linux.git/kernel/fork.c, branch v5.2-rc1

kernel/latencytop.c: rename clear_all_latency_tracing to clear_tsk_latency_tracing

2019-05-15T02:52:49+00:00

The name clear_all_latency_tracing is misleading, in fact which only
clear per task's latency_record[], and we do have another function named
clear_global_latency_tracing which clear the global latency_record[]
buffer.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190226114602.16902-1-linf@wangsu.com
Signed-off-by: Lin Feng 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Fabian Frederick 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

userfaultfd: use RCU to free the task struct when fork fails

2019-05-15T02:52:47+00:00

The task structure is freed while get_mem_cgroup_from_mm() holds
rcu_read_lock() and dereferences mm->owner.

  get_mem_cgroup_from_mm()                failing fork()
  ----                                    ---
  task = mm->owner
                                          mm->owner = NULL;
                                          free(task)
  if (task) *task; /* use after free */

The fix consists in freeing the task with RCU also in the fork failure
case, exactly like it always happens for the regular exit(2) path.  That
is enough to make the rcu_read_lock hold in get_mem_cgroup_from_mm()
(left side above) effective to avoid a use after free when dereferencing
the task structure.

An alternate possible fix would be to defer the delivery of the
userfaultfd contexts to the monitor until after fork() is guaranteed to
succeed.  Such a change would require more changes because it would
create a strict ordering dependency where the uffd methods would need to
be called beyond the last potentially failing branch in order to be
safe.  This solution as opposed only adds the dependency to common code
to set mm->owner to NULL and to free the task struct that was pointed by
mm->owner with RCU, if fork ends up failing.  The userfaultfd methods
can still be called anywhere during the fork runtime and the monitor
will keep discarding orphaned "mm" coming from failed forks in userland.

This race condition couldn't trigger if CONFIG_MEMCG was set =n at build
time.

[aarcange@redhat.com: improve changelog, reduce #ifdefs per Michal]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190429035752.4508-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325225636.11635-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 893e26e61d04 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli 
Tested-by: zhong jiang 
Reported-by: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Mike Kravetz 
Cc: Peter Xu 
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe 
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: zhong jiang 
Cc: syzbot+cbb52e396df3e565ab02@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

fork: do not release lock that wasn't taken

2019-05-10T12:26:12+00:00

Avoid calling cgroup_threadgroup_change_end() without having called
cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin() first.

During process creation we need to check whether the cgroup we are in
allows us to fork. To perform this check the cgroup needs to guard itself
against threadgroup changes and takes a lock.
Prior to CLONE_PIDFD the cleanup target "bad_fork_free_pid" would also need
to call cgroup_threadgroup_change_end() because said lock had already been
taken.
However, this is not the case anymore with the addition of CLONE_PIDFD. We
are now allocating a pidfd before we check whether the cgroup we're in can
fork and thus prior to taking the lock. So when copy_process() fails at the
right step it would release a lock we haven't taken.
This bug is not even very subtle to be honest. It's just not very clear
from the naming of cgroup_threadgroup_change_{begin,end}() that a lock is
taken.

Here's the relevant splat:

entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139
RIP: 0023:0xf7fec849
Code: 85 d2 74 02 89 0a 5b 5d c3 8b 04 24 c3 8b 14 24 c3 8b 3c 24 c3 90 90
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90
90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 002b:00000000ffed5a8c EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000078
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000003ffc RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
------------[ cut here ]------------
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(depth <= 0)
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7744 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 __lock_release
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7744 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052
lock_release+0x667/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4321
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 7744 Comm: syz-executor007 Not tainted 5.1.0+ #4
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214
  __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:566
  report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186
  fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline]
  fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline]
  do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272
  do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291
  invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:972
RIP: 0010:__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4052 [inline]
RIP: 0010:lock_release+0x667/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4321
Code: 0f 85 a0 03 00 00 8b 35 77 66 08 08 85 f6 75 23 48 c7 c6 a0 55 6b 87
48 c7 c7 40 25 6b 87 4c 89 85 70 ff ff ff e8 b7 a9 eb ff <0f> 0b 4c 8b 85
70 ff ff ff 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 4c 89 c7 e8 52 63 ff
RSP: 0018:ffff888094117b48 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11012822f6f RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815af236 RDI: ffffed1012822f5b
RBP: ffff888094117c00 R08: ffff888092bfc400 R09: fffffbfff113301d
R10: fffffbfff113301c R11: ffffffff889980e3 R12: ffffffff8a451df8
R13: ffffffff8142e71f R14: ffffffff8a44cc80 R15: ffff888094117bd8
  percpu_up_read.constprop.0+0xcb/0x110 include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:92
  cgroup_threadgroup_change_end include/linux/cgroup-defs.h:712 [inline]
  copy_process.part.0+0x47ff/0x6710 kernel/fork.c:2222
  copy_process kernel/fork.c:1772 [inline]
  _do_fork+0x25d/0xfd0 kernel/fork.c:2338
  __do_compat_sys_x86_clone arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:240 [inline]
  __se_compat_sys_x86_clone arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:236 [inline]
  __ia32_compat_sys_x86_clone+0xbc/0x140 arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c:236
  do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:334 [inline]
  do_fast_syscall_32+0x281/0xd54 arch/x86/entry/common.c:405
  entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139
RIP: 0023:0xf7fec849
Code: 85 d2 74 02 89 0a 5b 5d c3 8b 04 24 c3 8b 14 24 c3 8b 3c 24 c3 90 90
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90
90 90 90 eb 0d 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 002b:00000000ffed5a8c EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000078
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000003ffc RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000012 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3286e58549edc479faae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b3e583825266 ("clone: add CLONE_PIDFD")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner

Merge branch 'for-5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup

2019-05-09T20:52:12+00:00

Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
 "This includes Roman's cgroup2 freezer implementation.

  It's a separate machanism from cgroup1 freezer. Instead of blocking
  user tasks in arbitrary uninterruptible sleeps, the new implementation
  extends jobctl stop - frozen tasks are trapped in jobctl stop until
  thawed and can be killed and ptraced. Lots of thanks to Oleg for
  sheperding the effort.

  Other than that, there are a few trivial changes"

* 'for-5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  cgroup: never call do_group_exit() with task->frozen bit set
  kernel: cgroup: fix misuse of %x
  cgroup: get rid of cgroup_freezer_frozen_exit()
  cgroup: prevent spurious transition into non-frozen state
  cgroup: Remove unused cgrp variable
  cgroup: document cgroup v2 freezer interface
  cgroup: add tracing points for cgroup v2 freezer
  cgroup: make TRACE_CGROUP_PATH irq-safe
  kselftests: cgroup: add freezer controller self-tests
  kselftests: cgroup: don't fail on cg_kill_all() error in cg_destroy()
  cgroup: cgroup v2 freezer
  cgroup: protect cgroup->nr_(dying_)descendants by css_set_lock
  cgroup: implement __cgroup_task_count() helper
  cgroup: rename freezer.c into legacy_freezer.c
  cgroup: remove extra cgroup_migrate_finish() call

Merge tag 'pidfd-v5.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

2019-05-07T19:30:24+00:00

Pull pidfd updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pidfds at process creation
  time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the clone() system
  call. Linus originally suggested to implement this as a new flag to
  clone() instead of making it a separate system call.

  After a thorough review from Oleg CLONE_PIDFD returns pidfds in the
  parent_tidptr argument. This means we can give back the associated pid
  and the pidfd at the same time. Access to process metadata information
  thus becomes rather trivial.

  As has been agreed, CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on
  anonymous inodes similar to the new mount api. They are made
  unconditional by this patchset as they are now needed by core kernel
  code (vfs, pidfd) even more than they already were before (timerfd,
  signalfd, io_uring, epoll etc.). The core patchset is rather small.
  The bulky looking changelist is caused by David's very simple changes
  to Kconfig to make anon inodes unconditional.

  A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel
  supports procfs. The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in
  the callers pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status
  file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d".

  To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes
  with a sample/test program that illustrates how a combination of
  CLONE_PIDFD and pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free
  access to process metadata through /proc/.

  Further work based on this patchset has been done by Joel. His work
  makes pidfds pollable. It finished too late for this merge window. I
  would prefer to have it sitting in linux-next for a while and send it
  for inclusion during the 5.3 merge window"

* tag 'pidfd-v5.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  samples: show race-free pidfd metadata access
  signal: support CLONE_PIDFD with pidfd_send_signal
  clone: add CLONE_PIDFD
  Make anon_inodes unconditional

clone: add CLONE_PIDFD

2019-05-07T12:31:03+00:00

This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at
process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the
clone() system call.  Linus originally suggested to implement this as a
new flag to clone() instead of making it a separate system call.  As
spotted by Linus, there is exactly one bit for clone() left.

CLONE_PIDFD creates file descriptors based on the anonymous inode
implementation in the kernel that will also be used to implement the new
mount api.  They serve as a simple opaque handle on pids.  Logically,
this makes it possible to interpret a pidfd differently, narrowing or
widening the scope of various operations (e.g. signal sending).  Thus, a
pidfd cannot just refer to a tgid, but also a tid, or in theory - given
appropriate flag arguments in relevant syscalls - a process group or
session. A pidfd does not represent a privilege.  This does not imply it
cannot ever be that way but for now this is not the case.

A pidfd comes with additional information in fdinfo if the kernel supports
procfs.  The fdinfo file contains the pid of the process in the callers
pid namespace in the same format as the procfs status file, i.e. "Pid:\t%d".

As suggested by Oleg, with CLONE_PIDFD the pidfd is returned in the
parent_tidptr argument of clone.  This has the advantage that we can
give back the associated pid and the pidfd at the same time.

To remove worries about missing metadata access this patchset comes with
a sample program that illustrates how a combination of CLONE_PIDFD, and
pidfd_send_signal() can be used to gain race-free access to process
metadata through /proc/.  The sample program can easily be
translated into a helper that would be suitable for inclusion in libc so
that users don't have to worry about writing it themselves.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner 
Co-developed-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: David Howells 
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" 
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Aleksa Sarai 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Al Viro

fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm

2019-04-30T10:37:51+00:00

Provide a function for copying init_mm. This function will be later used
for setting a temporary mm.

Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit 
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426001143.4983-6-namit@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

uprobes: Initialize uprobes earlier

2019-04-30T10:37:51+00:00

In order to have a separate address space for text poking, we need to
duplicate init_mm early during start_kernel(). This, however, introduces
a problem since uprobes functions are called from dup_mmap(), but
uprobes is still not initialized in this early stage.

Since uprobes initialization is necassary for fork, and since all the
dependant initialization has been done when fork is initialized (percpu
and vmalloc), move uprobes initialization to fork_init(). It does not
seem uprobes introduces any security problem for the poking_mm.

Crash and burn if uprobes initialization fails, similarly to other early
initializations. Change the init_probes() name to probes_init() to match
other early initialization functions name convention.

Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Rick Edgecombe 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: deneen.t.dock@intel.com
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: kristen@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux_dti@icloud.com
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190426232303.28381-6-nadav.amit@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

cgroup: cgroup v2 freezer

2019-04-19T18:26:48+00:00

Cgroup v1 implements the freezer controller, which provides an ability
to stop the workload in a cgroup and temporarily free up some
resources (cpu, io, network bandwidth and, potentially, memory)
for some other tasks. Cgroup v2 lacks this functionality.

This patch implements freezer for cgroup v2.

Cgroup v2 freezer tries to put tasks into a state similar to jobctl
stop. This means that tasks can be killed, ptraced (using
PTRACE_SEIZE*), and interrupted. It is possible to attach to
a frozen task, get some information (e.g. read registers) and detach.
It's also possible to migrate a frozen tasks to another cgroup.

This differs cgroup v2 freezer from cgroup v1 freezer, which mostly
tried to imitate the system-wide freezer. However uninterruptible
sleep is fine when all tasks are going to be frozen (hibernation case),
it's not the acceptable state for some subset of the system.

Cgroup v2 freezer is not supporting freezing kthreads.
If a non-root cgroup contains kthread, the cgroup still can be frozen,
but the kthread will remain running, the cgroup will be shown
as non-frozen, and the notification will not be delivered.

* PTRACE_ATTACH is not working because non-fatal signal delivery
is blocked in frozen state.

There are some interface differences between cgroup v1 and cgroup v2
freezer too, which are required to conform the cgroup v2 interface
design principles:
1) There is no separate controller, which has to be turned on:
the functionality is always available and is represented by
cgroup.freeze and cgroup.events cgroup control files.
2) The desired state is defined by the cgroup.freeze control file.
Any hierarchical configuration is allowed.
3) The interface is asynchronous. The actual state is available
using cgroup.events control file ("frozen" field). There are no
dedicated transitional states.
4) It's allowed to make any changes with the cgroup hierarchy
(create new cgroups, remove old cgroups, move tasks between cgroups)
no matter if some cgroups are frozen.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
No-objection-from-me-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma

2019-03-09T23:53:03+00:00

Pull rdma updates from Jason Gunthorpe:
 "This has been a slightly more active cycle than normal with ongoing
  core changes and quite a lot of collected driver updates.

   - Various driver fixes for bnxt_re, cxgb4, hns, mlx5, pvrdma, rxe

   - A new data transfer mode for HFI1 giving higher performance

   - Significant functional and bug fix update to the mlx5
     On-Demand-Paging MR feature

   - A chip hang reset recovery system for hns

   - Change mm->pinned_vm to an atomic64

   - Update bnxt_re to support a new 57500 chip

   - A sane netlink 'rdma link add' method for creating rxe devices and
     fixing the various unregistration race conditions in rxe's
     unregister flow

   - Allow lookup up objects by an ID over netlink

   - Various reworking of the core to driver interface:
       - drivers should not assume umem SGLs are in PAGE_SIZE chunks
       - ucontext is accessed via udata not other means
       - start to make the core code responsible for object memory
         allocation
       - drivers should convert struct device to struct ib_device via a
         helper
       - drivers have more tools to avoid use after unregister problems"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma: (280 commits)
  net/mlx5: ODP support for XRC transport is not enabled by default in FW
  IB/hfi1: Close race condition on user context disable and close
  RDMA/umem: Revert broken 'off by one' fix
  RDMA/umem: minor bug fix in error handling path
  RDMA/hns: Use GFP_ATOMIC in hns_roce_v2_modify_qp
  cxgb4: kfree mhp after the debug print
  IB/rdmavt: Fix concurrency panics in QP post_send and modify to error
  IB/rdmavt: Fix loopback send with invalidate ordering
  IB/iser: Fix dma_nents type definition
  IB/mlx5: Set correct write permissions for implicit ODP MR
  bnxt_re: Clean cq for kernel consumers only
  RDMA/uverbs: Don't do double free of allocated PD
  RDMA: Handle ucontext allocations by IB/core
  RDMA/core: Fix a WARN() message
  bnxt_re: fix the regression due to changes in alloc_pbl
  IB/mlx4: Increase the timeout for CM cache
  IB/core: Abort page fault handler silently during owning process exit
  IB/mlx5: Validate correct PD before prefetch MR
  IB/mlx5: Protect against prefetch of invalid MR
  RDMA/uverbs: Store PR pointer before it is overwritten
  ...