linux.git/kernel/bpf/verifier.c, branch v7.2

bpf: Propagate untrusted pointer state in commuted arithmetic

2026-07-31T19:45:28+00:00

The untrusted PTR_TO_MEM early return skips pointer offset tracking
because accesses go through probe-read handling. Moving it after full
pointer-state propagation ensures scalar += untrusted_pointer leaves the
destination as PTR_TO_MEM instead of an unrelated scalar.

Fixes: f2362a57aeff ("bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast()")
Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen 
Tested-by: Daniel Wade 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729-c3-035-public-bpf-v4-v4-3-8ee297e2346b@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman

bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic

2026-07-31T19:45:21+00:00

When scalar += pointer is handled in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(), the
destination register inherits the pointer state from the source pointer.
Copying only selected fields is fragile because pointer provenance is
tracked by several bpf_reg_state fields.

Use the caller's temporary offset register to preserve the scalar operand
while replacing the destination with the full pointer state. This preserves
the frame number for PTR_TO_STACK registers and keeps parent identity
fields consistent.

Fixes: f4d7e40a5b71 ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen 
Tested-by: Daniel Wade 
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729-c3-035-public-bpf-v4-v4-2-8ee297e2346b@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman

bpf: Simplify sanitize_err() signature

2026-07-31T19:44:06+00:00

The sanitize_err() function is called when:
- ptr += scalar
- scalar += ptr
- scalar += scalar
ALU operations are processed.

This commit drops offset and pointer registers parameters from its
signature to simplify the follow-up changes for 'scalar += ptr' case.
regs[src].type is safe to access, as it is not mutated by the callers.

Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen 
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729-c3-035-public-bpf-v4-v4-1-8ee297e2346b@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman

bpf: Reject passing scalar NULL to nonnull arg of a global subprog

2026-07-23T23:09:07+00:00

A global subprogram argument tagged __arg_nonnull is set up as a
non-nullable PTR_TO_MEM. However the verifier does not check against a
scalar NULL, leading to real NULL pointer dereference. Reject it as
well.

Fixes: 94e1c70a3452 ("bpf: support 'arg:xxx' btf_decl_tag-based hints for global subprog args")
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung 
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260723221815.367797-1-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman

bpf: Fix tracing of kfuncs with implicit args

2026-07-16T23:11:29+00:00

A kfunc marked with KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS flag takes implicit arguments
(such as bpf_prog_aux) that the verifier injects at load time.
resolve_btfids strips those from the kfunc's BTF-visible prototype and
keeps the real kernel ABI in a counterpart _impl prototype [1].

fentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession programs may attach to the BPF kernel
functions, including those with implicit args. However
bpf_check_attach_target() and bpf_check_attach_btf_id_multi() extract
the struct btf_func_model from the wrong BTF prototype of the
kfunc. The btf_func_model is later read to construct the trampoline,
which then causes the injected implicit argument to be clobbered and
the kfunc dereferencing garbage.

Add btf_attach_func_proto() to resolve the real ABI prototype of the
kfunc the way the call site does: by looking up the _impl prototype
for a KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS kfunc. Use it at both attach-target model
construction sites.

To enable this, make two supporting changes:
  * pass bpf_verifier_log instead of bpf_verifier_env to
    find_kfunc_impl_proto(), so it can be reused from the attach path
  * add btf_kfunc_check_flag() to test a flag across all of a kfunc's
    hook sets, because a program attaching to a kfunc is not in the
    kfunc's call-set

KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS must be consistent across the sets, so
btf_kfunc_check_flag() returns -EINVAL on inconsistency.

btf_kfunc_check_flag() reads the kfunc's flags from the target's
kfunc_set_tab. For a module BTF that table is stable only after the
module is live, so take a module reference around the read, mirroring
how the kfunc call path gates the same lookup with btf_try_get_module().

The remaining call sites of btf_distill_func_proto() are safe as
is. The BPF_TRACE_ITER case distills a registered iterator's
prototype, and bpf_struct_ops_desc_init() distills the
function-pointer members of a struct_ops type. Neither is a kfunc, and
so can't have implicit arguments.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260120222638.3976562-1-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev/

Fixes: 64e1360524b9 ("bpf: Verifier support for KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS")
Reported-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai 
Link: https://github.com/sched-ext/scx/issues/3687#issuecomment-4906694106
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713235223.1639022-2-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman

bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers

2026-07-15T09:32:42+00:00

The verifier rejects variable offsets for PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF
accesses, but it currently accepts a constant negative offset produced by
pointer arithmetic.

Commit 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for
pointers") moved constant pointer offsets from reg->off to reg->var_off.
However, __check_buffer_access() continued to check only the instruction
offset. An access with reg->var_off equal to -8 and an instruction offset
of zero therefore passes verification.

For writable raw tracepoints, the access end is also calculated from the
unsigned reg->var_off.value. An eight-byte access starting at -8 wraps
the calculated end to zero, allowing the program to load and attach
without increasing max_tp_access.

After ensuring that reg->var_off is constant, calculate the effective
access start using signed arithmetic and reject it when it is negative.
Use the validated start to calculate the access end for both
PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF.

Fixes: 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers")
Signed-off-by: Sun Jian 
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.2.0
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714093846.18159-2-sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman

bpf: Fix insn_aux_data leak on verifier err_free_env path

2026-06-26T01:23:56+00:00

When bpf_check() allocates env->insn_aux_data successfully but later
fails to allocate env->succ, it jumps directly to err_free_env.

The existing vfree(env->insn_aux_data) sits before the err_free_env
label, so that direct jump bypasses it and leaks insn_aux_data.

Move vfree(env->insn_aux_data) into err_free_env so all early and late
exit paths release it consistently.

Fixes: 2f69c5685427 ("bpf: make bpf_insn_successors to return a pointer")
Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan 
Reviewed-by: Anton Protopopov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260624123536.114757-1-kafai.wan@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: Reject offset refcount acquire arguments

2026-06-26T00:51:20+00:00

bpf_refcount_acquire() increments the refcount at the caller-supplied
pointer plus the refcount field offset, then returns the caller-supplied
pointer unchanged.

The verifier records the return value as a base pointer to the refcounted
object.

bpf_list_pop_front() and bpf_rbtree_remove() can return embedded
graph-node pointers as PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC with a fixed offset equal
to the node field offset. Passing such a pointer directly to
bpf_refcount_acquire() currently passes the refcounted-kptr type check.

That makes the runtime operation start from base + node_off while the
verifier models the returned pointer as the object base.

Require refcount-acquire arguments to have zero fixed offset by carrying
the requirement through check_func_arg_reg_off() to __check_ptr_off_reg().
Programs can still acquire a refcount from a graph-node-derived pointer
after normalizing it with container_of().

Fixes: 7c50b1cb76aca ("bpf: Add bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc")
Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen 
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman 
Acked-by: Yonghong Song 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2f894647f56f71838fdddeb97a3e057ed35ea92e.1782192383.git.chenyy23@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: Reset register bounds before narrowing retval range in check_mem_access()

2026-06-23T00:11:46+00:00

When the BPF verifier processes a context load of an LSM hook return
value, it calls __mark_reg_s32_range() to narrow the register to the
hook's valid range. However, __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects the new
range with the register's existing bounds using max_t()/min_t() rather
than replacing them.

If the destination register carries stale bounds from a prior instruction
(e.g. BPF_MOV64_IMM), the intersection can produce a range narrower than
reality. The verifier then believes it knows the register's exact value,
while at runtime the actual hook return value is loaded, creating a
verifier/runtime mismatch that can be used to bypass BPF memory safety
checks.

The else branch already calls mark_reg_unknown() to reset register state
before any narrowing. Apply the same reset in the is_retval path so
stale bounds are cleared before __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects.

Fixes: 5d99e198be27 ("bpf, lsm: Add check for BPF LSM return value")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani 
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260622230123.3695446-2-tristmd@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: Emit verbose message when prog-specific btf_struct_access rejects a write

2026-06-22T00:58:49+00:00

When BPF_WRITE goes through a PTR_TO_BTF_ID register, check_ptr_to_btf_access()
delegates to env->ops->btf_struct_access(). Most implementations
(bpf_scx_btf_struct_access, tc_cls_act_btf_struct_access, etc.) return
-EACCES for disallowed fields without logging anything, so the verifier
rejects the program with an empty message. For example a scx program doing

  1: R1=trusted_ptr_task_struct()
  ...
  4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = r2
  verification time 83 usec
  the program is rejected

leaves the user guessing which field is off-limits.
Emit verbose message.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis 
Acked-by: Yonghong Song 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260615232146.5491-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov