Furthermore, it twiddles with the details of SKB list handling
directly, which we're trying to eliminate.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The Bluetooth source uses some endian conversion helpers, that in the end
translate to kernel standard routines. So remove this obfuscation since it
is fully pointless.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and
SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is
no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as
SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE.

Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this
actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends
on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your
existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of
course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place
is a security issue.

The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now
used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this
way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation
is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also
enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since
this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of
the authentication can't be guaranteed.

As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level
is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on
PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with
a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be
used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level
will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only
the HIGH security level will require this.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The L2CAP and RFCOMM applications require support for authorization
and the ability of rejecting incoming connection requests. The socket
interface is not really able to support this.

This patch does the ground work for a socket option to defer connection
setup. Setting this option allows calling of accept() and then the
first read() will trigger the final connection setup. Calling close()
would reject the connection.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

With the introduction of CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG it is possible to
allow debugging without having to recompile the kernel. This patch turns
all BT_DBG() calls into pr_debug() to support dynamic debug messages.

As a side effect all CONFIG_BT_*_DEBUG statements are now removed and
some broken debug entries have been fixed.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__

Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Enable the common timestamp functionality that the network subsystem
provides for L2CAP, RFCOMM and SCO sockets. It is possible to either
use SO_TIMESTAMP or the IOCTLs to retrieve the timestamp of the
current packet.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

hci_sock_cleanup() always returns 0 and its return value isn't used
anywhere in the code.

Compile-tested with 'make allyesconfig && make net/bluetooth/bluetooth.ko'

Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch converts the Bluetooth class devices into real devices. The
Bluetooth class is kept and the driver core provides the appropriate
symlinks for backward compatibility.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>