<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security/Kconfig, branch v4.8-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: Hardened usercopy</title>
<updated>2016-07-26T21:41:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-07T18:05:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f5509cc18daa7f82bcc553be70df2117c8eedc16'/>
<id>f5509cc18daa7f82bcc553be70df2117c8eedc16</id>
<content type='text'>
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.

This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
  - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
    implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
  and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
  - object must not extend before/after the current process stack
  - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
    arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks &lt;valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.

This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
  - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
    implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
  and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
  - object must not extend before/after the current process stack
  - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
    arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks &lt;valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions</title>
<updated>2016-04-21T00:47:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-20T22:46:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9b091556a073a9f5f93e2ad23d118f45c4796a84'/>
<id>9b091556a073a9f5f93e2ad23d118f45c4796a84</id>
<content type='text'>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Yama: remove needless CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED</title>
<updated>2015-07-28T03:18:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-24T01:02:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=730daa164e7c7e31c08fab940549f4acc3329432'/>
<id>730daa164e7c7e31c08fab940549f4acc3329432</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.

Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.

Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T23:35:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Iulia Manda</name>
<email>iulia.manda21@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-15T23:16:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2813893f8b197a14f1e1ddb04d99bce46817c84a'/>
<id>2813893f8b197a14f1e1ddb04d99bce46817c84a</id>
<content type='text'>
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root.  For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.

This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional.  It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.

When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.

The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.

Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.

In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.

This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build.  The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB.  (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.

The kernel was booted in Qemu.  All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.

Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda &lt;iulia.manda21@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett &lt;josh@joshtriplett.org&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root.  For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.

This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional.  It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.

When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.

The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.

Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.

In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.

This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build.  The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB.  (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.

The kernel was booted in Qemu.  All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.

Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda &lt;iulia.manda21@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett &lt;josh@joshtriplett.org&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on arm on arm64</title>
<updated>2014-02-05T14:59:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Cross</name>
<email>ccross@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-04T02:15:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=530b099dfe8499d639e7fbcad28c4199e2a720c7'/>
<id>530b099dfe8499d639e7fbcad28c4199e2a720c7</id>
<content type='text'>
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected.  Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 &amp;&amp; COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.

Signed-off-by: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected.  Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 &amp;&amp; COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.

Signed-off-by: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig</title>
<updated>2012-05-11T09:56:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-11T09:56:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f0894940aed13b21f363a411c7ec57358827ad87'/>
<id>f0894940aed13b21f363a411c7ec57358827ad87</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Yama LSM</title>
<updated>2012-02-09T22:18:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-21T20:17:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2d514487faf188938a4ee4fb3464eeecfbdcf8eb'/>
<id>2d514487faf188938a4ee4fb3464eeecfbdcf8eb</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:23:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-28T02:21:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=982e617a313b57abee3bcfa53381c356d00fd64a'/>
<id>982e617a313b57abee3bcfa53381c356d00fd64a</id>
<content type='text'>
Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or,
for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key.  This patch
removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or,
for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key.  This patch
removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: move ima inode integrity data management</title>
<updated>2011-07-18T16:29:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-09T19:13:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f381c272224f5f158f5cff64f8f3481fa0eee8b3'/>
<id>f381c272224f5f158f5cff64f8f3481fa0eee8b3</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.

Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
  locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static

There should be no other functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.

Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
  locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static

There should be no other functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on ARM.</title>
<updated>2011-03-21T22:35:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-14T23:32:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5806896019ceaa0a1e808182afb4bba33c948ad6'/>
<id>5806896019ceaa0a1e808182afb4bba33c948ad6</id>
<content type='text'>
The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says:

   For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
   a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
   On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.

The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets
that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map.
So select the right value if we know we are building ARM.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says:

   For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
   a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
   On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.

The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets
that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map.
So select the right value if we know we are building ARM.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
