Unlocking robust non-PI futexes happens in user space with the following
sequence:

  1)	robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex);
  2)	robust_list_remove(mutex);

  	lval = 0;
  3)	lval = atomic_xchg(lock, lval);
  4)	if (lval & WAITERS)
  5)		sys_futex(WAKE,....);
  6)	robust_list_clear_op_pending();

That opens a window between #3 and #6 where the mutex could be acquired by
some other task which observes that it is the last user and:

  A) unmaps the mutex memory
  B) maps a different file, which ends up covering the same address

When the original task exits before reaching #6 then the kernel robust list
handling observes the pending op entry and tries to fix up user space.

In case that the newly mapped data contains the TID of the exiting thread
at the address of the mutex/futex the kernel will set the owner died bit in
that memory and therefore corrupting unrelated data.

PI futexes have a similar problem both for the non-contented user space
unlock and the in kernel unlock:

  1)	robust_list_set_op_pending(mutex);
  2)	robust_list_remove(mutex);

  	lval = gettid();
  3)	if (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(lock, lval, 0))
  4)		sys_futex(UNLOCK_PI,....);
  5)	robust_list_clear_op_pending();

Address the first part of the problem where the futexes have waiters and
need to enter the kernel anyway. Add a new FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK flag, which
is valid for the sys_futex() FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI, FUTEX_WAKE, FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET
operations.

This deliberately omits FUTEX_WAKE_OP from this treatment as it's unclear
whether this is needed and there is no usage of it in glibc either to
investigate.

For the futex2 syscall family this needs to be implemented with a new
syscall.

The sys_futex() case [ab]uses the @uaddr2 argument to hand the pointer to
robust_list_head::list_pending_op into the kernel. This argument is only
evaluated when the FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK bit is set and is therefore backward
compatible.

This is an explicit argument to avoid the lookup of the robust list pointer
and retrieving the pending op pointer from there. User space has the
pointer already available so it can just put it into the @uaddr2
argument. Aside of that this allows the usage of multiple robust lists in
the future without any changes to the internal functions as they just operate
on the provided pointer.

This requires a second flag FUTEX_ROBUST_LIST32 which indicates that the
robust list pointer points to an u32 and not to an u64. This is required
for two reasons:

    1) sys_futex() has no compat variant

    2) The gaming emulators use both both 64-bit and compat 32-bit robust
       lists in the same 64-bit application

As a consequence 32-bit applications have to set this flag unconditionally
so they can run on a 64-bit kernel in compat mode unmodified. 32-bit
kernels return an error code when the flag is not set. 64-bit kernels will
happily clear the full 64 bits if user space fails to set it.

In case of FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI this clears the robust list pending op when the
unlock succeeded. In case of errors, the user space value is still locked
by the caller and therefore the above cannot happen.

In case of FUTEX_WAKE* this does the unlock of the futex in the kernel and
clears the robust list pending op when the unlock was successful. If not,
the user space value is still locked and user space has to deal with the
returned error. That means that the unlocking of non-PI robust futexes has
to use the same try_cmpxchg() unlock scheme as PI futexes.

If the clearing of the pending list op fails (fault) then the kernel clears
the registered robust list pointer if it matches to prevent that exit()
will try to handle invalid data. That's a valid paranoid decision because
the robust list head sits usually in the TLS and if the TLS is not longer
accessible then the chance for fixing up the resulting mess is very close
to zero.

The problem of non-contended unlocks still exists and will be addressed
separately.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.670514505@kernel.org

Having all these members in task_struct along with the required #ifdeffery
is annoying, does not allow efficient initializing of the data with
memset() and makes extending it tedious.

Move it into a data structure and fix up all usage sites.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602090535.308220888@kernel.org

Nicholas reported that his LLM found it was possible to create a UaF
when sys_futex_requeue() is used with different flags. The initial
motivation for allowing different flags was the variable sized futex,
but since that hasn't been merged (yet), simply mandate the flags are
identical, as is the case for the old style sys_futex() requeue
operations.

Fixes: 0f4b5f972216 ("futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()")
Reported-by: Nicholas Carlini <npc@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>

This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using

    git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
        xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'

to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.

Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.

For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>

sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access()
to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's
robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the
target process.

During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a
privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings
may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before
this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information
after the target becomes privileged.

A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which
ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a
privileged state via exec().

For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a
setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T
is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions
based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec
immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory
mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list
without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a
now-privileged process.

This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could
expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger
exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized
disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a
potential security risk.

Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking
ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list.
This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the
check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of
credentials.

Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/1477863998-3298-5-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net/
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/119

To make it more generically useful, augment it with allowing the caller
to pass in the wake handler and wake data. Convert the futex_waitv()
syscall, passing in the default handlers.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We need this for validating the futex2 flags outside of the normal
futex syscalls.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding
sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are
too numerous to fit into a regular syscall. As such, use struct
futex_waitv to pass the 'source' and 'destination' futexes to the
syscall.

This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
and uses {val, uaddr, flags} for source and {uaddr, flags} for
destination.

This design explicitly allows requeueing between different types of
futex by having a different flags word per uaddr.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.511860556@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net

In order to support mixed size requeue, add a second flags argument to
the internal futex_requeue() function.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.396780136@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net