<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/mm, branch v7.0-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'slab-for-7.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vbabka/slab</title>
<updated>2026-02-27T17:54:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-27T17:54:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3feb464fb7784d09008dce6c95f895e815ee97d0'/>
<id>3feb464fb7784d09008dce6c95f895e815ee97d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull slab fixes from Vlastimil Babka:

 - Fix for spurious page allocation warnings on sheaf refill (Harry Yoo)

 - Fix for CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG warnings (Suren
   Baghdasaryan)

 - Fix for kernel-doc warning on ksize() (Sanjay Chitroda)

 - Fix to avoid setting slab-&gt;stride later than on slab allocation.
   Doesn't yet fix the reports from powerpc; debugging is making
   progress (Harry Yoo)

* tag 'slab-for-7.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vbabka/slab:
  mm/slab: initialize slab-&gt;stride early to avoid memory ordering issues
  mm/slub: drop duplicate kernel-doc for ksize()
  mm/slab: mark alloc tags empty for sheaves allocated with __GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT
  mm/slab: pass __GFP_NOWARN to refill_sheaf() if fallback is available
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull slab fixes from Vlastimil Babka:

 - Fix for spurious page allocation warnings on sheaf refill (Harry Yoo)

 - Fix for CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG warnings (Suren
   Baghdasaryan)

 - Fix for kernel-doc warning on ksize() (Sanjay Chitroda)

 - Fix to avoid setting slab-&gt;stride later than on slab allocation.
   Doesn't yet fix the reports from powerpc; debugging is making
   progress (Harry Yoo)

* tag 'slab-for-7.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vbabka/slab:
  mm/slab: initialize slab-&gt;stride early to avoid memory ordering issues
  mm/slub: drop duplicate kernel-doc for ksize()
  mm/slab: mark alloc tags empty for sheaves allocated with __GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT
  mm/slab: pass __GFP_NOWARN to refill_sheaf() if fallback is available
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/slab: initialize slab-&gt;stride early to avoid memory ordering issues</title>
<updated>2026-02-27T15:22:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harry Yoo</name>
<email>harry.yoo@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-23T07:58:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e9217ca77dc35b4978db0fe901685ddb3f1e223a'/>
<id>e9217ca77dc35b4978db0fe901685ddb3f1e223a</id>
<content type='text'>
When alloc_slab_obj_exts() is called later (instead of during slab
allocation and initialization), slab-&gt;stride and slab-&gt;obj_exts are
updated after the slab is already accessible by multiple CPUs.

The current implementation does not enforce memory ordering between
slab-&gt;stride and slab-&gt;obj_exts. For correctness, slab-&gt;stride must be
visible before slab-&gt;obj_exts. Otherwise, concurrent readers may observe
slab-&gt;obj_exts as non-zero while stride is still stale.

With stale slab-&gt;stride, slab_obj_ext() could return the wrong obj_ext.
This could cause two problems:

  - obj_cgroup_put() is called on the wrong objcg, leading to
    a use-after-free due to incorrect reference counting [1] by
    decrementing the reference count more than it was incremented.

  - refill_obj_stock() is called on the wrong objcg, leading to
    a page_counter overflow [2] by uncharging more memory than charged.

Fix this by unconditionally initializing slab-&gt;stride in
alloc_slab_obj_exts_early(), before the need_slab_obj_exts() check.
In the case of SLAB_OBJ_EXT_IN_OBJ, it is overridden in the function.

This ensures updates to slab-&gt;stride become visible before the slab
can be accessed by other CPUs via the per-node partial slab list
(protected by spinlock with acquire/release semantics).

Thanks to Shakeel Butt for pointing out this issue [3].

[vbabka@kernel.org: the bug reports [1] and [2] are not yet fully fixed,
 with investigation ongoing, but it is nevertheless a step in the right
 direction to only set stride once after allocating the slab and not
 change it later ]

Fixes: 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote &lt;venkat88@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ca241daa-e7e7-4604-a48d-de91ec9184a5@linux.ibm.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ddff7c7d-c0c3-4780-808f-9a83268bbf0c@linux.ibm.com [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/aZu9G9mVIVzSm6Ft@hyeyoo [3]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When alloc_slab_obj_exts() is called later (instead of during slab
allocation and initialization), slab-&gt;stride and slab-&gt;obj_exts are
updated after the slab is already accessible by multiple CPUs.

The current implementation does not enforce memory ordering between
slab-&gt;stride and slab-&gt;obj_exts. For correctness, slab-&gt;stride must be
visible before slab-&gt;obj_exts. Otherwise, concurrent readers may observe
slab-&gt;obj_exts as non-zero while stride is still stale.

With stale slab-&gt;stride, slab_obj_ext() could return the wrong obj_ext.
This could cause two problems:

  - obj_cgroup_put() is called on the wrong objcg, leading to
    a use-after-free due to incorrect reference counting [1] by
    decrementing the reference count more than it was incremented.

  - refill_obj_stock() is called on the wrong objcg, leading to
    a page_counter overflow [2] by uncharging more memory than charged.

Fix this by unconditionally initializing slab-&gt;stride in
alloc_slab_obj_exts_early(), before the need_slab_obj_exts() check.
In the case of SLAB_OBJ_EXT_IN_OBJ, it is overridden in the function.

This ensures updates to slab-&gt;stride become visible before the slab
can be accessed by other CPUs via the per-node partial slab list
(protected by spinlock with acquire/release semantics).

Thanks to Shakeel Butt for pointing out this issue [3].

[vbabka@kernel.org: the bug reports [1] and [2] are not yet fully fixed,
 with investigation ongoing, but it is nevertheless a step in the right
 direction to only set stride once after allocating the slab and not
 change it later ]

Fixes: 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote &lt;venkat88@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ca241daa-e7e7-4604-a48d-de91ec9184a5@linux.ibm.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ddff7c7d-c0c3-4780-808f-9a83268bbf0c@linux.ibm.com [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/aZu9G9mVIVzSm6Ft@hyeyoo [3]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/slab: mark alloc tags empty for sheaves allocated with __GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T16:30:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suren Baghdasaryan</name>
<email>surenb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-25T16:34:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f3ec502b6755a3bfb12c1c47025ef989ff9efc72'/>
<id>f3ec502b6755a3bfb12c1c47025ef989ff9efc72</id>
<content type='text'>
alloc_empty_sheaf() allocates sheaves from SLAB_KMALLOC caches using
__GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT to avoid recursion, however it does not mark their
allocation tags empty before freeing, which results in a warning when
CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG is set. Fix this by marking allocation
tags for such sheaves as empty.

The problem was technically introduced in commit 4c0a17e28340 but only
becomes possible to hit with commit 913ffd3a1bf5.

Fixes: 4c0a17e28340 ("slab: prevent recursive kmalloc() in alloc_empty_sheaf()")
Fixes: 913ffd3a1bf5 ("slab: handle kmalloc sheaves bootstrap")
Reported-by: David Wang &lt;00107082@163.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260223155128.3849-1-00107082@163.com/
Analyzed-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: David Wang &lt;00107082@163.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225163407.2218712-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
alloc_empty_sheaf() allocates sheaves from SLAB_KMALLOC caches using
__GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT to avoid recursion, however it does not mark their
allocation tags empty before freeing, which results in a warning when
CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG is set. Fix this by marking allocation
tags for such sheaves as empty.

The problem was technically introduced in commit 4c0a17e28340 but only
becomes possible to hit with commit 913ffd3a1bf5.

Fixes: 4c0a17e28340 ("slab: prevent recursive kmalloc() in alloc_empty_sheaf()")
Fixes: 913ffd3a1bf5 ("slab: handle kmalloc sheaves bootstrap")
Reported-by: David Wang &lt;00107082@163.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260223155128.3849-1-00107082@163.com/
Analyzed-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: David Wang &lt;00107082@163.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225163407.2218712-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/slab: pass __GFP_NOWARN to refill_sheaf() if fallback is available</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T16:30:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harry Yoo</name>
<email>harry.yoo@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-23T13:33:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=021ca6b670bebebc409d43845efcfe8c11c1dd54'/>
<id>021ca6b670bebebc409d43845efcfe8c11c1dd54</id>
<content type='text'>
When refill_sheaf() is called, failing to refill the sheaf doesn't
necessarily mean the allocation will fail because a fallback path
might be available and serve the allocation request.

Suppress spurious warnings by passing __GFP_NOWARN along with
__GFP_NOMEMALLOC whenever a fallback path is available.

When the caller is alloc_full_sheaf() or __pcs_replace_empty_main(),
the kernel always falls back to the slowpath (__slab_alloc_node()).
For __prefill_sheaf_pfmemalloc(), the fallback path is available
only when gfp_pfmemalloc_allowed() returns true.

Reported-and-tested-by: Chris Bainbridge &lt;chris.bainbridge@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/aZt2-oS9lkmwT7Ch@debian.local
Fixes: 1ce20c28eafd ("slab: handle pfmemalloc slabs properly with sheaves")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/aZwSreGj9-HHdD-j@hyeyoo
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260223133322.16705-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov &lt;mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When refill_sheaf() is called, failing to refill the sheaf doesn't
necessarily mean the allocation will fail because a fallback path
might be available and serve the allocation request.

Suppress spurious warnings by passing __GFP_NOWARN along with
__GFP_NOMEMALLOC whenever a fallback path is available.

When the caller is alloc_full_sheaf() or __pcs_replace_empty_main(),
the kernel always falls back to the slowpath (__slab_alloc_node()).
For __prefill_sheaf_pfmemalloc(), the fallback path is available
only when gfp_pfmemalloc_allowed() returns true.

Reported-and-tested-by: Chris Bainbridge &lt;chris.bainbridge@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/aZt2-oS9lkmwT7Ch@debian.local
Fixes: 1ce20c28eafd ("slab: handle pfmemalloc slabs properly with sheaves")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/aZwSreGj9-HHdD-j@hyeyoo
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo &lt;harry.yoo@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260223133322.16705-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov &lt;mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix NULL NODE_DATA dereference for memoryless nodes on boot</title>
<updated>2026-02-24T19:13:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ming Lei</name>
<email>ming.lei@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-22T11:57:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a4ab97e34bb687a2ca63fc70b47e8762e689797f'/>
<id>a4ab97e34bb687a2ca63fc70b47e8762e689797f</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit d49004c5f0c1 ("arch, mm: consolidate initialization of nodes, zones
and memory map") moved free_area_init() from setup_arch() to
mm_core_init_early(), which runs after setup_arch() returns.

This changed the ordering relative to init_cpu_to_node() on x86.  Before
the commit, free_area_init() ran during paging_init() (called from
setup_arch()) *before* init_cpu_to_node().  After the commit, it runs
*after* init_cpu_to_node().

On machines with memoryless NUMA nodes (e.g., node 0 has CPUs but no
memory), this causes a NULL pointer dereference:

 1. numa_register_nodes() skips memoryless nodes: no alloc_node_data()
    and no node_set_online() for them.
 2. init_cpu_to_node() sets memoryless nodes online (they have CPUs)
    but does not allocate NODE_DATA.
 3. free_area_init() checks "if (!node_online(nid))" to decide whether
    to call alloc_offline_node_data(). Since the memoryless node is now
    online, the allocation is skipped, leaving NODE_DATA(nid) == NULL.
 4. The immediate "pgdat = NODE_DATA(nid)" dereferences NULL.

The crash happens before console_init(), so no output is visible without
earlyprintk.  With earlyprintk enabled, the following panic is observed:

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000002a1e0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
 RIP: 0010:free_area_init_node+0x3a/0x540
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  free_area_init+0x331/0x4e0
  start_kernel+0x69/0x4a0
  x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
  x86_64_start_kernel+0x125/0x130
  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task!

Fix this by checking "if (!NODE_DATA(nid))" instead of "if
(!node_online(nid))".  This directly tests whether the per-node data
structure needs to be allocated, regardless of the node's online status. 
This change is also safe for non-x86 architectures as they all allocate
NODE_DATA for every node including memoryless ones, so the check simply
evaluates to false with no change in behavior.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260222115702.3659-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Fixes: d49004c5f0c1 ("arch, mm: consolidate initialization of nodes, zones and memory map")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit d49004c5f0c1 ("arch, mm: consolidate initialization of nodes, zones
and memory map") moved free_area_init() from setup_arch() to
mm_core_init_early(), which runs after setup_arch() returns.

This changed the ordering relative to init_cpu_to_node() on x86.  Before
the commit, free_area_init() ran during paging_init() (called from
setup_arch()) *before* init_cpu_to_node().  After the commit, it runs
*after* init_cpu_to_node().

On machines with memoryless NUMA nodes (e.g., node 0 has CPUs but no
memory), this causes a NULL pointer dereference:

 1. numa_register_nodes() skips memoryless nodes: no alloc_node_data()
    and no node_set_online() for them.
 2. init_cpu_to_node() sets memoryless nodes online (they have CPUs)
    but does not allocate NODE_DATA.
 3. free_area_init() checks "if (!node_online(nid))" to decide whether
    to call alloc_offline_node_data(). Since the memoryless node is now
    online, the allocation is skipped, leaving NODE_DATA(nid) == NULL.
 4. The immediate "pgdat = NODE_DATA(nid)" dereferences NULL.

The crash happens before console_init(), so no output is visible without
earlyprintk.  With earlyprintk enabled, the following panic is observed:

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000002a1e0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
 RIP: 0010:free_area_init_node+0x3a/0x540
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  free_area_init+0x331/0x4e0
  start_kernel+0x69/0x4a0
  x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
  x86_64_start_kernel+0x125/0x130
  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task!

Fix this by checking "if (!NODE_DATA(nid))" instead of "if
(!node_online(nid))".  This directly tests whether the per-node data
structure needs to be allocated, regardless of the node's online status. 
This change is also safe for non-x86 architectures as they all allocate
NODE_DATA for every node including memoryless ones, so the check simply
evaluates to false with no change in behavior.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260222115702.3659-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Fixes: d49004c5f0c1 ("arch, mm: consolidate initialization of nodes, zones and memory map")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei &lt;ming.lei@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/kfence: fix KASAN hardware tag faults during late enablement</title>
<updated>2026-02-24T19:13:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-20T14:49:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d155aab90fffa00f93cea1f107aef0a3d548b2ff'/>
<id>d155aab90fffa00f93cea1f107aef0a3d548b2ff</id>
<content type='text'>
When KASAN hardware tags are enabled, re-enabling KFENCE late (via
/sys/module/kfence/parameters/sample_interval) causes KASAN faults.

This happens because the KFENCE pool and metadata are allocated via the
page allocator, which tags the memory, while KFENCE continues to access it
using untagged pointers during initialization.

Use __GFP_SKIP_KASAN for late KFENCE pool and metadata allocations to
ensure the memory remains untagged, consistent with early allocations from
memblock.  To support this, add __GFP_SKIP_KASAN to the allowlist in
__alloc_contig_verify_gfp_mask().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260220144940.2779209-1-glider@google.com
Fixes: 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Ernesto Martinez Garcia &lt;ernesto.martinezgarcia@tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When KASAN hardware tags are enabled, re-enabling KFENCE late (via
/sys/module/kfence/parameters/sample_interval) causes KASAN faults.

This happens because the KFENCE pool and metadata are allocated via the
page allocator, which tags the memory, while KFENCE continues to access it
using untagged pointers during initialization.

Use __GFP_SKIP_KASAN for late KFENCE pool and metadata allocations to
ensure the memory remains untagged, consistent with early allocations from
memblock.  To support this, add __GFP_SKIP_KASAN to the allowlist in
__alloc_contig_verify_gfp_mask().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260220144940.2779209-1-glider@google.com
Fixes: 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Ernesto Martinez Garcia &lt;ernesto.martinezgarcia@tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/damon/core: disallow non-power of two min_region_sz</title>
<updated>2026-02-24T19:13:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>SeongJae Park</name>
<email>sj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-14T21:41:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c80f46ac228b48403866d65391ad09bdf0e8562a'/>
<id>c80f46ac228b48403866d65391ad09bdf0e8562a</id>
<content type='text'>
DAMON core uses min_region_sz parameter value as the DAMON region
alignment.  The alignment is made using ALIGN() and ALIGN_DOWN(), which
support only the power of two alignments.  But DAMON core API callers can
set min_region_sz to an arbitrary number.  Users can also set it
indirectly, using addr_unit.

When the alignment is not properly set, DAMON behavior becomes difficult
to expect and understand, makes it effectively broken.  It doesn't cause a
kernel crash-like significant issue, though.

Fix the issue by disallowing min_region_sz input that is not a power of
two.  Add the check to damon_commit_ctx(), as all DAMON API callers who
set min_region_sz uses the function.

This can be a sort of behavioral change, but it does not break users, for
the following reasons.  As the symptom is making DAMON effectively broken,
it is not reasonable to believe there are real use cases of non-power of
two min_region_sz.  There is no known use case or issue reports from the
setup, either.

In future, if we find real use cases of non-power of two alignments and we
can support it with low enough overhead, we can consider moving the
restriction.  But, for now, simply disallowing the corner case should be
good enough as a hot fix.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260214214124.87689-1-sj@kernel.org
Fixes: d8f867fa0825 ("mm/damon: add damon_ctx-&gt;min_sz_region")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Quanmin Yan &lt;yanquanmin1@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[6.18+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
DAMON core uses min_region_sz parameter value as the DAMON region
alignment.  The alignment is made using ALIGN() and ALIGN_DOWN(), which
support only the power of two alignments.  But DAMON core API callers can
set min_region_sz to an arbitrary number.  Users can also set it
indirectly, using addr_unit.

When the alignment is not properly set, DAMON behavior becomes difficult
to expect and understand, makes it effectively broken.  It doesn't cause a
kernel crash-like significant issue, though.

Fix the issue by disallowing min_region_sz input that is not a power of
two.  Add the check to damon_commit_ctx(), as all DAMON API callers who
set min_region_sz uses the function.

This can be a sort of behavioral change, but it does not break users, for
the following reasons.  As the symptom is making DAMON effectively broken,
it is not reasonable to believe there are real use cases of non-power of
two min_region_sz.  There is no known use case or issue reports from the
setup, either.

In future, if we find real use cases of non-power of two alignments and we
can support it with low enough overhead, we can consider moving the
restriction.  But, for now, simply disallowing the corner case should be
good enough as a hot fix.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260214214124.87689-1-sj@kernel.org
Fixes: d8f867fa0825 ("mm/damon: add damon_ctx-&gt;min_sz_region")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Quanmin Yan &lt;yanquanmin1@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[6.18+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>liveupdate: luo_file: remember retrieve() status</title>
<updated>2026-02-24T19:13:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pratyush Yadav (Google)</name>
<email>pratyush@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-16T13:22:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f85b1c6af5bc3872f994df0a5688c1162de07a62'/>
<id>f85b1c6af5bc3872f994df0a5688c1162de07a62</id>
<content type='text'>
LUO keeps track of successful retrieve attempts on a LUO file.  It does so
to avoid multiple retrievals of the same file.  Multiple retrievals cause
problems because once the file is retrieved, the serialized data
structures are likely freed and the file is likely in a very different
state from what the code expects.

The retrieve boolean in struct luo_file keeps track of this, and is passed
to the finish callback so it knows what work was already done and what it
has left to do.

All this works well when retrieve succeeds.  When it fails,
luo_retrieve_file() returns the error immediately, without ever storing
anywhere that a retrieve was attempted or what its error code was.  This
results in an errored LIVEUPDATE_SESSION_RETRIEVE_FD ioctl to userspace,
but nothing prevents it from trying this again.

The retry is problematic for much of the same reasons listed above.  The
file is likely in a very different state than what the retrieve logic
normally expects, and it might even have freed some serialization data
structures.  Attempting to access them or free them again is going to
break things.

For example, if memfd managed to restore 8 of its 10 folios, but fails on
the 9th, a subsequent retrieve attempt will try to call
kho_restore_folio() on the first folio again, and that will fail with a
warning since it is an invalid operation.

Apart from the retry, finish() also breaks.  Since on failure the
retrieved bool in luo_file is never touched, the finish() call on session
close will tell the file handler that retrieve was never attempted, and it
will try to access or free the data structures that might not exist, much
in the same way as the retry attempt.

There is no sane way of attempting the retrieve again.  Remember the error
retrieve returned and directly return it on a retry.  Also pass this
status code to finish() so it can make the right decision on the work it
needs to do.

This is done by changing the bool to an integer.  A value of 0 means
retrieve was never attempted, a positive value means it succeeded, and a
negative value means it failed and the error code is the value.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260216132221.987987-1-pratyush@kernel.org
Fixes: 7c722a7f44e0 ("liveupdate: luo_file: implement file systems callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Yadav (Google) &lt;pratyush@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pasha Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@soleen.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
LUO keeps track of successful retrieve attempts on a LUO file.  It does so
to avoid multiple retrievals of the same file.  Multiple retrievals cause
problems because once the file is retrieved, the serialized data
structures are likely freed and the file is likely in a very different
state from what the code expects.

The retrieve boolean in struct luo_file keeps track of this, and is passed
to the finish callback so it knows what work was already done and what it
has left to do.

All this works well when retrieve succeeds.  When it fails,
luo_retrieve_file() returns the error immediately, without ever storing
anywhere that a retrieve was attempted or what its error code was.  This
results in an errored LIVEUPDATE_SESSION_RETRIEVE_FD ioctl to userspace,
but nothing prevents it from trying this again.

The retry is problematic for much of the same reasons listed above.  The
file is likely in a very different state than what the retrieve logic
normally expects, and it might even have freed some serialization data
structures.  Attempting to access them or free them again is going to
break things.

For example, if memfd managed to restore 8 of its 10 folios, but fails on
the 9th, a subsequent retrieve attempt will try to call
kho_restore_folio() on the first folio again, and that will fail with a
warning since it is an invalid operation.

Apart from the retry, finish() also breaks.  Since on failure the
retrieved bool in luo_file is never touched, the finish() call on session
close will tell the file handler that retrieve was never attempted, and it
will try to access or free the data structures that might not exist, much
in the same way as the retry attempt.

There is no sane way of attempting the retrieve again.  Remember the error
retrieve returned and directly return it on a retry.  Also pass this
status code to finish() so it can make the right decision on the work it
needs to do.

This is done by changing the bool to an integer.  A value of 0 means
retrieve was never attempted, a positive value means it succeeded, and a
negative value means it failed and the error code is the value.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260216132221.987987-1-pratyush@kernel.org
Fixes: 7c722a7f44e0 ("liveupdate: luo_file: implement file systems callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Yadav (Google) &lt;pratyush@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pasha Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@soleen.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: thp: deny THP for files on anonymous inodes</title>
<updated>2026-02-24T19:13:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Deepanshu Kartikey</name>
<email>kartikey406@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-14T00:15:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=dd085fe9a8ebfc5d10314c60452db38d2b75e609'/>
<id>dd085fe9a8ebfc5d10314c60452db38d2b75e609</id>
<content type='text'>
file_thp_enabled() incorrectly allows THP for files on anonymous inodes
(e.g. guest_memfd and secretmem). These files are created via
alloc_file_pseudo(), which does not call get_write_access() and leaves
inode-&gt;i_writecount at 0. Combined with S_ISREG(inode-&gt;i_mode) being
true, they appear as read-only regular files when
CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, making them eligible for THP
collapse.

Anonymous inodes can never pass the inode_is_open_for_write() check
since their i_writecount is never incremented through the normal VFS
open path. The right thing to do is to exclude them from THP eligibility
altogether, since CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS was designed for real
filesystem files (e.g. shared libraries), not for pseudo-filesystem
inodes.

For guest_memfd, this allows khugepaged and MADV_COLLAPSE to create
large folios in the page cache via the collapse path, but the
guest_memfd fault handler does not support large folios. This triggers
WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio)) in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping().

For secretmem, collapse_file() tries to copy page contents through the
direct map, but secretmem pages are removed from the direct map. This
can result in a kernel crash:

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88810284d000
    RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0x16/0x130
    Call Trace:
     collapse_file
     hpage_collapse_scan_file
     madvise_collapse

Secretmem is not affected by the crash on upstream as the memory failure
recovery handles the failed copy gracefully, but it still triggers
confusing false memory failure reports:

    Memory failure: 0x106d96f: recovery action for clean unevictable
    LRU page: Recovered

Check IS_ANON_FILE(inode) in file_thp_enabled() to deny THP for all
anonymous inode files.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAEvNRgHegcz3ro35ixkDw39ES8=U6rs6S7iP0gkR9enr7HoGtA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260214001535.435626-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Fixes: 7fbb5e188248 ("mm: remove VM_EXEC requirement for THP eligibility")
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey &lt;Kartikey406@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
Tested-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Barry Song &lt;baohua@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng &lt;ackerleytng@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ackerley Tng &lt;ackerleytng@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Dev Jain &lt;dev.jain@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Fangrui Song &lt;i@maskray.me&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Nico Pache &lt;npache@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Yang Shi &lt;shy828301@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Zi Yan &lt;ziy@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
file_thp_enabled() incorrectly allows THP for files on anonymous inodes
(e.g. guest_memfd and secretmem). These files are created via
alloc_file_pseudo(), which does not call get_write_access() and leaves
inode-&gt;i_writecount at 0. Combined with S_ISREG(inode-&gt;i_mode) being
true, they appear as read-only regular files when
CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, making them eligible for THP
collapse.

Anonymous inodes can never pass the inode_is_open_for_write() check
since their i_writecount is never incremented through the normal VFS
open path. The right thing to do is to exclude them from THP eligibility
altogether, since CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS was designed for real
filesystem files (e.g. shared libraries), not for pseudo-filesystem
inodes.

For guest_memfd, this allows khugepaged and MADV_COLLAPSE to create
large folios in the page cache via the collapse path, but the
guest_memfd fault handler does not support large folios. This triggers
WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio)) in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping().

For secretmem, collapse_file() tries to copy page contents through the
direct map, but secretmem pages are removed from the direct map. This
can result in a kernel crash:

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88810284d000
    RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0x16/0x130
    Call Trace:
     collapse_file
     hpage_collapse_scan_file
     madvise_collapse

Secretmem is not affected by the crash on upstream as the memory failure
recovery handles the failed copy gracefully, but it still triggers
confusing false memory failure reports:

    Memory failure: 0x106d96f: recovery action for clean unevictable
    LRU page: Recovered

Check IS_ANON_FILE(inode) in file_thp_enabled() to deny THP for all
anonymous inode files.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAEvNRgHegcz3ro35ixkDw39ES8=U6rs6S7iP0gkR9enr7HoGtA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260214001535.435626-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Fixes: 7fbb5e188248 ("mm: remove VM_EXEC requirement for THP eligibility")
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey &lt;Kartikey406@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
Tested-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Lance Yang &lt;lance.yang@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Barry Song &lt;baohua@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng &lt;ackerleytng@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ackerley Tng &lt;ackerleytng@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Baolin Wang &lt;baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Dev Jain &lt;dev.jain@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Fangrui Song &lt;i@maskray.me&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Nico Pache &lt;npache@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ryan Roberts &lt;ryan.roberts@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Yang Shi &lt;shy828301@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Zi Yan &lt;ziy@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/kfence: disable KFENCE upon KASAN HW tags enablement</title>
<updated>2026-02-24T19:13:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-13T09:54:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=09833d99db36d74456a4d13eb29c32d56ff8f2b6'/>
<id>09833d99db36d74456a4d13eb29c32d56ff8f2b6</id>
<content type='text'>
KFENCE does not currently support KASAN hardware tags.  As a result, the
two features are incompatible when enabled simultaneously.

Given that MTE provides deterministic protection and KFENCE is a
sampling-based debugging tool, prioritize the stronger hardware
protections.  Disable KFENCE initialization and free the pre-allocated
pool if KASAN hardware tags are detected to ensure the system maintains
the security guarantees provided by MTE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260213095410.1862978-1-glider@google.com
Fixes: 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ernesto Martinez Garcia &lt;ernesto.martinezgarcia@tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
KFENCE does not currently support KASAN hardware tags.  As a result, the
two features are incompatible when enabled simultaneously.

Given that MTE provides deterministic protection and KFENCE is a
sampling-based debugging tool, prioritize the stronger hardware
protections.  Disable KFENCE initialization and free the pre-allocated
pool if KASAN hardware tags are detected to ensure the system maintains
the security guarantees provided by MTE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260213095410.1862978-1-glider@google.com
Fixes: 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ernesto Martinez Garcia &lt;ernesto.martinezgarcia@tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
