<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security/integrity/evm, branch vsnprintf</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T02:49:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Guzik</name>
<email>mjguzik@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-06T13:36:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=699ae6241920b0fa837fa57e61f7d5b0e2e65b58'/>
<id>699ae6241920b0fa837fa57e61f7d5b0e2e65b58</id>
<content type='text'>
The EVM_NEW_FILE flag is unset if the file already existed at the time
of open and this can be checked without looking at i_writecount.

Not accessing it reduces traffic on the cacheline during parallel open
of the same file and drop the evm_file_release routine from second place
to bottom of the profile.

Fixes: 75a323e604fc ("evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The EVM_NEW_FILE flag is unset if the file already existed at the time
of open and this can be checked without looking at i_writecount.

Not accessing it reduces traffic on the cacheline during parallel open
of the same file and drop the evm_file_release routine from second place
to bottom of the profile.

Fixes: 75a323e604fc ("evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr</title>
<updated>2024-07-31T18:47:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xu Kuohai</name>
<email>xukuohai@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-24T02:06:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=924e19c39e8f0bbd581ab8a049f95a0ed02235b1'/>
<id>924e19c39e8f0bbd581ab8a049f95a0ed02235b1</id>
<content type='text'>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code.

Before:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when
  discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any
  other negative error code otherwise.

After:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED*
  when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or
  any other negative error code otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
To be consistent with most LSM hooks, convert the return value of
hook inode_copy_up_xattr to 0 or a negative error code.

Before:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, 1 when
  discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or any
  other negative error code otherwise.

After:
- Hook inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 when accepting xattr, *-ECANCELED*
  when discarding xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know xattr, or
  any other negative error code otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Rename is_unsupported_fs to is_unsupported_hmac_fs</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5e2e4d0ea5c2c886c4a082890be6a1c2ee064605'/>
<id>5e2e4d0ea5c2c886c4a082890be6a1c2ee064605</id>
<content type='text'>
Rename is_unsupported_fs to is_unsupported_hmac_fs since now only HMAC is
unsupported.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rename is_unsupported_fs to is_unsupported_hmac_fs since now only HMAC is
unsupported.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: Rename SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED to SB_I_EVM_HMAC_UNSUPPORTED</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1f65e57dc5417b166843438bef31c70b9a5208fe'/>
<id>1f65e57dc5417b166843438bef31c70b9a5208fe</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that EVM supports RSA signatures for previously completely
unsupported filesystems rename the flag SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED to
SB_I_EVM_HMAC_UNSUPPORTED to reflect that only HMAC is not supported.

Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that EVM supports RSA signatures for previously completely
unsupported filesystems rename the flag SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED to
SB_I_EVM_HMAC_UNSUPPORTED to reflect that only HMAC is not supported.

Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Enforce signatures on unsupported filesystem for EVM_INIT_X509</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=47add87ad181473e5ef2438918669540ba5016a6'/>
<id>47add87ad181473e5ef2438918669540ba5016a6</id>
<content type='text'>
Unsupported filesystems currently do not enforce any signatures. Add
support for signature enforcement of the "original" and "portable &amp;
immutable" signatures when EVM_INIT_X509 is enabled.

The "original" signature type contains filesystem specific metadata.
Thus it cannot be copied up and verified. However with EVM_INIT_X509
and EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES enabled, the "original" file signature
may be written.

When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is not set or once it is removed from
/sys/kernel/security/evm by setting EVM_INIT_HMAC for example, it is not
possible to write or remove xattrs on the overlay filesystem.

This change still prevents EVM from writing HMAC signatures on
unsupported filesystem when EVM_INIT_HMAC is enabled.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Unsupported filesystems currently do not enforce any signatures. Add
support for signature enforcement of the "original" and "portable &amp;
immutable" signatures when EVM_INIT_X509 is enabled.

The "original" signature type contains filesystem specific metadata.
Thus it cannot be copied up and verified. However with EVM_INIT_X509
and EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES enabled, the "original" file signature
may be written.

When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is not set or once it is removed from
/sys/kernel/security/evm by setting EVM_INIT_HMAC for example, it is not
possible to write or remove xattrs on the overlay filesystem.

This change still prevents EVM from writing HMAC signatures on
unsupported filesystem when EVM_INIT_HMAC is enabled.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Store and detect metadata inode attributes changes</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a652aa59068bd78d96a1ab6ea7c0c4d3c79fb5e8'/>
<id>a652aa59068bd78d96a1ab6ea7c0c4d3c79fb5e8</id>
<content type='text'>
On stacked filesystem the metadata inode may be different than the one
file data inode and therefore changes to it need to be detected
independently. Therefore, store the i_version, device number, and inode
number associated with the file metadata inode.

Implement a function to detect changes to the inode and if a change is
detected reset the evm_status. This function will be called by IMA when
IMA detects that the metadata inode is different from the file's inode.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On stacked filesystem the metadata inode may be different than the one
file data inode and therefore changes to it need to be detected
independently. Therefore, store the i_version, device number, and inode
number associated with the file metadata inode.

Implement a function to detect changes to the inode and if a change is
detected reset the evm_status. This function will be called by IMA when
IMA detects that the metadata inode is different from the file's inode.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Use the metadata inode to calculate metadata hash</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=faf994811e0548df854e5fd946f3094725fcd9b5'/>
<id>faf994811e0548df854e5fd946f3094725fcd9b5</id>
<content type='text'>
Changes to file attributes (mode bits, uid, gid) on the lower layer are
not taken into account when d_backing_inode() is used when a file is
accessed on the overlay layer and this file has not yet been copied up.
This is because d_backing_inode() does not return the real inode of the
lower layer but instead returns the backing inode which in this case
holds wrong file attributes. Further, when CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_METACOPY is
enabled and a copy-up is triggered due to file metadata changes, then
the metadata are held by the backing inode while the data are still held
by the real inode. Therefore, use d_inode(d_real(dentry, D_REAL_METADATA))
to get to the file's metadata inode and use it to calculate the metadata
hash with.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Changes to file attributes (mode bits, uid, gid) on the lower layer are
not taken into account when d_backing_inode() is used when a file is
accessed on the overlay layer and this file has not yet been copied up.
This is because d_backing_inode() does not return the real inode of the
lower layer but instead returns the backing inode which in this case
holds wrong file attributes. Further, when CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_METACOPY is
enabled and a copy-up is triggered due to file metadata changes, then
the metadata are held by the backing inode while the data are still held
by the real inode. Therefore, use d_inode(d_real(dentry, D_REAL_METADATA))
to get to the file's metadata inode and use it to calculate the metadata
hash with.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Implement per signature type decision in security_inode_copy_up_xattr</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f2b3fc42f6ce19524d8ecaf9f878456ed8c50914'/>
<id>f2b3fc42f6ce19524d8ecaf9f878456ed8c50914</id>
<content type='text'>
To support "portable and immutable signatures" on otherwise unsupported
filesystems, determine the EVM signature type by the content of a file's
xattr. If the file has the appropriate signature type then allow it to be
copied up. All other signature types are discarded as before.

"Portable and immutable" EVM signatures can be copied up by stacked file-
system since the metadata their signature covers does not include file-
system-specific data such as a file's inode number, generation, and UUID.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
To support "portable and immutable signatures" on otherwise unsupported
filesystems, determine the EVM signature type by the content of a file's
xattr. If the file has the appropriate signature type then allow it to be
copied up. All other signature types are discarded as before.

"Portable and immutable" EVM signatures can be copied up by stacked file-
system since the metadata their signature covers does not include file-
system-specific data such as a file's inode number, generation, and UUID.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: allow finer granularity in permitting copy-up of security xattrs</title>
<updated>2024-04-09T21:14:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3253804773c0613a1bad5bfea2edf172b760d8b6'/>
<id>3253804773c0613a1bad5bfea2edf172b760d8b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Copying up xattrs is solely based on the security xattr name. For finer
granularity add a dentry parameter to the security_inode_copy_up_xattr
hook definition, allowing decisions to be based on the xattr content as
well.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt; (LSM,SELinux)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Copying up xattrs is solely based on the security xattr name. For finer
granularity add a dentry parameter to the security_inode_copy_up_xattr
hook definition, allowing decisions to be based on the xattr content as
well.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt; (LSM,SELinux)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings</title>
<updated>2024-04-08T11:55:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavoars@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-04T15:00:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=38aa3f5ac6d2de6b471ecb6e1cd878957ae7e8de'/>
<id>38aa3f5ac6d2de6b471ecb6e1cd878957ae7e8de</id>
<content type='text'>
-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end is coming in GCC-14, and we are getting
ready to enable it globally.

There is currently an object (`hdr)` in `struct ima_max_digest_data`
that contains a flexible structure (`struct ima_digest_data`):

 struct ima_max_digest_data {
        struct ima_digest_data hdr;
        u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;

So, in order to avoid ending up with a flexible-array member in the
middle of a struct, we use the `__struct_group()` helper to separate
the flexible array from the rest of the members in the flexible
structure:

struct ima_digest_data {
        __struct_group(ima_digest_data_hdr, hdr, __packed,

        ... the rest of the members

        );
        u8 digest[];
} __packed;

And similarly for `struct evm_ima_xattr_data`.

With the change described above, we can now declare an object of the
type of the tagged `struct ima_digest_data_hdr`, without embedding the
flexible array in the middle of another struct:

 struct ima_max_digest_data {
        struct ima_digest_data_hdr hdr;
        u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;

And similarly for `struct evm_digest` and `struct evm_xattr`.

We also use `container_of()` whenever we need to retrieve a pointer to
the flexible structure.

So, with these changes, fix the following warnings:

security/integrity/evm/evm.h:64:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/202
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end is coming in GCC-14, and we are getting
ready to enable it globally.

There is currently an object (`hdr)` in `struct ima_max_digest_data`
that contains a flexible structure (`struct ima_digest_data`):

 struct ima_max_digest_data {
        struct ima_digest_data hdr;
        u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;

So, in order to avoid ending up with a flexible-array member in the
middle of a struct, we use the `__struct_group()` helper to separate
the flexible array from the rest of the members in the flexible
structure:

struct ima_digest_data {
        __struct_group(ima_digest_data_hdr, hdr, __packed,

        ... the rest of the members

        );
        u8 digest[];
} __packed;

And similarly for `struct evm_ima_xattr_data`.

With the change described above, we can now declare an object of the
type of the tagged `struct ima_digest_data_hdr`, without embedding the
flexible array in the middle of another struct:

 struct ima_max_digest_data {
        struct ima_digest_data_hdr hdr;
        u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
 } __packed;

And similarly for `struct evm_digest` and `struct evm_xattr`.

We also use `container_of()` whenever we need to retrieve a pointer to
the flexible structure.

So, with these changes, fix the following warnings:

security/integrity/evm/evm.h:64:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/202
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
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