linux.git/kernel/bpf, branch v6.2-rc5 Linux kernel source tree bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation 2023-01-13T16:18:35+00:00 Luis Gerhorst gerhorst@cs.fau.de 2023-01-09T15:05:46+00:00 e4f4db47794c9f474b184ee1418f42e6a07412b6 To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a pointer to the stack. However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using, for example, a branch-based cache side channel. To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small. The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit and the mitigation: [...] // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input) // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked // r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack. // // Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor // for no r9-r10 dependency. // *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr // 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID, // store may be subject to SSB // // fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr // r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) // r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr // // leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel: r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict // architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0, // only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1 r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast) SLOW: [...] After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64 times to recover the whole address on amd64. In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") for details. Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks} because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled. For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged processes. Fixes: 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Henriette Hofmeier <henriette.hofmeier@rub.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/edc95bad-aada-9cfc-ffe2-fa9bb206583c@cs.fau.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230109150544.41465-1-gerhorst@cs.fau.de 
To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.

However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.

To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.

The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:

  [...]
  // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
  // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
  // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
  //
  r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
  *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
  // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
  //
  // Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
  // for no r9-r10 dependency.
  //
  *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
  // 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
  // store may be subject to SSB
  //
  // fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
  //
  r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
  // r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
  //
  // leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
  r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
  if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
  // architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
  // only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
  r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
  [...]

After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.

In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.

Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes.

Fixes: 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Henriette Hofmeier <henriette.hofmeier@rub.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/edc95bad-aada-9cfc-ffe2-fa9bb206583c@cs.fau.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230109150544.41465-1-gerhorst@cs.fau.de
bpf: hash map, avoid deadlock with suitable hash mask 2023-01-13T02:55:42+00:00 Tonghao Zhang tong@infragraf.org 2023-01-11T09:29:01+00:00 9f907439dc80e4a2fcfb949927b36c036468dbb3 The deadlock still may occur while accessed in NMI and non-NMI context. Because in NMI, we still may access the same bucket but with different map_locked index. For example, on the same CPU, .max_entries = 2, we update the hash map, with key = 4, while running bpf prog in NMI nmi_handle(), to update hash map with key = 20, so it will have the same bucket index but have different map_locked index. To fix this issue, using min mask to hash again. Fixes: 20b6cc34ea74 ("bpf: Avoid hashtab deadlock with map_locked") Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <tong@infragraf.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111092903.92389-1-tong@infragraf.org Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> 
The deadlock still may occur while accessed in NMI and non-NMI
context. Because in NMI, we still may access the same bucket but with
different map_locked index.

For example, on the same CPU, .max_entries = 2, we update the hash map,
with key = 4, while running bpf prog in NMI nmi_handle(), to update
hash map with key = 20, so it will have the same bucket index but have
different map_locked index.

To fix this issue, using min mask to hash again.

Fixes: 20b6cc34ea74 ("bpf: Avoid hashtab deadlock with map_locked")
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <tong@infragraf.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111092903.92389-1-tong@infragraf.org
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
bpf: remove the do_idr_lock parameter from bpf_prog_free_id() 2023-01-10T03:47:59+00:00 Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com 2023-01-06T15:44:00+00:00 e7895f017b79410bf4591396a733b876dc1e0e9d It was determined that the do_idr_lock parameter to bpf_prog_free_id() was not necessary as it should always be true. Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106154400.74211-2-paul@paul-moore.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
It was determined that the do_idr_lock parameter to
bpf_prog_free_id() was not necessary as it should always be true.

Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106154400.74211-2-paul@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf: restore the ebpf program ID for BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD and PERF_BPF_EVENT_PROG_UNLOAD 2023-01-10T03:47:58+00:00 Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com 2023-01-06T15:43:59+00:00 ef01f4e25c1760920e2c94f1c232350277ace69b When changing the ebpf program put() routines to support being called from within IRQ context the program ID was reset to zero prior to calling the perf event and audit UNLOAD record generators, which resulted in problems as the ebpf program ID was bogus (always zero). This patch addresses this problem by removing an unnecessary call to bpf_prog_free_id() in __bpf_prog_offload_destroy() and adjusting __bpf_prog_put() to only call bpf_prog_free_id() after audit and perf have finished their bpf program unload tasks in bpf_prog_put_deferred(). For the record, no one can determine, or remember, why it was necessary to free the program ID, and remove it from the IDR, prior to executing bpf_prog_put_deferred(); regardless, both Stanislav and Alexei agree that the approach in this patch should be safe. It is worth noting that when moving the bpf_prog_free_id() call, the do_idr_lock parameter was forced to true as the ebpf devs determined this was the correct as the do_idr_lock should always be true. The do_idr_lock parameter will be removed in a follow-up patch, but it was kept here to keep the patch small in an effort to ease any stable backports. I also modified the bpf_audit_prog() logic used to associate the AUDIT_BPF record with other associated records, e.g. @ctx != NULL. Instead of keying off the operation, it now keys off the execution context, e.g. '!in_irg && !irqs_disabled()', which is much more appropriate and should help better connect the UNLOAD operations with the associated audit state (other audit records). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d809e134be7a ("bpf: Prepare bpf_prog_put() to be called from irq context.") Reported-by: Burn Alting <burn.alting@iinet.net.au> Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106154400.74211-1-paul@paul-moore.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
When changing the ebpf program put() routines to support being called
from within IRQ context the program ID was reset to zero prior to
calling the perf event and audit UNLOAD record generators, which
resulted in problems as the ebpf program ID was bogus (always zero).
This patch addresses this problem by removing an unnecessary call to
bpf_prog_free_id() in __bpf_prog_offload_destroy() and adjusting
__bpf_prog_put() to only call bpf_prog_free_id() after audit and perf
have finished their bpf program unload tasks in
bpf_prog_put_deferred().  For the record, no one can determine, or
remember, why it was necessary to free the program ID, and remove it
from the IDR, prior to executing bpf_prog_put_deferred();
regardless, both Stanislav and Alexei agree that the approach in this
patch should be safe.

It is worth noting that when moving the bpf_prog_free_id() call, the
do_idr_lock parameter was forced to true as the ebpf devs determined
this was the correct as the do_idr_lock should always be true.  The
do_idr_lock parameter will be removed in a follow-up patch, but it
was kept here to keep the patch small in an effort to ease any stable
backports.

I also modified the bpf_audit_prog() logic used to associate the
AUDIT_BPF record with other associated records, e.g. @ctx != NULL.
Instead of keying off the operation, it now keys off the execution
context, e.g. '!in_irg && !irqs_disabled()', which is much more
appropriate and should help better connect the UNLOAD operations with
the associated audit state (other audit records).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d809e134be7a ("bpf: Prepare bpf_prog_put() to be called from irq context.")
Reported-by: Burn Alting <burn.alting@iinet.net.au>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106154400.74211-1-paul@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf: Skip invalid kfunc call in backtrack_insn 2023-01-06T17:49:37+00:00 Hao Sun sunhao.th@gmail.com 2023-01-04T01:47:09+00:00 d3178e8a434b58678d99257c0387810a24042fb6 The verifier skips invalid kfunc call in check_kfunc_call(), which would be captured in fixup_kfunc_call() if such insn is not eliminated by dead code elimination. However, this can lead to the following warning in backtrack_insn(), also see [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ verifier backtracking bug WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8646 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 backtrack_insn kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 __mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3065 mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3165 adjust_reg_min_max_vals kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10715 check_alu_op kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10928 do_check kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13821 [inline] do_check_common kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289 [...] So make backtracking conservative with this by returning ENOTSUPP. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaXNceR8ZjkLG=dT3P=4A8SBsg0Z5h5PWLryF5=ghKq=g@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+4da3ff23081bafe74fc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230104014709.9375-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com 
The verifier skips invalid kfunc call in check_kfunc_call(), which
would be captured in fixup_kfunc_call() if such insn is not eliminated
by dead code elimination. However, this can lead to the following
warning in backtrack_insn(), also see [1]:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  verifier backtracking bug
  WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8646 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 backtrack_insn
  kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756
	__mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3065
	mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3165
	adjust_reg_min_max_vals kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10715
	check_alu_op kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10928
	do_check kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13821 [inline]
	do_check_common kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
  [...]

So make backtracking conservative with this by returning ENOTSUPP.

  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaXNceR8ZjkLG=dT3P=4A8SBsg0Z5h5PWLryF5=ghKq=g@mail.gmail.com/

Reported-by: syzbot+4da3ff23081bafe74fc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230104014709.9375-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com
bpf: Always use maximal size for copy_array() 2022-12-28T22:54:53+00:00 Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org 2022-12-23T18:28:44+00:00 45435d8da71f9f3e6860e6e6ea9667b6ec17ec64 Instead of counting on prior allocations to have sized allocations to the next kmalloc bucket size, always perform a krealloc that is at least ksize(dst) in size (which is a no-op), so the size can be correctly tracked by all the various allocation size trackers (KASAN, __alloc_size, etc). Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221223094551.GA1439509@ubuntu Fixes: ceb35b666d42 ("bpf/verifier: Use kmalloc_size_roundup() to match ksize() usage") Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223182836.never.866-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
Instead of counting on prior allocations to have sized allocations to
the next kmalloc bucket size, always perform a krealloc that is at least
ksize(dst) in size (which is a no-op), so the size can be correctly
tracked by all the various allocation size trackers (KASAN,
__alloc_size, etc).

Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221223094551.GA1439509@ubuntu
Fixes: ceb35b666d42 ("bpf/verifier: Use kmalloc_size_roundup() to match ksize() usage")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221223182836.never.866-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf: keep a reference to the mm, in case the task is dead. 2022-12-28T22:11:48+00:00 Kui-Feng Lee kuifeng@meta.com 2022-12-16T22:18:54+00:00 7ff94f276f8ea05df82eb115225e9b26f47a3347 Fix the system crash that happens when a task iterator travel through vma of tasks. In task iterators, we used to access mm by following the pointer on the task_struct; however, the death of a task will clear the pointer, even though we still hold the task_struct. That can cause an unexpected crash for a null pointer when an iterator is visiting a task that dies during the visit. Keeping a reference of mm on the iterator ensures we always have a valid pointer to mm. Co-developed-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <kuifeng@meta.com> Reported-by: Nathan Slingerland <slinger@meta.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221216221855.4122288-2-kuifeng@meta.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
Fix the system crash that happens when a task iterator travel through
vma of tasks.

In task iterators, we used to access mm by following the pointer on
the task_struct; however, the death of a task will clear the pointer,
even though we still hold the task_struct.  That can cause an
unexpected crash for a null pointer when an iterator is visiting a
task that dies during the visit.  Keeping a reference of mm on the
iterator ensures we always have a valid pointer to mm.

Co-developed-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <kuifeng@meta.com>
Reported-by: Nathan Slingerland <slinger@meta.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221216221855.4122288-2-kuifeng@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf: Fix panic due to wrong pageattr of im->image 2022-12-28T21:46:28+00:00 Chuang Wang nashuiliang@gmail.com 2022-12-24T13:31:46+00:00 9ed1d9aeef5842ecacb660fce933613b58af1e00 In the scenario where livepatch and kretfunc coexist, the pageattr of im->image is rox after arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline in bpf_trampoline_update, and then modify_fentry or register_fentry returns -EAGAIN from bpf_tramp_ftrace_ops_func, the BPF_TRAMP_F_ORIG_STACK flag will be configured, and arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline will be re-executed. At this time, because the pageattr of im->image is rox, arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline will read and write im->image, which causes a fault. as follows: insmod livepatch-sample.ko # samples/livepatch/livepatch-sample.c bpftrace -e 'kretfunc:cmdline_proc_show {}' BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0206000 PGD 322d067 P4D 322d067 PUD 322e063 PMD 1297e067 PTE d428061 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 270 Comm: bpftrace Tainted: G E K 6.1.0 #5 RIP: 0010:arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline+0xed/0x8c0 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001083ad8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffffffffa0206000 RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffffffa0206001 RSI: ffffffffa0206000 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: ffffc90001083b70 R08: 0000000000000066 R09: ffff88800f51b400 R10: 000000002e72c6e5 R11: 00000000d0a15080 R12: ffff8880110a68c8 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88800f51b400 R15: ffffffff814fec10 FS: 00007f87bc0dc780(0000) GS:ffff88803e600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffa0206000 CR3: 0000000010b70000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bpf_trampoline_update+0x25a/0x6b0 __bpf_trampoline_link_prog+0x101/0x240 bpf_trampoline_link_prog+0x2d/0x50 bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x24c/0x530 bpf_raw_tp_link_attach+0x73/0x1d0 __sys_bpf+0x100e/0x2570 __x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd With this patch, when modify_fentry or register_fentry returns -EAGAIN from bpf_tramp_ftrace_ops_func, the pageattr of im->image will be reset to nx+rw. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 00963a2e75a8 ("bpf: Support bpf_trampoline on functions with IPMODIFY (e.g. livepatch)") Signed-off-by: Chuang Wang <nashuiliang@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221224133146.780578-1-nashuiliang@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
In the scenario where livepatch and kretfunc coexist, the pageattr of
im->image is rox after arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline in
bpf_trampoline_update, and then modify_fentry or register_fentry returns
-EAGAIN from bpf_tramp_ftrace_ops_func, the BPF_TRAMP_F_ORIG_STACK flag
will be configured, and arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline will be re-executed.

At this time, because the pageattr of im->image is rox,
arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline will read and write im->image, which causes
a fault. as follows:

  insmod livepatch-sample.ko    # samples/livepatch/livepatch-sample.c
  bpftrace -e 'kretfunc:cmdline_proc_show {}'

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0206000
PGD 322d067 P4D 322d067 PUD 322e063 PMD 1297e067 PTE d428061
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 270 Comm: bpftrace Tainted: G            E K    6.1.0 #5
RIP: 0010:arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline+0xed/0x8c0
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001083ad8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffa0206000 RBX: 0000000000000020 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffffffa0206001 RSI: ffffffffa0206000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffffc90001083b70 R08: 0000000000000066 R09: ffff88800f51b400
R10: 000000002e72c6e5 R11: 00000000d0a15080 R12: ffff8880110a68c8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88800f51b400 R15: ffffffff814fec10
FS:  00007f87bc0dc780(0000) GS:ffff88803e600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffa0206000 CR3: 0000000010b70000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
 bpf_trampoline_update+0x25a/0x6b0
 __bpf_trampoline_link_prog+0x101/0x240
 bpf_trampoline_link_prog+0x2d/0x50
 bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x24c/0x530
 bpf_raw_tp_link_attach+0x73/0x1d0
 __sys_bpf+0x100e/0x2570
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x1c/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

With this patch, when modify_fentry or register_fentry returns -EAGAIN
from bpf_tramp_ftrace_ops_func, the pageattr of im->image will be reset
to nx+rw.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 00963a2e75a8 ("bpf: Support bpf_trampoline on functions with IPMODIFY (e.g. livepatch)")
Signed-off-by: Chuang Wang <nashuiliang@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221224133146.780578-1-nashuiliang@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Merge tag 'for-netdev' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf 2022-12-24T09:39:02+00:00 David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net 2022-12-24T09:39:02+00:00 be1236fce5f4ac94915cdca8c61bb6e0e1503b81 Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree. We've added 7 non-merge commits during the last 5 day(s) which contain a total of 11 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Fix a splat in bpf_skb_generic_pop() under CHECKSUM_PARTIAL due to misuse of skb_postpull_rcsum(), from Jakub Kicinski with test case from Martin Lau. 2) Fix BPF verifier's nullness propagation when registers are of type PTR_TO_BTF_ID, from Hao Sun. 3) Fix bpftool build for JIT disassembler under statically built libllvm, from Anton Protopopov. 4) Fix warnings reported by resolve_btfids when building vmlinux with CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK disabled, from Hou Tao. 5) Minor fix up for BPF selftest gitignore, from Stanislav Fomichev. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

We've added 7 non-merge commits during the last 5 day(s) which contain
a total of 11 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix a splat in bpf_skb_generic_pop() under CHECKSUM_PARTIAL due to
   misuse of skb_postpull_rcsum(), from Jakub Kicinski with test case
   from Martin Lau.

2) Fix BPF verifier's nullness propagation when registers are of
   type PTR_TO_BTF_ID, from Hao Sun.

3) Fix bpftool build for JIT disassembler under statically built
   libllvm, from Anton Protopopov.

4) Fix warnings reported by resolve_btfids when building vmlinux
   with CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK disabled, from Hou Tao.

5) Minor fix up for BPF selftest gitignore, from Stanislav Fomichev.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
bpf: fix nullness propagation for reg to reg comparisons 2022-12-23T01:19:06+00:00 Hao Sun sunhao.th@gmail.com 2022-12-22T02:44:13+00:00 8374bfd5a3c90a5b250f7c087c4d2b8ac467b12e After befae75856ab, the verifier would propagate null information after JEQ/JNE, e.g., if two pointers, one is maybe_null and the other is not, the former would be marked as non-null in eq path. However, as comment "PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does not need to be null checked by the BPF program ... The verifier must keep this in mind and can make no assumptions about null or non-null when doing branch ...". If one pointer is maybe_null and the other is PTR_TO_BTF, the former is incorrectly marked non-null. The following BPF prog can trigger a null-ptr-deref, also see this report for more details[1]: 0: (18) r1 = map_fd ; R1_w=map_ptr(ks=4, vs=4) 2: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8) ; R6_w=bpf_map->inner_map_data ; R6 is PTR_TO_BTF_ID ; equals to null at runtime 3: (bf) r2 = r10 4: (07) r2 += -4 5: (62) *(u32 *)(r2 +0) = 0 6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 ; R0_w=map_value_or_null 7: (1d) if r6 == r0 goto pc+1 8: (95) exit ; from 7 to 9: R0=map_value R6=ptr_bpf_map 9: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) ; null-ptr-deref 10: (95) exit So, make the verifier propagate nullness information for reg to reg comparisons only if neither reg is PTR_TO_BTF_ID. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaFJwjC5oiw-1KXvcazywodwXo4zGYsRHwbr2gSG9WcSw@mail.gmail.com/T/#u Fixes: befae75856ab ("bpf: propagate nullness information for reg to reg comparisons") Signed-off-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222024414.29539-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> 
After befae75856ab, the verifier would propagate null information after
JEQ/JNE, e.g., if two pointers, one is maybe_null and the other is not,
the former would be marked as non-null in eq path. However, as comment
"PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to a kernel struct that does not need to be null
checked by the BPF program ... The verifier must keep this in mind and
can make no assumptions about null or non-null when doing branch ...".
If one pointer is maybe_null and the other is PTR_TO_BTF, the former is
incorrectly marked non-null. The following BPF prog can trigger a
null-ptr-deref, also see this report for more details[1]:

	0: (18) r1 = map_fd	        ; R1_w=map_ptr(ks=4, vs=4)
	2: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8)    ; R6_w=bpf_map->inner_map_data
					; R6 is PTR_TO_BTF_ID
					; equals to null at runtime
	3: (bf) r2 = r10
	4: (07) r2 += -4
	5: (62) *(u32 *)(r2 +0) = 0
	6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1    ; R0_w=map_value_or_null
	7: (1d) if r6 == r0 goto pc+1
	8: (95) exit
	; from 7 to 9: R0=map_value R6=ptr_bpf_map
	9: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0)          ; null-ptr-deref
	10: (95) exit

So, make the verifier propagate nullness information for reg to reg
comparisons only if neither reg is PTR_TO_BTF_ID.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaFJwjC5oiw-1KXvcazywodwXo4zGYsRHwbr2gSG9WcSw@mail.gmail.com/T/#u

Fixes: befae75856ab ("bpf: propagate nullness information for reg to reg comparisons")
Signed-off-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221222024414.29539-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>