linux.git/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c, branch v6.9

tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets

2024-05-03T02:01:59+00:00

TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by
cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers.

In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide
by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust()

A socket makes the following state transitions,
without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(),
meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called.

         TCP_CLOSE
connect()
         TCP_SYN_SENT
         TCP_SYN_RECV
shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN)
         TCP_FIN_WAIT1

To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not
perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition,
which makes no sense anyway.

When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state
from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at
sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state,
and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state.

This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH
context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations.

[1]
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767
Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da
FS:  00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 
  tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513
  tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578
  inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680
  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline]
  sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068
  ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803
  ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
  do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939
  __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline]
  __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
  __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline]
  __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: add dropreasons in tcp_rcv_state_process()

2024-02-28T10:39:22+00:00

In this patch, I equipped this function with more dropreasons, but
it still doesn't work yet, which I will do later.

Signed-off-by: Jason Xing 
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reviewed-by: David Ahern 
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tcp: add more specific possible drop reasons in tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process()

2024-02-28T10:39:22+00:00

This patch does two things:
1) add two more new reasons
2) only change the return value(1) to various drop reason values
for the future use

For now, we still cannot trace those two reasons. We'll implement the full
function in the subsequent patch in this series.

Signed-off-by: Jason Xing 
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reviewed-by: David Ahern 
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tcp: Spelling s/curcuit/circuit/

2024-02-16T10:12:00+00:00

Fix a misspelling of "circuit".

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tcp: no need to use acceptable for conn_request

2024-02-15T11:57:11+00:00

Since tcp_conn_request() always returns zero, there is no need to
keep the dead code. Remove it then.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iJwx9b2dUGUKFSV3PF=kN5o+kxz3A_fHZZsOS4AnXhBNw@mail.gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing 
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213131205.4309-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni

net: tcp: accept old ack during closing

2024-01-30T02:10:45+00:00

For now, the packet with an old ack is not accepted if we are in
FIN_WAIT1 state, which can cause retransmission. Taking the following
case as an example:

    Client                               Server
      |                                    |
  FIN_WAIT1(Send FIN, seq=10)          FIN_WAIT1(Send FIN, seq=20, ack=10)
      |                                    |
      |                                Send ACK(seq=21, ack=11)
   Recv ACK(seq=21, ack=11)
      |
   Recv FIN(seq=20, ack=10)

In the case above, simultaneous close is happening, and the FIN and ACK
packet that send from the server is out of order. Then, the FIN will be
dropped by the client, as it has an old ack. Then, the server has to
retransmit the FIN, which can cause delay if the server has set the
SO_LINGER on the socket.

Old ack is accepted in the ESTABLISHED and TIME_WAIT state, and I think
it should be better to keep the same logic.

In this commit, we accept old ack in FIN_WAIT1/FIN_WAIT2/CLOSING/LAST_ACK
states. Maybe we should limit it to FIN_WAIT1 for now?

Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong 
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman 
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126040519.1846345-1-menglong8.dong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

2023-12-15T01:14:41+00:00

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

Conflicts:

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_ethtool.c
  3a0b5a2929fd ("iavf: Introduce new state machines for flow director")
  95260816b489 ("iavf: use iavf_schedule_aq_request() helper")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/84e12519-04dc-bd80-bc34-8cf50d7898ce@intel.com/

drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
  c13e268c0768 ("bnxt_en: Fix HWTSTAMP_FILTER_ALL packet timestamp logic")
  c2f8063309da ("bnxt_en: Refactor RX VLAN acceleration logic.")
  a7445d69809f ("bnxt_en: Add support for new RX and TPA_START completion types for P7")
  1c7fd6ee2fe4 ("bnxt_en: Rename some macros for the P5 chips")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231211110022.27926ad9@canb.auug.org.au/

drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ptp.c
  bd6781c18cb5 ("bnxt_en: Fix wrong return value check in bnxt_close_nic()")
  84793a499578 ("bnxt_en: Skip nic close/open when configuring tstamp filters")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231214113041.3a0c003c@canb.auug.org.au/

drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fw_reset.c
  3d7a3f2612d7 ("net/mlx5: Nack sync reset request when HotPlug is enabled")
  cecf44ea1a1f ("net/mlx5: Allow sync reset flow when BF MGT interface device is present")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231211110328.76c925af@canb.auug.org.au/

No adjacent changes.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: fix tcp_disordered_ack() vs usec TS resolution

2023-12-09T01:15:51+00:00

After commit 939463016b7a ("tcp: change data receiver flowlabel after one dup")
we noticed an increase of TCPACKSkippedPAWS events.

Neal Cardwell tracked the issue to tcp_disordered_ack() assumption
about remote peer TS clock.

RFC 1323 & 7323 are suggesting the following:
  "timestamp clock frequency in the range 1 ms to 1 sec per tick
   between 1ms and 1sec."

This has to be adjusted for 1 MHz clock frequency.

This hints at reorders of SACK packets on send side,
this might deserve a future patch.
(skb->ooo_okay is always set for pure ACK packets)

Fixes: 614e8316aa4c ("tcp: add support for usec resolution in TCP TS values")
Co-developed-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: David Morley 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231207181342.525181-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

2023-12-08T01:53:17+00:00

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

Conflicts:

drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.h
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/hwif.h
  37e4b8df27bc ("net: stmmac: fix FPE events losing")
  c3f3b97238f6 ("net: stmmac: Refactor EST implementation")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231206110306.01e91114@canb.auug.org.au/

Adjacent changes:

net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c
  9396c4ee93f9 ("net/tcp: Don't store TCP-AO maclen on reqsk")
  7b0f570f879a ("tcp: Move TCP-AO bits from cookie_v[46]_check() to tcp_ao_syncookie().")

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent

2023-12-07T03:00:42+00:00

This patch is based on a detailed report and ideas from Yepeng Pan
and Christian Rossow.

ACK seq validation is currently following RFC 5961 5.2 guidelines:

   The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
   it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <=
   SND.NXT).  All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
   above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.  It needs to
   be noted that RFC 793 on page 72 (fifth check) says: "If the ACK is a
   duplicate (SEG.ACK < SND.UNA), it can be ignored.  If the ACK
   acknowledges something not yet sent (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT) then send an
   ACK, drop the segment, and return".  The "ignored" above implies that
   the processing of the incoming data segment continues, which means
   the ACK value is treated as acceptable.  This mitigation makes the
   ACK check more stringent since any ACK < SND.UNA wouldn't be
   accepted, instead only ACKs that are in the range ((SND.UNA -
   MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <= SND.NXT) get through.

This can be refined for new (and possibly spoofed) flows,
by not accepting ACK for bytes that were never sent.

This greatly improves TCP security at a little cost.

I added a Fixes: tag to make sure this patch will reach stable trees,
even if the 'blamed' patch was adhering to the RFC.

tp->bytes_acked was added in linux-4.2

Following packetdrill test (courtesy of Yepeng Pan) shows
the issue at hand:

0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
+0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
+0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
+0 listen(3, 1024) = 0

// ---------------- Handshake ------------------- //

// when window scale is set to 14 the window size can be extended to
// 65535 * (2^14) = 1073725440. Linux would accept an ACK packet
// with ack number in (Server_ISN+1-1073725440. Server_ISN+1)
// ,though this ack number acknowledges some data never
// sent by the server.

+0 < S 0:0(0) win 65535 
+0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <...>
+0 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 65535
+0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4

// For the established connection, we send an ACK packet,
// the ack packet uses ack number 1 - 1073725300 + 2^32,
// where 2^32 is used to wrap around.
// Note: we used 1073725300 instead of 1073725440 to avoid possible
// edge cases.
// 1 - 1073725300 + 2^32 = 3221241997

// Oops, old kernels happily accept this packet.
+0 < . 1:1001(1000) ack 3221241997 win 65535

// After the kernel fix the following will be replaced by a challenge ACK,
// and prior malicious frame would be dropped.
+0 > . 1:1(0) ack 1001

Fixes: 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: Yepeng Pan 
Reported-by: Christian Rossow 
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205161841.2702925-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski