<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/mm/maccess.c, branch v5.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: Add strict non-pagefault kernel-space read function</title>
<updated>2019-11-02T19:39:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-01T23:17:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=75a1a607bb7e6d918be3aca11ec2214a275392f4'/>
<id>75a1a607bb7e6d918be3aca11ec2214a275392f4</id>
<content type='text'>
Add two new probe_kernel_read_strict() and strncpy_from_unsafe_strict()
helpers which by default alias to the __probe_kernel_read() and the
__strncpy_from_unsafe(), respectively, but can be overridden by archs
which have non-overlapping address ranges for kernel space and user
space in order to bail out with -EFAULT when attempting to probe user
memory including non-canonical user access addresses [0]:

  4-level page tables:
    user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00007fffffffffff
    non-canonical:  0x0000800000000000 - 0xffff7fffffffffff

  5-level page tables:
    user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00ffffffffffffff
    non-canonical:  0x0100000000000000 - 0xfeffffffffffffff

The idea is that these helpers are complementary to the probe_user_read()
and strncpy_from_unsafe_user() which probe user-only memory. Both added
helpers here do the same, but for kernel-only addresses.

Both set of helpers are going to be used for BPF tracing. They also
explicitly avoid throwing the splat for non-canonical user addresses from
00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address
dereferences").

For compat, the current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
left as-is.

  [0] Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/eefeefd769aa5a013531f491a71f0936779e916b.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add two new probe_kernel_read_strict() and strncpy_from_unsafe_strict()
helpers which by default alias to the __probe_kernel_read() and the
__strncpy_from_unsafe(), respectively, but can be overridden by archs
which have non-overlapping address ranges for kernel space and user
space in order to bail out with -EFAULT when attempting to probe user
memory including non-canonical user access addresses [0]:

  4-level page tables:
    user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00007fffffffffff
    non-canonical:  0x0000800000000000 - 0xffff7fffffffffff

  5-level page tables:
    user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00ffffffffffffff
    non-canonical:  0x0100000000000000 - 0xfeffffffffffffff

The idea is that these helpers are complementary to the probe_user_read()
and strncpy_from_unsafe_user() which probe user-only memory. Both added
helpers here do the same, but for kernel-only addresses.

Both set of helpers are going to be used for BPF tracing. They also
explicitly avoid throwing the splat for non-canonical user addresses from
00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address
dereferences").

For compat, the current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
left as-is.

  [0] Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/eefeefd769aa5a013531f491a71f0936779e916b.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space write function</title>
<updated>2019-11-02T19:39:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-01T23:17:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1d1585ca0f48fe7ed95c3571f3e4a82b2b5045dc'/>
<id>1d1585ca0f48fe7ed95c3571f3e4a82b2b5045dc</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 3d7081822f7f ("uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions")
missed to add probe write function, therefore factor out a probe_write_common()
helper with most logic of probe_kernel_write() except setting KERNEL_DS, and
add a new probe_user_write() helper so it can be used from BPF side.

Again, on some archs, the user address space and kernel address space can
co-exist and be overlapping, so in such case, setting KERNEL_DS would mean
that the given address is treated as being in kernel address space.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9df2542e68141bfa3addde631441ee45503856a8.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 3d7081822f7f ("uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions")
missed to add probe write function, therefore factor out a probe_write_common()
helper with most logic of probe_kernel_write() except setting KERNEL_DS, and
add a new probe_user_write() helper so it can be used from BPF side.

Again, on some archs, the user address space and kernel address space can
co-exist and be overlapping, so in such case, setting KERNEL_DS would mean
that the given address is treated as being in kernel address space.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9df2542e68141bfa3addde631441ee45503856a8.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'trace-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace</title>
<updated>2019-07-18T18:51:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-18T18:51:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=818e95c768c6607a1df4cf022c00c3c58e2f203e'/>
<id>818e95c768c6607a1df4cf022c00c3c58e2f203e</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tracing updates from Steven Rostedt:
 "The main changes in this release include:

   - Add user space specific memory reading for kprobes

   - Allow kprobes to be executed earlier in boot

  The rest are mostly just various clean ups and small fixes"

* tag 'trace-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: (33 commits)
  tracing: Make trace_get_fields() global
  tracing: Let filter_assign_type() detect FILTER_PTR_STRING
  tracing: Pass type into tracing_generic_entry_update()
  ftrace/selftest: Test if set_event/ftrace_pid exists before writing
  ftrace/selftests: Return the skip code when tracing directory not configured in kernel
  tracing/kprobe: Check registered state using kprobe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_event_call accesses APIs
  tracing/probe: Add probe event name and group name accesses APIs
  tracing/probe: Add trace flag access APIs for trace_probe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_event_file access APIs for trace_probe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_event_call register API for trace_probe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_probe init and free functions
  tracing/uprobe: Set print format when parsing command
  tracing/kprobe: Set print format right after parsed command
  kprobes: Fix to init kprobes in subsys_initcall
  tracepoint: Use struct_size() in kmalloc()
  ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS
  ftrace: Enable trampoline when rec count returns back to one
  tracing/kprobe: Do not run kprobe boot tests if kprobe_event is on cmdline
  tracing: Make a separate config for trace event self tests
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull tracing updates from Steven Rostedt:
 "The main changes in this release include:

   - Add user space specific memory reading for kprobes

   - Allow kprobes to be executed earlier in boot

  The rest are mostly just various clean ups and small fixes"

* tag 'trace-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: (33 commits)
  tracing: Make trace_get_fields() global
  tracing: Let filter_assign_type() detect FILTER_PTR_STRING
  tracing: Pass type into tracing_generic_entry_update()
  ftrace/selftest: Test if set_event/ftrace_pid exists before writing
  ftrace/selftests: Return the skip code when tracing directory not configured in kernel
  tracing/kprobe: Check registered state using kprobe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_event_call accesses APIs
  tracing/probe: Add probe event name and group name accesses APIs
  tracing/probe: Add trace flag access APIs for trace_probe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_event_file access APIs for trace_probe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_event_call register API for trace_probe
  tracing/probe: Add trace_probe init and free functions
  tracing/uprobe: Set print format when parsing command
  tracing/kprobe: Set print format right after parsed command
  kprobes: Fix to init kprobes in subsys_initcall
  tracepoint: Use struct_size() in kmalloc()
  ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS
  ftrace: Enable trampoline when rec count returns back to one
  tracing/kprobe: Do not run kprobe boot tests if kprobe_event is on cmdline
  tracing: Make a separate config for trace event self tests
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions</title>
<updated>2019-05-26T03:04:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-15T05:38:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3d7081822f7f9eab867d9bcc8fd635208ec438e0'/>
<id>3d7081822f7f9eab867d9bcc8fd635208ec438e0</id>
<content type='text'>
Add probe_user_read(), strncpy_from_unsafe_user() and
strnlen_unsafe_user() which allows caller to access user-space
in IRQ context.

Current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
not available for user-space memory, because it sets
KERNEL_DS while accessing data. On some arch, user address
space and kernel address space can be co-exist, but others
can not. In that case, setting KERNEL_DS means given
address is treated as a kernel address space.
Also strnlen_user() is only available from user context since
it can sleep if pagefault is enabled.

To access user-space memory without pagefault, we need
these new functions which sets USER_DS while accessing
the data.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789869802.26965.4940338412595759063.stgit@devnote2

Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add probe_user_read(), strncpy_from_unsafe_user() and
strnlen_unsafe_user() which allows caller to access user-space
in IRQ context.

Current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
not available for user-space memory, because it sets
KERNEL_DS while accessing data. On some arch, user address
space and kernel address space can be co-exist, but others
can not. In that case, setting KERNEL_DS means given
address is treated as a kernel address space.
Also strnlen_user() is only available from user context since
it can sleep if pagefault is enabled.

To access user-space memory without pagefault, we need
these new functions which sets USER_DS while accessing
the data.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789869802.26965.4940338412595759063.stgit@devnote2

Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files</title>
<updated>2019-05-21T08:50:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-19T12:08:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=457c89965399115e5cd8bf38f9c597293405703d'/>
<id>457c89965399115e5cd8bf38f9c597293405703d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
   initial scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
   initial scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses"</title>
<updated>2019-02-25T17:10:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T17:10:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=53a41cb7ed381edee91029cdcabe9b3250f43f4d'/>
<id>53a41cb7ed381edee91029cdcabe9b3250f43f4d</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b.

It was well-intentioned, but wrong.  Overriding the exception tables for
instructions for random reasons is just wrong, and that is what the new
code did.

It caused problems for tracing, and it caused problems for strncpy_from_user(),
because the new checks made perfectly valid use cases break, rather than
catch things that did bad things.

Unchecked user space accesses are a problem, but that's not a reason to
add invalid checks that then people have to work around with silly flags
(in this case, that 'kernel_uaccess_faults_ok' flag, which is just an
odd way to say "this commit was wrong" and was sprinked into random
places to hide the wrongness).

The real fix to unchecked user space accesses is to get rid of the
special "let's not check __get_user() and __put_user() at all" logic.
Make __{get|put}_user() be just aliases to the regular {get|put}_user()
functions, and make it impossible to access user space without having
the proper checks in places.

The raison d'être of the special double-underscore versions used to be
that the range check was expensive, and if you did multiple user
accesses, you'd do the range check up front (like the signal frame
handling code, for example).  But SMAP (on x86) and PAN (on ARM) have
made that optimization pointless, because the _real_ expense is the "set
CPU flag to allow user space access".

Do let's not break the valid cases to catch invalid cases that shouldn't
even exist.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Tobin C. Harding &lt;tobin@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b.

It was well-intentioned, but wrong.  Overriding the exception tables for
instructions for random reasons is just wrong, and that is what the new
code did.

It caused problems for tracing, and it caused problems for strncpy_from_user(),
because the new checks made perfectly valid use cases break, rather than
catch things that did bad things.

Unchecked user space accesses are a problem, but that's not a reason to
add invalid checks that then people have to work around with silly flags
(in this case, that 'kernel_uaccess_faults_ok' flag, which is just an
odd way to say "this commit was wrong" and was sprinked into random
places to hide the wrongness).

The real fix to unchecked user space accesses is to get rid of the
special "let's not check __get_user() and __put_user() at all" logic.
Make __{get|put}_user() be just aliases to the regular {get|put}_user()
functions, and make it impossible to access user space without having
the proper checks in places.

The raison d'être of the special double-underscore versions used to be
that the range check was expensive, and if you did multiple user
accesses, you'd do the range check up front (like the signal frame
handling code, for example).  But SMAP (on x86) and PAN (on ARM) have
made that optimization pointless, because the _real_ expense is the "set
CPU flag to allow user space access".

Do let's not break the valid cases to catch invalid cases that shouldn't
even exist.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Tobin C. Harding &lt;tobin@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses</title>
<updated>2018-09-03T13:12:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-28T20:14:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b'/>
<id>9da3f2b74054406f87dff7101a569217ffceb29b</id>
<content type='text'>
There have been multiple kernel vulnerabilities that permitted userspace to
pass completely unchecked pointers through to userspace accessors:

 - the waitid() bug - commit 96ca579a1ecc ("waitid(): Add missing
   access_ok() checks")
 - the sg/bsg read/write APIs
 - the infiniband read/write APIs

These don't happen all that often, but when they do happen, it is hard to
test for them properly; and it is probably also hard to discover them with
fuzzing. Even when an unmapped kernel address is supplied to such buggy
code, it just returns -EFAULT instead of doing a proper BUG() or at least
WARN().

Try to make such misbehaving code a bit more visible by refusing to do a
fixup in the pagefault handler code when a userspace accessor causes a #PF
on a kernel address and the current context isn't whitelisted.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy &lt;anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-7-jannh@google.com

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There have been multiple kernel vulnerabilities that permitted userspace to
pass completely unchecked pointers through to userspace accessors:

 - the waitid() bug - commit 96ca579a1ecc ("waitid(): Add missing
   access_ok() checks")
 - the sg/bsg read/write APIs
 - the infiniband read/write APIs

These don't happen all that often, but when they do happen, it is hard to
test for them properly; and it is probably also hard to discover them with
fuzzing. Even when an unmapped kernel address is supplied to such buggy
code, it just returns -EFAULT instead of doing a proper BUG() or at least
WARN().

Try to make such misbehaving code a bit more visible by refusing to do a
fixup in the pagefault handler code when a userspace accessor causes a #PF
on a kernel address and the current context isn't whitelisted.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy &lt;anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828201421.157735-7-jannh@google.com

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: docs: fix parameter names mismatch</title>
<updated>2018-02-07T02:32:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Rapoport</name>
<email>rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-06T23:42:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f144c390f9059d9efafe54c4eb22bb13a2cb5534'/>
<id>f144c390f9059d9efafe54c4eb22bb13a2cb5534</id>
<content type='text'>
There are several places where parameter descriptions do no match the
actual code.  Fix it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516700871-22279-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
There are several places where parameter descriptions do no match the
actual code.  Fix it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516700871-22279-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86: remove more uaccess_32.h complexity</title>
<updated>2016-05-23T00:21:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-23T00:21:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bd28b14591b98f696bc9f94c5ba2e598ca487dfd'/>
<id>bd28b14591b98f696bc9f94c5ba2e598ca487dfd</id>
<content type='text'>
I'm looking at trying to possibly merge the 32-bit and 64-bit versions
of the x86 uaccess.h implementation, but first this needs to be cleaned
up.

For example, the 32-bit version of "__copy_from_user_inatomic()" is
mostly the special cases for the constant size, and it's actually almost
never relevant.  Most users aren't actually using a constant size
anyway, and the few cases that do small constant copies are better off
just using __get_user() instead.

So get rid of the unnecessary complexity.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
I'm looking at trying to possibly merge the 32-bit and 64-bit versions
of the x86 uaccess.h implementation, but first this needs to be cleaned
up.

For example, the 32-bit version of "__copy_from_user_inatomic()" is
mostly the special cases for the constant size, and it's actually almost
never relevant.  Most users aren't actually using a constant size
anyway, and the few cases that do small constant copies are better off
just using __get_user() instead.

So get rid of the unnecessary complexity.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/maccess.c: actually return -EFAULT from strncpy_from_unsafe</title>
<updated>2015-11-06T03:34:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-06T02:50:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=9dd861d55b01f1d0848f82007e8665371ae18710'/>
<id>9dd861d55b01f1d0848f82007e8665371ae18710</id>
<content type='text'>
As far as I can tell, strncpy_from_unsafe never returns -EFAULT.  ret is
the result of a __copy_from_user_inatomic(), which is 0 for success and
positive (in this case necessarily 1) for access error - it is never
negative.  So we were always returning the length of the, possibly
truncated, destination string.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
As far as I can tell, strncpy_from_unsafe never returns -EFAULT.  ret is
the result of a __copy_from_user_inatomic(), which is 0 for success and
positive (in this case necessarily 1) for access error - it is never
negative.  So we were always returning the length of the, possibly
truncated, destination string.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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