linux.git/net/ipv6/datagram.c, branch v5.1 Linux kernel source tree ipv6: fix kernel-infoleak in ipv6_local_error() 2019-01-10T14:36:41+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2019-01-08T12:06:14+00:00 7d033c9f6a7fd3821af75620a0257db87c2b552a This patch makes sure the flow label in the IPv6 header forged in ipv6_local_error() is initialized. BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 CPU: 1 PID: 24675 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #4 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x455/0xb00 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:675 kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601 _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:177 [inline] move_addr_to_user+0x2e9/0x4f0 net/socket.c:227 ___sys_recvmsg+0x5d7/0x1140 net/socket.c:2284 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline] __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x457ec9 Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f8750c06c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9 RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000020000400 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8750c076d4 R13: 00000000004c4a60 R14: 00000000004d8140 R15: 00000000ffffffff Uninit was stored to memory at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:219 [inline] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x134/0x230 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:439 __msan_chain_origin+0x70/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:200 ipv6_recv_error+0x1e3f/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:475 udpv6_recvmsg+0x398/0x2ab0 net/ipv6/udp.c:335 inet_recvmsg+0x4fb/0x600 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:830 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x1d1/0x230 net/socket.c:801 ___sys_recvmsg+0x4d5/0x1140 net/socket.c:2278 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline] __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] ipv6_local_error+0x1a7/0x9e0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:334 __ip6_append_data+0x129f/0x4fd0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1311 ip6_make_skb+0x6cc/0xcf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1775 udpv6_sendmsg+0x3f8e/0x45d0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1384 inet_sendmsg+0x54a/0x720 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline] __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 Bytes 4-7 of 28 are uninitialized Memory access of size 28 starts at ffff8881937bfce0 Data copied to user address 0000000020000000 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
This patch makes sure the flow label in the IPv6 header
forged in ipv6_local_error() is initialized.

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
CPU: 1 PID: 24675 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #4
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x455/0xb00 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:675
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601
 _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:177 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x2e9/0x4f0 net/socket.c:227
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x5d7/0x1140 net/socket.c:2284
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334
 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f8750c06c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000020000400 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8750c076d4
R13: 00000000004c4a60 R14: 00000000004d8140 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:219 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x134/0x230 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:439
 __msan_chain_origin+0x70/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:200
 ipv6_recv_error+0x1e3f/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:475
 udpv6_recvmsg+0x398/0x2ab0 net/ipv6/udp.c:335
 inet_recvmsg+0x4fb/0x600 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:830
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0x1d1/0x230 net/socket.c:801
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x4d5/0x1140 net/socket.c:2278
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2327 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg+0x2fa/0x450 net/socket.c:2334
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2334
 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7

Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline]
 ipv6_local_error+0x1a7/0x9e0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:334
 __ip6_append_data+0x129f/0x4fd0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1311
 ip6_make_skb+0x6cc/0xcf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1775
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x3f8e/0x45d0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1384
 inet_sendmsg+0x54a/0x720 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0x8c4/0xac0 net/socket.c:1788
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1796
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1796
 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7

Bytes 4-7 of 28 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 28 starts at ffff8881937bfce0
Data copied to user address 0000000020000000

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ip: on queued skb use skb_header_pointer instead of pskb_may_pull 2019-01-10T14:27:20+00:00 Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com 2019-01-07T21:47:33+00:00 4a06fa67c4da20148803525151845276cdb995c1 Commit 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull") avoided a read beyond the end of the skb linear segment by calling pskb_may_pull. That function can trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head if the skb is shared, which it is when when peeking. It can also return ENOMEM. Avoid both by switching to safer skb_header_pointer. Fixes: 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
Commit 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call
pskb_may_pull") avoided a read beyond the end of the skb linear
segment by calling pskb_may_pull.

That function can trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head if the skb is
shared, which it is when when peeking. It can also return ENOMEM.

Avoid both by switching to safer skb_header_pointer.

Fixes: 2efd4fca703a ("ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net: ensure unbound datagram socket to be chosen when not in a VRF 2018-11-08T00:12:38+00:00 Mike Manning mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com 2018-11-07T15:36:04+00:00 6da5b0f027a825df2aebc1927a27bda185dc03d4 Ensure an unbound datagram skt is chosen when not in a VRF. The check for a device match in compute_score() for UDP must be performed when there is no device match. For this, a failure is returned when there is no device match. This ensures that bound sockets are never selected, even if there is no unbound socket. Allow IPv6 packets to be sent over a datagram skt bound to a VRF. These packets are currently blocked, as flowi6_oif was set to that of the master vrf device, and the ipi6_ifindex is that of the slave device. Allow these packets to be sent by checking the device with ipi6_ifindex has the same L3 scope as that of the bound device of the skt, which is the master vrf device. Note that this check always succeeds if the skt is unbound. Even though the right datagram skt is now selected by compute_score(), a different skt is being returned that is bound to the wrong vrf. The difference between these and stream sockets is the handling of the skt option for SO_REUSEPORT. While the handling when adding a skt for reuse correctly checks that the bound device of the skt is a match, the skts in the hashslot are already incorrect. So for the same hash, a skt for the wrong vrf may be selected for the required port. The root cause is that the skt is immediately placed into a slot when it is created, but when the skt is then bound using SO_BINDTODEVICE, it remains in the same slot. The solution is to move the skt to the correct slot by forcing a rehash. Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
Ensure an unbound datagram skt is chosen when not in a VRF. The check
for a device match in compute_score() for UDP must be performed when
there is no device match. For this, a failure is returned when there is
no device match. This ensures that bound sockets are never selected,
even if there is no unbound socket.

Allow IPv6 packets to be sent over a datagram skt bound to a VRF. These
packets are currently blocked, as flowi6_oif was set to that of the
master vrf device, and the ipi6_ifindex is that of the slave device.
Allow these packets to be sent by checking the device with ipi6_ifindex
has the same L3 scope as that of the bound device of the skt, which is
the master vrf device. Note that this check always succeeds if the skt
is unbound.

Even though the right datagram skt is now selected by compute_score(),
a different skt is being returned that is bound to the wrong vrf. The
difference between these and stream sockets is the handling of the skt
option for SO_REUSEPORT. While the handling when adding a skt for reuse
correctly checks that the bound device of the skt is a match, the skts
in the hashslot are already incorrect. So for the same hash, a skt for
the wrong vrf may be selected for the required port. The root cause is
that the skt is immediately placed into a slot when it is created,
but when the skt is then bound using SO_BINDTODEVICE, it remains in the
same slot. The solution is to move the skt to the correct slot by
forcing a rehash.

Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@vyatta.att-mail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net: add helpers checking if socket can be bound to nonlocal address 2018-08-01T16:50:04+00:00 Vincent Bernat vincent@bernat.im 2018-07-31T19:18:11+00:00 83ba4645152d1177c161750e1064e3a8e7cee19b The construction "net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind || inet->freebind || inet->transparent" is present three times and its IPv6 counterpart is also present three times. We introduce two small helpers to characterize these tests uniformly. Signed-off-by: Vincent Bernat <vincent@bernat.im> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
The construction "net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind || inet->freebind
|| inet->transparent" is present three times and its IPv6 counterpart
is also present three times. We introduce two small helpers to
characterize these tests uniformly.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Bernat <vincent@bernat.im>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net/ipv6: allow any source address for sendmsg pktinfo with ip_nonlocal_bind 2018-07-29T19:27:13+00:00 Vincent Bernat vincent@bernat.im 2018-07-25T11:19:13+00:00 d0c1f01138c4b7e532889474e3f2a485546d7270 When freebind feature is set of an IPv6 socket, any source address can be used when sending UDP datagrams using IPv6 PKTINFO ancillary message. Global non-local bind feature was added in commit 35a256fee52c ("ipv6: Nonlocal bind") for IPv6. This commit also allows IPv6 source address spoofing when non-local bind feature is enabled. Signed-off-by: Vincent Bernat <vincent@bernat.im> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
When freebind feature is set of an IPv6 socket, any source address can
be used when sending UDP datagrams using IPv6 PKTINFO ancillary
message. Global non-local bind feature was added in commit
35a256fee52c ("ipv6: Nonlocal bind") for IPv6. This commit also allows
IPv6 source address spoofing when non-local bind feature is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Vincent Bernat <vincent@bernat.im>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Merge ra.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net 2018-07-25T02:21:58+00:00 David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net 2018-07-25T02:21:58+00:00 19725496da5602b401eae389736ab00d1817e264 






ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull
2018-07-24T23:35:58+00:00

Willem de Bruijn
willemb@google.com

2018-07-23T23:36:48+00:00

2efd4fca703a6707cad16ab486eaab8fc7f0fd49

Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning
IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:

  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
  CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #9
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
  Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
    dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
    kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125
    kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219
    kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261
    copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
    put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
    ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719
    ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733
    rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521
    [..]

This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from
the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4.

With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a
packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in
the head and the remainder in a frag.

Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies
in skb head.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>





Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning
IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:

  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
  CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #9
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
  Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
    dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
    kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125
    kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219
    kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261
    copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
    put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
    ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719
    ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733
    rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521
    [..]

This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from
the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4.

With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a
packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in
the head and the remainder in a frag.

Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies
in skb head.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>







ipv6: fold sockcm_cookie into ipcm6_cookie
2018-07-07T01:58:49+00:00

Willem de Bruijn
willemb@google.com

2018-07-06T14:12:57+00:00

5fdaa88dfefa87ee1ea92750e99950dca182ea41

ipcm_cookie includes sockcm_cookie. Do the same for ipcm6_cookie.

This reduces the number of arguments that need to be passed around,
applies ipcm6_init to all cookie fields at once and reduces code
differentiation between ipv4 and ipv6.

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>





ipcm_cookie includes sockcm_cookie. Do the same for ipcm6_cookie.

This reduces the number of arguments that need to be passed around,
applies ipcm6_init to all cookie fields at once and reduces code
differentiation between ipv4 and ipv6.

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>







udp: fix rx queue len reported by diag and proc interface
2018-06-08T23:55:15+00:00

Paolo Abeni
pabeni@redhat.com

2018-06-08T09:35:40+00:00

6c206b20092a3623184cff9470dba75d21507874

After commit 6b229cf77d68 ("udp: add batching to udp_rmem_release()")
the sk_rmem_alloc field does not measure exactly anymore the
receive queue length, because we batch the rmem release. The issue
is really apparent only after commit 0d4a6608f68c ("udp: do rmem bulk
free even if the rx sk queue is empty"): the user space can easily
check for an empty socket with not-0 queue length reported by the 'ss'
tool or the procfs interface.

We need to use a custom UDP helper to report the correct queue length,
taking into account the forward allocation deficit.

Reported-by: trevor.francis@46labs.com
Fixes: 6b229cf77d68 ("UDP: add batching to udp_rmem_release()")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>





After commit 6b229cf77d68 ("udp: add batching to udp_rmem_release()")
the sk_rmem_alloc field does not measure exactly anymore the
receive queue length, because we batch the rmem release. The issue
is really apparent only after commit 0d4a6608f68c ("udp: do rmem bulk
free even if the rx sk queue is empty"): the user space can easily
check for an empty socket with not-0 queue length reported by the 'ss'
tool or the procfs interface.

We need to use a custom UDP helper to report the correct queue length,
taking into account the forward allocation deficit.

Reported-by: trevor.francis@46labs.com
Fixes: 6b229cf77d68 ("UDP: add batching to udp_rmem_release()")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>







ipv6: add a wrapper for ip6_dst_store() with flowi6 checks
2018-04-04T15:31:57+00:00

Alexey Kodanev
alexey.kodanev@oracle.com

2018-04-03T12:00:07+00:00

7d6850f7c618d8f13d7945dd0dcee98223be6459

Move commonly used pattern of ip6_dst_store() usage to a separate
function - ip6_sk_dst_store_flow(), which will check the addresses
for equality using the flow information, before saving them.

There is no functional changes in this patch. In addition, it will
be used in the next patch, in ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow().

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>





Move commonly used pattern of ip6_dst_store() usage to a separate
function - ip6_sk_dst_store_flow(), which will check the addresses
for equality using the flow information, before saving them.

There is no functional changes in this patch. In addition, it will
be used in the next patch, in ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow().

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>