<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/net/ipv4, branch v7.2-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf</title>
<updated>2026-07-17T19:55:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-17T19:55:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=94515f3a7d4256a5062176b7d6ed0471938cd51a'/>
<id>94515f3a7d4256a5062176b7d6ed0471938cd51a</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull bpf fixes from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi:

 - Fix a UAF in socket clone early bailout paths (Matt Bobrowski)

 - Reject unhashed UDP sockets on sockmap update to prevent refcount
   leaks (Michal Luczaj)

 - Account for receive queue data in FIONREAD on sockmap sockets without
   a verdict program (Mattia Meleleo)

 - Reject negative constant offsets for verifier buffer pointers (Sun
   Jian)

 - Fix for tracing of kfuncs with implicit arguments (Ihor Solodrai)

* tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
  selftests/bpf: Cover tracing implicit kfunc args
  bpf: Fix tracing of kfuncs with implicit args
  selftests/bpf: Cover negative buffer pointer offsets
  bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers
  selftests/bpf: Test FIONREAD on a sockmap socket without a verdict program
  bpf, sockmap: Account for receive queue in FIONREAD without a verdict program
  selftests/bpf: Fail unbound UDP on sockmap update
  selftests/bpf: Adapt sockmap update error handling
  bpf, sockmap: Reject unhashed UDP sockets on sockmap update
  selftests/bpf: Ensure UDP sockets are bound
  bpf: Fix UAF in sock clone early bailouts
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull bpf fixes from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi:

 - Fix a UAF in socket clone early bailout paths (Matt Bobrowski)

 - Reject unhashed UDP sockets on sockmap update to prevent refcount
   leaks (Michal Luczaj)

 - Account for receive queue data in FIONREAD on sockmap sockets without
   a verdict program (Mattia Meleleo)

 - Reject negative constant offsets for verifier buffer pointers (Sun
   Jian)

 - Fix for tracing of kfuncs with implicit arguments (Ihor Solodrai)

* tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
  selftests/bpf: Cover tracing implicit kfunc args
  bpf: Fix tracing of kfuncs with implicit args
  selftests/bpf: Cover negative buffer pointer offsets
  bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers
  selftests/bpf: Test FIONREAD on a sockmap socket without a verdict program
  bpf, sockmap: Account for receive queue in FIONREAD without a verdict program
  selftests/bpf: Fail unbound UDP on sockmap update
  selftests/bpf: Adapt sockmap update error handling
  bpf, sockmap: Reject unhashed UDP sockets on sockmap update
  selftests/bpf: Ensure UDP sockets are bound
  bpf: Fix UAF in sock clone early bailouts
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix TIME_WAIT socket reference leak on PSP policy failure</title>
<updated>2026-07-17T09:53:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-10T18:13:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2c1931a81122c3cdc4c89448fe0442c69e21c0d5'/>
<id>2c1931a81122c3cdc4c89448fe0442c69e21c0d5</id>
<content type='text'>
Release the TIME_WAIT socket reference and jump to discard_it
upon PSP policy failure in both IPv4 and IPv6 receive paths.
This prevents a memory leak of tcp_tw_bucket structures.

Fixes: 659a2899a57d ("tcp: add datapath logic for PSP with inline key exchange")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Zahka &lt;daniel.zahka@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710181317.4060230-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Release the TIME_WAIT socket reference and jump to discard_it
upon PSP policy failure in both IPv4 and IPv6 receive paths.
This prevents a memory leak of tcp_tw_bucket structures.

Fixes: 659a2899a57d ("tcp: add datapath logic for PSP with inline key exchange")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Zahka &lt;daniel.zahka@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710181317.4060230-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, sockmap: Account for receive queue in FIONREAD without a verdict program</title>
<updated>2026-07-15T09:10:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mattia Meleleo</name>
<email>mattia.meleleo@coralogix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-08T16:55:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=04af4efde58a4a4ef4feab7360c46af9ec0b83a0'/>
<id>04af4efde58a4a4ef4feab7360c46af9ec0b83a0</id>
<content type='text'>
tcp_bpf_ioctl() answers SIOCINQ from psock-&gt;msg_tot_len, which only
counts bytes in ingress_msg. Without a stream/skb verdict program
nothing is diverted there: data stays in sk_receive_queue, so FIONREAD
returns 0 even though read() returns data.

Add tcp_inq() to the reported value when the psock has no verdict
program. The two queues are disjoint, so bytes redirected into
ingress_msg from other sockets stay correctly accounted through
msg_tot_len.

Remove unused sk_psock_msg_inq().

Fixes: 929e30f93125 ("bpf, sockmap: Fix FIONREAD for sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Mattia Meleleo &lt;mattia.meleleo@coralogix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708-fionread-no-verdict-v3-1-b4ee31b3af53@coralogix.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
tcp_bpf_ioctl() answers SIOCINQ from psock-&gt;msg_tot_len, which only
counts bytes in ingress_msg. Without a stream/skb verdict program
nothing is diverted there: data stays in sk_receive_queue, so FIONREAD
returns 0 even though read() returns data.

Add tcp_inq() to the reported value when the psock has no verdict
program. The two queues are disjoint, so bytes redirected into
ingress_msg from other sockets stay correctly accounted through
msg_tot_len.

Remove unused sk_psock_msg_inq().

Fixes: 929e30f93125 ("bpf, sockmap: Fix FIONREAD for sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Mattia Meleleo &lt;mattia.meleleo@coralogix.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708-fionread-no-verdict-v3-1-b4ee31b3af53@coralogix.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: fib: free fib_alias with kfree_rcu() on insert error path</title>
<updated>2026-07-10T14:00:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weiming Shi</name>
<email>bestswngs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-04T17:14:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f2f152e94a67bc746afaf05a1b2702c195553112'/>
<id>f2f152e94a67bc746afaf05a1b2702c195553112</id>
<content type='text'>
fib_table_insert() publishes new_fa into the leaf's fa_list with
fib_insert_alias() before calling the fib entry notifiers. When a
notifier fails, the error path removes new_fa with fib_remove_alias()
(hlist_del_rcu) and frees it right away with kmem_cache_free().

fib_table_lookup() walks that list under rcu_read_lock() only, so a
concurrent lookup that already reached new_fa keeps reading it after the
free:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810676d4eb by task exploit/297
 Call Trace:
  fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601)
  ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu (net/ipv4/route.c:2814)
  ip_route_output_key_hash (net/ipv4/route.c:2705)
  __ip4_datagram_connect (net/ipv4/datagram.c:49)
  udp_connect (net/ipv4/udp.c:2144)
  __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167)
  __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2173)
  do_syscall_64
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
 which belongs to the cache ip_fib_alias of size 56

Triggering the error path needs CAP_NET_ADMIN and a registered fib
notifier that can reject a route; a netdevsim device whose IPv4 FIB
resource is exhausted is enough.

Free new_fa with alias_free_mem_rcu(), as fib_table_delete() already
does for a fib_alias removed from the trie.

Fixes: a6c76c17df02 ("ipv4: Notify route after insertion to the routing table")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704171421.1786806-1-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
fib_table_insert() publishes new_fa into the leaf's fa_list with
fib_insert_alias() before calling the fib entry notifiers. When a
notifier fails, the error path removes new_fa with fib_remove_alias()
(hlist_del_rcu) and frees it right away with kmem_cache_free().

fib_table_lookup() walks that list under rcu_read_lock() only, so a
concurrent lookup that already reached new_fa keeps reading it after the
free:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810676d4eb by task exploit/297
 Call Trace:
  fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601)
  ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu (net/ipv4/route.c:2814)
  ip_route_output_key_hash (net/ipv4/route.c:2705)
  __ip4_datagram_connect (net/ipv4/datagram.c:49)
  udp_connect (net/ipv4/udp.c:2144)
  __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167)
  __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2173)
  do_syscall_64
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
 which belongs to the cache ip_fib_alias of size 56

Triggering the error path needs CAP_NET_ADMIN and a registered fib
notifier that can reject a route; a netdevsim device whose IPv4 FIB
resource is exhausted is enough.

Free new_fa with alias_free_mem_rcu(), as fib_table_delete() already
does for a fib_alias removed from the trie.

Fixes: a6c76c17df02 ("ipv4: Notify route after insertion to the routing table")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704171421.1786806-1-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: igmp: Fix potential memory leaks in igmp_mod_timer() and igmp_stop_timer()</title>
<updated>2026-07-08T12:41:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-05T18:17:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3546deaa0c30a14c7cdb5dc8f2432cb428f0cd36'/>
<id>3546deaa0c30a14c7cdb5dc8f2432cb428f0cd36</id>
<content type='text'>
When a timer is deleted and not re-armed in igmp_mod_timer(), or stopped
in igmp_stop_timer(), the code currently decrements the reference counter
of the multicast list entry @im using refcount_dec(&amp;im-&gt;refcnt).

However, both functions can be called from the RCU reader path:
- igmp_mod_timer() via igmp_heard_query() -&gt; for_each_pmc_rcu()
- igmp_stop_timer() via igmp_rcv() -&gt; igmp_heard_report()

If the group im was concurrently removed from the list by ip_mc_dec_group(),
its reference count might have already been decremented to 1.

In this case, timer_delete() succeeds, and refcount_dec() decrements
the refcount from 1 to 0. Since refcount_dec() does not free the object
when it hits 0 (unlike ip_ma_put()), the im structure is leaked.

Fix this by using ip_ma_put(im) instead of refcount_dec(&amp;im-&gt;refcnt),
and deferring the put until after the spinlock is released.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260705181756.963063-4-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When a timer is deleted and not re-armed in igmp_mod_timer(), or stopped
in igmp_stop_timer(), the code currently decrements the reference counter
of the multicast list entry @im using refcount_dec(&amp;im-&gt;refcnt).

However, both functions can be called from the RCU reader path:
- igmp_mod_timer() via igmp_heard_query() -&gt; for_each_pmc_rcu()
- igmp_stop_timer() via igmp_rcv() -&gt; igmp_heard_report()

If the group im was concurrently removed from the list by ip_mc_dec_group(),
its reference count might have already been decremented to 1.

In this case, timer_delete() succeeds, and refcount_dec() decrements
the refcount from 1 to 0. Since refcount_dec() does not free the object
when it hits 0 (unlike ip_ma_put()), the im structure is leaked.

Fix this by using ip_ma_put(im) instead of refcount_dec(&amp;im-&gt;refcnt),
and deferring the put until after the spinlock is released.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260705181756.963063-4-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: igmp: Fix potential UAF in igmp_gq_start_timer()</title>
<updated>2026-07-08T12:41:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-05T18:17:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7b19c0f81ed1fdaec6bc522569be367199a9edf3'/>
<id>7b19c0f81ed1fdaec6bc522569be367199a9edf3</id>
<content type='text'>
A race condition exists between device teardown (inetdev_destroy) and
incoming IGMP query processing (igmp_rcv), leading to a Use-After-Free
in the IGMP timer callback.

During device destruction, inetdev_destroy() drops the primary reference
to in_device, which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of
in_device memory is deferred via RCU (using call_rcu()).

Concurrently, igmp_rcv() runs under RCU read lock and obtains the
in_device pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can safely
dereference in_device even if its refcount has hit 0.

However, if CPU-0 calls igmp_gq_start_timer() and re-arms the timer, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the in_device memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period (as the free callback does not check the refcount again),
the device is freed while the timer is still armed. When the timer
expires, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.

Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not arm the timer.

A similar issue in IPv6 MLD is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative &lt;zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260705181756.963063-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
A race condition exists between device teardown (inetdev_destroy) and
incoming IGMP query processing (igmp_rcv), leading to a Use-After-Free
in the IGMP timer callback.

During device destruction, inetdev_destroy() drops the primary reference
to in_device, which can drop its refcount to 0. The actual freeing of
in_device memory is deferred via RCU (using call_rcu()).

Concurrently, igmp_rcv() runs under RCU read lock and obtains the
in_device pointer. Because the memory is RCU-protected, CPU-0 can safely
dereference in_device even if its refcount has hit 0.

However, if CPU-0 calls igmp_gq_start_timer() and re-arms the timer, it
attempts to acquire a reference using in_dev_hold(). This increments the
refcount from 0 to 1, triggering a "refcount_t: addition on 0" warning.
Since the in_device memory is still scheduled to be freed after the RCU
grace period (as the free callback does not check the refcount again),
the device is freed while the timer is still armed. When the timer
expires, it accesses the freed memory, causing a kernel panic.

Fix this by using refcount_inc_not_zero() (via a new helper
in_dev_hold_safe()) to prevent acquiring a reference if the device is
already being destroyed. If the refcount is 0, we do not arm the timer.

A similar issue in IPv6 MLD is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative &lt;zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260705181756.963063-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction</title>
<updated>2026-07-07T10:15:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yuyang Huang</name>
<email>yuyanghuang@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-01T23:50:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7993211bde166471dffac074dc965489f86531f8'/>
<id>7993211bde166471dffac074dc965489f86531f8</id>
<content type='text'>
When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through
the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling
them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's
multicast hash table (mc_hash).

Since the device remains published in dev-&gt;ip_ptr until after
ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash
can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is
decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is
accessing it, a use-after-free occurs.

Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using
ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276

Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90
 print_report+0x175/0x7c0
 kasan_report+0x147/0x180
 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0
 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390
 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120
 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0
 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340
 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00
 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0
 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60
 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0
 do_softirq+0x57/0x80
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;

Allocated by task 2239:
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40
 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0
 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010
 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90
 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300

Freed by task 0:
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60
 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220
 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190
 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0
 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0

Fixes: e9897071350b ("igmp: hash a hash table to speedup ip_check_mc_rcu()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yuyang Huang &lt;yuyanghuang@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701235014.73505-1-yuyanghuang@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through
the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling
them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's
multicast hash table (mc_hash).

Since the device remains published in dev-&gt;ip_ptr until after
ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash
can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is
decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is
accessing it, a use-after-free occurs.

Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using
ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276

Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90
 print_report+0x175/0x7c0
 kasan_report+0x147/0x180
 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0
 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390
 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120
 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0
 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340
 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00
 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0
 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60
 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0
 do_softirq+0x57/0x80
 &lt;/IRQ&gt;

Allocated by task 2239:
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40
 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0
 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010
 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90
 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300

Freed by task 0:
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60
 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220
 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190
 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0
 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0

Fixes: e9897071350b ("igmp: hash a hash table to speedup ip_check_mc_rcu()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yuyang Huang &lt;yuyanghuang@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701235014.73505-1-yuyanghuang@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Decrement tcp_md5_needed static branch</title>
<updated>2026-06-30T01:14:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Safonov</name>
<email>0x7f454c46@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-25T18:21:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6f6e860e370c9e4e919b92118a25e9e1f82e9180'/>
<id>6f6e860e370c9e4e919b92118a25e9e1f82e9180</id>
<content type='text'>
In case of early freeing an unwanted TCP-MD5 key on TCP-AO connect(),
md5sig_info is freed right away (and set to NULL). Later, at
the moment of socket destruction, the static branch counter
is not getting decremented.

Add a missing decrement for TCP-MD5 static branch.

Reported-by: Qihang &lt;q.h.hack.winter@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 0aadc73995d0 ("net/tcp: Prevent TCP-MD5 with TCP-AO being set")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-tcp-md5-connect-v3-3-1fd313d6c1e0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In case of early freeing an unwanted TCP-MD5 key on TCP-AO connect(),
md5sig_info is freed right away (and set to NULL). Later, at
the moment of socket destruction, the static branch counter
is not getting decremented.

Add a missing decrement for TCP-MD5 static branch.

Reported-by: Qihang &lt;q.h.hack.winter@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 0aadc73995d0 ("net/tcp: Prevent TCP-MD5 with TCP-AO being set")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-tcp-md5-connect-v3-3-1fd313d6c1e0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: defer md5sig_info kfree past RCU grace period in tcp_connect</title>
<updated>2026-06-30T01:14:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-25T18:21:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b74cd55038905d5e74c1de109ab78a30b2ea0e1f'/>
<id>b74cd55038905d5e74c1de109ab78a30b2ea0e1f</id>
<content type='text'>
The md5+ao reconciliation in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c)
has two symmetric branches:

	if (needs_md5) {
		tcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, false);
	} else if (needs_ao) {
		tcp_clear_md5_list(sk);
		kfree(rcu_replace_pointer(tp-&gt;md5sig_info, NULL, ...));
	}

Both branches free a per-socket auth-info object while the socket is
in TCP_SYN_SENT and is already on the inet ehash (inserted by
inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect()). Both branches are reachable
by softirq RX-path readers that load the corresponding info pointer
via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken.

The needs_md5 branch is fixed in the prior patch by re-introducing
the call_rcu() free in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(): the equivalent per-key
loop runs inside tcp_ao_info_free_rcu(), the RCU callback, so by the
time it frees each tcp_ao_key all softirq readers that captured the
container have already completed rcu_read_unlock().

The needs_ao branch is not symmetric in the same way. The container
free can be deferred via kfree_rcu(md5sig, rcu) -- struct
tcp_md5sig_info already has the required rcu member
(include/net/tcp.h:1999-2002), and the rest of the tree already does
this in the tcp_md5sig_info_add() rollback paths
(net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1410, 1436). But the per-key teardown is done
by tcp_clear_md5_list() in process context BEFORE the container's
RCU grace period: it walks &amp;md5sig-&gt;head and frees each
tcp_md5sig_key with bare hlist_del + kfree. A concurrent softirq
reader in __tcp_md5_do_lookup() / __tcp_md5_do_lookup_exact()
(tcp_ipv4.c:1253, 1298) walks the same list via
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() and races with that bare kfree on the
keys themselves -- a per-key slab use-after-free of the same class
as the TCP-AO bug, on the same race window.

Fix this in two halves:

  1. Convert the bare kfree() in tcp_connect() to kfree_rcu() so the
     md5sig_info container joins the rest of the md5sig lifecycle.
     The local-variable lift is mechanical and required because
     kfree_rcu() is a macro that expects an lvalue.

  2. Make tcp_clear_md5_list() RCU-safe by replacing hlist_del +
     kfree(key) with hlist_del_rcu + kfree_rcu(key, rcu). struct
     tcp_md5sig_key already carries the rcu member
     (include/net/tcp.h:1995) and tcp_md5_do_del()
     (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1456) already uses kfree_rcu, so this
     restores the lifecycle invariant the rest of the file follows
     rather than introducing a one-off.

The other caller of tcp_clear_md5_list() is tcp_md5_destruct_sock()
(net/ipv4/tcp.c:412), which runs from the sock destructor when the
socket is already unhashed and unreachable; the extra grace period
there is unnecessary but harmless. Making the helper unconditionally
RCU-safe is the cleaner contract.

The needs_ao branch is not reachable by the userns reproducer used
to demonstrate the AO-side splat (the repro installs both keys but
ends up in the needs_md5 branch because the connect peer matches
the MD5 key, not the AO key); however the symmetric race exists
and a maintainer touching this code should not have to think about
which branch escapes RCU and which one does not.

Fixes: 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.18+
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
[also credits to Qihang, who found that this races with tcp-diag]
Reported-by: Qihang &lt;q.h.hack.winter@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-tcp-md5-connect-v3-2-1fd313d6c1e0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The md5+ao reconciliation in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c)
has two symmetric branches:

	if (needs_md5) {
		tcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, false);
	} else if (needs_ao) {
		tcp_clear_md5_list(sk);
		kfree(rcu_replace_pointer(tp-&gt;md5sig_info, NULL, ...));
	}

Both branches free a per-socket auth-info object while the socket is
in TCP_SYN_SENT and is already on the inet ehash (inserted by
inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect()). Both branches are reachable
by softirq RX-path readers that load the corresponding info pointer
via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken.

The needs_md5 branch is fixed in the prior patch by re-introducing
the call_rcu() free in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(): the equivalent per-key
loop runs inside tcp_ao_info_free_rcu(), the RCU callback, so by the
time it frees each tcp_ao_key all softirq readers that captured the
container have already completed rcu_read_unlock().

The needs_ao branch is not symmetric in the same way. The container
free can be deferred via kfree_rcu(md5sig, rcu) -- struct
tcp_md5sig_info already has the required rcu member
(include/net/tcp.h:1999-2002), and the rest of the tree already does
this in the tcp_md5sig_info_add() rollback paths
(net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1410, 1436). But the per-key teardown is done
by tcp_clear_md5_list() in process context BEFORE the container's
RCU grace period: it walks &amp;md5sig-&gt;head and frees each
tcp_md5sig_key with bare hlist_del + kfree. A concurrent softirq
reader in __tcp_md5_do_lookup() / __tcp_md5_do_lookup_exact()
(tcp_ipv4.c:1253, 1298) walks the same list via
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() and races with that bare kfree on the
keys themselves -- a per-key slab use-after-free of the same class
as the TCP-AO bug, on the same race window.

Fix this in two halves:

  1. Convert the bare kfree() in tcp_connect() to kfree_rcu() so the
     md5sig_info container joins the rest of the md5sig lifecycle.
     The local-variable lift is mechanical and required because
     kfree_rcu() is a macro that expects an lvalue.

  2. Make tcp_clear_md5_list() RCU-safe by replacing hlist_del +
     kfree(key) with hlist_del_rcu + kfree_rcu(key, rcu). struct
     tcp_md5sig_key already carries the rcu member
     (include/net/tcp.h:1995) and tcp_md5_do_del()
     (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1456) already uses kfree_rcu, so this
     restores the lifecycle invariant the rest of the file follows
     rather than introducing a one-off.

The other caller of tcp_clear_md5_list() is tcp_md5_destruct_sock()
(net/ipv4/tcp.c:412), which runs from the sock destructor when the
socket is already unhashed and unreachable; the extra grace period
there is unnecessary but harmless. Making the helper unconditionally
RCU-safe is the cleaner contract.

The needs_ao branch is not reachable by the userns reproducer used
to demonstrate the AO-side splat (the repro installs both keys but
ends up in the needs_md5 branch because the connect peer matches
the MD5 key, not the AO key); however the symmetric race exists
and a maintainer touching this code should not have to think about
which branch escapes RCU and which one does not.

Fixes: 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.18+
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
[also credits to Qihang, who found that this races with tcp-diag]
Reported-by: Qihang &lt;q.h.hack.winter@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-tcp-md5-connect-v3-2-1fd313d6c1e0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: restore RCU grace period in tcp_ao_destroy_sock</title>
<updated>2026-06-30T01:14:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-25T18:21:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8bc4d43bccbd60efe85d0a44d5bf41762f2f0c30'/>
<id>8bc4d43bccbd60efe85d0a44d5bf41762f2f0c30</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU")
removed the call_rcu() callback from tcp_ao_destroy_sock(), arguing that
"the destruction of info/keys is delayed until the socket destructor"
and therefore "no one can discover it anymore".

That argument does not hold for the call site in tcp_connect()
(net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4327-4332). At that point the socket is in
TCP_SYN_SENT, has already been inserted into the inet ehash by
inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect(), and is therefore very much
discoverable: any softirq running tcp_v4_rcv() on another CPU can take
the socket out of the ehash, walk into tcp_inbound_hash(), and load
tp-&gt;ao_info via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken on
the destroying CPU.

The reader path then enters __tcp_ao_do_lookup() (net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c:208)
which re-loads tp-&gt;ao_info via rcu_dereference_check(); the re-load can
still observe the (about-to-be-freed) pointer because there is no
synchronize_rcu() between rcu_assign_pointer(tp-&gt;ao_info, NULL) and
tcp_ao_info_free() in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(). The captured pointer is
then walked at line 223:

	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &amp;ao-&gt;head, node, ...)

The writer's synchronous kfree() is free to complete between the line
218 re-fetch and the line 223 hlist iteration. The slab is reused
(or simply LIST_POISON1-stamped if not yet reused) and the iteration
walks attacker-controlled or poison memory in softirq context.

Reproducer (no debug shim, stock x86_64 v7.1-rc2 SMP+KASAN, QEMU+KVM):
an unprivileged uid=1000 process inside CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET
installs TCP_MD5SIG + TCP_AO_ADD_KEY on a TCP socket, sprays forged
TCP-AO segments toward its eventual 4-tuple via raw sockets, then
calls connect(). The md5-wins reconciliation in tcp_connect() fires
tcp_ao_destroy_sock(); the softirq backlog reader on the loopback
NAPI path crashes on the freed ao-&gt;head.first walk:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical
    address 0xfbd59c000000002f
  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range
    [0xdead000000000178-0xdead00000000017f]
  CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 100 Comm: repro_userns
  RIP: 0010:__tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0
  Call Trace: &lt;IRQ&gt;
    __tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0
    tcp_ao_inbound_lookup.constprop.0+0x12a/0x200
    tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x5ea/0x1520
    tcp_inbound_hash+0x7ce/0x1240
    tcp_v4_rcv+0x1e7a/0x3e10
    ...

Restore the RCU grace period: re-add struct rcu_head to tcp_ao_info
and replace the synchronous tcp_ao_info_free() with a call_rcu()
callback. Readers that captured tp-&gt;ao_info before rcu_assign_pointer
NULLed it now see the object remain valid until rcu_read_unlock().
With the patch applied the reproducer runs cleanly for 2000 iterations
on the same kernel build.

Fixes: 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.18+
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-tcp-md5-connect-v3-1-1fd313d6c1e0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU")
removed the call_rcu() callback from tcp_ao_destroy_sock(), arguing that
"the destruction of info/keys is delayed until the socket destructor"
and therefore "no one can discover it anymore".

That argument does not hold for the call site in tcp_connect()
(net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4327-4332). At that point the socket is in
TCP_SYN_SENT, has already been inserted into the inet ehash by
inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect(), and is therefore very much
discoverable: any softirq running tcp_v4_rcv() on another CPU can take
the socket out of the ehash, walk into tcp_inbound_hash(), and load
tp-&gt;ao_info via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken on
the destroying CPU.

The reader path then enters __tcp_ao_do_lookup() (net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c:208)
which re-loads tp-&gt;ao_info via rcu_dereference_check(); the re-load can
still observe the (about-to-be-freed) pointer because there is no
synchronize_rcu() between rcu_assign_pointer(tp-&gt;ao_info, NULL) and
tcp_ao_info_free() in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(). The captured pointer is
then walked at line 223:

	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &amp;ao-&gt;head, node, ...)

The writer's synchronous kfree() is free to complete between the line
218 re-fetch and the line 223 hlist iteration. The slab is reused
(or simply LIST_POISON1-stamped if not yet reused) and the iteration
walks attacker-controlled or poison memory in softirq context.

Reproducer (no debug shim, stock x86_64 v7.1-rc2 SMP+KASAN, QEMU+KVM):
an unprivileged uid=1000 process inside CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET
installs TCP_MD5SIG + TCP_AO_ADD_KEY on a TCP socket, sprays forged
TCP-AO segments toward its eventual 4-tuple via raw sockets, then
calls connect(). The md5-wins reconciliation in tcp_connect() fires
tcp_ao_destroy_sock(); the softirq backlog reader on the loopback
NAPI path crashes on the freed ao-&gt;head.first walk:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical
    address 0xfbd59c000000002f
  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range
    [0xdead000000000178-0xdead00000000017f]
  CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 100 Comm: repro_userns
  RIP: 0010:__tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0
  Call Trace: &lt;IRQ&gt;
    __tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0
    tcp_ao_inbound_lookup.constprop.0+0x12a/0x200
    tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x5ea/0x1520
    tcp_inbound_hash+0x7ce/0x1240
    tcp_v4_rcv+0x1e7a/0x3e10
    ...

Restore the RCU grace period: re-add struct rcu_head to tcp_ao_info
and replace the synchronous tcp_ao_info_free() with a call_rcu()
callback. Readers that captured tp-&gt;ao_info before rcu_assign_pointer
NULLed it now see the object remain valid until rcu_read_unlock().
With the patch applied the reproducer runs cleanly for 2000 iterations
on the same kernel build.

Fixes: 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.18+
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;dima@arista.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-tcp-md5-connect-v3-1-1fd313d6c1e0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
