linux.git/kernel/signal.c, branch v5.7-rc2

signal: use kill_proc_info instead of kill_pid_info in kill_something_info

2020-04-12T20:46:34+00:00

signal.c provides kill_proc_info, we can use it instead of kill_pid_info
in kill_something_info func gracefully.

Signed-off-by: Zhiqiang Liu 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Acked-by: Christian Brauner 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/80236965-f0b5-c888-95ff-855bdec75bb3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

signal: check sig before setting info in kill_pid_usb_asyncio

2020-04-12T20:46:34+00:00

In kill_pid_usb_asyncio, if signal is not valid, we do not need to
set info struct.

Signed-off-by: Zhiqiang Liu 
Acked-by: Christian Brauner 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f525fd08-1cf7-fb09-d20c-4359145eb940@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

2020-04-02T18:22:17+00:00

Pull exec/proc updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This contains two significant pieces of work: the work to sort out
  proc_flush_task, and the work to solve a deadlock between strace and
  exec.

  Fixing proc_flush_task so that it no longer requires a persistent
  mount makes improvements to proc possible. The removal of the
  persistent mount solves an old regression that that caused the hidepid
  mount option to only work on remount not on mount. The regression was
  found and reported by the Android folks. This further allows Alexey
  Gladkov's work making proc mount options specific to an individual
  mount of proc to move forward.

  The work on exec starts solving a long standing issue with exec that
  it takes mutexes of blocking userspace applications, which makes exec
  extremely deadlock prone. For the moment this adds a second mutex with
  a narrower scope that handles all of the easy cases. Which makes the
  tricky cases easy to spot. With a little luck the code to solve those
  deadlocks will be ready by next merge window"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (25 commits)
  signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits
  pidfd: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
  perf: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
  proc: io_accounting: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
  proc: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
  kernel/kcmp.c: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
  kernel: doc: remove outdated comment cred.c
  mm: docs: Fix a comment in process_vm_rw_core
  selftests/ptrace: add test cases for dead-locks
  exec: Fix a deadlock in strace
  exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex
  exec: Move exec_mmap right after de_thread in flush_old_exec
  exec: Move cleanup of posix timers on exec out of de_thread
  exec: Factor unshare_sighand out of de_thread and call it separately
  exec: Only compute current once in flush_old_exec
  pid: Improve the comment about waiting in zap_pid_ns_processes
  proc: Remove the now unnecessary internal mount of proc
  uml: Create a private mount of proc for mconsole
  uml: Don't consult current to find the proc_mnt in mconsole_proc
  proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc
  ...

signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits

2020-04-01T17:04:24+00:00

Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible
to wrap the exec_id counter.  With care an attacker can cause exec_id
wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent.  This
bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their
credentials during exec.

The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing
of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times.
Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit
exec_id.  Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7
days.  Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server.
Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec
gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.

Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit
architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can
take two read instructions.  Which means that is is possible to hit
a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written
value.  So with very lucky timing after this change this still
remains expoiltable.

I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE
and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE
to make it clear that there is no locking between these two
locations.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl
Fixes: 2.3.23pre2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

signal: avoid double atomic counter increments for user accounting

2020-02-26T17:54:03+00:00

When queueing a signal, we increment both the users count of pending
signals (for RLIMIT_SIGPENDING tracking) and we increment the refcount
of the user struct itself (because we keep a reference to the user in
the signal structure in order to correctly account for it when freeing).

That turns out to be fairly expensive, because both of them are atomic
updates, and particularly under extreme signal handling pressure on big
machines, you can get a lot of cache contention on the user struct.
That can then cause horrid cacheline ping-pong when you do these
multiple accesses.

So change the reference counting to only pin the user for the _first_
pending signal, and to unpin it when the last pending signal is
dequeued.  That means that when a user sees a lot of concurrent signal
queuing - which is the only situation when this matters - the only
atomic access needed is generally the 'sigpending' count update.

This was noticed because of a particularly odd timing artifact on a
dual-socket 96C/192T Cascade Lake platform: when you get into bad
contention, on that machine for some reason seems to be much worse when
the contention happens in the upper 32-byte half of the cacheline.

As a result, the kernel test robot will-it-scale 'signal1' benchmark had
an odd performance regression simply due to random alignment of the
'struct user_struct' (and pointed to a completely unrelated and
apparently nonsensical commit for the regression).

Avoiding the double increments (and decrements on the dequeueing side,
of course) makes for much less contention and hugely improved
performance on that will-it-scale microbenchmark.

Quoting Feng Tang:

 "It makes a big difference, that the performance score is tripled! bump
  from original 17000 to 54000. Also the gap between 5.0-rc6 and
  5.0-rc6+Jiri's patch is reduced to around 2%"

[ The "2% gap" is the odd cacheline placement difference on that
  platform: under the extreme contention case, the effect of which half
  of the cacheline was hot was 5%, so with the reduced contention the
  odd timing artifact is reduced too ]

It does help in the non-contended case too, but is not nearly as
noticeable.

Reported-and-tested-by: Feng Tang 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Huang, Ying 
Cc: Philip Li 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu

2020-01-26T09:54:47+00:00

This patch fixes the following sparse errors by annotating the
sighand_struct with __rcu

kernel/fork.c:1511:9: error: incompatible types in comparison expression
kernel/exit.c:100:19: error: incompatible types in comparison expression
kernel/signal.c:1370:27: error: incompatible types in comparison expression

This fix introduces the following sparse error in signal.c due to
checking the sighand pointer without rcu primitives:

kernel/signal.c:1386:21: error: incompatible types in comparison expression

This new sparse error is also fixed in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik 
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124045908.26389-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

cgroup: freezer: call cgroup_enter_frozen() with preemption disabled in ptrace_stop()

2019-10-11T15:39:57+00:00

ptrace_stop() does preempt_enable_no_resched() to avoid the preemption,
but after that cgroup_enter_frozen() does spin_lock/unlock and this adds
another preemption point.

Reported-and-tested-by: Bruce Ashfield 
Fixes: 76f969e8948d ("cgroup: cgroup v2 freezer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo

Merge tag 'core-process-v5.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

2019-09-16T16:28:19+00:00

Pull pidfd/waitid updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains two features and various tests.

  First, it adds support for waiting on process through pidfds by adding
  the P_PIDFD type to the waitid() syscall. This completes the basic
  functionality of the pidfd api (cf. [1]). In the meantime we also have
  a new adition to the userspace projects that make use of the pidfd
  api. The qt project was nice enough to send a mail pointing out that
  they have a pr up to switch to the pidfd api (cf. [2]).

  Second, this tag contains an extension to the waitid() syscall to make
  it possible to wait on the current process group in a race free manner
  (even though the actual problem is very unlikely) by specifing 0
  together with the P_PGID type. This extension traces back to a
  discussion on the glibc development mailing list.

  There are also a range of tests for the features above. Additionally,
  the test-suite which detected the pidfd-polling race we fixed in [3]
  is included in this tag"

[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/794707/
[2] https://codereview.qt-project.org/c/qt/qtbase/+/108456
[3] commit b191d6491be6 ("pidfd: fix a poll race when setting exit_state")

* tag 'core-process-v5.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  waitid: Add support for waiting for the current process group
  tests: add pidfd poll tests
  tests: move common definitions and functions into pidfd.h
  pidfd: add pidfd_wait tests
  pidfd: add P_PIDFD to waitid()

signal: Allow cifs and drbd to receive their terminating signals

2019-08-19T11:34:13+00:00

My recent to change to only use force_sig for a synchronous events
wound up breaking signal reception cifs and drbd.  I had overlooked
the fact that by default kthreads start out with all signals set to
SIG_IGN.  So a change I thought was safe turned out to have made it
impossible for those kernel thread to catch their signals.

Reverting the work on force_sig is a bad idea because what the code
was doing was very much a misuse of force_sig.  As the way force_sig
ultimately allowed the signal to happen was to change the signal
handler to SIG_DFL.  Which after the first signal will allow userspace
to send signals to these kernel threads.  At least for
wake_ack_receiver in drbd that does not appear actively wrong.

So correct this problem by adding allow_kernel_signal that will allow
signals whose siginfo reports they were sent by the kernel through,
but will not allow userspace generated signals, and update cifs and
drbd to call allow_kernel_signal in an appropriate place so that their
thread can receive this signal.

Fixing things this way ensures that userspace won't be able to send
signals and cause problems, that it is clear which signals the
threads are expecting to receive, and it guarantees that nothing
else in the system will be affected.

This change was partly inspired by similar cifs and drbd patches that
added allow_signal.

Reported-by: ronnie sahlberg 
Reported-by: Christoph Böhmwalder 
Tested-by: Christoph Böhmwalder 
Cc: Steve French 
Cc: Philipp Reisner 
Cc: David Laight 
Fixes: 247bc9470b1e ("cifs: fix rmmod regression in cifs.ko caused by force_sig changes")
Fixes: 72abe3bcf091 ("signal/cifs: Fix cifs_put_tcp_session to call send_sig instead of force_sig")
Fixes: fee109901f39 ("signal/drbd: Use send_sig not force_sig")
Fixes: 3cf5d076fb4d ("signal: Remove task parameter from force_sig")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

kernel/signal.c: fix a kernel-doc markup

2019-08-03T14:02:00+00:00

The kernel-doc parser doesn't handle expressions with %foo*.  Instead,
when an asterisk should be part of a constant, it uses an alternative
notation: `foo*`.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7f18c2e0b5e39e6b7eb55ddeb043b8b260b49f2d.1563361575.git.mchehab+samsung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab 
Cc: Deepa Dinamani 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds