As these pointers have been printed without using %p they were missed in the big network kptr_restrict conversion patch %p -> %pK from Dan Rosenberg. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers, specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl. If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user (intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG (currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's. If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects "(nil)". The supporting code for kptr_restrict and %pK are currently in the -mm tree. This patch converts users of %p in net/ to %pK. Cases of printing pointers to the syslog are not covered, since this would eliminate useful information for postmortem debugging and the reading of the syslog is already optionally protected by the dmesg_restrict sysctl. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
can: rename can_try_module_get to can_get_proto can_try_module_get does return a struct can_proto. The name explains what is done in so much detail that a caller may not notice that a struct can_proto is locked/unlocked. Signed-off-by: Kurt Van Dijck <kurt.van.dijck@eia.be> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
commit 53914b67993c724cec585863755c9ebc8446e83b had the same message. That commit did put everything in place but did not make can_proto const itself. Signed-off-by: Kurt Van Dijck <kurt.van.dijck@eia.be> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Resolved logic conflicts causing a build failure due to drivers/net/r8169.c changes using a patch from Stephen Rothwell. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
v2: added space after 'if' according code style. We can get here with a NULL socket argument passed from userspace, so we need to handle it accordingly. Thanks to Dave Jones pointing at this issue in net/can/bcm.c Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We can get here with a NULL socket argument passed from userspace, so we need to handle it accordingly. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts: drivers/net/smsc911x.c
This patch removes spin_locks at CAN socket creation time by using RCU. Inspired by the discussion with Kurt van Dijck and Eric Dumazet the RCU code was partly derived from af_phonet.c Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kurt Van Dijck <kurt.van.dijck@eia.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed. Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>