<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security/keys/keyctl.c, branch v2.6.27</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0b77f5bfb45c13e1e5142374f9d6ca75292252a4'/>
<id>0b77f5bfb45c13e1e5142374f9d6ca75292252a4</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: allow clients to set key perms in key_create_or_update()</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arun Raghavan</name>
<email>arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6b79ccb5144f9ffb4d4596c23e7570238dd12abc'/>
<id>6b79ccb5144f9ffb4d4596c23e7570238dd12abc</id>
<content type='text'>
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satyam Sharma &lt;ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satyam Sharma &lt;ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: add keyctl function to get a security label</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=70a5bb72b55e82fbfbf1e22cae6975fac58a1e2d'/>
<id>70a5bb72b55e82fbfbf1e22cae6975fac58a1e2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4a38e122e2cc6294779021ff4ccc784a3997059e'/>
<id>4a38e122e2cc6294779021ff4ccc784a3997059e</id>
<content type='text'>
Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for
internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than
request_key().  request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string.

The functions that change are:

	request_key_with_auxdata()
	request_key_async()
	request_key_async_with_auxdata()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for
internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than
request_key().  request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string.

The functions that change are:

	request_key_with_auxdata()
	request_key_async()
	request_key_async_with_auxdata()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: increase the payload size when instantiating a key</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=38bbca6b6f164e08a4a9cdfd719fff679af98375'/>
<id>38bbca6b6f164e08a4a9cdfd719fff679af98375</id>
<content type='text'>
Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in
add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key().  This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs
to be passed around.  The limit is raised to 1MB.  If kmalloc() can't allocate
a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Steven French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in
add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key().  This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs
to be passed around.  The limit is raised to 1MB.  If kmalloc() can't allocate
a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: Steven French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Keys: Allow in-kernel key requestor to pass auxiliary data to upcaller</title>
<updated>2006-06-29T17:26:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-29T09:24:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4e54f08543d05e519e601368571cc3787fefae96'/>
<id>4e54f08543d05e519e601368571cc3787fefae96</id>
<content type='text'>
The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to
userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key.  This is
because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will
be contacted through rpc_pipefs.

This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall
operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a
pre-existing communications channel more easily.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-By: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to
userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key.  This is
because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will
be contacted through rpc_pipefs.

This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall
operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a
pre-existing communications channel more easily.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-By: Kevin Coffman &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] keys: let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner</title>
<updated>2006-06-26T16:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fredrik Tolf</name>
<email>fredrik@dolda2000.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-26T07:24:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5801649d8b83e7cb9b15839761bdee594653c294'/>
<id>5801649d8b83e7cb9b15839761bdee594653c294</id>
<content type='text'>
Let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner, including attempting to transfer the
quota burden to the new user.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner, including attempting to transfer the
quota burden to the new user.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] keys: sort out key quota system</title>
<updated>2006-06-26T16:58:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-26T07:24:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7e047ef5fe2d52e83020e856b1bf2556a6a2ce98'/>
<id>7e047ef5fe2d52e83020e856b1bf2556a6a2ce98</id>
<content type='text'>
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some
circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a
process that didn't previously have one.

This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a
new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some
circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a
process that didn't previously have one.

This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a
new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] strndup_user: convert keyctl</title>
<updated>2006-03-24T15:33:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davi Arnaut</name>
<email>davi.arnaut@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-03-24T11:18:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0cb409d98e351e6817e0bc37fe6815fc14b2c036'/>
<id>0cb409d98e351e6817e0bc37fe6815fc14b2c036</id>
<content type='text'>
Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string
duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the
type.)

Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut &lt;davi.arnaut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string
duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the
type.)

Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut &lt;davi.arnaut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix keyctl usage of strnlen_user()</title>
<updated>2006-02-03T16:32:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davi Arnaut</name>
<email>davi.arnaut@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-02-03T11:04:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6d94074f0804143eac6bce72dc04447c0040e7d8'/>
<id>6d94074f0804143eac6bce72dc04447c0040e7d8</id>
<content type='text'>
In the small window between strnlen_user() and copy_from_user() userspace
could alter the terminating `\0' character.

Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut &lt;davi.arnaut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In the small window between strnlen_user() and copy_from_user() userspace
could alter the terminating `\0' character.

Signed-off-by: Davi Arnaut &lt;davi.arnaut@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
