linux.git/mm, branch v3.17-rc2

Merge branch 'akpm' (fixes from Andrew Morton)

2014-08-14T16:56:25+00:00

Merge leftovers from Andrew Morton:
 "A few leftovers.

  I have a bunch of OCFS2 patches which are still out for review and
  which I might sneak along after -rc1.  Partly my fault - I should send
  my review pokes out earlier"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton :
  mm: fix CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH help text grammar
  drivers/mfd/rtsx_usb.c: export device table
  mm, hugetlb_cgroup: align hugetlb cgroup limit to hugepage size

mm, hugetlb_cgroup: align hugetlb cgroup limit to hugepage size

2014-08-14T16:56:15+00:00

Memcg aligns memory.limit_in_bytes to PAGE_SIZE as part of the resource
counter since it makes no sense to allow a partial page to be charged.

As a result of the hugetlb cgroup using the resource counter, it is also
aligned to PAGE_SIZE but makes no sense unless aligned to the size of
the hugepage being limited.

Align hugetlb cgroup limit to hugepage size.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Li Zefan 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2014-08-11T18:44:11+00:00

Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Stuff in here:

   - acct.c fixes and general rework of mnt_pin mechanism.  That allows
     to go for delayed-mntput stuff, which will permit mntput() on deep
     stack without worrying about stack overflows - fs shutdown will
     happen on shallow stack.  IOW, we can do Eric's umount-on-rmdir
     series without introducing tons of stack overflows on new mntput()
     call chains it introduces.
   - Bruce's d_splice_alias() patches
   - more Miklos' rename() stuff.
   - a couple of regression fixes (stable fodder, in the end of branch)
     and a fix for API idiocy in iov_iter.c.

  There definitely will be another pile, maybe even two.  I'd like to
  get Eric's series in this time, but even if we miss it, it'll go right
  in the beginning of for-next in the next cycle - the tricky part of
  prereqs is in this pile"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits)
  fix copy_tree() regression
  __generic_file_write_iter(): fix handling of sync error after DIO
  switch iov_iter_get_pages() to passing maximal number of pages
  fs: mark __d_obtain_alias static
  dcache: d_splice_alias should detect loops
  exportfs: update Exporting documentation
  dcache: d_find_alias needn't recheck IS_ROOT && DCACHE_DISCONNECTED
  dcache: remove unused d_find_alias parameter
  dcache: d_obtain_alias callers don't all want DISCONNECTED
  dcache: d_splice_alias should ignore DCACHE_DISCONNECTED
  dcache: d_splice_alias mustn't create directory aliases
  dcache: close d_move race in d_splice_alias
  dcache: move d_splice_alias
  namei: trivial fix to vfs_rename_dir comment
  VFS: allow ->d_manage() to declare -EISDIR in rcu_walk mode.
  cifs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE
  hostfs: support rename flags
  shmem: support RENAME_EXCHANGE
  shmem: support RENAME_NOREPLACE
  btrfs: add RENAME_NOREPLACE
  ...

__generic_file_write_iter(): fix handling of sync error after DIO

2014-08-11T16:27:40+00:00

If DIO results in short write and sync write fails, we want to bugger off
whether the DIO part has written anything or not; the logics on the return
will take care of the right return value.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.16]
Reported-by: Anton Altaparmakov 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

shm: wait for pins to be released when sealing

2014-08-08T22:57:31+00:00

If we set SEAL_WRITE on a file, we must make sure there cannot be any
ongoing write-operations on the file.  For write() calls, we simply lock
the inode mutex, for mmap() we simply verify there're no writable
mappings.  However, there might be pages pinned by AIO, Direct-IO and
similar operations via GUP.  We must make sure those do not write to the
memfd file after we set SEAL_WRITE.

As there is no way to notify GUP users to drop pages or to wait for them
to be done, we implement the wait ourself: When setting SEAL_WRITE, we
check all pages for their ref-count.  If it's bigger than 1, we know
there's some user of the page.  We then mark the page and wait for up to
150ms for those ref-counts to be dropped.  If the ref-counts are not
dropped in time, we refuse the seal operation.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Ryan Lortie 
Cc: Lennart Poettering 
Cc: Daniel Mack 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

shm: add memfd_create() syscall

2014-08-08T22:57:31+00:00

memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap().  It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points.  Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.

memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode.  Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file.  If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.  Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).

Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit.  It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Ryan Lortie 
Cc: Lennart Poettering 
Cc: Daniel Mack 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

shm: add sealing API

2014-08-08T22:57:31+00:00

If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
  - one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
  - one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
  - one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries

If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement.  However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies.  Look at the following two
use-cases:

  1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
     graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
     read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
     scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
     the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
     cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
  2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
     bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
     assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
     want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
     source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
     copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
     local copy.

While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.

This patch introduces the concept of SEALING.  If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever.  Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed.  Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.

An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
  - SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
            in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
  - GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
          in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
  - WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
           are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
           write().
  - SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
          This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
          can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
          don't want.

The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:

  1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
     SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
     allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
     Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
  2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
     SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
     process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
     Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
     peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
     process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).

The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
  F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
               can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
               sealing.
  F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
               access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
               Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
               there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
               Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
               The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
               on the file. You cannot remove seals again.

The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Ryan Lortie 
Cc: Lennart Poettering 
Cc: Daniel Mack 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: allow drivers to prevent new writable mappings

2014-08-08T22:57:31+00:00

This patch (of 6):

The i_mmap_writable field counts existing writable mappings of an
address_space.  To allow drivers to prevent new writable mappings, make
this counter signed and prevent new writable mappings if it is negative.
This is modelled after i_writecount and DENYWRITE.

This will be required by the shmem-sealing infrastructure to prevent any
new writable mappings after the WRITE seal has been set.  In case there
exists a writable mapping, this operation will fail with EBUSY.

Note that we rely on the fact that iff you already own a writable mapping,
you can increase the counter without using the helpers.  This is the same
that we do for i_writecount.

Signed-off-by: David Herrmann 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Michael Kerrisk 
Cc: Ryan Lortie 
Cc: Lennart Poettering 
Cc: Daniel Mack 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

arm64,ia64,ppc,s390,sh,tile,um,x86,mm: remove default gate area

2014-08-08T22:57:27+00:00

The core mm code will provide a default gate area based on
FIXADDR_USER_START and FIXADDR_USER_END if
!defined(__HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA) && defined(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR).

This default is only useful for ia64.  arm64, ppc, s390, sh, tile, 64-bit
UML, and x86_32 have their own code just to disable it.  arm, 32-bit UML,
and x86_64 have gate areas, but they have their own implementations.

This gets rid of the default and moves the code into ia64.

This should save some code on architectures without a gate area: it's now
possible to inline the gate_area functions in the default case.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Acked-by: Nathan Lynch 
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin 
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt  [in principle]
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger  [for um]
Acked-by: Will Deacon  [for arm64]
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Tony Luck 
Cc: Fenghua Yu 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Chris Metcalf 
Cc: Jeff Dike 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Nathan Lynch 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm/zswap.c: add __init to zswap_entry_cache_destroy()

2014-08-08T22:57:18+00:00

zswap_entry_cache_destroy() is only called by __init init_zswap().

This patch also fixes function name zswap_entry_cache_ s/destory/destroy

Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick 
Acked-by: Seth Jennings 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds