linux.git/net/core, branch v4.4-rc5

Merge branch 'master' into for-4.4-fixes

2015-12-07T15:09:03+00:00

The following commit which went into mainline through networking tree

  3b13758f51de ("cgroups: Allow dynamically changing net_classid")

conflicts in net/core/netclassid_cgroup.c with the following pending
fix in cgroup/for-4.4-fixes.

  1f7dd3e5a6e4 ("cgroup: fix handling of multi-destination migration from subtree_control enabling")

The former separates out update_classid() from cgrp_attach() and
updates it to walk all fds of all tasks in the target css so that it
can be used from both migration and config change paths.  The latter
drops @css from cgrp_attach().

Resolve the conflict by making cgrp_attach() call update_classid()
with the css from the first task.  We can revive @tset walking in
cgrp_attach() but given that net_cls is v1 only where there always is
only one target css during migration, this is fine.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell 
Cc: Nina Schiff

ipv6: kill sk_dst_lock

2015-12-03T16:32:06+00:00

While testing the np->opt RCU conversion, I found that UDP/IPv6 was
using a mixture of xchg() and sk_dst_lock to protect concurrent changes
to sk->sk_dst_cache, leading to possible corruptions and crashes.

ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow() uses sk_dst_check() anyway, so the simplest
way to fix the mess is to remove sk_dst_lock completely, as we did for
IPv4.

__ip6_dst_store() and ip6_dst_store() share same implementation.

sk_setup_caps() being called with socket lock being held or not,
we have to use sk_dst_set() instead of __sk_dst_set()

Note that I had to move the "np->dst_cookie = rt6_get_cookie(rt);"
in ip6_dst_store() before the sk_setup_caps(sk, dst) call.

This is because ip6_dst_store() can be called from process context,
without any lock held.

As soon as the dst is installed in sk->sk_dst_cache, dst can be freed
from another cpu doing a concurrent ip6_dst_store()

Doing the dst dereference before doing the install is needed to make
sure no use after free would trigger.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

cgroup: fix handling of multi-destination migration from subtree_control enabling

2015-12-03T15:18:21+00:00

Consider the following v2 hierarchy.

  P0 (+memory) --- P1 (-memory) --- A
                                 \- B
       
P0 has memory enabled in its subtree_control while P1 doesn't.  If
both A and B contain processes, they would belong to the memory css of
P1.  Now if memory is enabled on P1's subtree_control, memory csses
should be created on both A and B and A's processes should be moved to
the former and B's processes the latter.  IOW, enabling controllers
can cause atomic migrations into different csses.

The core cgroup migration logic has been updated accordingly but the
controller migration methods haven't and still assume that all tasks
migrate to a single target css; furthermore, the methods were fed the
css in which subtree_control was updated which is the parent of the
target csses.  pids controller depends on the migration methods to
move charges and this made the controller attribute charges to the
wrong csses often triggering the following warning by driving a
counter negative.

 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/cgroup_pids.c:97 pids_cancel.constprop.6+0x31/0x40()
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.4.0-rc1+ #29
 ...
  ffffffff81f65382 ffff88007c043b90 ffffffff81551ffc 0000000000000000
  ffff88007c043bc8 ffffffff810de202 ffff88007a752000 ffff88007a29ab00
  ffff88007c043c80 ffff88007a1d8400 0000000000000001 ffff88007c043bd8
 Call Trace:
  [] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82
  [] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
  [] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
  [] pids_cancel.constprop.6+0x31/0x40
  [] pids_can_attach+0x6d/0xf0
  [] cgroup_taskset_migrate+0x6c/0x330
  [] cgroup_migrate+0xf5/0x190
  [] cgroup_attach_task+0x176/0x200
  [] __cgroup_procs_write+0x2ad/0x460
  [] cgroup_procs_write+0x14/0x20
  [] cgroup_file_write+0x35/0x1c0
  [] kernfs_fop_write+0x141/0x190
  [] __vfs_write+0x28/0xe0
  [] vfs_write+0xac/0x1a0
  [] SyS_write+0x49/0xb0
  [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76

This patch fixes the bug by removing @css parameter from the three
migration methods, ->can_attach, ->cancel_attach() and ->attach() and
updating cgroup_taskset iteration helpers also return the destination
css in addition to the task being migrated.  All controllers are
updated accordingly.

* Controllers which don't care whether there are one or multiple
  target csses can be converted trivially.  cpu, io, freezer, perf,
  netclassid and netprio fall in this category.

* cpuset's current implementation assumes that there's single source
  and destination and thus doesn't support v2 hierarchy already.  The
  only change made by this patchset is how that single destination css
  is obtained.

* memory migration path already doesn't do anything on v2.  How the
  single destination css is obtained is updated and the prep stage of
  mem_cgroup_can_attach() is reordered to accomodate the change.

* pids is the only controller which was affected by this bug.  It now
  correctly handles multi-destination migrations and no longer causes
  counter underflow from incorrect accounting.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Reported-and-tested-by: Daniel Wagner 
Cc: Aleksa Sarai

net/neighbour: fix crash at dumping device-agnostic proxy entries

2015-12-03T05:07:51+00:00

Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: fix sock_wake_async() rcu protection

2015-12-01T20:45:05+00:00

Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller)
triggering a fault in sock_wake_async() when async IO is requested.

Said program stressed af_unix sockets, but the issue is generic
and should be addressed in core networking stack.

The problem is that by the time sock_wake_async() is called,
we should not access the @flags field of 'struct socket',
as the inode containing this socket might be freed without
further notice, and without RCU grace period.

We already maintain an RCU protected structure, "struct socket_wq"
so moving SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE & SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA into it
is the safe route.

It also reduces number of cache lines needing dirtying, so might
provide a performance improvement anyway.

In followup patches, we might move remaining flags (SOCK_NOSPACE,
SOCK_PASSCRED, SOCK_PASSSEC) to save 8 bytes and let 'struct socket'
being mostly read and let it being shared between cpus.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: rename SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA

2015-12-01T20:45:05+00:00

This patch is a cleanup to make following patch easier to
review.

Goal is to move SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA
from (struct socket)->flags to a (struct socket_wq)->flags
to benefit from RCU protection in sock_wake_async()

To ease backports, we rename both constants.

Two new helpers, sk_set_bit(int nr, struct sock *sk)
and sk_clear_bit(int net, struct sock *sk) are added so that
following patch can change their implementation.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

cgroups: Allow dynamically changing net_classid

2015-11-23T17:13:46+00:00

The classid of a process is changed either when a process is moved to
or from a cgroup or when the net_cls.classid file is updated.
Previously net_cls only supported propogating these changes to the
cgroup's related sockets when a process was added or removed from the
cgroup. This means it was neccessary to remove and re-add all processes
to a cgroup in order to update its classid. This change introduces
support for doing this dynamically - i.e. when the value is changed in
the net_cls_classid file, this will also trigger an update to the
classid associated with all sockets controlled by the cgroup.
This mimics the behaviour of other cgroup subsystems.
net_prio circumvents this issue by storing an index into a table with
each socket (and so any updates to the table, don't require updating
the value associated with the socket). net_cls, however, passes the
socket the classid directly, and so this additional step is needed.

Signed-off-by: Nina Schiff 
Acked-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in scm_detach_fds

2015-11-23T01:34:58+00:00

David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:

(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)

[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
               cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
[ 1002.296153]  ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
[ 1002.296162]  ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
[ 1002.296169]  ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
[ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
[ 1002.296190]  [] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
[ 1002.296200]  [] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
[ 1002.296209]  [] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
[ 1002.296220]  [] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
[ 1002.296228]  [] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1002.296236]  [] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
[ 1002.296243]  [] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
[ 1002.296248]  [] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 1002.296257]  [] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
[ 1002.296263]  [] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
[ 1002.296271]  [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85

Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.

In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
control buffer.

When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will
overflow in scm_detach_fds():

  int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int));  <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
  err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
  if (!err)
    err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
  if (!err) {
    cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));  <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
    msg->msg_control += cmlen;
    msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;         <--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
  }                                            ... wrap-around

F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.

In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
as well.

In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is
being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen
elsewhere.

Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).

Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read
after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!

Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
in the example).

Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a
("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
overflow").

RFC3542, section 20.2. says:

  The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
  structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
  structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
  application may or may not include padding at the end of last
  ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
  as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
  padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
  copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
  include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
  if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
  including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
  may set MSG_CTRUNC.

Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow.

Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
David and HacKurx).

No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).

Reported-by: David Sterba 
Reported-by: HacKurx 
Cc: PaX Team 
Cc: Emese Revfy 
Cc: Brad Spengler 
Cc: Wei Yongjun 
Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net/core: revert "net: fix __netdev_update_features return.." and add comment

2015-11-17T20:25:45+00:00

This reverts commit 00ee59271777 ("net: fix __netdev_update_features return
on ndo_set_features failure")
and adds a comment explaining why it's okay to return a value other than
0 upon error. Some drivers might actually change flags and return an
error so it's better to fire a spurious notification rather than miss
these.

CC: Michał Mirosław 
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

rtnetlink: fix frame size warning in rtnl_fill_ifinfo

2015-11-17T20:25:44+00:00

Fix the following warning:

  CC      net/core/rtnetlink.o
net/core/rtnetlink.c: In function ‘rtnl_fill_ifinfo’:
net/core/rtnetlink.c:1308:1: warning: the frame size of 2864 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
 }
 ^
by splitting up the huge rtnl_fill_ifinfo into some smaller ones, so we
don't have the huge frame allocations at the same time.

Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller