<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/kernel/futex/requeue.c, branch v7.2-rc1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'locking-core-2026-06-14' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2026-06-15T08:51:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-15T08:51:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=764e77d868a5b932c709e20ddb5993f9111a841c'/>
<id>764e77d868a5b932c709e20ddb5993f9111a841c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Futex updates:

   - Optimize futex hash bucket access patterns (Peter Zijlstra)

   - Large series to address the robust futex unlock race for real, by
     Thomas Gleixner:

      "The robust futex unlock mechanism is racy in respect to the
       clearing of the robust_list_head::list_op_pending pointer because
       unlock and clearing the pointer are not atomic.

       The race window is between the unlock and clearing the pending op
       pointer. If the task is forced to exit in this window, exit will
       access a potentially invalid pending op pointer when cleaning up
       the robust list.

       That happens if another task manages to unmap the object
       containing the lock before the cleanup, which results in an UAF.

       In the worst case this UAF can lead to memory corruption when
       unrelated content has been mapped to the same address by the time
       the access happens.

       User space can't solve this problem without help from the kernel.
       This series provides the kernel side infrastructure to help it
       along:

        1) Combined unlock, pointer clearing, wake-up for the
           contended case

        2) VDSO based unlock and pointer clearing helpers with a
           fix-up function in the kernel when user space was interrupted
           within the critical section.

      ... with help by André Almeida:

        - Add a note about robust list race condition (André Almeida)
        - Add self-tests for robust release operations (André Almeida)

  Context analysis updates:

   - Implement context analysis for 'struct rt_mutex'. (Bart Van Assche)
   - Bump required Clang version to 23 (Marco Elver)

  Guard infrastructure updates:

   - Series to remove NULL check from unconditional guards (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  Lockdep updates:

   - Restore self-test migrate_disable() and sched_rt_mutex state on
     PREEMPT_RT (Karl Mehltretter)

  Membarriers updates:

   - Use per-CPU mutexes for targeted commands (Aniket Gattani)
   - Modernize membarrier_global_expedited with cleanup guards (Aniket
     Gattani)
   - Add rseq stress test for CFS throttle interactions (Aniket Gattani)

  percpu-rwsems updates:

   - Extract __percpu_up_read() to optimize inlining overhead (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  Seqlocks updates:

   - Allow UBSAN_ALIGNMENT to fail optimizing (Heiko Carstens)

  Lock tracing:

   - Add contended_release tracepoint to sleepable locks such as
     mutexes, percpu-rwsems, rtmutexes, rwsems and semaphores (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  MAINTAINERS updates:

   - MAINTAINERS: Add RUST [SYNC] entry (Boqun Feng)

  Misc updates and fixes by Randy Dunlap, YE WEI-HONG, Fabricio Parra,
  Dmitry Ilvokhin and Peter Zijlstra"

* tag 'locking-core-2026-06-14' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
  locking: Add contended_release tracepoint to sleepable locks
  locking/percpu-rwsem: Extract __percpu_up_read()
  tracing/lock: Remove unnecessary linux/sched.h include
  futex: Optimize futex hash bucket access patterns
  rust: sync: completion: Mark inline complete_all and wait_for_completion
  MAINTAINERS: Add RUST [SYNC] entry
  cleanup: Specify nonnull argument index
  selftests: futex: Add tests for robust release operations
  Documentation: futex: Add a note about robust list race condition
  x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock()
  x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support
  futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race
  futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range
  futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes
  futex: Cleanup UAPI defines
  x86: Select ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TSO
  uaccess: Provide unsafe_atomic_store_release_user()
  futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers
  futex: Move futex related mm_struct data into a struct
  futex: Make futex_mm_init() void
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Futex updates:

   - Optimize futex hash bucket access patterns (Peter Zijlstra)

   - Large series to address the robust futex unlock race for real, by
     Thomas Gleixner:

      "The robust futex unlock mechanism is racy in respect to the
       clearing of the robust_list_head::list_op_pending pointer because
       unlock and clearing the pointer are not atomic.

       The race window is between the unlock and clearing the pending op
       pointer. If the task is forced to exit in this window, exit will
       access a potentially invalid pending op pointer when cleaning up
       the robust list.

       That happens if another task manages to unmap the object
       containing the lock before the cleanup, which results in an UAF.

       In the worst case this UAF can lead to memory corruption when
       unrelated content has been mapped to the same address by the time
       the access happens.

       User space can't solve this problem without help from the kernel.
       This series provides the kernel side infrastructure to help it
       along:

        1) Combined unlock, pointer clearing, wake-up for the
           contended case

        2) VDSO based unlock and pointer clearing helpers with a
           fix-up function in the kernel when user space was interrupted
           within the critical section.

      ... with help by André Almeida:

        - Add a note about robust list race condition (André Almeida)
        - Add self-tests for robust release operations (André Almeida)

  Context analysis updates:

   - Implement context analysis for 'struct rt_mutex'. (Bart Van Assche)
   - Bump required Clang version to 23 (Marco Elver)

  Guard infrastructure updates:

   - Series to remove NULL check from unconditional guards (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  Lockdep updates:

   - Restore self-test migrate_disable() and sched_rt_mutex state on
     PREEMPT_RT (Karl Mehltretter)

  Membarriers updates:

   - Use per-CPU mutexes for targeted commands (Aniket Gattani)
   - Modernize membarrier_global_expedited with cleanup guards (Aniket
     Gattani)
   - Add rseq stress test for CFS throttle interactions (Aniket Gattani)

  percpu-rwsems updates:

   - Extract __percpu_up_read() to optimize inlining overhead (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  Seqlocks updates:

   - Allow UBSAN_ALIGNMENT to fail optimizing (Heiko Carstens)

  Lock tracing:

   - Add contended_release tracepoint to sleepable locks such as
     mutexes, percpu-rwsems, rtmutexes, rwsems and semaphores (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  MAINTAINERS updates:

   - MAINTAINERS: Add RUST [SYNC] entry (Boqun Feng)

  Misc updates and fixes by Randy Dunlap, YE WEI-HONG, Fabricio Parra,
  Dmitry Ilvokhin and Peter Zijlstra"

* tag 'locking-core-2026-06-14' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
  locking: Add contended_release tracepoint to sleepable locks
  locking/percpu-rwsem: Extract __percpu_up_read()
  tracing/lock: Remove unnecessary linux/sched.h include
  futex: Optimize futex hash bucket access patterns
  rust: sync: completion: Mark inline complete_all and wait_for_completion
  MAINTAINERS: Add RUST [SYNC] entry
  cleanup: Specify nonnull argument index
  selftests: futex: Add tests for robust release operations
  Documentation: futex: Add a note about robust list race condition
  x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock()
  x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support
  futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race
  futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range
  futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes
  futex: Cleanup UAPI defines
  x86: Select ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TSO
  uaccess: Provide unsafe_atomic_store_release_user()
  futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers
  futex: Move futex related mm_struct data into a struct
  futex: Make futex_mm_init() void
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Optimize futex hash bucket access patterns</title>
<updated>2026-06-11T11:41:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T21:20:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a734d9fca84e1d4fa0cb442ef5f84c88f8212d32'/>
<id>a734d9fca84e1d4fa0cb442ef5f84c88f8212d32</id>
<content type='text'>
Breno reported significant c2c HITM in a futex hash heavy workload.

It turns out that the hash bucket to private hash table reverse pointer
(futex_hash_bucket::priv) was to blame. Notably when the hash buckets are
heavily contended, the: 'fph = bh-&gt;priv;' load in futex_hash() will typically
miss and consequently become quite expensive.

Since this load in particular is quite superfluous, removing it is fairly
straight forward. However, removing it does not in fact achieve anything much.
The pain moves to the next user, notably: futex_hash_put().

Therefore rework the whole private hash refcounting to avoid needing this back
pointer (and removing it). Instead of passing around 'struct futex_hash_bucket
*hb', pass around a new structure that contains it and the related 'struct
futex_private_hash *fph' pointer in tandem.

Funnily this turns out to remove more code than it adds and significantly
improves futex hash performance (as measured by 'perf bench futex hash'):

SKL dual socket 112 threads:

		  Baseline        Patched
  shared (16k)    1571857         1641435         + 4.4%
  autosize (512)   646390          903371         +39.7%
  -b 256           464395          587014         +26.4%
  -b 512           715687          995943         +39.2%
  -b 1024          995085         1396328         +40.3%
  -b 2048         1293114         1668395         +29.0%
  -b 4096         2124438         2240228         + 5.5%

Zen3 dual socket 256 threads:

                  Baseline        Patched
  shared  (16k)   1275840         1381279         + 8.2%
  autosize (512)  1252745         1482179         +18.3%
  -b 256           856274          955455         +11.5%
  -b 512          1267490         1544010         +21.8%
  -b 1024         1424013         1625424         +14.1%
  -b 2048         1505181         1669342         +10.9%
  -b 4096         1465993         1688932         +15.2%

AMD EPYC 9D64 (Zen4, single socket) 176 threads:

                       Baseline       Patched      Delta
  shared (16k)         1,230,599      1,368,655    +11.2%
  autosize (1024)      1,285,440      1,556,946    +21.1%
  -b 256               1,341,471      1,520,303    +13.3%
  -b 512               1,438,330      1,599,319    +11.2%
  -b 1024              1,443,772      1,622,493    +12.4%
  -b 2048              1,472,108      1,643,975    +11.7%
  -b 4096              1,333,098      1,570,897    +17.8%

Reported-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610135510.GB1430057@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Breno reported significant c2c HITM in a futex hash heavy workload.

It turns out that the hash bucket to private hash table reverse pointer
(futex_hash_bucket::priv) was to blame. Notably when the hash buckets are
heavily contended, the: 'fph = bh-&gt;priv;' load in futex_hash() will typically
miss and consequently become quite expensive.

Since this load in particular is quite superfluous, removing it is fairly
straight forward. However, removing it does not in fact achieve anything much.
The pain moves to the next user, notably: futex_hash_put().

Therefore rework the whole private hash refcounting to avoid needing this back
pointer (and removing it). Instead of passing around 'struct futex_hash_bucket
*hb', pass around a new structure that contains it and the related 'struct
futex_private_hash *fph' pointer in tandem.

Funnily this turns out to remove more code than it adds and significantly
improves futex hash performance (as measured by 'perf bench futex hash'):

SKL dual socket 112 threads:

		  Baseline        Patched
  shared (16k)    1571857         1641435         + 4.4%
  autosize (512)   646390          903371         +39.7%
  -b 256           464395          587014         +26.4%
  -b 512           715687          995943         +39.2%
  -b 1024          995085         1396328         +40.3%
  -b 2048         1293114         1668395         +29.0%
  -b 4096         2124438         2240228         + 5.5%

Zen3 dual socket 256 threads:

                  Baseline        Patched
  shared  (16k)   1275840         1381279         + 8.2%
  autosize (512)  1252745         1482179         +18.3%
  -b 256           856274          955455         +11.5%
  -b 512          1267490         1544010         +21.8%
  -b 1024         1424013         1625424         +14.1%
  -b 2048         1505181         1669342         +10.9%
  -b 4096         1465993         1688932         +15.2%

AMD EPYC 9D64 (Zen4, single socket) 176 threads:

                       Baseline       Patched      Delta
  shared (16k)         1,230,599      1,368,655    +11.2%
  autosize (1024)      1,285,440      1,556,946    +21.1%
  -b 256               1,341,471      1,520,303    +13.3%
  -b 512               1,438,330      1,599,319    +11.2%
  -b 1024              1,443,772      1,622,493    +12.4%
  -b 2048              1,472,108      1,643,975    +11.7%
  -b 4096              1,333,098      1,570,897    +17.8%

Reported-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Breno Leitao &lt;leitao@debian.org&gt;
Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610135510.GB1430057@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex/requeue: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock</title>
<updated>2026-06-02T20:27:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ji'an Zhou</name>
<email>eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-02T09:12:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=74e144274af39935b0f410c0ee4d2b91c3730414'/>
<id>74e144274af39935b0f410c0ee4d2b91c3730414</id>
<content type='text'>
When FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI requeues a non-top waiter that already owns the
target PI futex, task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() returns -EDEADLK before setting
waiter-&gt;task.

The subsequent remove_waiter() in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() dereferences
the NULL waiter-&gt;task, causing a kernel crash.

Add a self-deadlock check for non-top waiters before calling
rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(), analogous to the top-waiter check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic().

Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd4773109b7b8c280c0f3b5ae7d349 ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")
Signed-off-by: Ji'an Zhou &lt;eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI requeues a non-top waiter that already owns the
target PI futex, task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() returns -EDEADLK before setting
waiter-&gt;task.

The subsequent remove_waiter() in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() dereferences
the NULL waiter-&gt;task, causing a kernel crash.

Add a self-deadlock check for non-top waiters before calling
rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(), analogous to the top-waiter check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic().

Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd4773109b7b8c280c0f3b5ae7d349 ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")
Signed-off-by: Ji'an Zhou &lt;eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Prevent lockup in requeue-PI during signal/ timeout wakeup</title>
<updated>2026-04-29T06:56:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-28T10:34:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bc7304f3ae20972d11db6e0b1b541c63feda5f05'/>
<id>bc7304f3ae20972d11db6e0b1b541c63feda5f05</id>
<content type='text'>
During wait-requeue-pi (task A) and requeue-PI (task B) the following
race can happen:

     Task A                             Task B
  futex_wait_requeue_pi()
    futex_setup_timer()
    futex_do_wait()
                                   futex_requeue()
                                        CLASS(hb, hb1)(&amp;key1);
                                        CLASS(hb, hb2)(&amp;key2);
        *timeout*
    futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync()
        requeue_state = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE

    *blocks on hb-&gt;lock*

                                        futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
                                          futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
                                            Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE =&gt; -EAGAIN
                                        double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2)
                                         *retry*

Task B acquires both hb locks and attempts to acquire the PI-lock of the
top most waiter (task B). Task A is leaving early due to a signal/
timeout and started removing itself from the queue. It updates its
requeue_state but can not remove it from the list because this requires
the hb lock which is owned by task B.

Usually task A is able to swoop the lock after task B unlocked it.
However if task B is of higher priority then task A may not be able to
wake up in time and acquire the lock before task B gets it again.
Especially on a UP system where A is never scheduled.

As a result task A blocks on the lock and task B busy loops, trying to
make progress but live locks the system instead. Tragic.

This can be fixed by removing the top most waiter from the list in this
case. This allows task B to grab the next top waiter (if any) in the
next iteration and make progress.

Remove the top most waiter if futex_requeue_pi_prepare() fails.
Let the waiter conditionally remove itself from the list in
handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup().

Fixes: 07d91ef510fb1 ("futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT")
Reported-by: Moritz Klammler &lt;Moritz.Klammler@ferchau.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260428103425.dywXyPd3@linutronix.de
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/VE1PR06MB6894BE61C173D802365BE19DFF4CA@VE1PR06MB6894.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
During wait-requeue-pi (task A) and requeue-PI (task B) the following
race can happen:

     Task A                             Task B
  futex_wait_requeue_pi()
    futex_setup_timer()
    futex_do_wait()
                                   futex_requeue()
                                        CLASS(hb, hb1)(&amp;key1);
                                        CLASS(hb, hb2)(&amp;key2);
        *timeout*
    futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync()
        requeue_state = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE

    *blocks on hb-&gt;lock*

                                        futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
                                          futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
                                            Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE =&gt; -EAGAIN
                                        double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2)
                                         *retry*

Task B acquires both hb locks and attempts to acquire the PI-lock of the
top most waiter (task B). Task A is leaving early due to a signal/
timeout and started removing itself from the queue. It updates its
requeue_state but can not remove it from the list because this requires
the hb lock which is owned by task B.

Usually task A is able to swoop the lock after task B unlocked it.
However if task B is of higher priority then task A may not be able to
wake up in time and acquire the lock before task B gets it again.
Especially on a UP system where A is never scheduled.

As a result task A blocks on the lock and task B busy loops, trying to
make progress but live locks the system instead. Tragic.

This can be fixed by removing the top most waiter from the list in this
case. This allows task B to grab the next top waiter (if any) in the
next iteration and make progress.

Remove the top most waiter if futex_requeue_pi_prepare() fails.
Let the waiter conditionally remove itself from the list in
handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup().

Fixes: 07d91ef510fb1 ("futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT")
Reported-by: Moritz Klammler &lt;Moritz.Klammler@ferchau.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260428103425.dywXyPd3@linutronix.de
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/VE1PR06MB6894BE61C173D802365BE19DFF4CA@VE1PR06MB6894.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Prevent use-after-free during requeue-PI</title>
<updated>2025-09-20T15:40:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-10T10:42:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b549113738e8c751b613118032a724b772aa83f2'/>
<id>b549113738e8c751b613118032a724b772aa83f2</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot managed to trigger the following race:

   T1                               T2

 futex_wait_requeue_pi()
   futex_do_wait()
     schedule()
                               futex_requeue()
                                 futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
                                   futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
                                   requeue_pi_wake_futex()
                                     futex_requeue_pi_complete()
                                      /* preempt */

         * timeout/ signal wakes T1 *

   futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() // Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED
   futex_hash_put()
  // back to userland, on stack futex_q is garbage

                                      /* back */
                                     wake_up_state(q-&gt;task, TASK_NORMAL);

In this scenario futex_wait_requeue_pi() is able to leave without using
futex_q::lock_ptr for synchronization.

This can be prevented by reading futex_q::task before updating the
futex_q::requeue_state. A reference on the task_struct is not needed
because requeue_pi_wake_futex() is invoked with a spinlock_t held which
implies a RCU read section.

Even if T1 terminates immediately after, the task_struct will remain valid
during T2's wake_up_state().  A READ_ONCE on futex_q::task before
futex_requeue_pi_complete() is enough because it ensures that the variable
is read before the state is updated.

Read futex_q::task before updating the requeue state, use it for the
following wakeup.

Fixes: 07d91ef510fb1 ("futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT")
Reported-by: syzbot+034246a838a10d181e78@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68b75989.050a0220.3db4df.01dd.GAE@google.com/
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
syzbot managed to trigger the following race:

   T1                               T2

 futex_wait_requeue_pi()
   futex_do_wait()
     schedule()
                               futex_requeue()
                                 futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
                                   futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
                                   requeue_pi_wake_futex()
                                     futex_requeue_pi_complete()
                                      /* preempt */

         * timeout/ signal wakes T1 *

   futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() // Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED
   futex_hash_put()
  // back to userland, on stack futex_q is garbage

                                      /* back */
                                     wake_up_state(q-&gt;task, TASK_NORMAL);

In this scenario futex_wait_requeue_pi() is able to leave without using
futex_q::lock_ptr for synchronization.

This can be prevented by reading futex_q::task before updating the
futex_q::requeue_state. A reference on the task_struct is not needed
because requeue_pi_wake_futex() is invoked with a spinlock_t held which
implies a RCU read section.

Even if T1 terminates immediately after, the task_struct will remain valid
during T2's wake_up_state().  A READ_ONCE on futex_q::task before
futex_requeue_pi_complete() is enough because it ensures that the variable
is read before the state is updated.

Read futex_q::task before updating the requeue state, use it for the
following wakeup.

Fixes: 07d91ef510fb1 ("futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT")
Reported-by: syzbot+034246a838a10d181e78@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68b75989.050a0220.3db4df.01dd.GAE@google.com/
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Allow to resize the private local hash</title>
<updated>2025-05-03T10:02:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-16T16:29:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bd54df5ea7cadac520e346d5f0fe5d58e635b6ba'/>
<id>bd54df5ea7cadac520e346d5f0fe5d58e635b6ba</id>
<content type='text'>
The mm_struct::futex_hash_lock guards the futex_hash_bucket assignment/
replacement. The futex_hash_allocate()/ PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS
operation can now be invoked at runtime and resize an already existing
internal private futex_hash_bucket to another size.

The reallocation is based on an idea by Thomas Gleixner: The initial
allocation of struct futex_private_hash sets the reference count
to one. Every user acquires a reference on the local hash before using
it and drops it after it enqueued itself on the hash bucket. There is no
reference held while the task is scheduled out while waiting for the
wake up.
The resize process allocates a new struct futex_private_hash and drops
the initial reference. Synchronized with mm_struct::futex_hash_lock it
is checked if the reference counter for the currently used
mm_struct::futex_phash is marked as DEAD. If so, then all users enqueued
on the current private hash are requeued on the new private hash and the
new private hash is set to mm_struct::futex_phash. Otherwise the newly
allocated private hash is saved as mm_struct::futex_phash_new and the
rehashing and reassigning is delayed to the futex_hash() caller once the
reference counter is marked DEAD.
The replacement is not performed at rcuref_put() time because certain
callers, such as futex_wait_queue(), drop their reference after changing
the task state. This change will be destroyed once the futex_hash_lock
is acquired.

The user can change the number slots with PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS
multiple times. An increase and decrease is allowed and request blocks
until the assignment is done.

The private hash allocated at thread creation is changed from 16 to
  16 &lt;= 4 * number_of_threads &lt;= global_hash_size
where number_of_threads can not exceed the number of online CPUs. Should
the user PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS then the auto scaling is disabled.

[peterz: reorganize the code to avoid state tracking and simplify new
object handling, block the user until changes are in effect, allow
increase and decrease of the hash].

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-15-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The mm_struct::futex_hash_lock guards the futex_hash_bucket assignment/
replacement. The futex_hash_allocate()/ PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS
operation can now be invoked at runtime and resize an already existing
internal private futex_hash_bucket to another size.

The reallocation is based on an idea by Thomas Gleixner: The initial
allocation of struct futex_private_hash sets the reference count
to one. Every user acquires a reference on the local hash before using
it and drops it after it enqueued itself on the hash bucket. There is no
reference held while the task is scheduled out while waiting for the
wake up.
The resize process allocates a new struct futex_private_hash and drops
the initial reference. Synchronized with mm_struct::futex_hash_lock it
is checked if the reference counter for the currently used
mm_struct::futex_phash is marked as DEAD. If so, then all users enqueued
on the current private hash are requeued on the new private hash and the
new private hash is set to mm_struct::futex_phash. Otherwise the newly
allocated private hash is saved as mm_struct::futex_phash_new and the
rehashing and reassigning is delayed to the futex_hash() caller once the
reference counter is marked DEAD.
The replacement is not performed at rcuref_put() time because certain
callers, such as futex_wait_queue(), drop their reference after changing
the task state. This change will be destroyed once the futex_hash_lock
is acquired.

The user can change the number slots with PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS
multiple times. An increase and decrease is allowed and request blocks
until the assignment is done.

The private hash allocated at thread creation is changed from 16 to
  16 &lt;= 4 * number_of_threads &lt;= global_hash_size
where number_of_threads can not exceed the number of online CPUs. Should
the user PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS then the auto scaling is disabled.

[peterz: reorganize the code to avoid state tracking and simplify new
object handling, block the user until changes are in effect, allow
increase and decrease of the hash].

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-15-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Introduce futex_q_lockptr_lock()</title>
<updated>2025-05-03T10:02:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-16T16:29:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b04b8f3032aae6121303bfa324c768faba032242'/>
<id>b04b8f3032aae6121303bfa324c768faba032242</id>
<content type='text'>
futex_lock_pi() and __fixup_pi_state_owner() acquire the
futex_q::lock_ptr without holding a reference assuming the previously
obtained hash bucket and the assigned lock_ptr are still valid. This
isn't the case once the private hash can be resized and becomes invalid
after the reference drop.

Introduce futex_q_lockptr_lock() to lock the hash bucket recorded in
futex_q::lock_ptr. The lock pointer is read in a RCU section to ensure
that it does not go away if the hash bucket has been replaced and the
old pointer has been observed. After locking the pointer needs to be
compared to check if it changed. If so then the hash bucket has been
replaced and the user has been moved to the new one and lock_ptr has
been updated. The lock operation needs to be redone in this case.

The locked hash bucket is not returned.

A special case is an early return in futex_lock_pi() (due to signal or
timeout) and a successful futex_wait_requeue_pi(). In both cases a valid
futex_q::lock_ptr is expected (and its matching hash bucket) but since
the waiter has been removed from the hash this can no longer be
guaranteed. Therefore before the waiter is removed and a reference is
acquired which is later dropped by the waiter to avoid a resize.

Add futex_q_lockptr_lock() and use it.
Acquire an additional reference in requeue_pi_wake_futex() and
futex_unlock_pi() while the futex_q is removed, denote this extra
reference in futex_q::drop_hb_ref and let the waiter drop the reference
in this case.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-11-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
futex_lock_pi() and __fixup_pi_state_owner() acquire the
futex_q::lock_ptr without holding a reference assuming the previously
obtained hash bucket and the assigned lock_ptr are still valid. This
isn't the case once the private hash can be resized and becomes invalid
after the reference drop.

Introduce futex_q_lockptr_lock() to lock the hash bucket recorded in
futex_q::lock_ptr. The lock pointer is read in a RCU section to ensure
that it does not go away if the hash bucket has been replaced and the
old pointer has been observed. After locking the pointer needs to be
compared to check if it changed. If so then the hash bucket has been
replaced and the user has been moved to the new one and lock_ptr has
been updated. The lock operation needs to be redone in this case.

The locked hash bucket is not returned.

A special case is an early return in futex_lock_pi() (due to signal or
timeout) and a successful futex_wait_requeue_pi(). In both cases a valid
futex_q::lock_ptr is expected (and its matching hash bucket) but since
the waiter has been removed from the hash this can no longer be
guaranteed. Therefore before the waiter is removed and a reference is
acquired which is later dropped by the waiter to avoid a resize.

Add futex_q_lockptr_lock() and use it.
Acquire an additional reference in requeue_pi_wake_futex() and
futex_unlock_pi() while the futex_q is removed, denote this extra
reference in futex_q::drop_hb_ref and let the waiter drop the reference
in this case.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-11-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Decrease the waiter count before the unlock operation</title>
<updated>2025-05-03T10:02:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sebastian Andrzej Siewior</name>
<email>bigeasy@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-16T16:29:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fe00e88d217a7bf7a4d0268d08f51e624d40ee53'/>
<id>fe00e88d217a7bf7a4d0268d08f51e624d40ee53</id>
<content type='text'>
To support runtime resizing of the process private hash, it's required
to not use the obtained hash bucket once the reference count has been
dropped. The reference will be dropped after the unlock of the hash
bucket.
The amount of waiters is decremented after the unlock operation. There
is no requirement that this needs to happen after the unlock. The
increment happens before acquiring the lock to signal early that there
will be a waiter. The waiter can avoid blocking on the lock if it is
known that there will be no waiter.
There is no difference in terms of ordering if the decrement happens
before or after the unlock.

Decrease the waiter count before the unlock operation.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-10-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
To support runtime resizing of the process private hash, it's required
to not use the obtained hash bucket once the reference count has been
dropped. The reference will be dropped after the unlock of the hash
bucket.
The amount of waiters is decremented after the unlock operation. There
is no requirement that this needs to happen after the unlock. The
increment happens before acquiring the lock to signal early that there
will be a waiter. The waiter can avoid blocking on the lock if it is
known that there will be no waiter.
There is no difference in terms of ordering if the decrement happens
before or after the unlock.

Decrease the waiter count before the unlock operation.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-10-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Create futex_hash() get/put class</title>
<updated>2025-05-03T10:02:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-16T16:29:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6c67f8d880c0950215b8e6f8539562ad1971a05a'/>
<id>6c67f8d880c0950215b8e6f8539562ad1971a05a</id>
<content type='text'>
This gets us:

  hb = futex_hash(key) /* gets hb and inc users */
  futex_hash_get(hb)   /* inc users */
  futex_hash_put(hb)   /* dec users */

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-7-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This gets us:

  hb = futex_hash(key) /* gets hb and inc users */
  futex_hash_get(hb)   /* inc users */
  futex_hash_put(hb)   /* dec users */

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-7-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Create hb scopes</title>
<updated>2025-05-03T10:02:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-16T16:29:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8486d12f558ff9e4e90331e8ef841d84bf3a8c24'/>
<id>8486d12f558ff9e4e90331e8ef841d84bf3a8c24</id>
<content type='text'>
Create explicit scopes for hb variables; almost pure re-indent.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-6-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Create explicit scopes for hb variables; almost pure re-indent.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250416162921.513656-6-bigeasy@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
