<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security/Kconfig, branch v4.19-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2018-08-15T15:45:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-15T15:45:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8c479c2c0f9dc105c0afaa662a22f39383d4ce92'/>
<id>8c479c2c0f9dc105c0afaa662a22f39383d4ce92</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook:
 "This cleans up a minor Kconfig issue and adds a kernel boot option for
  disabling hardened usercopy for distro users that may have corner-case
  performance issues (e.g. high bandwidth small-packet UDP traffic).

  Summary:

   - drop unneeded Kconfig "select BUG" (Kamal Mostafa)

   - add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von
     Recklinghausen)"

* tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening
  usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook:
 "This cleans up a minor Kconfig issue and adds a kernel boot option for
  disabling hardened usercopy for distro users that may have corner-case
  performance issues (e.g. high bandwidth small-packet UDP traffic).

  Summary:

   - drop unneeded Kconfig "select BUG" (Kamal Mostafa)

   - add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von
     Recklinghausen)"

* tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening
  usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32</title>
<updated>2018-07-19T23:11:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T09:41:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7757d607c6b31867777de42e1fb0210b9c5d8b70'/>
<id>7757d607c6b31867777de42e1fb0210b9c5d8b70</id>
<content type='text'>
Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;llong@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" &lt;dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca&gt;
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Machek &lt;pavel@ucw.cz&gt;
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;llong@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" &lt;dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca&gt;
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY</title>
<updated>2018-07-03T00:21:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kamal Mostafa</name>
<email>kamal@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-29T20:04:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6aa56f44253a6dd802e45d8ab1b48847feaf063a'/>
<id>6aa56f44253a6dd802e45d8ab1b48847feaf063a</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled.
The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG.

Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa &lt;kamal@canonical.com&gt;
[kees: tweak commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled.
The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG.

Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa &lt;kamal@canonical.com&gt;
[kees: tweak commit log]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2018-02-04T00:25:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-04T00:25:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=617aebe6a97efa539cc4b8a52adccd89596e6be0'/>
<id>617aebe6a97efa539cc4b8a52adccd89596e6be0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
 "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
  cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
  available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.

  To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
  a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
  copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
  control.

  Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
  whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
  userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
  whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
  get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
  these sizes cannot change at runtime.)

  This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
  the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.

  The series has roughly the following sections:
   - remove %p and improve reporting with offset
   - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
   - update VFS subsystem with whitelists
   - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
   - update network subsystem with whitelists
   - update process memory with whitelists
   - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
   - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
   - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
   - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"

* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
  lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
  usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
  kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
  kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
  arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
  fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
  fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
  net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
  sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
  sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
  caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
  ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
  net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
  scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
  cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
  vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
  ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
 "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
  cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
  available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.

  To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
  a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
  copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
  control.

  Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
  whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
  userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
  whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
  get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
  these sizes cannot change at runtime.)

  This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
  the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.

  The series has roughly the following sections:
   - remove %p and improve reporting with offset
   - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
   - update VFS subsystem with whitelists
   - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
   - update network subsystem with whitelists
   - update process memory with whitelists
   - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
   - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
   - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
   - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"

* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
  lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
  usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
  kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
  kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
  arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
  fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
  fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
  net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
  sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
  sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
  caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
  ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
  net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
  scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
  cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
  vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
  ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'char-misc-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc</title>
<updated>2018-02-01T18:31:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T18:31:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f6cff79f1d122f78a4b35bf4b2f0112afcd89ea4'/>
<id>f6cff79f1d122f78a4b35bf4b2f0112afcd89ea4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the big pull request for char/misc drivers for 4.16-rc1.

  There's a lot of stuff in here. Three new driver subsystems were added
  for various types of hardware busses:

   - siox
   - slimbus
   - soundwire

  as well as a new vboxguest subsystem for the VirtualBox hypervisor
  drivers.

  There's also big updates from the FPGA subsystem, lots of Android
  binder fixes, the usual handful of hyper-v updates, and lots of other
  smaller driver updates.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a long time, with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'char-misc-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (155 commits)
  char: lp: use true or false for boolean values
  android: binder: use VM_ALLOC to get vm area
  android: binder: Use true and false for boolean values
  lkdtm: fix handle_irq_event symbol for INT_HW_IRQ_EN
  EISA: Delete error message for a failed memory allocation in eisa_probe()
  EISA: Whitespace cleanup
  misc: remove AVR32 dependencies
  virt: vbox: Add error mapping for VERR_INVALID_NAME and VERR_NO_MORE_FILES
  soundwire: Fix a signedness bug
  uio_hv_generic: fix new type mismatch warnings
  uio_hv_generic: fix type mismatch warnings
  auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE
  uio_hv_generic: add rescind support
  uio_hv_generic: check that host supports monitor page
  uio_hv_generic: create send and receive buffers
  uio: document uio_hv_generic regions
  doc: fix documentation about uio_hv_generic
  vmbus: add monitor_id and subchannel_id to sysfs per channel
  vmbus: fix ABI documentation
  uio_hv_generic: use ISR callback method
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
 "Here is the big pull request for char/misc drivers for 4.16-rc1.

  There's a lot of stuff in here. Three new driver subsystems were added
  for various types of hardware busses:

   - siox
   - slimbus
   - soundwire

  as well as a new vboxguest subsystem for the VirtualBox hypervisor
  drivers.

  There's also big updates from the FPGA subsystem, lots of Android
  binder fixes, the usual handful of hyper-v updates, and lots of other
  smaller driver updates.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a long time, with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'char-misc-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (155 commits)
  char: lp: use true or false for boolean values
  android: binder: use VM_ALLOC to get vm area
  android: binder: Use true and false for boolean values
  lkdtm: fix handle_irq_event symbol for INT_HW_IRQ_EN
  EISA: Delete error message for a failed memory allocation in eisa_probe()
  EISA: Whitespace cleanup
  misc: remove AVR32 dependencies
  virt: vbox: Add error mapping for VERR_INVALID_NAME and VERR_NO_MORE_FILES
  soundwire: Fix a signedness bug
  uio_hv_generic: fix new type mismatch warnings
  uio_hv_generic: fix type mismatch warnings
  auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE
  uio_hv_generic: add rescind support
  uio_hv_generic: check that host supports monitor page
  uio_hv_generic: create send and receive buffers
  uio: document uio_hv_generic regions
  doc: fix documentation about uio_hv_generic
  vmbus: add monitor_id and subchannel_id to sysfs per channel
  vmbus: fix ABI documentation
  uio_hv_generic: use ISR callback method
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists</title>
<updated>2018-01-15T20:07:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-30T21:04:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2d891fbc3bb681ba1f826e7ee70dbe38ca7465fe'/>
<id>2d891fbc3bb681ba1f826e7ee70dbe38ca7465fe</id>
<content type='text'>
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the
behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist
violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy
whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive.

If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with
"slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead
of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists
immediately.

Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the
behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist
violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy
whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive.

If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with
"slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead
of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists
immediately.

Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI</title>
<updated>2018-01-14T10:42:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>W. Trevor King</name>
<email>wking@tremily.us</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-12T23:24:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a237f762681e2a394ca67f21df2feb2b76a3609b'/>
<id>a237f762681e2a394ca67f21df2feb2b76a3609b</id>
<content type='text'>
When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was
added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final
documentation has a different file name.

Fix it up to point to the proper file.

Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King &lt;wking@tremily.us&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was
added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final
documentation has a different file name.

Fix it up to point to the proper file.

Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King &lt;wking@tremily.us&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/pti: Enable PTI by default</title>
<updated>2018-01-03T14:57:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-03T14:18:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=87faa0d9b43b4755ff6963a22d1fd1bee1aa3b39'/>
<id>87faa0d9b43b4755ff6963a22d1fd1bee1aa3b39</id>
<content type='text'>
This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are
doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are
doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge 4.15-rc6 into char-misc-next</title>
<updated>2018-01-02T13:46:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-02T13:46:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b6a09416e83ffe4eccfb4ef1b91b3b66483fa810'/>
<id>b6a09416e83ffe4eccfb4ef1b91b3b66483fa810</id>
<content type='text'>
We want the fixes in here as well.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We want the fixes in here as well.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig</title>
<updated>2017-12-23T20:13:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-04T14:08:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=385ce0ea4c078517fa51c261882c4e72fba53005'/>
<id>385ce0ea4c078517fa51c261882c4e72fba53005</id>
<content type='text'>
Finally allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to be enabled.

PARAVIRT generally requires that the kernel not manage its own page tables.
It also means that the hypervisor and kernel must agree wholeheartedly
about what format the page tables are in and what they contain.
PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, unfortunately, changes the rules and they
can not be used together.

I've seen conflicting feedback from maintainers lately about whether they
want the Kconfig magic to go first or last in a patch series.  It's going
last here because the partially-applied series leads to kernels that can
not boot in a bunch of cases.  I did a run through the entire series with
CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y to look for build errors, though.

[ tglx: Removed SMP and !PARAVIRT dependencies as they not longer exist ]

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Finally allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to be enabled.

PARAVIRT generally requires that the kernel not manage its own page tables.
It also means that the hypervisor and kernel must agree wholeheartedly
about what format the page tables are in and what they contain.
PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, unfortunately, changes the rules and they
can not be used together.

I've seen conflicting feedback from maintainers lately about whether they
want the Kconfig magic to go first or last in a patch series.  It's going
last here because the partially-applied series leads to kernels that can
not boot in a bunch of cases.  I did a run through the entire series with
CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y to look for build errors, though.

[ tglx: Removed SMP and !PARAVIRT dependencies as they not longer exist ]

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
