linux.git/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h, branch v6.1 Linux kernel source tree Merge tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2022-10-07T00:31:02+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2022-10-07T00:31:02+00:00 4c0ed7d8d6e3dc013c4599a837de84794baa5b62 Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro: "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *" * tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: ecryptfs: constify path spufs: constify path nd_jump_link(): constify path audit_init_parent(): constify path __io_setxattr(): constify path do_proc_readlink(): constify path overlayfs: constify path fs/notify: constify path may_linkat(): constify path do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM... 
Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro:
 "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *"

* tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  ecryptfs: constify path
  spufs: constify path
  nd_jump_link(): constify path
  audit_init_parent(): constify path
  __io_setxattr(): constify path
  do_proc_readlink(): constify path
  overlayfs: constify path
  fs/notify: constify path
  may_linkat(): constify path
  do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path
  ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm 2022-10-04T00:51:52+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2022-10-04T00:51:52+00:00 26b84401da8458c5cbd6818d5732f7bbb84124a2 Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: "Seven patches for the LSM layer and we've got a mix of trivial and significant patches. Highlights below, starting with the smaller bits first so they don't get lost in the discussion of the larger items: - Remove some redundant NULL pointer checks in the common LSM audit code. - Ratelimit the lockdown LSM's access denial messages. With this change there is a chance that the last visible lockdown message on the console is outdated/old, but it does help preserve the initial series of lockdown denials that started the denial message flood and my gut feeling is that these might be the more valuable messages. - Open userfaultfds as readonly instead of read/write. While this code obviously lives outside the LSM, it does have a noticeable impact on the LSMs with Ondrej explaining the situation in the commit description. It is worth noting that this patch languished on the VFS list for over a year without any comments (objections or otherwise) so I took the liberty of pulling it into the LSM tree after giving fair notice. It has been in linux-next since the end of August without any noticeable problems. - Add a LSM hook for user namespace creation, with implementations for both the BPF LSM and SELinux. Even though the changes are fairly small, this is the bulk of the diffstat as we are also including BPF LSM selftests for the new hook. It's also the most contentious of the changes in this pull request with Eric Biederman NACK'ing the LSM hook multiple times during its development and discussion upstream. While I've never taken NACK's lightly, I'm sending these patches to you because it is my belief that they are of good quality, satisfy a long-standing need of users and distros, and are in keeping with the existing nature of the LSM layer and the Linux Kernel as a whole. The patches in implement a LSM hook for user namespace creation that allows for a granular approach, configurable at runtime, which enables both monitoring and control of user namespaces. The general consensus has been that this is far preferable to the other solutions that have been adopted downstream including outright removal from the kernel, disabling via system wide sysctls, or various other out-of-tree mechanisms that users have been forced to adopt since we haven't been able to provide them an upstream solution for their requests. Eric has been steadfast in his objections to this LSM hook, explaining that any restrictions on the user namespace could have significant impact on userspace. While there is the possibility of impacting userspace, it is important to note that this solution only impacts userspace when it is requested based on the runtime configuration supplied by the distro/admin/user. Frederick (the pathset author), the LSM/security community, and myself have tried to work with Eric during development of this patchset to find a mutually acceptable solution, but Eric's approach and unwillingness to engage in a meaningful way have made this impossible. I have CC'd Eric directly on this pull request so he has a chance to provide his side of the story; there have been no objections outside of Eric's" * tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lockdown: ratelimit denial messages userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY selinux: Implement userns_create hook selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() lsm: clean up redundant NULL pointer check 
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
 "Seven patches for the LSM layer and we've got a mix of trivial and
  significant patches. Highlights below, starting with the smaller bits
  first so they don't get lost in the discussion of the larger items:

   - Remove some redundant NULL pointer checks in the common LSM audit
     code.

   - Ratelimit the lockdown LSM's access denial messages.

     With this change there is a chance that the last visible lockdown
     message on the console is outdated/old, but it does help preserve
     the initial series of lockdown denials that started the denial
     message flood and my gut feeling is that these might be the more
     valuable messages.

   - Open userfaultfds as readonly instead of read/write.

     While this code obviously lives outside the LSM, it does have a
     noticeable impact on the LSMs with Ondrej explaining the situation
     in the commit description. It is worth noting that this patch
     languished on the VFS list for over a year without any comments
     (objections or otherwise) so I took the liberty of pulling it into
     the LSM tree after giving fair notice. It has been in linux-next
     since the end of August without any noticeable problems.

   - Add a LSM hook for user namespace creation, with implementations
     for both the BPF LSM and SELinux.

     Even though the changes are fairly small, this is the bulk of the
     diffstat as we are also including BPF LSM selftests for the new
     hook.

     It's also the most contentious of the changes in this pull request
     with Eric Biederman NACK'ing the LSM hook multiple times during its
     development and discussion upstream. While I've never taken NACK's
     lightly, I'm sending these patches to you because it is my belief
     that they are of good quality, satisfy a long-standing need of
     users and distros, and are in keeping with the existing nature of
     the LSM layer and the Linux Kernel as a whole.

     The patches in implement a LSM hook for user namespace creation
     that allows for a granular approach, configurable at runtime, which
     enables both monitoring and control of user namespaces. The general
     consensus has been that this is far preferable to the other
     solutions that have been adopted downstream including outright
     removal from the kernel, disabling via system wide sysctls, or
     various other out-of-tree mechanisms that users have been forced to
     adopt since we haven't been able to provide them an upstream
     solution for their requests. Eric has been steadfast in his
     objections to this LSM hook, explaining that any restrictions on
     the user namespace could have significant impact on userspace.
     While there is the possibility of impacting userspace, it is
     important to note that this solution only impacts userspace when it
     is requested based on the runtime configuration supplied by the
     distro/admin/user. Frederick (the pathset author), the LSM/security
     community, and myself have tried to work with Eric during
     development of this patchset to find a mutually acceptable
     solution, but Eric's approach and unwillingness to engage in a
     meaningful way have made this impossible. I have CC'd Eric directly
     on this pull request so he has a chance to provide his side of the
     story; there have been no objections outside of Eric's"

* tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  lockdown: ratelimit denial messages
  userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY
  selinux: Implement userns_create hook
  selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook
  bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable
  security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
  lsm: clean up redundant NULL pointer check
->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM... 2022-09-01T21:34:39+00:00 Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk 2022-01-31T00:57:52+00:00 c8e477c649b40c1a073b7a843d89e51dc0037db7 cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is allowed to modify its contents. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> 
cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is
allowed to modify its contents.

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op 2022-08-26T15:19:43+00:00 Luis Chamberlain mcgrof@kernel.org 2022-07-15T19:16:22+00:00 2a5840124009f133bd09fd855963551fb2cefe22 io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details. This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file operation. [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring:
add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct
file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use
to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command
passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details.

This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something
conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file
operation.

[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() 2022-08-16T21:32:46+00:00 Frederick Lawler fred@cloudflare.com 2022-08-15T16:20:25+00:00 7cd4c5c2101cb092db00f61f69d24380cf7a0ee8 User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform some exploit. [1,2,3] While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched. Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in order of granularity: 1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl 2. Distro specific patch(es) 3. CONFIG_USER_NS To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and it is called before create_user_ns(): cred = prepare_creds() security_prepare_creds() call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ... if (cred) create_user_ns(cred) Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4] Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the hook returns any non-zero error code. This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack. Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome. Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an accompanying userns_create LSM hook. With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or administrators. This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials, otherwise an error is returned. Links: 1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492 2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636 3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918 4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/ Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with
permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User
namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers
sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform
some exploit. [1,2,3]

While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which
causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to
more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this
functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched.

Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in
order of granularity:

        1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl
        2. Distro specific patch(es)
        3. CONFIG_USER_NS

To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a
decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and
it is called before create_user_ns():

        cred = prepare_creds()
                security_prepare_creds()
                        call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
        if (cred)
                create_user_ns(cred)

Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare
credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4]
Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the
hook returns any non-zero error code.

This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to
access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER
call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack.

Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook
further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome.
Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an
accompanying userns_create LSM hook.

With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the
observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users
should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as
usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or
administrators.

This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy
against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials,
otherwise an error is returned.

Links:
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492
2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636
3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918
4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall 2022-07-15T18:21:49+00:00 Micah Morton mortonm@chromium.org 2022-06-08T20:57:11+00:00 fcfe0ac2fcfae7d5fcad3d0375cb8ff38caf8aba Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls. The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> 
Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There
are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls.
The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are
allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print
statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it
gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE 2022-05-23T11:27:58+00:00 Mickaël Salaün mic@digikod.net 2022-05-06T16:10:56+00:00 100f59d964050020285f0c8264ce520f0c406c13 In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the rename flags to LSMs. This may also improve performance because of the switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock, reduce the number of path walks). AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change. This should not change the current behavior (same check order), except (different level of) speed boosts. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221212522.320243-1-mic@digikod.net Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-7-mic@digikod.net 
In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and
RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the
rename flags to LSMs.  This may also improve performance because of the
switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs
using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock,
reduce the number of path walks).

AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change.  This
should not change the current behavior (same check order), except
(different level of) speed boosts.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221212522.320243-1-mic@digikod.net

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-7-mic@digikod.net
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux 2022-03-22T03:47:54+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2022-03-22T03:47:54+00:00 c269497d248e43558aafc6b3f87b49d4dd3c2713 Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got a number of SELinux patches queued up, the highlights are: - Fixup the security_fs_context_parse_param() LSM hook so it executes all of the LSM hook implementations unless a serious error occurs. We also correct the SELinux hook implementation so that it returns zero on success. - In addition to a few SELinux mount option parsing fixes, we simplified the parsing by moving it earlier in the process. The logic was that it was unlikely an admin/user would use the new mount API and not have the policy loaded before passing the SELinux options. - Properly fixed the LSM/SELinux/SCTP hooks with the addition of the security_sctp_assoc_established() hook. This work was done in conjunction with the netdev folks and should complete the move of the SCTP labeling from the endpoints to the associations. - Fixed a variety of sparse warnings caused by changes in the "__rcu" markings of some core kernel structures. - Ensure we access the superblock's LSM security blob using the stacking-safe accessors. - Added the ability for the kernel to always allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX if the "ioctl_skip_cloexec" policy capability is specified. - Various constifications improvements, type casting improvements, additional return value checks, and dead code/parameter removal. - Documentation fixes" * tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (23 commits) selinux: shorten the policy capability enum names docs: fix 'make htmldocs' warning in SCTP.rst selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability selinux: use correct type for context length selinux: drop return statement at end of void functions security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux security: add sctp_assoc_established hook selinux: parse contexts for mount options early selinux: various sparse fixes selinux: try to use preparsed sid before calling parse_sid() selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat() LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param selinux: fix a type cast problem in cred_init_security() selinux: drop unused macro selinux: simplify cred_init_security selinux: do not discard const qualifier in cast selinux: drop unused parameter of avtab_insert_node selinux: drop cast to same type selinux: enclose macro arguments in parenthesis selinux: declare name parameter of hash_eval const ... 
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "We've got a number of SELinux patches queued up, the highlights are:

   - Fixup the security_fs_context_parse_param() LSM hook so it executes
     all of the LSM hook implementations unless a serious error occurs.

     We also correct the SELinux hook implementation so that it returns
     zero on success.

   - In addition to a few SELinux mount option parsing fixes, we
     simplified the parsing by moving it earlier in the process.

     The logic was that it was unlikely an admin/user would use the new
     mount API and not have the policy loaded before passing the SELinux
     options.

   - Properly fixed the LSM/SELinux/SCTP hooks with the addition of the
     security_sctp_assoc_established() hook.

     This work was done in conjunction with the netdev folks and should
     complete the move of the SCTP labeling from the endpoints to the
     associations.

   - Fixed a variety of sparse warnings caused by changes in the "__rcu"
     markings of some core kernel structures.

   - Ensure we access the superblock's LSM security blob using the
     stacking-safe accessors.

   - Added the ability for the kernel to always allow FIOCLEX and
     FIONCLEX if the "ioctl_skip_cloexec" policy capability is
     specified.

   - Various constifications improvements, type casting improvements,
     additional return value checks, and dead code/parameter removal.

   - Documentation fixes"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (23 commits)
  selinux: shorten the policy capability enum names
  docs: fix 'make htmldocs' warning in SCTP.rst
  selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability
  selinux: use correct type for context length
  selinux: drop return statement at end of void functions
  security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux
  security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
  selinux: parse contexts for mount options early
  selinux: various sparse fixes
  selinux: try to use preparsed sid before calling parse_sid()
  selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()
  LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param
  selinux: fix a type cast problem in cred_init_security()
  selinux: drop unused macro
  selinux: simplify cred_init_security
  selinux: do not discard const qualifier in cast
  selinux: drop unused parameter of avtab_insert_node
  selinux: drop cast to same type
  selinux: enclose macro arguments in parenthesis
  selinux: declare name parameter of hash_eval const
  ...
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook 2022-02-15T20:03:38+00:00 Ondrej Mosnacek omosnace@redhat.com 2022-02-12T17:59:21+00:00 5e50f5d4ff31e95599d695df1f0a4e7d2d6fef99 security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace security_inet_conn_established() called in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.

Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Merge tag 'fixes-v5.17-lsm-ceph-null' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2022-01-29T06:52:27+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2022-01-29T06:52:27+00:00 d1e7f0919ea84911e2ab965418cd502ba6a906e1 Pull security sybsystem fix from James Morris: "Fix NULL pointer crash in LSM via Ceph, from Vivek Goyal" * tag 'fixes-v5.17-lsm-ceph-null' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration 
Pull security sybsystem fix from James Morris:
 "Fix NULL pointer crash in LSM via Ceph, from Vivek Goyal"

* tag 'fixes-v5.17-lsm-ceph-null' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration