linux.git/net/netlabel, branch v7.1

netlabel: validate unlabeled address and mask attribute lengths

2026-06-06T02:05:06+00:00

netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() used the address attribute length to
determine whether the attribute data could be read as an IPv4 or IPv6
address, but did not independently validate the corresponding mask
attribute length.  A crafted Generic Netlink request could therefore
provide a valid IPv4/IPv6 address attribute with a shorter mask
attribute, which would later be read as a full struct in_addr or
struct in6_addr.

NLA_BINARY policy lengths are maximum lengths by default, so use
NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() for the unlabeled IPv4/IPv6 address and mask
attributes.  This rejects short attributes during policy validation and
also exposes the exact length requirements through policy introspection.

Fixes: 8cc44579d1bd ("NetLabel: Introduce static network labels for unlabeled connections")
Signed-off-by: Chenguang Zhao 
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument

2026-02-22T01:09:51+00:00

This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using

    git grep -l '\

treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types

2026-02-21T09:02:28+00:00

This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

audit: add record for multiple task security contexts

2025-08-30T14:15:30+00:00

Replace the single skb pointer in an audit_buffer with a list of
skb pointers. Add the audit_stamp information to the audit_buffer as
there's no guarantee that there will be an audit_context containing
the stamp associated with the event. At audit_log_end() time create
auxiliary records as have been added to the list. Functions are
created to manage the skb list in the audit_buffer.

Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is:

    type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS
      msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
      subj_apparmor=unconfined
      subj_smack=_

When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record the
"subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
multiple security modules that may make access decisions based on a
subject security context.

Refactor audit_log_task_context(), creating a new audit_log_subj_ctx().
This is used in netlabel auditing to provide multiple subject security
contexts as necessary.

Suggested-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler 
[PM: subj tweak, audit example readability indents]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

lsm: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection

2025-08-30T14:15:29+00:00

Add a parameter lsmid to security_lsmblob_to_secctx() to identify which
of the security modules that may be active should provide the security
context. If the value of lsmid is LSM_ID_UNDEF the first LSM providing
a hook is used. security_secid_to_secctx() is unchanged, and will
always report the first LSM providing a hook.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler 
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

calipso: unlock rcu before returning -EAFNOSUPPORT

2025-06-05T15:03:38+00:00

syzbot reported that a recent patch forgot to unlock rcu
in the error path.

Adopt the convention that netlbl_conn_setattr() is already using.

Fixes: 6e9f2df1c550 ("calipso: Don't call calipso functions for AF_INET sk.")
Reported-by: syzbot 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250604133826.1667664-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

calipso: Don't call calipso functions for AF_INET sk.

2025-05-28T06:59:09+00:00

syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in txopt_get(). [0]

The offset 0x70 was of struct ipv6_txoptions in struct ipv6_pinfo,
so struct ipv6_pinfo was NULL there.

However, this never happens for IPv6 sockets as inet_sk(sk)->pinet6
is always set in inet6_create(), meaning the socket was not IPv6 one.

The root cause is missing validation in netlbl_conn_setattr().

netlbl_conn_setattr() switches branches based on struct
sockaddr.sa_family, which is passed from userspace.  However,
netlbl_conn_setattr() does not check if the address family matches
the socket.

The syzkaller must have called connect() for an IPv6 address on
an IPv4 socket.

We have a proper validation in tcp_v[46]_connect(), but
security_socket_connect() is called in the earlier stage.

Let's copy the validation to netlbl_conn_setattr().

[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 12928 Comm: syz.9.1677 Not tainted 6.12.0 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:txopt_get include/net/ipv6.h:390 [inline]
RIP: 0010:
Code: 02 00 00 49 8b ac 24 f8 02 00 00 e8 84 69 2a fd e8 ff 00 16 fd 48 8d 7d 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 53 02 00 00 48 8b 6d 70 48 85 ed 0f 84 ab 01 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88811b8afc48 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff11023715f8a RCX: ffffffff841ab00c
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffc90007d9e000 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed1023715f9d R09: ffffed1023715f9e
R10: ffffed1023715f9d R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff888123075f00
R13: ffff88810245bd80 R14: ffff888113646780 R15: ffff888100578a80
FS:  00007f9019bd7640(0000) GS:ffff8882d2d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f901b927bac CR3: 0000000104788003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
 
 calipso_sock_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:557
 netlbl_conn_setattr+0x10c/0x280 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1177
 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper+0xd3/0x1b0 security/selinux/netlabel.c:569
 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked security/selinux/netlabel.c:597 [inline]
 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xb6/0x100 security/selinux/netlabel.c:615
 selinux_socket_connect+0x5f/0x80 security/selinux/hooks.c:4931
 security_socket_connect+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4598
 __sys_connect_file+0xa4/0x190 net/socket.c:2067
 __sys_connect+0x12c/0x170 net/socket.c:2088
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2098 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2095 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:2095
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xaa/0x1b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f901b61a12d
Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9019bd6fa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f901b925fa0 RCX: 00007f901b61a12d
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000200000000140 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f901b701505 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f901b5b62a0 R15: 00007f9019bb7000
 
Modules linked in:

Fixes: ceba1832b1b2 ("calipso: Set the calipso socket label to match the secattr.")
Reported-by: syzkaller 
Reported-by: John Cheung 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=M1LzunrcQB1fSGauMrJrhL6GGps5cPAKzHJXj6GQV+-g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250522221858.91240-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni

net: corrections for security_secid_to_secctx returns

2025-01-05T03:11:22+00:00

security_secid_to_secctx() returns the size of the new context,
whereas previous versions provided that via a pointer parameter.
Correct the type of the value returned in nfqnl_get_sk_secctx()
and the check for error in netlbl_unlhsh_add(). Add an error
check.

Fixes: 2d470c778120 ("lsm: replace context+len with lsm_context")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

lsm: replace context+len with lsm_context

2024-12-04T19:42:31+00:00

Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.

security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx()
will now return the length value on success instead of 0.

Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos 
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler 
[PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

lsm: ensure the correct LSM context releaser

2024-12-04T15:46:26+00:00

Add a new lsm_context data structure to hold all the information about a
"security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated
the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have
different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux
allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer
to an entry in a list that never goes away.

Update security_release_secctx() to use the lsm_context instead of a
(char *, len) pair. Change its callers to do likewise.  The LSMs
supporting this hook have had comments added to remind the developer
that there is more work to be done.

The BPF security module provides all LSM hooks. While there has yet to
be a known instance of a BPF configuration that uses security contexts,
the possibility is real. In the existing implementation there is
potential for multiple frees in that case.

Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos 
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler 
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore