content type='text'>
Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to
instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4.

The patch makes the following changes:

 (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type
     to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be
     spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the
     rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance.

     The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation
     name are passed to the method.

 (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key
     to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in
     /proc/pid/cmdline.

     This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the
     patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no
     longer there.

     A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow.

 (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this
     key will retrieve the information.

 (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the
     authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here
     for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the
     lowest level of the session keyring.

     This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to
     switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and
     so is usable in multithreaded programs.

     The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec.

 (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that
     permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated
     key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated
     with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings.

     This function can also clear the assumption.

 (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently
     assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY).

 (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is
     assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if
     instantiation is successful.

 (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the
     file of permissions functions.

 (9) The documentation is updated.

From: &lt;Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu&gt;

    Build fix.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: Alexander Zangerl &lt;az@bond.edu.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to
instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4.

The patch makes the following changes:

 (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type
     to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be
     spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the
     rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance.

     The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation
     name are passed to the method.

 (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key
     to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in
     /proc/pid/cmdline.

     This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the
     patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no
     longer there.

     A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow.

 (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this
     key will retrieve the information.

 (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the
     authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here
     for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the
     lowest level of the session keyring.

     This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to
     switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and
     so is usable in multithreaded programs.

     The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec.

 (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that
     permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated
     key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated
     with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings.

     This function can also clear the assumption.

 (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently
     assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY).

 (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is
     assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if
     instantiation is successful.

 (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the
     file of permissions functions.

 (9) The documentation is updated.

From: &lt;Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu&gt;

    Build fix.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: Alexander Zangerl &lt;az@bond.edu.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] keys: Discard duplicate keys from a keyring on link</title>
<updated>2006-01-09T04:13:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-08T09:02:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=cab8eb594e84b434d20412fc5a3985b0bee3ab9f'/>
<id>cab8eb594e84b434d20412fc5a3985b0bee3ab9f</id>
<content type='text'>
Cause any links within a keyring to keys that match a key to be linked into
that keyring to be discarded as a link to the new key is added.  The match is
contingent on the type and description strings being the same.

This permits requests, adds and searches to displace negative, expired,
revoked and dead keys easily.  After some discussion it was concluded that
duplicate valid keys should probably be discarded also as they would otherwise
hide the new key.

Since request_key() is intended to be the primary method by which keys are
added to a keyring, duplicate valid keys wouldn't be an issue there as that
function would return an existing match in preference to creating a new key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: Alexander Zangerl &lt;az@bond.edu.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Cause any links within a keyring to keys that match a key to be linked into
that keyring to be discarded as a link to the new key is added.  The match is
contingent on the type and description strings being the same.

This permits requests, adds and searches to displace negative, expired,
revoked and dead keys easily.  After some discussion it was concluded that
duplicate valid keys should probably be discarded also as they would otherwise
hide the new key.

Since request_key() is intended to be the primary method by which keys are
added to a keyring, duplicate valid keys wouldn't be an issue there as that
function would return an existing match in preference to creating a new key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no&gt;
Cc: Alexander Zangerl &lt;az@bond.edu.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
