Success was indicated on a memory allocation failure, thereby causing
a crash due to a later NULL deref.
(Affects v2.6.30-rc1 up to here.)

Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In 5e140dfc1fe87eae27846f193086724806b33c7d "net: reorder struct Qdisc
for better SMP performance" the definition of struct gnet_stats_basic
changed incompatibly, as copies of this struct are shipped to
userland via netlink.

Restoring old behavior is not welcome, for performance reason.

Fix is to use a private structure for kernel, and
teach gnet_stats_copy_basic() to convert from kernel to user land,
using legacy structure (struct gnet_stats_basic)

Based on a report and initial patch from Michael Spang.

Reported-by: Michael Spang <mspang@csclub.uwaterloo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When a slab cache uses SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, we must be careful when allocating
objects, since slab allocator could give a freed object still used by lockless
readers.

In particular, nf_conntrack RCU lookups rely on ct->tuplehash[xxx].hnnode.next
being always valid (ie containing a valid 'nulls' value, or a valid pointer to next
object in hash chain.)

kmem_cache_zalloc() setups object with NULL values, but a NULL value is not valid
for ct->tuplehash[xxx].hnnode.next.

Fix is to call kmem_cache_alloc() and do the zeroing ourself.

As spotted by Patrick, we also need to make sure lookup keys are committed to
memory before setting refcount to 1, or a lockless reader could get a reference
on the old version of the object. Its key re-check could then pass the barrier.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>

The first argument is the address family, the second one the hook
number.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>

As reported by Philip, the UNTRACKED state bit does not fit within
the 8-bit state_mask member. Enlarge state_mask and give status_mask
a few more bits too.

Reported-by: Philip Craig <philipc@snapgear.com>
References: http://markmail.org/thread/b7eg6aovfh4agyz7
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>

When NAT helpers change the TCP packet size, the highest seen sequence
number needs to be corrected. This is currently only done upwards, when
the packet size is reduced the sequence number is unchanged. This causes
TCP conntrack to falsely detect unacknowledged data and decrease the
timeout.

Fix by updating the highest seen sequence number in both directions after
packet mangling.

Tested-by: Krzysztof Piotr Oledzki <ole@ans.pl>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>

RCU barriers, rcu_barrier(), is inserted two places.

 In nf_conntrack_expect.c nf_conntrack_expect_fini() before the
 kmem_cache_destroy().  Firstly to make sure the callback to the
 nf_ct_expect_free_rcu() code is still around.  Secondly because I'm
 unsure about the consequence of having in flight
 nf_ct_expect_free_rcu/kmem_cache_free() calls while doing a
 kmem_cache_destroy() slab destroy.

 And in nf_conntrack_extend.c nf_ct_extend_unregister(), inorder to
 wait for completion of callbacks to __nf_ct_ext_free_rcu(), which is
 invoked by __nf_ct_ext_add().  It might be more efficient to call
 rcu_barrier() in nf_conntrack_core.c nf_conntrack_cleanup_net(), but
 thats make it more difficult to read the code (as the callback code
 in located in nf_conntrack_extend.c).

Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@comx.dk>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>

As noticed by Török Edwin <edwintorok@gmail.com>:

Compiling the kernel with clang has shown this warning:

net/netfilter/xt_rateest.c:69:16: warning: self-comparison always results in a
constant value
                        ret &= pps2 == pps2;
                                    ^
Looking at the code:
if (info->flags & XT_RATEEST_MATCH_BPS)
            ret &= bps1 == bps2;
        if (info->flags & XT_RATEEST_MATCH_PPS)
            ret &= pps2 == pps2;

Judging from the MATCH_BPS case it seems to be a typo, with the intention of
comparing pps1 with pps2.

http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13535

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>

Commit v2.6.29-rc5-872-gacc738f ("xtables: avoid pointer to self")
forgot to copy the initial quota value supplied by iptables into the
private structure, thus counting from whatever was in the memory
kmalloc returned.

Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>