linux.git/net/rxrpc, branch v7.0

rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output

2026-04-09T01:45:32+00:00

The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".

That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().

As a result, a case such as

  [ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535

is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.

Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().

Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
  explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
  mapped-v4 example

Fixes: 75b54cb57ca3 ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support")
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Anderson Nascimento 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-22-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge

2026-04-09T01:45:05+00:00

Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu 
Reported-by: Juefei Pu 
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan 
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan 
Suggested-by: Xin Liu 
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang 
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator()

2026-04-09T01:44:34+00:00

Fix rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() to check the buffer size before checking
the nonce.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-20-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context in rxgk_verify_response()

2026-04-09T01:44:34+00:00

Fix rxgk_verify_response() to clean up the rxgk context it creates.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-19-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response()

2026-04-09T01:44:34+00:00

In rxgk_verify_response(), there's a potential integer overflow due to
rounding up token_len before checking it, thereby allowing the length check to
be bypassed.

Fix this by checking the unrounded value against len too (len is limited as
the response must fit in a single UDP packet).

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-18-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure

2026-04-09T01:44:34+00:00

Add error checking for failure of crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt() to various
rxkad function as the crypto functions can fail with ENOMEM at least.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jeffrey Altman 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-17-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING)

2026-04-09T01:44:34+00:00

An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time.  When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx->securities.

setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.

Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.

Fix this by:

 (1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
     makes on rx->key.

 (2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
     rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key().

 (3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities.

This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Anderson Nascimento 
cc: Luxiao Xu 
cc: Yuan Tan 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()

2026-04-09T01:44:33+00:00

This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
by checking if rx->securities is already set.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu 
Reported-by: Juefei Pu 
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan 
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan 
Suggested-by: Xin Liu 
Tested-by: Ren Wei 
Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu 
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-15-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check

2026-04-09T01:44:33+00:00

rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed
to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is
inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed
to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an
impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).

Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:

RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
  [net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
 skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
 rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
 rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
 rxrpc_process_connection()
   [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
    net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
 process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
 worker_thread()
   [kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
 kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
 ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]

Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: Willy Tarreau 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-14-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

rxrpc: fix RESPONSE authenticator parser OOB read

2026-04-09T01:44:33+00:00

rxgk_verify_authenticator() copies auth_len bytes into a temporary
buffer and then passes p + auth_len as the parser limit to
rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(). Since p is a __be32 *, that inflates the
parser end pointer by a factor of four and lets malformed RESPONSE
authenticators read past the kmalloc() buffer.

Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxgk_verify_response()
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl() [lib/dump_stack.c:123]
 print_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482]
 kasan_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:597]
 rxgk_verify_response()
   [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1103 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1167
    net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
 rxrpc_process_connection()
   [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
    net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
 process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
 worker_thread()
   [kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
 kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
 ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]

Allocated by task 54:
 rxgk_verify_response()
   [include/linux/slab.h:954 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1155
    net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
 rxrpc_process_connection()
   [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
    net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]

Convert the byte count to __be32 units before constructing the parser
limit.

Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Simon Horman 
cc: Willy Tarreau 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-13-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski