<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/ipc, branch v3.8-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-12-18T18:55:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-18T18:55:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a2faf2fc534f57ba26bc4d613795236ed4f5fb1c'/>
<id>a2faf2fc534f57ba26bc4d613795236ed4f5fb1c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull (again) user namespace infrastructure changes from Eric Biederman:
 "Those bugs, those darn embarrasing bugs just want don't want to get
  fixed.

  Linus I just updated my mirror of your kernel.org tree and it appears
  you successfully pulled everything except the last 4 commits that fix
  those embarrasing bugs.

  When you get a chance can you please repull my branch"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  userns: Fix typo in description of the limitation of userns_install
  userns: Add a more complete capability subset test to commit_creds
  userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.
  Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull (again) user namespace infrastructure changes from Eric Biederman:
 "Those bugs, those darn embarrasing bugs just want don't want to get
  fixed.

  Linus I just updated my mirror of your kernel.org tree and it appears
  you successfully pulled everything except the last 4 commits that fix
  those embarrasing bugs.

  When you get a chance can you please repull my branch"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  userns: Fix typo in description of the limitation of userns_install
  userns: Add a more complete capability subset test to commit_creds
  userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.
  Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2012-12-17T23:44:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-17T23:44:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6a2b60b17b3e48a418695a94bd2420f6ab32e519'/>
<id>6a2b60b17b3e48a418695a94bd2420f6ab32e519</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
 "While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to
  containers in general and user namespaces in particular.  The user
  space interface is now complete.

  This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user
  namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces.
  The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from
  using cool new kernel features is broken.

  This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for
  the pid, user, mount namespaces.

  This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace
  cleanups/simplifications.  Of particular significance is the rework of
  the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out
  tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation.  At
  least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been converted from regular files
  to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS,
  ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is
  currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission
  checks are always applied.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers
  so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same
  namespaces.

  Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the
  permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user
  namespace root to usefully use the networking stack.  Similar changes
  for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my
  tree.

  Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn
  in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the
  /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ files in this tree.

  Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs,
  ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the
  Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from
  being built when any of those filesystems are enabled.

  Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial
  user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits)
  proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.
  proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.
  proc: Generalize proc inode allocation
  userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs
  userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file
  procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file
  userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
  userns: Implent proc namespace operations
  userns: Kill task_user_ns
  userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter
  userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces
  userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid.
  userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces.
  userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped
  userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure
  vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.
  vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces
  vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
 "While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to
  containers in general and user namespaces in particular.  The user
  space interface is now complete.

  This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user
  namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces.
  The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from
  using cool new kernel features is broken.

  This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for
  the pid, user, mount namespaces.

  This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace
  cleanups/simplifications.  Of particular significance is the rework of
  the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out
  tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation.  At
  least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been converted from regular files
  to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS,
  ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is
  currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission
  checks are always applied.

  The files under /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers
  so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same
  namespaces.

  Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the
  permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user
  namespace root to usefully use the networking stack.  Similar changes
  for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my
  tree.

  Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn
  in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the
  /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/ns/ files in this tree.

  Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs,
  ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the
  Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from
  being built when any of those filesystems are enabled.

  Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial
  user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits)
  proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.
  proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.
  proc: Generalize proc inode allocation
  userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs
  userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file
  procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file
  userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
  userns: Implent proc namespace operations
  userns: Kill task_user_ns
  userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter
  userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces
  userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid.
  userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation
  userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces.
  userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped
  userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure
  vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.
  vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces
  vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.</title>
<updated>2012-12-15T00:12:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-14T15:55:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5e4a08476b50fa39210fca82e03325cc46b9c235'/>
<id>5e4a08476b50fa39210fca82e03325cc46b9c235</id>
<content type='text'>
Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt; found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns.  With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.

However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.

Which made the following nasty sequence possible.

pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
	system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
	char path[PATH_MAX];
	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	setns(fd, 0);
	system("su -");
}

Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt; found a nasty little bug in
the permissions of setns.  With unprivileged user namespaces it
became possible to create new namespaces without privilege.

However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the user nameapce of the targed namespace.

Which made the following nasty sequence possible.

pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS);
if (pid == 0) { /* child */
	system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd");
}
else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */
	char path[PATH_MAX];
	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt");
	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
	setns(fd, 0);
	system("su -");
}

Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: support more pagesizes for MAP_HUGETLB/SHM_HUGETLB</title>
<updated>2012-12-12T01:22:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andi Kleen</name>
<email>ak@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-12T00:01:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=42d7395feb56f0655cd8b68e06fc6063823449f8'/>
<id>42d7395feb56f0655cd8b68e06fc6063823449f8</id>
<content type='text'>
There was some desire in large applications using MAP_HUGETLB or
SHM_HUGETLB to use 1GB huge pages on some mappings, and stay with 2MB on
others.  This is useful together with NUMA policy: use 2MB interleaving
on some mappings, but 1GB on local mappings.

This patch extends the IPC/SHM syscall interfaces slightly to allow
specifying the page size.

It borrows some upper bits in the existing flag arguments and allows
encoding the log of the desired page size in addition to the *_HUGETLB
flag.  When 0 is specified the default size is used, this makes the
change fully compatible.

Extending the internal hugetlb code to handle this is straight forward.
Instead of a single mount it just keeps an array of them and selects the
right mount based on the specified page size.  When no page size is
specified it uses the mount of the default page size.

The change is not visible in /proc/mounts because internal mounts don't
appear there.  It also has very little overhead: the additional mounts
just consume a super block, but not more memory when not used.

I also exported the new flags to the user headers (they were previously
under __KERNEL__).  Right now only symbols for x86 and some other
architecture for 1GB and 2MB are defined.  The interface should already
work for all other architectures though.  Only architectures that define
multiple hugetlb sizes actually need it (that is currently x86, tile,
powerpc).  However tile and powerpc have user configurable hugetlb
sizes, so it's not easy to add defines.  A program on those
architectures would need to query sysfs and use the appropiate log2.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[rientjes@google.com: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki &lt;kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;dhillf@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There was some desire in large applications using MAP_HUGETLB or
SHM_HUGETLB to use 1GB huge pages on some mappings, and stay with 2MB on
others.  This is useful together with NUMA policy: use 2MB interleaving
on some mappings, but 1GB on local mappings.

This patch extends the IPC/SHM syscall interfaces slightly to allow
specifying the page size.

It borrows some upper bits in the existing flag arguments and allows
encoding the log of the desired page size in addition to the *_HUGETLB
flag.  When 0 is specified the default size is used, this makes the
change fully compatible.

Extending the internal hugetlb code to handle this is straight forward.
Instead of a single mount it just keeps an array of them and selects the
right mount based on the specified page size.  When no page size is
specified it uses the mount of the default page size.

The change is not visible in /proc/mounts because internal mounts don't
appear there.  It also has very little overhead: the additional mounts
just consume a super block, but not more memory when not used.

I also exported the new flags to the user headers (they were previously
under __KERNEL__).  Right now only symbols for x86 and some other
architecture for 1GB and 2MB are defined.  The interface should already
work for all other architectures though.  Only architectures that define
multiple hugetlb sizes actually need it (that is currently x86, tile,
powerpc).  However tile and powerpc have user configurable hugetlb
sizes, so it's not easy to add defines.  A program on those
architectures would need to query sysfs and use the appropiate log2.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[rientjes@google.com: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki &lt;kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Hillf Danton &lt;dhillf@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T12:19:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-15T17:21:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=98f842e675f96ffac96e6c50315790912b2812be'/>
<id>98f842e675f96ffac96e6c50315790912b2812be</id>
<content type='text'>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.

A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.

This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.

We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.

I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that
inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc
inode for every namespace in proc.

A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test
to see if two processes are in the same namespace.

This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because
a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and
would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of
namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks
impossible.

We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which
appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and
migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors)
but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important.

I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so
their structures can be statically initialized.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T12:17:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-26T11:02:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bcf58e725ddc45d31addbc6627d4f0edccc824c1'/>
<id>bcf58e725ddc45d31addbc6627d4f0edccc824c1</id>
<content type='text'>
Modify create_new_namespaces to explicitly take a user namespace
parameter, instead of implicitly through the task_struct.

This allows an implementation of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) where
the new user namespace is not stored onto the current task_struct
until after all of the namespaces are created.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Modify create_new_namespaces to explicitly take a user namespace
parameter, instead of implicitly through the task_struct.

This allows an implementation of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) where
the new user namespace is not stored onto the current task_struct
until after all of the namespaces are created.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns.</title>
<updated>2012-11-20T12:17:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-26T08:13:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=142e1d1d5f088e7a38659daca6e84a730967774a'/>
<id>142e1d1d5f088e7a38659daca6e84a730967774a</id>
<content type='text'>
- Push the permission check from the core setns syscall into
  the setns install methods where the user namespace of the
  target namespace can be determined, and used in a ns_capable
  call.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
- Push the permission check from the core setns syscall into
  the setns install methods where the user namespace of the
  target namespace can be determined, and used in a ns_capable
  call.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: make audit_inode take struct filename</title>
<updated>2012-10-13T00:15:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-10T20:43:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=adb5c2473d3f91526c79db972aafb20a56d3fbb3'/>
<id>adb5c2473d3f91526c79db972aafb20a56d3fbb3</id>
<content type='text'>
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.

Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Keep a pointer to the audit_names "slot" in struct filename.

Have all of the audit_inode callers pass a struct filename ponter to
audit_inode instead of a string pointer. If the aname field is already
populated, then we can skip walking the list altogether and just use it
directly.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return it</title>
<updated>2012-10-13T00:14:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-10T19:25:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=91a27b2a756784714e924e5e854b919273082d26'/>
<id>91a27b2a756784714e924e5e854b919273082d26</id>
<content type='text'>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a
kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would
however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to
the string.

For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the
amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled,
we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not
need to recopy it from userspace.

This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return
a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the
string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it.

Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes
convenient.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: set the name_len in audit_inode for parent lookups</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T04:32:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-10T19:25:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bfcec7087458812f575d9022b2d151641f34ee84'/>
<id>bfcec7087458812f575d9022b2d151641f34ee84</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.

Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.

While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into
audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems
wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets
called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path
but has the parent inode info attached.

Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets
set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for
the audit entry correctly from the get-go.

While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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