<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/net, branch v3.6-rc7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERM</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T17:58:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhao Hongjiang</name>
<email>zhaohongjiang@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-20T22:37:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bf5b30b8a4416de04f1ac1196281ddb318669464'/>
<id>bf5b30b8a4416de04f1ac1196281ddb318669464</id>
<content type='text'>
Change return value from -EACCES to -EPERM when the permission check fails.

Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Change return value from -EACCES to -EPERM when the permission check fails.

Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang &lt;zhaohongjiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix return value check in fib6_add()</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T17:43:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-20T18:29:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f950c0ecc78f745e490d615280e031de4dbb1306'/>
<id>f950c0ecc78f745e490d615280e031de4dbb1306</id>
<content type='text'>
In case of error, the function fib6_add_1() returns ERR_PTR()
or NULL pointer. The ERR_PTR() case check is missing in fib6_add().

dpatch engine is used to generated this patch.
(https://github.com/weiyj/dpatch)

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In case of error, the function fib6_add_1() returns ERR_PTR()
or NULL pointer. The ERR_PTR() case check is missing in fib6_add().

dpatch engine is used to generated this patch.
(https://github.com/weiyj/dpatch)

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: do not disable sg for packets requiring no checksum</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T02:23:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ed Cashin</name>
<email>ecashin@coraid.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T15:49:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c0d680e577ff171e7b37dbdb1b1bf5451e851f04'/>
<id>c0d680e577ff171e7b37dbdb1b1bf5451e851f04</id>
<content type='text'>
A change in a series of VLAN-related changes appears to have
inadvertently disabled the use of the scatter gather feature of
network cards for transmission of non-IP ethernet protocols like ATA
over Ethernet (AoE).  Below is a reference to the commit that
introduces a "harmonize_features" function that turns off scatter
gather when the NIC does not support hardware checksumming for the
ethernet protocol of an sk buff.

  commit f01a5236bd4b140198fbcc550f085e8361fd73fa
  Author: Jesse Gross &lt;jesse@nicira.com&gt;
  Date:   Sun Jan 9 06:23:31 2011 +0000

      net offloading: Generalize netif_get_vlan_features().

The can_checksum_protocol function is not equipped to consider a
protocol that does not require checksumming.  Calling it for a
protocol that requires no checksum is inappropriate.

The patch below has harmonize_features call can_checksum_protocol when
the protocol needs a checksum, so that the network layer is not forced
to perform unnecessary skb linearization on the transmission of AoE
packets.  Unnecessary linearization results in decreased performance
and increased memory pressure, as reported here:

  http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg15184.html

The problem has probably not been widely experienced yet, because
only recently has the kernel.org-distributed aoe driver acquired the
ability to use payloads of over a page in size, with the patchset
recently included in the mm tree:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/8/28/140

The coraid.com-distributed aoe driver already could use payloads of
greater than a page in size, but its users generally do not use the
newest kernels.

Signed-off-by: Ed Cashin &lt;ecashin@coraid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A change in a series of VLAN-related changes appears to have
inadvertently disabled the use of the scatter gather feature of
network cards for transmission of non-IP ethernet protocols like ATA
over Ethernet (AoE).  Below is a reference to the commit that
introduces a "harmonize_features" function that turns off scatter
gather when the NIC does not support hardware checksumming for the
ethernet protocol of an sk buff.

  commit f01a5236bd4b140198fbcc550f085e8361fd73fa
  Author: Jesse Gross &lt;jesse@nicira.com&gt;
  Date:   Sun Jan 9 06:23:31 2011 +0000

      net offloading: Generalize netif_get_vlan_features().

The can_checksum_protocol function is not equipped to consider a
protocol that does not require checksumming.  Calling it for a
protocol that requires no checksum is inappropriate.

The patch below has harmonize_features call can_checksum_protocol when
the protocol needs a checksum, so that the network layer is not forced
to perform unnecessary skb linearization on the transmission of AoE
packets.  Unnecessary linearization results in decreased performance
and increased memory pressure, as reported here:

  http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg15184.html

The problem has probably not been widely experienced yet, because
only recently has the kernel.org-distributed aoe driver acquired the
ability to use payloads of over a page in size, with the patchset
recently included in the mm tree:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/8/28/140

The coraid.com-distributed aoe driver already could use payloads of
greater than a page in size, but its users generally do not use the
newest kernels.

Signed-off-by: Ed Cashin &lt;ecashin@coraid.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: don't copy esn replay window twice for new states</title>
<updated>2012-09-20T22:08:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T11:33:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e3ac104d41a97b42316915020ba228c505447d21'/>
<id>e3ac104d41a97b42316915020ba228c505447d21</id>
<content type='text'>
The ESN replay window was already fully initialized in
xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(). No need to copy it again.

Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The ESN replay window was already fully initialized in
xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(). No need to copy it again.

Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid</title>
<updated>2012-09-20T22:08:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-20T10:01:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720'/>
<id>ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720</id>
<content type='text'>
The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:

1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
   code later on.

2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
   memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
   CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (&lt;http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/&gt;). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.

To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.

To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).

Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Willi &lt;martin@revosec.ch&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:

1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
   code later on.

2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
   memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
   CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (&lt;http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/&gt;). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.

To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.

To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).

Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Willi &lt;martin@revosec.ch&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()</title>
<updated>2012-09-20T22:08:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T11:33:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5'/>
<id>1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5</id>
<content type='text'>
The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.

Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.

Cc: Brad Spengler &lt;spender@grsecurity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.

Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.

Cc: Brad Spengler &lt;spender@grsecurity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_policy()</title>
<updated>2012-09-20T22:08:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T11:33:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7b789836f434c87168eab067cfbed1ec4783dffd'/>
<id>7b789836f434c87168eab067cfbed1ec4783dffd</id>
<content type='text'>
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm policy includes multiple padding
bytes added by the compiler for alignment (padding bytes in struct
xfrm_selector and struct xfrm_userpolicy_info). Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the heap info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm policy includes multiple padding
bytes added by the compiler for alignment (padding bytes in struct
xfrm_selector and struct xfrm_userpolicy_info). Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the heap info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_state()</title>
<updated>2012-09-20T22:08:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T11:33:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f778a636713a435d3a922c60b1622a91136560c1'/>
<id>f778a636713a435d3a922c60b1622a91136560c1</id>
<content type='text'>
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm state includes the padding bytes of
struct xfrm_usersa_info added by the compiler for alignment (7 for
amd64, 3 for i386). Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer
to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The memory reserved to dump the xfrm state includes the padding bytes of
struct xfrm_usersa_info added by the compiler for alignment (7 for
amd64, 3 for i386). Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer
to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_auth()</title>
<updated>2012-09-20T22:08:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T11:33:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4c87308bdea31a7b4828a51f6156e6f721a1fcc9'/>
<id>4c87308bdea31a7b4828a51f6156e6f721a1fcc9</id>
<content type='text'>
copy_to_user_auth() fails to initialize the remainder of alg_name and
therefore discloses up to 54 bytes of heap memory via netlink to
userland.

Use strncpy() instead of strcpy() to fill the trailing bytes of alg_name
with null bytes.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
copy_to_user_auth() fails to initialize the remainder of alg_name and
therefore discloses up to 54 bytes of heap memory via netlink to
userland.

Use strncpy() instead of strcpy() to fill the trailing bytes of alg_name
with null bytes.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: restore rcv_wscale in a repair mode (v2)</title>
<updated>2012-09-20T21:49:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Vagin</name>
<email>avagin@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-19T09:40:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bc26ccd8fc756749de95606d28314efd0ce5aec3'/>
<id>bc26ccd8fc756749de95606d28314efd0ce5aec3</id>
<content type='text'>
rcv_wscale is a symetric parameter with snd_wscale.

Both this parameters are set on a connection handshake.

Without this value a remote window size can not be interpreted correctly,
because a value from a packet should be shifted on rcv_wscale.

And one more thing is that wscale_ok should be set too.

This patch doesn't break a backward compatibility.
If someone uses it in a old scheme, a rcv window
will be restored with the same bug (rcv_wscale = 0).

v2: Save backward compatibility on big-endian system. Before
    the first two bytes were snd_wscale and the second two bytes were
    rcv_wscale. Now snd_wscale is opt_val &amp; 0xFFFF and rcv_wscale &gt;&gt; 16.
    This approach is independent on byte ordering.

Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov &lt;kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Cc: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
CC: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
rcv_wscale is a symetric parameter with snd_wscale.

Both this parameters are set on a connection handshake.

Without this value a remote window size can not be interpreted correctly,
because a value from a packet should be shifted on rcv_wscale.

And one more thing is that wscale_ok should be set too.

This patch doesn't break a backward compatibility.
If someone uses it in a old scheme, a rcv window
will be restored with the same bug (rcv_wscale = 0).

v2: Save backward compatibility on big-endian system. Before
    the first two bytes were snd_wscale and the second two bytes were
    rcv_wscale. Now snd_wscale is opt_val &amp; 0xFFFF and rcv_wscale &gt;&gt; 16.
    This approach is independent on byte ordering.

Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov &lt;kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI &lt;yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org&gt;
Cc: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
CC: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
